CECILIA GASTON, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REYNALDO M. ALON, AS JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF SILAY CITY, BRANCH 40, AND GERTRUDES MEDEL, RESPONDENTS.

Gaston versus Court of Appeals

The Case

This is a petition for review brought by Cecilia Gaston against the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court of Silay City, and Gertrudes Medel. It arises from a decades-long dispute over inherited land. Gertrudes Medel sued to recover her share in the estate of Mariano de Oca, and after a final judgment in her favor the defendants simply refused to partition the properties. When the trial court itself partitioned the lots, Cecilia Gaston attacked that order as a grave abuse of discretion. The case matters because it teaches the limits of a final judgment, the meaning of grave abuse of discretion, and the strict timetable for a petition for certiorari.

Procedural History

In 1972 Gertrudes Medel filed a complaint for recovery of her share against Sofia de Oca, widow of Gaston, and other defendants before the Regional Trial Court of Silay City, Branch 40. The trial court dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and ordered the defendants to partition the properties to include the plaintiff's share within sixty days from finality. The defendants elevated the matter to the Supreme Court, which dismissed the petition, and judgment became final on January 14, 1991.

When the defendants still refused to partition, Gertrudes Medel moved to require them to submit a project of partition and to cite them in contempt. The trial court directed the defendants' counsel to comment, warning that otherwise the court would partition the property. No comment came. On January 17, 1992 the trial court issued the order commissioning a geodetic engineer to survey and segregate a portion of Lot 771-B and directing the Register of Deeds to cancel the title over Lot 759-A and issue a new one in the name of Gertrudes Medel.

Cecilia Gaston then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which dismissed it for lack of merit on December 16, 1993. Her motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence this petition for review before the Supreme Court.

Facts

Gertrudes Medel claimed that her mother, Gliceria de Oca, was the daughter of Mariano de Oca by his first marriage, and that she was therefore entitled to the properties he left. She sued the widow Sofia de Oca and the other defendants in 1972. The trial court dismissed her complaint, but the Court of Appeals reversed and declared several transfer certificates of title null and void, ordering the Register of Deeds to issue new titles covering the lots inclusive of her share, after the defendants had partitioned the properties to include that share within sixty days from finality.

The defendants took the case to the Supreme Court, which dismissed their petition, and the judgment became final on January 14, 1991. Despite the lapse of the sixty-day period, and despite letters from the plaintiff's counsel, the defendants did not submit any project of partition. Gertrudes Medel then moved to require them to do so and to cite them in contempt.

The trial court ordered the defendants' counsel to comment within five days, warning that otherwise the court would partition the property. The defendants ignored this order as well. The trial court then granted the plaintiff's motion, commissioned a survey of Lot 771-B and segregated a portion of .8121 hectare in her name, and ordered the cancellation of the title over Lot 759-A, with a new title issued in her name. Pursuant to that order, new titles were issued to Gertrudes Medel.

Issues

• Whether or not the order of January 17, 1992 is null and void for having altered a final judgment and for having been issued without a project of partition.
• Whether or not the petition for nullification of that order was already barred by laches.

Applicable Provisions

The decision applies the rule on certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which the Court treats as requiring filing within a reasonable period. The Court states the governing standard:

The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the reasonableness of the length of time that had expired from the commission of the actuation complained of up to the institution of the proceeding to amend the same.

This standard governs the second issue, because the petition was filed long after the challenged order.

The decision also fixes the meaning of grave abuse of discretion, which is the ground for the first issue:

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough - it must be grave.

This definition controls whether the trial court's order may be annulled.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion. The Court of Appeals had ordered the defendants to partition the properties within sixty days from finality, and they did not comply. The trial court then ordered their counsel to comment, with the warning that otherwise the court would partition the property, and the defendants ignored that order too. The Court found that this disregard manifested a clear and deliberate intention to deprive Gertrudes Medel of her share, and that the defendants had only themselves to blame for the absence of a project of partition.

The Court added that the petitioner failed to show how much share each heir was supposed to receive, or in what way the share given to Gertrudes Medel exceeded her just share. Even assuming the trial court gave her more than her share, the Court said, if the same nevertheless approximates her just share, there is still no grave abuse of discretion. The Court restated the standard:

By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and mere abuse of discretion is not enough - it must be grave.

On the second issue, the Court held that the petition for certiorari was barred by laches. The challenged order was dated January 17, 1992, but the petition was filed only on August 7, 1992, more than seven months later. The Court noted its earlier ruling that a special civil action for certiorari must be filed within a reasonable period of only three months, and that an interval of seven months after the last order sought to be set aside is definitely barred by laches. The essence of laches, the Court explained, is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier.

Doctrine

First, grave abuse of discretion means a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction; mere abuse of discretion is not enough, it must be grave. A party alleging it must show concretely how the challenged order exceeded the just share or deprived her of her own.

Second, a party who disobeys a final judgment ordering partition, and then ignores the trial court's order to submit a project of partition, cannot complain when the court itself partitions the property. The court acts within its authority to carry the final judgment into effect.

Third, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 must be filed within a reasonable period, which the Court measures at three months; a delay of more than seven months is barred by laches.

Disposition

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit and affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals, so Gertrudes Medel prevailed.

Remember This

Memorize the line that grave abuse of discretion means capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, and that mere abuse is not enough. Examiners use this case for the three-month reasonable period for certiorari and for the rule that a disobedient party cannot complain when the court itself partitions the estate.