JUAN TOLENTINO ET AL., PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. CLODOALDO VITUG ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

The spouses Manuel Tolentino and Pascuala Ycban died, the latter dying
earlier than the former, and were survived by four children named Santiago,
Genoveva, Dolores, and Remigia. Santiago, Genoveva, and Dolores married, and on
their death, they were survived by their respective descendants. Remigia was
married to Vicente Rivera, with whom she had a son named Guillermo Rivera.
Guillermo Rivera married Felipa Vitug with whom he had five children named
Victor, Romualdo, Antonia, Pelagia, and Geronima, all surnamed Rivera.

After the death of Manuel Tolentino, which occurred in 1876, his property
remained pro indiviso in the care and administration of his children. In 1889,
certain disputes arose between Ancleto Yuson, husband of Dolores Tolentino, and
the rest of the coheirs, and for this reason and on petition of Anacleto Yuson,
an inventory was made of the property left by Manuel Tolentino, which property
is described in paragraph 5 of the amended complaint, and by order of the Court
of First Instance of Pampanga, said property was placed under the control of
Licerio Flores. In 1895, said court appointed Julian Vitug to substitute Lucerio
Flores in the management of the property. As such trustee, Julian Vitug took
possession of the property. Upon the death of Julian Vitug on February 6, 1903,
the control over the property was transferred to his children Felipa and
Clodoaldo and to his grandchildren, the children of Felipa.

In this case, the plaintiffs, the descendants and heirs of Santiago,
Genoveva, and Dolores Tolentino, ask that they be declared owners of the
property described in the complaint and that they be paid the value of the
fruits and products of the same. The defendants Clodoaldo Vitug, Felipa Vitug,
and her children Victor, Romualdo, Antonia, Pelagia, and Geronima deny the fact
of being mere trustees of the property and allege, as their principal defense,
that each and all of them have been in possession of the property in question
for more than ten years, such possession being public, continuous, under a claim
of title, exclusive of any other right and adverse to all other claimants, in
good faith and with just title, and that therefore the plaintiffs’ action has
prescribed.

On December 10, 1912, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga for the recovery of the property in question, but said
complaint was, on June 22, 1914, dismissed without a consideration on the merits
of the case. On October 15, 1914, the plaintiffs again brought the same action
by virtue of a complaint which gave rise to the cause which is now before this
court on appeal.

It is fully proven that in the year 1895, the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga appointed Julian Vitug trustee of the property of Manuel Tolentino,,
described in paragraph 5 of the amended complaint; that said Vitug accepted the
trust, took the corresponding oath, and received the property. All of these
facts are shown in Exhibit 1 which is a certified official copy of all
proceedings had with relation to the trust over the property. This exhibit was
duly authenticated at the trial and admitted by the court after sufficient
evidence was introduced to show that the originals were burned during the
revolution.

The acceptance of this trust by Julian Vitug and the receipt by him of the
property as such trustee have the weight of an admission on his part that the
property so received by him did not belong to him but to the heirs of Manuel
Tolentino.

Of the 17 parcels sought to be recovered in the complaint, those marked 3, 5,
13, 14, and 15 are in the possession of the defendant Clodoaldo Vitug. The other
defendants, a mother and her children, possess the remaining parcels. All of the
defendants allege that they have inherited this property from Julian Vitug, with
the exception of the parcels, the title to which (Exhibits 1, 2, 10),, is
derived from her mother-in-law Remigia Tolentino, according to the defendant
Felipa Vitug. However, upon examination of these exhibits, it is seen that they
do not refer to the lands claimed by the plaintiffs. The land described on
Exhibit 2 does not agree in description with any of the parcels claimed.
Moreover, Exhibit 2 is not a title in the name of Remigia Tolentino, but a
contract of sale in favor of Julian Vitug. The lands described in Exhibit 10 are
included in Exhibit 1. Exhibit 1 is, in fact, a composition title with the
State, issued in 1889 in favor of Remigia Tolentino. But, the description of the
lands included in this exhibit does not coincide with that of any of the parcels
claimed in the complaint. Moreover, it appears that in 1895 Remigia Tolentino
intervened partly in the judicial proceedings had with regard to the trust over
the property in question in favor of Julian Vitug. If any of the property given
in trust to said Vitug was included in her composition title with the State, she
would, undoubtedly, have protested against said trust; but it appears that she
has not done that. We therefore arrive at the conclusion that the title to all
the parcels claimed in the complaint and possessed by the defendants was derived
from Julian Vitug. If, on the other hand, Julian Vitug was not the owner of
these lands, he could not transmit the title to said lands to the defendants nor
could the latter receive from the former any right to the same.

The principal
defense relied upon by the defendants in this case is that of prescription. We
believe however that this defense is not supported by the evidence.

Because
Julian Vitug was a mere administrator and trustee of the property, his
possession in such capacity was not adverse but was only in the name and in
behalf of the owners of the same property, the heirs of Manuel Tolentino. The
records do not show that Vitug has ever repudiated the trust or has expressed
any claim of ownership over the property. His possession was not a possession
for himself, but for the owner. As to him it did not amount to possession as
owner. It could not, therefore, be a ground for prescription, neither can his
heirs, the defendants, now take advantage of such possession for the purpose of
the prescription which they allege. For this reason, the time for prescription
alleged by the defendants can be computed only from the date of the death of
Julian Vitug, that is, from February 8, 1903.

