THE UNITED STATES, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. ROMAN INFANTE AND TOMAS BARRETO, DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS.

This is an appeal taken from the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, convicting the appellants, Roman Infante and Tomas
Barreto, of the crime of falsification of a private document and
sentencing both and each of them to be imprisoned for one year eight
months and twenty-one days, to pay a fine of P1,000 each and in case of
insolvency to undergo the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment, to
suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law and each to pay
one-half the costs of the proceedings.

The proceedings were had by virtue of the following information filed
by the assistant prosecuting attorney for the city of Manila:

“The undersigned charges Roman Infante and Tomas Barreto with the
crime of falsification of a private document, committed as follows:

“That, on or about May 20, 1914, in the city of Manila, Philippine
Islands, the said Roman Infante and Tomas Barreto, conspiring and
confederating with each other and mutually assisting one another did,
willfully, unlawfully, criminally, and fraudulently falsify a private
document, to wit, a pawn ticket, No. 5158, issued by the ‘Monte de
Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Manila/ an institution duly organized and
doing business in the city of Manila, Philippine Islands, and did make
in the said pawn ticket the following alterations or changes:

“They erased the name ‘Francisco Martinez,’ which had been written in
the lower part of the pawn ticket and immediately below the words ‘the
pawner/ and substituted therefor the name of ‘Eusebio Mapalag.’ They
changed the words ‘eight pesos’ (the amount for which, according to the
said document, a certain gold coin was pawned) for the words
‘three-hundred and fifty pesos;’ the figures ‘P10’ (which, in the said
document, indicated the amount of the valuation of the said gold coin),
for those of ‘P500;’ and the words ‘an American five dollar gold
piece,’ (which, in the said document, were originally inserted as a
description of the pawned coin), for the following words: ‘An 18 carat
gold necklace, with an 18 carat gold pendent set with one large and
sixteen small brilliants, and an 18 carat
gold marquise ring inset
with 14 large and small brilliants;’ whereby it was made to appear in
the said document that an 18 carat gold necklace with a pendent of the
same metal, with one large and 16 small brilliants and an 18 carat gold
marquise ring inset with 14 large and small brilliants, both appraised
at P500, Philippine currency, had been pawned in the said establishment
for the sum of P350, Philippine currency, by a person named Eusebio
Mapalag, when, as a matter of fact and as the said accused very well
knew, the article pawned was only an American five dollar gold piece,
valued at P10, Philippine currency, and that it was pawned for P8, not
by Eusebio Mapalag, but by a person named Francisco Martinez;—acts
committed with intent to injure Hugo Roseburg, to whom the said accused
delivered the said pawn ticket as security for a loan, and to prejudice
the said ‘Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Manila.’ With violation
of law.”

When the case was called for hearing, counsel for the defendants
moved for a separate trial, which motion was granted by the court.

It appears that on about the 20th day of May, 1914, Hugo Roseburg, the complaining witness, was the owner of the pawnshop La Insular,
of which the defendant Roman Infante was the manager under a contract
with Roseburg, by the terms of which he was to receive, besides his
salary, a certain percentage of the gross business transacted. In his
character as manager, the defendant Infante had.full control of the
pawnshop, the proprietor being present only at certain intervals of the
day, and the greater part of the business being transacted by Infante
personally and independently of any intervention on the part of
Roseburg.

On or about the 3d day of November, 1914, one Alejandro Fernandez pawned in the La Insular pawnshop, for the sum of P700, three pawn tickets purporting to be pawn tickets of the Monte de Piedad,
of which sum P500 was paid in cash and P200 by check. One of these
tickets was Exhibit B, pawn ticket No. 5158, series of 1914, of the Monte de Piedad,
which the prosecution alleges was falsified by the defendants. The
theory of the prosecution, which is fully sustained by the evidence, is
that Infante induced his co-accused, Barreto, to falsify these pawn
tickets so that when falsified they could be used in the La Insular
pawnshop, of which Infante was manager, as pledges, upon which an
amount of money might be advanced with apparent propriety, far in
excess of that which would be justified upon presentation as pledges of
the original pawn tickets.

