AGUSTIN LAZARTE, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS ET AL., DEFENDANTS. BIBIANA YAPTINCHAY AND THE SHERIFF OF LAGUNA, APPELLANTS.

On July 18, 1914, the plaintiff Agustin Lazarte applied to the Court
of First Instance of Laguna for a writ of injunction against Bibiana
Yaptinchay, the Director of Lands and the sheriff of the Province of
Laguna. His complaint alleged that he was the owner of two parcels of
land belonging to the Hacienda of Santa Rosa, Laguna (Insular
Government property according to Exhibit A filed with his complaint),
through purchase on August 8, 1912, under pacto de retro,
from Celerino Tiongco; that said right of repurchase expired in
December, 1912, as shown in the attached document (Exhibit E); that
nevertheless the defendant Bibiana Yaptinchay filed a complaint against
the said Celerino Tiongco in the Court of First Instance of Laguna to
recover a certain sum of money; that she later obtained a judgment in
her favor; that same was afterwards ordered executed; that, when
levying execution against the judgment debtor Celerino Tiongco, the
defendant sheriff illegally and with violation of the plaintiff’s
rights proceeded to attach said two parcels of land that had been sold
to the plaintiff under pacto de retro, to sell same at public
auction, on July 18, 1914, to said Yaptinchay, and to issue to her the
corresponding certificate of sale; that the Director of Lands, the
Insular Government’s representative and agent in charge of the
management of the said Santa Rosa Hacienda to which the lands in
question pertain, was about to grant the required permit to convey said
two parcels of land to the defendant Yaptinchay, notwithstanding the
fact that the plaintiff had purchased for P4,585.88, all rights and
interest in them held by their vendor Celerino Tiongco who only
reserved the right of repurchase up to the end of December, 1914; that
the defendants intended to oust the plaintiff from the parcels of land
he had purchased; that such action would occasion him great and
irreparable injury, unless a writ of preliminary injunction, afterwards
to be made perpetual, should issue against the defendants to restrain
them from the performance of the acts complained of. Therefore
plaintiff prayed the court to render judgment against all the
defendants (1) enjoining them from carrying out their purpose of
ousting plaintiff from the aforementioned parcels of land; (2)
enjoining the Director of Lands from recording the conveyance in favor
of the defendant Yaptinchay and from issuing to her the required deed
of sale of said lands of the Santa Rosa Hacienda; (3) declaring the
plaintiff to be the owner of the lots of land in question, subject to
the condition of the right to redeem; and (4) canceling the certificate
of sale issued by the defendant sheriff to his co-defendant Yaptinchay
and, in place thereof, ordering the issue of another deed of sale
conveying to Yaptinchay the mere right, pertaining to Tiongco, to
repurchase from the plaintiff the parcels of land in question by the
month of December, 1914, for P4,585.88 with the costs against the
defendants.

The demurrers interposed by Yaptinchay and the sheriff of Laguna to
the aforementioned complaint having been overruled, the latter filed an
answer wherein he admitted the fact of the sale of the plaintiff’s
property in satisfaction of a judgment rendered against said plaintiff
and alleged that in so doing he had acted in his capacity of sheriff
and solely in the performance of his official duties. He therefore
asked to be absolved from the complaint without costs.

The defendant Yaptinchay admitted that Tiongco was the owner of the
two parcels of land in dispute, by purchase from the Insular
Government, as well as the facts that she had obtained a judgment
against him and that these two parcels of land were judicially sold in
satisfaction of her claim. In special defense she set forth that
Tiongco was indebted to her in the sum of P2,000, and that he owed a
further sum to Julia Yaptinchay; that these two creditors filed suit
against Tiongco in August, 1912, to recover the amounts owing them;
that thereupon, on the 7th and 8th of August, 1912, the debtor Tiongco,
for the purpose of defrauding his creditors, feigned and simulated
two sales of the said parcels of land to the plaintiff Lazarte; that on
July 11, 1914, she applied to the court for an attachmentof the parcels
of land described in the complaint filed in civil case No. 1297,
instituted by her against Tiongco for the recovery of her credit, but
that on June 13 of the same year this debtor maliciously and
fraudulently executed another instrument, in behalf of the plaintiff,
reducing the period for the redemption to two years and four months,
for the same purpose of defrauding his creditors; that, as a result of
the attachment the said two parcels of land were sold at public auction
and were awarded to her, the defendant Yaptinchay; that on July 18,
1914, the sheriff delivered to her the proper certificate of sale of
the lands in litigation; and that the sales made by Tiongco to
plaintiff were null and void, having been made in fraud of Tiongco’s
creditors without the consent or approval of the Director of Lands. By
way of counterclaim she alleged that by reason of the complaint in this
case she had been injured in the sum of P500, and therefore prayed the
court to order the said Lazarte to pay her the sum of P500 and to
absolve her from the complaint filed by the plaintiff, with the costs
against him.