We have reached the foregoing conclusions, notwithstanding the allegation of
the defendants that they took possession of these lands before the death of
Julian Vitug. Clodoaldo Vitug testified that his father delivered to him the
parcels which he now possesses, in order to cultivate them. He does not say that
such lands were delivered to and received by him as his own. His possession,
therefore, during the lifetime of his father, was nothing but the possession
which he had as a mere administrator or trustee. Felipa Vitug on her part stated
that she received the remaining parcels as her share thirty years before she
gave her testimony (1915). But this testimony can not be true or at most refers
to other lands, inasmuch as Julian Vitug came into possession of said land only
since 1895, when they were intrusted to him.

Since February 8, 1903, the date of Julian Vitug’s death, till December 10,
1912, when the plaintiffs presented for the first time in the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga a complaint for the recovery of the property in question, a
period of ten years has not elapsed. Hence, the plaintiffs still have the right
to bring said action (section 40, Code of Civil Procedure), and the defendants
have not as yet acquired a title by prescription to said lands (section 41,
id.). When said complaint was dismissed on July 22, 1914, ten years had already
elapsed, but, in view of the fact that the dismissal of the complaint was had
without any consideration of the merits of the case, the plaintiffs still have
one year from said date of dismissal within which to bring a new action (section
49, id.). The plaintiffs having brought this new action, which is now the object
of this appeal, on October 5, 1914, within the said period of one year, it can
not be claimed that their action to recover the property in question has
prescribed.

The plaintiffs also seek to recover from the defendants the sum of P185,000
representing the value of the products of the property in litigation. This claim
can not be considered favorably except under the supposition that the defendants
were the possessors in bad faith, but the evidence does not establish this
assumption. Good faith is presumed in every possessor. The only circumstance
which tends to refute this presumption is that testified to by Luciano Vitug to
the effect that the defendant Clodoaldo Vitug was present when his father Julian
Vitug received in trust the property in question. Clodoaldo denies this fact,
and we doubt seriously the truth of Luciano Vitug’s testimony, not only because
of his antecedents as proved in the case which unfavorably affect his veracity,
but also because of the enmity existing between him and the defendant Clodoaldo,
and also because of the special interest he has shown in this cause against the
defendants. The same witness testified that, on the death of Julian Vitug, he
(witness) went with Juan Tolentino, one of the plaintiffs to request Clodoaldo
Vitug to return the lands in question, but that said Clodoaldo Vitug flatly
refused to do so, alleging that he had inherited them from his father. This
circumstance shows that Clodoaldo Vitug did not admit the fact that the property
had been intrusted to the care of his father. On the other hand, the complete
failure of the plaintiffs to bring an action in the defense of their rights to
the property—they having made no effort whatsoever till December 10, 1910, when
they presented for the first time their complaint for the recovery of this
property—might have, with reason, strengthened the belief of the defendants that
they have lawfully inherited the property from Julian Vitug, and that the
plaintiffs were not in any way entitled thereto.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, we hold that the defendants are
possessors in good faith, and that, therefore, the fruits they have collected
belong to them.

On the other hand, there is no evidence of what the fruits collected by the
defendants were and of their value, and although three witnesses testified as to
what tyiese lands could produce, nevertheless their statements are conflicting
and show that their estimates are not well founded.

The lower court accepted as proved the fact that the property in question was
held in trust by Julian Vitug, but declared that said Vitug was the owner of the
property, and further stated that, even if said Vitug were not the owner, the
plaintiff’s action has already prescribed, and for these reasons the said court
absolved the defendants from the complaint.

In view, however, of the foregoing considerations it follows that the
judgment of the lower court Should be reversed, and that the property in
question belongs to the heirs of Manuel Tolentino.

It, however, appears that the plaintiffs are not the only ones interested in
the property, because the defendants Felipa Vitug and her children Victor,
Romualdo, Antonia, Pelagia, and Geronima, have also an interest in said
property, they being heirs of Manuel Tolentino. In view of the fact that some of
the plaintiffs are minors, it follows that they can not partition the property
among themselves without the intervention of the court. The prayer of the
complaint does not include the delivery of the property to the plaintiffs, and
in fact this delivery can not be made, because the property is held pro
indiviso, and also because the plaintiffs are not the only ones interested
therein.

With a reversal of the judgment appealed from, we hereby hold that the
property described in the complaint belongs to the heirs of Manuel Tolentino,
and without prejudice to the rights of the defendants Felipa Vitug and her
children, Victor, Romualdo, Antonia, Pelagia, and Geronima, as heirs of Manuel
Tolentino, it is hereby ordered that the property be delivered by the defendants
to the one who may duly represent all of the interested parties or to the
administrator of the estate of Manuel Tolentino, upon his appointment and
qualification. The defendants are hereby absolved from the other prayer of the
complaint, without any special finding as to costs. So ordered.

Torres, Johnson, Street, Malcolm, and Fisher, J.,
concur.