The voluntary confessions of
both the defendants and appellants to the witness Nelson, read together
with the other evidence of record, leave no room for reasonable doubt
as to their guilt of the crime of falsification of the private document
of which they were convicted in the court below.

Counsel for Infante contends that the confession of Infante should
not have been admitted in evidence over his objection, because, as
counsel, insists, it does not affirmatively appear that it was made
voluntarily. Nelson testified in substance that Infante voluntarily
confessed that he had directed his co-accused Barreto to falsify the
particular pawn ticket in question in this action, in the same way as
he, Infante, had explained to Nelson at a former interview that a
number of other tickets had been falsified. The undisputed evidence of
record discloses that this statement was made voluntarily, but counsel
contends that it does not appear that the statements made at the former
interview were made voluntarily, and that all reference thereto should
have been stricken out of the record. We cannot agree with counsel in
this regard. There is nothing in the record to suggest that the
statements made at the former interview were not made voluntarily; and
even if they were, the evidence clearly discloses that the statement
made at the latter interview was not made under any form of duress; and
on that occasion this accused voluntarily admitted the truth of certain
facts, which taken together with the other evidence of record,
conclusively establish his guilt of the crime of which he was
convicted. Whatever were the conditions under which the statements made
at the former interview were made, there can be no doubt as to the
voluntary character of the statement made at the latter interview. The
accused incorporated into his statement made at the latter interview
the substance of what he had said at the former interview, and in doing
so there can be no doubt that he was acting voluntarily and of his own
free will.

As to the contentions made on behalf of Barreto that he should not
be convicted of the crime of falsification because it does not appear
that he personally profited thereby, it is sufficient to indicate that
the gravamen of the offense of falsification of a private document
consists of the damage done to another or the intent to damage another
by the commission of the falsification, and that under the terms of the
law defining and penalizing the offense, proof that the accused
profited or hoped to gain or profit by the falsification is not
necessary to sustain a conviction. The language of the statute is as
follows:

“Any person who, to the damage of another, or with the intent to
cause such damage, shall in any private document commit any of the acts
of falsification enumerated in article three hundred shall suffer the
penalty of presidio correctional in its minimum and medium
degrees and be fined in a sum not less than six hundred and twenty-five
and not more than six thousand two hundred and fifty pesetas.” (Article
304, Penal Code.)

The evidence clearly discloses that the physical changeson the face
of the pawn ticket were made by Barreto and that he was induced to
commit the falsification by his co-accused Infante. There can be no
question, therefore, that both were guilty as principals.

The evidence clearly sustains the finding of the trial court that the
appellants conspired together to commit the crime with which they were
charged, and further that they actually committed the crime. They were
convicted in the court below of the commission of the consummated
crime, not of a mere conspiracy to commit it. There is no merit,
therefore, in the contention of counsel that the court erred in finding
the existence of a conspiracy. Counsel’s contention is based on the
provisions of article 4 of the Penal Code which declare that a
conspiracy to commit a crime is punishable only when the law
specifically prescribes a penalty therefor. While it is true that
penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a
crime unless the statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor,
nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many
cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together with the
other evidence of record, in establishing the existence of the
consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.

What has been said disposes of the numerous assignments of error by
counsel for these appellants other than those based upon alleged error
by the trial judge in making certain findings of fact with relation to
Infante, which, although they are sustained by the evidence adduced at
the separate trial of Barreto, are not sustained by the evidence
admitted at the trial of Infante. It appears that the trial judge did
in fact include in his findings of fact with relation to Infante’s
participation in the crime, a number of details which were not formally
developed by the evidence adduced at his separate trial; but a careful
examination of the whole record satisfies us that the inclusion of
these findings in the record in no wise affected the final result, and
that it was error without prejudice which does not justify or require a
reversal of the judgment convicting and sentencing this appellant.

We find no error in the proceedings prejudicial to the substantial
rights of either of these appellants, and the judgment entered in the
court below should, therefore, be affirmed, with one-half of the costs
in this instance against each of them. So ordered.

Torres, Trent, and Araullo, JJ. concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.