The case came to trial and on July 6, 1915, the court rendered
judgment in accordance with the plaintiffs petition, without special
findings as to the costs; he held that the plaintiff was not the owner
of the lots of land in question, but merely the holder thereof, having
a preferred right to finally purchase them from the Government—subject
however to the governing condition of the pacto de retracto.

From this judgment the defendants Yaptinchay and the sheriff of the
Province of Laguna appealed to this court and made the following
assignments of error—(1) the overruling of the demurrer to the
complaint; (2) the holding that the sales made by Celerino Tiongco of
the two parcels of land in question to Agustin Lazarte were not
fraudulent; and (3) the rendering of judgment in accordance with the
plaintiff’s claims.

There was no dispute whatever with respect to the identity of the
two pieces of land in litigation, for all the documents and evidence of
record clearly and exclusively relate to lot No. 907 situated in the
barrio of Poblacion of the municipality of Santa Rosa, Laguna, to lot
No. 1620 situated in the same barrio and municipality, and to the fact
that on January 30, 1909, the Director of Lands, pursuant to Act No.
1120, granted these lots to Tiongco under an option for final purchase
within the following nineteen years after payment of the amounts fixed.
Both these sales were recorded in certificates of sale Nos. 715 and 716
filed in the record as Exhibits C and D.

From the evidence introduced by the Director of Lands (Exhibit A-1)
it appears that up to April 20, 1915, the purchaser or grantee,
Tiongco, had been able to pay only P517.14 of the price of lot 907, and
P484.08 of lot 1620 (these sums represent seven annual payments),
leaving therefore unpaid the installments of twelve years necessary for
the purchaser Tiongco to become the exclusive owner of the said two
disputed lots or parcels of land, wherefore the grantee Tiongco held
the right to occupy and possess the land only so long as he should
punctually pay the annual installments as they fell due, and the
preferred right for final purchase after he should have completed the
nineteen annual partial payments.

Now then, according to the defendant’s Exhibits Nos. 1and 2, it
appears that on August 7, 1912, Tiongco filled out two blanks or forms
of the Bureau of Lands, setting out therein that he had sold, ceded and
conveyed the said lots 907 and 1620 to the plaintiff. On that same day
these deeds were ratified before a notary and on the following day,
August 8, 1912, Tiongco, reserving the right of repurchase within ten
years, sold to Lazarte the same parcels of land for P3,650 (Exhibits A
and E). On August 10 of the same year this transaction was ratified
before a notary (Exhibit E). By a notarial instrument of June 13,1914,
and for the consideration of P935.88 paid by Lazarte to Tiongco
(Exhibits B and F), the aforesaid instrument of August 8, 1912, was
amended by shortening the period for the redemption, so that if the
vendor, Tiongco, did not pay Lazarte the said sum of P935.88 by
December of that year (1914) Tiongco would lose all his right to
repurchase the parcels of land whereby the ownership thereof would be
consolidated in Lazarte.

However the record shows that prior to these transactions the vendor
Tiongco owed Julia Yaptinchay the sum of P900; that this debt was
secured by the mortgage of lots Nos. 907 and 1620; that on August 12,
1912, Julia Yaptinchay sued Tiongco for the recovery of this debt
(Exhibits 3 and 4); and that, by a judgment entered on August 20, 1913,
the debtor Tiongco was ordered to pay to Julia Yaptinchay the sum of
P900, with interest and costs (Exhibit 15). Prior to this time on
August 8, 1912, Julia Yaptinchay had requested the Director of Lands to
suspend approval of the conveyance of the two lots of land by Tiongco
to Lazarte for the reason that same had been made in fraud of Tiongco’s
creditors (Exhibit 6). Therefore the Director of Lands refrained from
approving the said conveyance to Lazarte until such time as the debt to
Julia Yaptinchay should have been paid (pars. 1, 2, Exhibit 8 and
Exhibits L and M), this being the reason why (according to Exhibit B
which is the same as Exhibit F) Tiongco, on June 13, 1914, shortened
the period of his right to redeem the two parcels of land sold to
Lazarte on August 8, 1912, receiving from the latter the sum of ?935.88
which, as stated in that document, “was to pay Julia Yaptinchay”
(record-sten. notes, p. 12). The amount owing Julia Yaptinchay was in fact paid
by Lazarte in Tiongco’s name and on June 9, 1914, Julia’s attorney,
Jose del Castillo, received the amount of the debt, P896, as proven by
the receipt Exhibit N. For this reason, on July 14, 1914, the Court of
First Instance of Laguna dismissed the action filed by Julia Yaptinchay
and dissolved the attachment on the defendant Tiongco’s property
(Exhibit 11).

