AMBROSIO GABIO, ET AL., PETITIONERS AND APPELLANTS, VS. RODOLFO GANZON, ET AL., RESPONDENTS AND APPELLEES.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo
dismissing the petition filed by Ambrosio Gabio, Igmedio Mesa and
Teopista Palma to declare void the order of City Mayor of Iloilo,
Rodolfo Ganzon, dated January 6, 1956, dismissing them as temporary
corporal Motor Vehicle Squad, temporary patrolman and temporary
corporal policewoman, respectively, of the Police Force of the City of
Iloilo.

Appellant Gabio was first appointed as temporary
patrolman in the Police Force of the City of Iloilo on December 1, 1945
(Exh. W) under Sec. 16 of Commonwealth Act No. 177. Another appointment
as temporary patrolman was extended to him on October 1, 1946 (Exh. X)
; another as temporary patrolman on December 4, 1946 (Exh. Y) ; another
as temporary corporal (Motor Vehicle Squad) on October 26, 1948 (Exh.
Z) ; another as temporary corporal (Motor Vehicle Squad) on January 2,
1949 (Exh. AA); and finally, as temporary corporal (Motor Vehicle Squad
on October 5, 1950 (Exh. BB). All said appointments contained a
notation that the appointment was authorized under Sec. 682 of the
Revised Administrative Code, the appointee to continue until replaced
by an eligible but net beyond thirty (30) days from receipt of the
certification of eligibles.

Appellant Mesa was originally
appointed as temporary patrolman in the Police Force of the City of
Iloilo on November 1, 1945 (Exh. L) under Sec. 16 of Commonwealth Act
No. 177, followed by a series of re-appointments to the same position
on May, 1, 1946 (Exh. M), December 4, 1946 (Exh. N), October 26, 1948
(Exh. O), October 5, 1950 (Exh. P) and, finally, on July 28, 1951 (Exh.
Q). All his appointments, except those of November 1, 1945 and October
26, 1948, contained notations by the Commissioner of Civil Service that
they were authorized under Sec. 682 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the appointee to continue until replaced by an eligible, but not beyond
thirty (30) days from receipt of the certification of eligibles.

Appellant Palma was first appointed as temporary corporal in the Police
Force of the City of Iloilo on September 13, 1946 (Exh. C). Similar
appointments were issued to her on December 5, 1946 (Exh. D), October
5, 1950 (Exh. E), January 22, 1951 (Exh. F) and June 9, 1951 (Exh. C).
Said appointments contained notations by the Commissioner of Civil
Service that they were authorized under Sec. 682 of the Revised
Administrative Code, the appointee to continue, until replaced by an
eligible, but not beyond thirty (30) days from receipt of certification
of eligibles.

On January 6, 1956, Mayor Ganzon summarily
dismissed appellants from their respective positions, claiming
authority to do so because their appointments were only temporary.

The question decisive of this appeal is whether or not Republic Act No.
186 applies not only to temporary teachers, officials and employees of
the government in actual service and with ten or more successive years
of continuous service to their credit at the time of its enactment but
also to those who had less than ten years of similar service.

That appellants were employees of the government holding civil service
positions at the time of their dismissal is not denied. Under the
provisions of Section 2, Republic Act No. 186, officials or employees
holding civil service positions in any branch of the government service
other than that provided for in Section 1 of the same Act, continuously
for at least ten successive years, shall be considered civil service
eligibles with permanent status under the following classification:

First Grade—Those with college degrees at the time of the appointment;

Second Grade—Those who were graduates of academic or vocational high school at the time of their appointment; and

Third Grade—Those possessing any education at the time of the appointment.

Appellants—if their contention be sustained—would fall under the third grade classification.

The lower court held the view that while appellants “may have become
civil service eligibles under the provisions of Republic Act No. 186
when they completed ten (10) years of continuous service in the
government, yet, “they did not automatically become permanent in their
positions. They only become (became) qualified for permanent
appointments”, and because appellants were never extended permanent
appointments, the court held that their original appointments continued
to be temporary and, as a result, the City Mayor had the authority to
dismiss them upon the expiration of the term of their respective last
appointments.

