THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ESTEBAN AGADAS AND ROSARIO SABACAHAN, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This appeal brings up for review a judgment of the Court of First
Instance of the Province of Misamis, condemning each of the defendants,
Esteban Agadas and Rosario Sabacahan, to six years ten months and one
day of presidio mayor, to jointly and severally indemnify
Gregoria Dapin in the sum of P380, and to the payment of the costs of
the cause for the crime of robbery.

Counsel de officio for the defendants urges that the
trialcourt erred (1) in finding that Gregoria Dapin was robbed of the
sum of P380 on the early morning of October 19, 1915, at Oroquieta,
Misamis; (2) in not finding that the defendants had established an
alibi; and (3) in not finding that this charge of Gregoria Dapin was a
mere revenge against the defendant, Esteban Agadas. These three alleged
errors, which raise the question of whether or not the guilt of the
defendants has been established beyond a reasonable doubt, may be
considered together.

Gregoria Dapin testified that about daylight on the morning of
October 19, 1915, she was awakened by someone who had placed his hand
over her mouth and who was examining her clothes which she then had on;
that that person then told her that he would kill her if she did not
give him her money; that the same person, within a few minutes
thereafter, took from her the sum of P380 which she had tied around her
waist in a handkerchief; that she was unable to identify the person in
any other manner except by his voice, because the lamp in the room was
no longer burning; that she did recognize the voice of the person to be
that of Esteban Agadas; that she was unable to recognize the other man
in the room; that at the time the two men left the room, one of her
children cried out, saying that one of the men was Rosario Sabacahan;
and that her husband, Galo Calavite, was not at home at the time the
robbery occurred, he having gone to the cockpit,
leaving her and her five children alone.

Marcosa Calavite, the 7-year old daughter of Gregoria Dapin and Galo
Calavite, testified that she recognized both of the defendants at the
time the robbery was committed; that one of them stepped on her hand,
she thinking that it was her father; and that Agadas put out the light
after he had stepped on her hand. Prudencio Calavite, the 9-year old
son of Gregoria Dapin and Galo Calavite, testified that when the
robbery was going on he was seized by Rosario Sabacahan, taken to the
window, and held in such a position that he could not see what was
occurring in that part of the house where his mother was; and that he recognized both of the defendants at the time they left the house.

The robbery was reported immediately to the authorities and
Lieutenant Dionisio of the Philippine Constabulary and the chief of
police of Oroquieta thereupon instituted an investigation and on being
informed that Gregoria Dapin had recognized the voice of the defendant
Agadas and that the two children had recognized both of the defendants
at the time they left the house, the two children were taken to the
house of Agadas and also to the house of Sabacahan, who were then
living in the same community, and identified the defendants as being
the men who committed the robbery. Rosario Sabacahan admitted to the
lieutenant and the chief of police that he had participated in the
robbery. On October 20 Rosario Sabacahan appeared before the justice of
the peace and freely and voluntarily confessed under oath that he and
Esteban committed this robbery. Rosario pleaded guilty to the charge at
the time he was arraigned before the justice of the peace, who held the
preliminary investigation. Rosario again made another written
confession to the same effect. Esteban Agadas denied at all times any
knowledge or participation in the robbery and attempted to establish an
alibi. Agadas testified that he was, on the morning of October 19,
1915, in the house of his parents in the center of the town of
Oroquieta, some 8 or 9 kilometers distant from the place where the
robbery was committed. The defense attempted to show that
the confessions made by Rosario Sabacahan were extorted from him by
threats and violence. The trial court declined to believe the testimony
of the defendants and their witnesses upon these two points. The court
sets forth its reasons for believing the testimony of the witnesses for
the prosecution. After a careful examination of the record, we are
thoroughly convinced that the defendants are guilty of the crime for
which they were convicted. While it is true that the two little
children, who identified both of the defendants at the time, are very
young, yet they knew both of the defendants, as they (the defendants)
were frequent visitors at the house and lived in the same community.

Rosario Sabacahan testified that he was 17 years of age; that he had
never purchased a cedula; and that he was going to purchase a cedula
the following January. Thereupon the court asked this defendant these
questions; “You are a pretty big boy for seventeen.” Answer: “I cannot
tell exactly because I do not remember when I was born, but 17 years is
my guess.” Court: “If you are going to take advantage of that excuse,
you had better get some positive evidence to that effect.” Answer: “I
do not remember, as I already stated on what date and in what year I
was born.” The court, in determining the question of the age of the
defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, said:

“The defendant, Rosario Sabacahan, testified that he thought that he
was about 17 years of age, but judging by his appearance he is a youth
18 or 19 years old. He has shown that he has no positive information on
the subject and no effort was made by the defense to prove the fact
that he is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of article 9,
paragraph 2, of the Penal Code, which fact it is held to be incumbent
upon the defense to establish by satisfactory evidence in order to
enable the court to give an accused person the benefit of that
mitigating circumstance.”

In United States vs. Estavillo and Perez (10 Off. Gaz.,
1984) Estavillo testified, when the case was tried in the court below,
that he then was only 16 years of age. There was no other testimony in
the record with reference to his age. But the trial judge said: “The
accused Estavillo, notwithstanding his testimony giving his age as 16
years, is, as a matter of fact, not less than 20.” This court, in
passing upon the age of Estavillo, held:

“We presume that the trial court reached this conclusion with
reference to the age of Estavillo from the latter’s personal
appearance. There is no proof in the record, as we have said, which
even tends to establish the assertion that this appellant understated
his age. * * * It is true that the trial court had an opportunity to
note the personal appearance of Estavillo for the purpose of
determining his age, and by so doing reached the conclusion that he was
at least 20, just two years over 18. This appellant testified that he
was only 16, and this testimony stands uncontradicted. Taking into
consideration the marked difference in the penalties to be imposed upon
those who are 18 years of age and those who are under that age, we
must, therefore, conclude (resolving all reasonable doubts in favor of
the appellants) that the appellants’ ages were 16 and 14 respectively.”

While it is true that in the instant case Rosario testified that he
was 17 years of age, yet the trial court reached the conclusion,
judging from the personal appearance of Rosario, that “he is a youth 18
or 19 years old.” Applying the rule enunciated in the case just cited,
we must conclude that there exists a reasonable doubt, at least, with
reference to the question whether Rosario was, in fact, 18 years of age
at the time the robbery was committed. This doubt must be resolved in
favor of the defendant, and he is, therefore, sentenced to six months
of arresto mayor in lieu of six years ten months and one day of presidio mayor. In all other respects the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.

Torres, Carson, and Araullo, J., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.