The foregoing statements regarding Julia Yaptinchay’s credit in
nowise concern the defendant Bibiana Yaptinchay. It has been necessary
to make them, however, as this defendant’s principal exception consists
in the claim that the conveyances made by the debtor Tiongco to Lazarte
were made for the purpose of defrauding his creditors.

With respect to Bibiana Yaptinchay the record shows as fully proven
that, prior to the aforementioned conveyances to Lazarte, the vendor
Tiongco was indebted to the defendant Yaptinchay, wherefore the latter,
on August 12, 1912, brought suit in the Court of First Instance of
Laguna (Exhibit 5) against Tiongco to recover the sum of P2,000.. That
suit was docketed in that court under No. 1297. During the month of
July of the same year this same Bibiana Yaptinchay filed another suit
(Exhibit 10) against the same debtor to recover from him another debt
of P820. In case No. 1297 judgment was rendered against Tiongco, on August 21, 1913, the court ordering him to pay Yaptinchay the sum of ^3,000 (Exhibit 16).

By a written complaint of June 11, 1914 (Exhibit 9), Yaptinchay
alleged that the house mortgaged to her was insufficient to cover the
sum specified in the judgment rendered against Tiongco and therefore
asked that the attachment be amplified so as to include the lots 907
and 1620, the property in litigation. In accordance with that petition
a writ of execution was issued which was amplified on June 18, 1914
(Exhibit G). As a result the said two parcels of land, lots 907 and
1620, were levied upon and, their sale at public auction having been
duly announced for the 18th of July of the same year (Exhibit H), they
were sold at publicauction and awarded to Bibiana Yaptinchay to whom
the proper certificate of sale was furnished (Exhibit J),
notwithstanding that on July 9, 1914, Lazarte filed with the
defendant-sheriff a third-party claim for these two parcels of land on
the ground that he had purchased them from the debtor Tiongco for
P4,585.88.

For the foregoing reasons the intervener Lazarte broughtthese
proceedings to recover possession of the aforesaid two lots of land and
to be declared entitled to purchase them from the Government, in due
season, in substitution of Celerino Tiongco. The record shows that the
lot No. 1620 had been previously mortgaged to Julia Yaptinchay who is
not a party to this suit; but that neither this lot nor lot No. 907 was
mortgaged or otherwise encumbered in favor of the defendant creditor
Yaptinchay, nor were they mortgaged at the time of the execution of the
sale under pacto de retro by Tiongco to Lazarte on August 6,
1912. For this reason this sale cannot, without proof to the contrary,
be qualified as fraudulent for the purpose of withdrawing these two
lots from the action of the debtor Tiongco’s creditors (especially from
Yaptinchay’s action), and for the purpose of defrauding them, for the
evidence shows that Tiongco came to owe the plaintiff, Lazarte,
P4,585.88, part of which sum was spent in the payment of the annual
installments owing the Government on the purchase price of the said
lands and part in the payment of his debts to Julia Yaptinchay and to
the defendant Bibiana Yaptinchay. These debts, however, were not
totally paid, as the debtor Tiongco’s uncontradicted reply to the
question of Bibiana’s counsel made clear (record, p. 15), in reply to a
question by the defendant Yaptinchay. If the proceeds from this
alienated property and rights were distributed by the debtor among his
creditors, although these latter did not succeed in recovering the
total amount of their credits, as the latter amounted to more than the
price of the sale, we cannot hold on that account that the sale was
fraudulent or that it was simulated in order to prejudice the creditors.

