MARIA CONCEPCION, PETITIONER, VS. THE PAYATAS ESTATE IMPROVEMENT CO., INC., RESPONDENT.

Being interrelated, these three (3) cases were jointly heard in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, which, in due course, rendered a single decision in
favor of the plaintiffs therein and petitioners herein. On appeal taken by
defendant (respondent herein) The Payatas Estate Improvement Co., the Court of
Appeals ordered the case remanded to the court of origin, for the reception of
additional evidence. Not being satisfied with the resolution of the Court of
Appeals to this effect, plaintiffs-petitioners now seek a review thereof by writ
of certiorari.

As set forth in the decision of the court of first instance, and quoted with
approval in said resolution of the Court of Appeals, the main facts are:

“In Civil Case No. 1476, the subject matter is Lot No. 12 of plan Psu-115484.
This Lot No. 12 of plan Psu-115484 is admittedly southeast of a parcel of land
(Lot No. 92 of plan Psu-24733) which the plaintiff Maria Concepcion and
Gregorio Diaz bought from the defendant company in 1925 as will be discussed in
more detail hereinafter. The contention of the plaintiff Maria Concepcion is
that in 1925 when she and Gregorio Diaz bought Lot No. 92 from the defendant
company, the boundary on the southeast was the San Mateo Elver, and that it was
only subsequently thereafter that the river gradually receded in an easterly
direction leaving dry and abandoned the river bed which is now Lot 12 of plan
Psu-115484. On the other hand, the defendant company contends that when the
plaintiff Maria Concepcion and Gregorio Diaz bought Lot No. 92 in 1925, the
boundary on the southeast was land comprised within the titled property of the
defendant.

“In Civil Case No, 1477, the subject-matter are Lots Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, and 14
of plan Psu-115484. These five lots are admittedly immediately adjacent to Lots
Nos. 95 and 97 of plan Psu-24733 and Lot No. 96-of plan Psu 564 which Patricio
de la Cruz (father of plaintiff) and plaintiff Alfonso Cruz bought from the
defendant company in 1926 and in 1927, respectively, as will be discussed in
more detail hereinafter. It is the contention of the plaintiff Alfonso Cruz that
when he and his father bought from the defendant company, Lots Nos. 95 and 96-Q,
they were bounded on the east by the San Mateo River, and that Lot No. 97 was
surrounded on all sides by the San Mateo River, but that subsequently thereafter
the said river receded gradually In an easterly direction leaving the river bed
dry and abandoned which is now the disputed Lots Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, and 14 of plan
Psu-115484. On the other hand, the defendant company contends that at the time
it sold to the plaintiff and to the latter’s father Lots 95 and 96-Q, they were
bounded on the east by land, and that Lot 97 was surrounded on all sides by land
which, were comprised in the titled property of the defendant.

“In Civil Case No. 1478, the subject matter are Lots Nos. 8, 9, and 10 of
plan Psu-115484. These three lots are admittedly east of Lot 94-F of plan
Psu-1859 which the plaintiffs Angel Sta. Maria, Vicente Sta. Maria, together
with their now deceased sister Eliza Sta. Maria, bought from the defendant
company in 1929 as will be discussed more in detail hereinafter. It is the
contention of the plaintiffs that when they bought from the defendant company in
1929 Lot No. 94-F it was bounded on the east by the San Mateo River, and that
subsequently thereafter the said river receded gradually in an easterly
direction, leaving dry and abandoned the river bed which is now the disputed
Lots Nos. 8, 9, and 10 of plan Psu-115484. On the other hand, the defendant
company contends that when it sold to the plaintiffs and Eliza Sta. Maria in
1929, Lot No. 94-F was bounded on the east by land which was comprised in the
titled property of the defendant.”

