ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, AND ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MAR…

Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of
Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7675, otherwise known as “An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be Known as the City of
Mandaluyong.”

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the
municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged to only one legislative
district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the
incumbent congressional representative of this legislative district, sponsored
the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9,
1994.

Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was
held on April 10, 1994. The people of
Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the
Municipality of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A.
No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite
was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted “yes” whereas 7,911 voted
“no.” By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified
and in effect.

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No.
7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for
being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.

Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

“As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall
have its own legislative district with the first representative to be elected
in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative
district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of
San Juan with its first representative to be elected at the same
election.”

Petitioners’ first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A.
No. 7675 is that it contravenes the “one subject-one bill” rule, as
enunciated in Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Constitution, to wit:

“Section 26 (1). Every
bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof.”

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49
in the subject law resulted in the latter embracing two principal subjects,
namely: (1) the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city; and (2) the division of the
congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not
germane to the subject matter of R.A. No. 7675 since the said law treats of the
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed in the
title of the law. Therefore, since Section
49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of the law, the
“one subject-one bill” rule has not been complied with.

Petitioners’ second and third objections involve Article VI,
Sections 5 (1) and (4) of the Constitution, which provide, to wit:

“Section 5 (1). The
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and
fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party list system of
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.”

“Section 5(4). Within
three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this
section.”

Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong
into separate congressional districts under Section 49 of the assailed law has
resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of Representatives
beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners contend that said
division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section
49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative
districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) as aforecited.

The contentions are devoid of merit.

Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the
Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly
urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand
indubitably ordains compliance with the “one city-one representative”
proviso in the Constitution:

“x x x Each city with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least one representative”
(Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).

Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional
mandate that the creation of a separate congressional district for the City of
Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675.

Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a subject separate and distinct
from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a
natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized
city. Verily, the title of R.A. No.
7675. “An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly
Urbanized City of Mandaluyong” necessarily includes and contemplates the
subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong.

Moreover, a liberal construction of the “one title-one
subject” rule has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to
cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in
Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that
the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1)
“should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions
are germane to that general subject.”

The liberal construction of the “one title-one subject”
rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v. Comelec (21
SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:

“Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to
employ in the title of an enactment, language of such precision as to mirror,
fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the
purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the
persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature,
scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation”
(emphasis supplied).

Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by
petitioners to the effect that there is no mention in the assailed law of any
census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum
requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative
districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No.
7675. The said Act enjoys the
presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes,
including due consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum
requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all
laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered
by Congress in the enactment of said laws.

As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present
limit on the number of representatives as set forth in the Constitution, a
reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted,
shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the
House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
“unless otherwise provided by law.” The inescapable import of the
latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be increased, if
Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional
representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do
not qualify to have separate legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of
R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect
preempts the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts, the said argument
borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the glaring fact that it was
Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,
including Section 49 thereof. Congress
cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675,
petitioners present further arguments against the velidity thereof.

Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been
made to participate in the plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a
change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved
in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city. The matter of separate district representation
was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the
inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they
had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioners’ additional argument that the subject law
has resulted in “gerrymandering,” which is the practice of creating
legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy
of credence. As correctly observed by
the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the author
of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San
Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep.
Zamora’s constituency has in fact been diminished, which development could
hardly be considered as favorable to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of
merit.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.