PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS.WILLIAM O. CASIDO @ “MARIO,” AND FRANKLIN A. ALCORIN @ “ARMAN,” ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

Casido versus Alcorin

The Case

This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines sought the conviction of William Casido and Franklin Alcorin for the killing of Victoriano Mapa, a killing the two men later claimed was committed in pursuit of their political beliefs. The case matters far beyond the guilt or innocence of the two accused, because while their appeal was pending before the Supreme Court they were released from prison on a conditional pardon signed by the President, and the Court had to decide whether that pardon was valid, whether a later grant of amnesty cured the defect, and whether the officials who processed the pardon should be disciplined. It is, in short, a case about the constitutional limits on the pardoning power and the sharp distinction between pardon and amnesty.

Procedural History

The two accused were charged and tried before the Regional Trial Court, which convicted them of the killing of Victoriano Mapa. From that conviction they appealed to the Supreme Court. While the appeal was pending, they filed an urgent motion to withdraw their appeal, and the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release and Pardon favorably recommended their applications for conditional pardon. The President signed the conditional pardon, and the Bureau of Corrections released them. In a resolution dated the thirtieth of July, nineteen hundred ninety-six, the Supreme Court ruled that the conditional pardons were void because they were extended during the pendency of the appeal, denied the motion to withdraw the appeal, directed the Bureau of Corrections to re-arrest and reconfine the two accused, and required the officers of the Committee to show cause why they should not be held in contempt. The Committee's Secretariat submitted a comment explaining its actions, and the Court required a list of the Secretariat members who participated and a copy of the alleged agreement with the lawyers of the applicants. Meanwhile, the National Amnesty Commission informed the Court that it had favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of both accused. The Office of the Solicitor General commented that the amnesty rendered moot the question of the premature pardon, and the case was then resolved on the merits.

Facts

William Casido and Franklin Alcorin were charged with the killing of Victoriano Mapa. They were convicted by the trial court, and they appealed to the Supreme Court. While that appeal was pending, they applied for conditional pardon before the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail, Release and Pardon, a body created by the President to recommend the grant of bail, release or pardon to persons detained or convicted of crimes committed in pursuit of political objectives.

The Secretariat of the Committee processed their applications and recommended them favorably, relying on a verbal undertaking by the lawyers of the non-government organizations representing the prisoners that motions to withdraw the appeals would be filed. The two accused did file an urgent motion to withdraw their appeal, which reached the Supreme Court on the eleventh of January, nineteen hundred ninety-six. The President signed the conditional pardon on the nineteenth of January, nineteen hundred ninety-six, and the Bureau of Corrections released the two accused on the twenty-fifth of January, nineteen hundred ninety-six.

Unknown to the Committee, the National Amnesty Commission had, on the twenty-second of February, nineteen hundred ninety-six, favorably acted on the applications for amnesty of the same two accused, finding them to be confirmed members of the communist rebel movement whose killing of Victoriano Mapa was committed in pursuit of their political beliefs. The amnesty was granted under a presidential proclamation concurred in by both Houses of Congress.

Issues

• Whether or not the conditional pardon granted to the accused while their appeal was pending before the Supreme Court was valid.
• Whether or not the subsequent grant of amnesty rendered moot and academic the question of the validity of the premature pardon.
• Whether or not the members of the Presidential Committee and its Secretariat should be held in contempt or otherwise disciplined for recommending and processing the pardon during the pendency of the appeal.

Applicable Provisions

The first paragraph of Section 19, Article Seven of the Constitution provides:

Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.

This is the provision the pardon violated, because the pardon was extended while the conviction was still on appeal and therefore not yet final.

Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Pardon by the Chief Executive shall neither work the restoration of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon, and it shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.

This defines the forward-looking effect of pardon, which relieves the offender of punishment but does not obliterate the offense.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the conditional pardon was void. It was granted during the pendency of the appeal, before conviction by final judgment, and therefore violated the first paragraph of Section 19, Article Seven of the Constitution. The Court stressed that as early as nineteen hundred ninety-one it had already ruled that a final judgment is necessary before parole or pardon may be extended, and it found unsatisfactory the explanation of the Secretariat that its members were unaware of the Court's prior rulings. The Court noted that the Secretariat itself required the lawyers of the applicants to file motions to withdraw the appeals, which showed that its members knew a pardon could only be granted after final conviction.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the Office of the Solicitor General that the amnesty rendered moot the question of the premature pardon. Quoting its earlier ruling in Barrioquinto versus Fernandez, the Court explained the distinction:

Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.

The Court added that while pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of the offense, amnesty looks backward and abolishes the offense itself, so that the person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Since the amnesty was validly granted under a proclamation concurred in by Congress, the release of the two accused was justified by the amnesty, but not by the pardon.

On the third issue, the Court declined to hold the officials in contempt but administered an admonition. It found that in failing to observe due care in the performance of their duties, the members of the Committee caused the President serious embarrassment, and it admonished them to exercise utmost care and diligence to save the President from any embarrassment in the exercise of the power to grant pardon or parole.

Doctrine

A pardon may be granted only after conviction by final judgment, as required by the first paragraph of Section 19, Article Seven of the Constitution. A pardon extended while an appeal is pending is void.

Pardon and amnesty are distinct. Pardon is a private act of the Chief Executive, granted after conviction, which relieves the offender from the consequences of the offense but does not restore political rights or exempt him from civil indemnity unless the terms provide otherwise. Amnesty is a public act of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, granted to classes of persons for political offenses, generally before or after the institution of criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction, and it obliterates the offense itself so that the grantee stands before the law as though he had committed no offense.

A valid grant of amnesty renders moot the question of the validity of a premature pardon, and the release of the accused may be justified on the ground of amnesty alone.

Disposition

The Court held that the release of William Casido and Franklin Alcorin was valid solely on the ground of the amnesty granted them, dismissed the case with costs de oficio, and admonished the members of the Presidential Committee and its Secretariat to exercise utmost care and diligence in the performance of their duties.

Remember This

Memorize the line that pardon looks forward and relieves the offender of punishment, while amnesty looks backward and obliterates the offense itself. Examiners use this case to test the constitutional requirement of final judgment before pardon, and the distinction between pardon and amnesty.