In the language of the petition herein, “the pivotal issue in all the three
(3) cases is whether the disputed lots were under water and were parts of the
bed of the San Mateo River at the time of the respective purchases by the
plaintiffs from the defendant company, or whether they were lands within the
titled property of defendant company at the time of said purchases.” In the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, respondent offered parol evidence to the
effect that, at that time, said lots were no longer part of the bed of the San
Mateo River, the same having changed its course and uncovered the area
represented by said lots, several years prior thereto. Petitioners objected to
the admission of this evidence and the lower court rejects it, upon the ground
that respondent thereby sought to alter the contents of the deeds of sale evidencing said purchases, respondent having stated therein that the lots thus
conveyed to petitioners, and/ or their predecessors in interest, were bounded on
the East or Southeast by the San Mateo River, except lot No. 97, which,
according to the corresponding deed of sale, was surrounded, on all sides, by
said river, and that, likewise, respondent was, therefore, in
estoppel.

Without passing upon the question of estoppel, the Court of
Appeals had the following to say in its aforementioned resolution:

“The record discloses that in the answers interposed by the defendant
company, the latter specifically denied the allegations in the complaints that
the questioned lots were bounded on the Southeast and East by the San Mateo River; defendant affirmatively averred that said lots were bounded in said
direction by its own properties. Defendant further asserted that the lots in
issue formed part and parcel of a huge mass of land originally registered under
Certificate of Title No. 333 in the name of Maria de la Concepcion Martinez
Canas Noriega de Roguera; that in 1920, the three parcels of land were sold to
Nanyo Shoji Kaisha Ltd. in whose favor Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5251
was issued; that subsequently, this title was cancelled and in lieu thereof,
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 5858 and 5859 were issued in the names of
Francisco Hidalgo and Nanyo Shoji Kaisha. Ltd.; that on December 23, 1952,
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 6085 already in the name of the Payatas Estate
Improvement Co., was cancelled by title No. 7377 in the name of Frank W.
Carpenter and this latter title was, in turn, cancelled by title No. 8691, again
in the name of the Payatas Estate Improvement Co.; that title No. 8691 was, upon
petition of defendant company, cancelled in favor of titles Nos. 8815 and 8816;
and that the lots now in question are not accretions to the lots originally sold
by the defendant to the plaintiffs or to the latter’s
predecessors-in-interest.

“There seems to be no question that the lots now in question, except lot No.
97, are all bounded toward the East and Southeast by the San Mateo River
according to the deeds of sale executed by the defendant in favor of the
plaintiffs; lot No. 97, according to Exhibit G-l, however, is bounded on all
sides by said river.

“The lengthy answers interposed by the defendant in these cases do not employ
the precise wordings of the rule in support of its contention that the documents
involved do not express the true intent and agreement of the parties. A careful
perusal, however, of said pleadings yields the ineluctable finding that the
defendant company’s main contention consisted in that the lots in question were
not included in the sales but formed part and parcel of the company’s original
property and that said lots were not accretions of riparian property. In its
pleadings, defendant further alleged that during the Japanese occupation, it
caused the survey of these lots and the plan thus made was considered a
subdivision plan on the theory that the lots so surveyed formed part of the
original mass belonging to Maria de la Concepcion Martinez Canas Noriega de
Roguera under Certificate of Title No. 333. Defendant, in this connection,
claims that the technical descriptions set forth in the deeds of sale in favor
of the plaintiffs or their predecessors were copied literally from Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 8815 which contains the old technical descriptions
appearing in the titles issued in favor of the previous owners; and that in the
preparation of the documents of sale, defendant merely had to copy the technical
descriptions appearing in the title itself in accordance with the rules
governing voluntary transfers of registered real properties.

“After a painstaking and careful consideration of the entire record- by
themselves voluminous-we find that the defendant-appellant should, by reason of
the allegations set up in Its answers, be allowed to show the actual condition
of the lots in question as of the time the deeds of sale were executed by it in
favor of the plaintiffs and appellees.