Republic Act 186 was originally House Bill No.
683, entitled “AN ACT TO CONSIDER AS JUNIOIS TEACHER ELIGIBLES ALL
TEACHERS WHO ARE IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOL SERVICE AND HAVE RENDERED
CONTINUOUS AND SATISFACTORY SERVICE FOR A CERTAIN NUMBER OF YEARS.”
Originally, therefore, it referred only to teachers who were at the
time in the public school service and had rendered continuous and
satisfactory service for a certain number of years. Once passed by the
House, and referred to the Philippine Senate, the latter introduced
several amendments, one of them (Section 2 of the amended bill)
extending the benefits of the bill to officials or employees holding
civil service positions in any branch of the government service—other
than those covered by the provisions of Section 1—continuously for at
least ten successive years. As the House rejected the Senate
amendments, the bill was referred to a Committee on Conference composed
of Congressmen Borra, Perez (T.P.) and Singson, authorized to take up
the consideration of the bill with its Senate counterpart. After a
study of the original and amended bills, the Conference Committee
submitted its report to the House recommending approval of the Senate
amendment and the inclusion of another amendment relative to “teachers
who are undergraduates and who have been in continuous service for ten
years”, who should also be considered, to all intents and purposes,
regular teachers with permanent status, which amendment had previously
been accepted by the Conference Committee on the part of the Senate.
Said report was approved. As finally passed, Republic Act 186, Section
1—grants civil service eligibility to “all teachers in the public
school who are holders of the degree of Bachelor of Science in
Education * * * at the time they were appointed, and who have been in the service continuously for ten successive years to the present time
(Italics supplied). It is clear that the civil service eligibility thus
granted by Section 1 was limited to temporary teachers who, besides
possessing certain educational qualifications, had already been in the
service continuously for ten successive years at the time the law was
enacted.

Section 2 of the Act under consideration, on the
other hand, grants civil service eligibility to “officials or employees
holding civil service positions in any branch of the government
service” other than those already covered by the provisions of Section
1. While the language used in this second section is not as explicit as
the language employed in the previous one in limiting its application
to officials or employees who at the time of the enactment of the
statute had already served the government for ten successive years or
more, we believe that there is no special reason why a criterion should
be applied in its construction and interpretation different from the
one clearly discernible from the phraseology adopted in Section 1. In
other words, inasmuch as the real intention of the original bill was to
grant civil service eligibility only to temporary teachers who had
already rendered continuously ten successive years of service up to the
date of the enactment of the law, the same must be construed to have
been the intention of Congress when it decided to include other
temporary officials and employees of the government among the
beneficiaries. As a matter of fact, this was the interpretation given
by the executive branch of the government called upon to implement the
provisions of law in question. Administrative Order No. 41 of August
12, 1947 (43 Off. Gaz., p. 351, issued for the purpose of laying down
the specific procedure to be followed by those seeking the benefits
under the aforesaid Act, provided, among other things, that the
applicants must have rendered continuous service for ten years on or
before June 21, 1947—which was the effectivity date of the Act in
question. While this construction is not necessarily binding upon the
courts, it must be given some weight as it comes from the particular
branch of the government called upon, as already stated, to implement
the provisions of Republic Act 186.

The record discloses
that appellants Gabio, Mesa and Palma were originally appointed on
December 1, 1945, November 1, 1945 and September 30, 1946,
respectively. Inasmuch as on June 21, 1947, when Republic Act 186
became effective, they did not have to their credit at least ten
continuous and successive years of service to the government, the
conclusion is inevitable that they are not entitled to claim benefits
under said act. As a result they did not acquire civil service
eligibility—much less permanent status as employees. In fact, it is not
denied that their respective appointments subsequent to the enactment
of the act aforesaid were temporary in nature. We are, therefore,
constrained to hold, as we do hereby hold, that at the time they were
dismissed they were mere temporary employees without civil service
eligibility, and it was within the authority of appellee Rodolfo
Ganzon, in his capacity as mayor of the City of Iloilo, to terminate
their services.

Wherefore, the appealed decision being in accordance with law, the same is hereby affirmed.

Bengzon, Acting C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, and Paredes, JJ., concur.