This court, always taking account of all the special circumstances
of each individual case, held that there were certain rules to
determine whether certain transfers or sales were or were not
fraudulent and that the courts have denominated the following as being
fraudulent; (1) a fictitious or inadequate consideration for the
conveyance; (2) a transfer made by a debtor after legal proceedings
have been brought against him and while the same are still pending; (3)
a sale on credit by an insolvent debtor; (4) evidence of large
indebtedness or complete insolvency; (5) the transfer by a debtor, of
all or nearly all of his property, especially if he is insolvent or
greatly embarrassed financially; (6) a transfer between father and son,
when some of the above circumstances are present; and (7), the failure
of the vendee to take exclusive possession of all the property. (Oria vs. McMicking, 21 Phil. Rep., 243.)

It was not shown that the sale of the said two parcels of land made
by the debtor Tiongco to the plaintiff fell within any of the cases
just above cited, nor that it was subject to any of the vices that
affect the validity and force of the conveyance of the said properties.

Neither was it proven that the vendor Tiongco acted in bad faith or
with intent to defraud his creditor Yaptinchay when he sold the said
two lots of land under pacto de retro—they were not mortgaged
or otherwise encumbered in favor of the said defendant-creditor and she
filed her claim several days after the said sale had been made.
Moreover, as aforesaid, the record shows that a part of the sum paid to
the vendor Tiongco was used to pay part of the debt owing to Bibiana
Yaptinchay.

Aside from the foregoing facts it is positive and certain that, when
the said lots of land were levied upon to meet one of Tiongco’s debts,
Tiongco was no longer the owner of them; he had already disposed of
them, though merely under pacto de retro, to Lazarte. The
latter is the true owner of the right to acquire the said properties
and, as he was not liable for the debt contracted by the vendor
Tiongco, the levy upon and the sale of the said lots to secure the
payment of a debt not contracted by the owner are entirely null, void,
and without effect, inasmuch as neither the lands sold nor the right to
buy them from the Government pertained to the debtor Tiongco, nor could
any levy be directly made upon them for the payment of the money which
Tiongco owed to Bibiana Yaptinchay.

In a decision of July 12, 1904, the supreme court of Spain laid down the following: rule:

“It being conditional in attachments of all kinds that the thing
attached must be the property of the debtor, from no provision of the
Mortgage Law can a conclusion be derived contrary to such principle,
simply because the name of the debtor appears in the registry as the
owner of property which does not actually belong to him, and much less
when it happens that the entry in his name was made in order to record
the attachment after the property was no longer owned by him.”

In the decision of the case of Lopez vs. Alvarez (9 Phil Rep., 28) this court applied the principle just enunciated and repeated it in the case Alvaran vs. Marquez (11 Phil Rep., 263):

“The doctrine has been established in the decision of the case of Lopez Villanueva vs.
Alvarez Perez et al. (9 Phil. Rep., 28), and is a settled rule that it
is a legal condition in attachments of all kinds that the thing attached
must be the property of the debtor, and from no provision of the
Mortgage Law can a conclusion be derived contrary to such principle.”

No evidence was adduced at the trial to show that the vendor Tiongco
acted in bad faith and with intent to defraud his creditor Yaptinchay
when he sold under pacto de retro the said two parcels of
land or the right to acquire them from the government, for neither the
parcels themselves nor the right to acquire them after their price
had been paid to the Director of Lands are mortgaged or otherwise
encumbered in favor of the said creditor; nor does the record disclose
that the debtor Tiongco did not possess any other kind of property, or
that he was absolutely insolvent and entertained no hope of being able
to pay the rest of his debt to the defendant Yaptinchay to whom, as
aforesaid, Tiongco had paid a part of his debt with the money derived
from the said sale to the plaintiff of the said parcels of land or of
his right to acquire them from the Government.

With respect to the error assigned to the judgment appealed from
with regard to the overruling of the demurrer interposed to the
complaint by the defendant Yaptinchay, we hold that the same was very
properly overruled inasmuch as the contract of sale executed between
Tiongco and the plaintiff Lazarte, once approved and consented to by
the Director of Lands, is neither contrary to law, nor in conflict with
any provision of law; and that the same neither makes any conveyance to
the prejudice of the creditor Yaptinchay who has no real right whatever
in the two parcels of land in question, nor is the said land mortgaged
in favor of Yaptinchay, who can only exercise a personal right against
her debtor Tiongco.

For the foregoing reasons, whereby the errors assigned to the
judgment appealed from are deemed to have been refuted, the said
judgment should be, as it is hereby, affirmed, with the costs against
the appellant. So ordered.

Carson, Moreland, Trent, and Araullo, JJ., concur.