“Defendant’s claim to the effect that the technical descriptions set forth in
the old title were lifted bodily therefrom and reproduced verbatim in the deeds
of sale in plaintiffs’ favor is, to our mind, well taken as this is a practice
commonly adhered to in the making of deeds of sales or other voluntary transfers
or conveyances of registered properties. This practice is exemplified by
transfer certificate of title No. 11856 in the name of plaintiff Maria
Concepcion (Exhibit D-2). Be it ,noted that Maria Concepcion acquired the rights
of her co-owner Gregorio Diaz over lot 92-C and, as a consequence thereof,
transfer certificate of title No. 11856 (Exhibit D-2) was issued in her name on
December 11, 1948. The technical description appearing in this title No. 11856,
though recently made, still points to the San Mateo River as the southeastern
boundary of lot No. 92-C despite the fact that the present actual southeastern
boundary of said lot 92-C is lot 12 of plan Psu-115484 one of the lots now in
question (Civil Case No. 1476).

“The reason for this seeming discrepancy is obvious. “When the old title in
the name of Maria Concepcion and Gregorio Diaz was cancelled and a new one
issued in the sole name of Maria Concepcion who had consolidated ownership in
her name, the technical description set forth in the old title was copied
verbatim and reproduced literally in the new consolidated title.

“With the evidence at hand, it is impossible for us to properly evaluate and
adequately weigh the respective contentions of the parties. For this reason, we
are constrained to remand the records hereof to the court a quo for the
reception of the evidence, testimonial and documentary, the defendant may desire
to present tending to show the actual conditions of the lots in issue as of the
date of the execution of the deeds of sale (Exhibits D, E, F, G and G-1) in
favor of the plaintiffs or their predecessors-in-interest, and to prove whether
the lots now in question were, in fact, included in the original title No. 333.
Plaintiffs, on their part, may present rebuttal evidence, if they so wish,
apropos of the points covered by the defendant’s additional evidence. Once the
parties have rested their case, the court below should render a new decision
based upon all the evidence adduced,”

Petitioners assail this view of the Court of Appeals upon the ground “that in
the answer interposed by the defendant company (respondent herein) there is no
allegation whatsoever that the * * * deed of sale” already adverted to ”do not
express the true intent and agreement of the parties.” Thus, petitioners
impliedly concedes that the parol evidence in question would be admissible if
respondent’s answer contained said allegation. It is not indispensable however,
that the question whether the averments in the answer amount or not to an
allegation that said deeds of sale do not faithfully reflect the intent of the
parties be decided now. The assertions made in said pleading are sufficient, to
our mind, to warrant a deferment of the determination of said question, and the
provisional admission of the parol evidence already referred to. What the
parties to a given transaction had in mind usually depends upon a number of
circumstances, some of which may be important, if not decisive, in the task of
ascertaining their intent. Very often, it is difficult, if not impossible, to
have the right perspective until after all pertinent facts have been assembled.
Until then, it is not possible, at times, to view, in its true light, the
effect, upon a party, of a pleading filed by his opponent, such as, for
instance, whether it sufficiently advises the former that the latter assails the
accuracy of the deed executed by both in describing the transaction between
them. For these reasons, it is best, to our mind, that the issue before us be
settled, later on, after the admission of the evidence alluded to in the
resolution of the Court of Appeals.’ After all, pleadings, as well as remedial
laws, should be construed liberally, in order that litigants may have ample
opportunity to prove their respective claims, and that a possible denial of
substantial justice, due to legal technicalities, may be avoided.

It is urged, by petitioners herein, that respondent is in estoppel to
maintain that its own deeds of sale are inaccurate, and that, regardless of
whether or not the inaccuracy is alleged in its answer, respondent’s parol
evidence thereon should not be admitted. There is, however, in the record
before us, nothing to indicate that petitioners were misled by the alleged
inaccuracy in said instruments, and that, acting upon the erroneous impression
thus produced by respondent’s acts, said petitioners assumed an obligation or
paid a price which otherwise they would not have assumed or paid. Without
passing upon the merits of the petitioners’ plea of estoppel, insofar as
material to the right of action of petitioners herein, it is our considered
opinion that the allegations in their petition and the arguments adduced in
support hereof are not enough to justify interference with the resolution
complained of.

Subject to the qualifications above stated, said resolution of the Court of
Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, without special pronouncement as to
costs. It is so ordered.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and
Felix, JJ., concur.