MAURICIA VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, PEDRO TOYON, FELIZARDO CON-AY, ROQUE NAYVE, ROMEO CALO, GENARO BALUD, CANTIDIO CALO, AND FLORENCIO TABAO, PETITIONERS, VS. MONTANO A. ORTIZ, AS DIST…

This is a petition for “certiorari, prohibition and mandamus.”

Petitioner Mauricia Vda. de Villanueva is the holder of an ordinary timber
license, covering a public forest situated in the municipality of Esperanza,
province of Agusan, and more particularly described as follows:

“* * * Bounded on the North by Wawa River and Cagbas Creek; on the South by
Labao River; on the West by Agusan River; and extending about 12 kilometers
eastward to the interior, covering a total forested area of about 4,720 hectares
in the Province of Agusan, Municipality of Esperanza, * * *.”

Respondent Pedro B. Patanao holds a similar timber license covering, a forest
area adjoining that of Mrs. Villanueva and more particularly described as
follows:

“Parcel II.-Starting from point 1, or junction of Wawa and Cagbas Creek;
thence following Wawa River upstream in a north and northeasterly and Bayugan
Creek; thence following Bayugan Creek upstream in a general easterly direction
about 11,000 meters to point 3, on junction of Bayugan and Maytoroc Creeks;
thence following a straight line S 70′ E about 1,400 meters to point 4, or
junction of Labao River and Mahogion Creek; thence following Labao River
downstream in a general southerly direction about 6,000 meters to point 5, or
junction of Labao River and a trail (Proposed National Road; thence following
straight line N 65′ W. about 1,800 meters to point 6, or source of Cagbas Creek;
thence following Cagbas Creek downstream in a northeasterly direction about
8,000 meters to point 1, or point of beginning.”

Prior to September 1, 1956, a conflict arose between these concessionaires in
connection with a portion of said forest, which was claimed by both as part of
the area covered by their respective licenses. The conflict was due to the fact
that the areas covered by licenses were separated, on one side thereof, by the
Cagbas Creek; that there were several creeks in the portion in dispute; and that
the concessionaires disagreed on which one was the Cagbas Creek. Upon the other
hand, this question was not, as yet, definitely settled by the records of the
Bureau of Forestry, under the jurisdiction of which the concessions in question
and public forests are. What ia worse, in order to determine the exact location
of said creek, insofar as material to the issue under consideration, a physical
survey of the area in dispute-which the Bureau of Forestry was not in a position
to undertake, at the moment-was necessary. Having been informed of said
conflict, on September 1, 1956, the office of the district forester in Butuan
City wrote to Pedro B. Patanao a letter reading:

“Reports from our field representatives who has conducted some survey along
and within the vicinities of Cagbas Creek show that you are operating within the
right side of said creek, following its course upstream. If this is true, you
are hereby requested to stop immediately your operations thereat until your
common boundary with Licensee M. Yda. de Villanueva is finally established on
the ground. Meanwhile that this Office is not yet in a position to survey the
course of Cagbas Creek, you should move your men and equipments to the left side
of Cagbas Creek following its course upstream to avoid trouble with your
neighboring licensee.

“In this connection, you will be informed when our man is ready to undertake
the establishment of your common boundary with O. T. Licensee M. C. Vda. de
Villanueva. Be sure to provide your representative who will accompany our man
with a written authorization, in case you cannot attend in person the field
survey.

“Your cooperation and compliance with this request will be highly
appreciated.”

On September 8, 1956, the same office wrote to Mrs. Villanueva a
communication of the following tenor:

“This Office has been informed that you are still operating within the area
contested by you and Mr. Pedxo B. Patanao contrary to our letter to you of
August 27, 1956, “whereby no new cutting, felling, bucking or hauling of logs
should be undertaken. The reasons given by you in your letter of August 27,
1956, while justifiable on ground of the -previous findings of this Office, are
now apparently assailable because the certainty of the Cagbas Creek has been
questioned. As a consequence, the boundary dispute and incidentally the logs
involved cannot be resolved unless the Cagbas Creek has been properly determined
as such beyond reasonable doubt by all parties concerned.

“If this information is correct and in justice to all concerned, we are once
more advising you to stop momentarily your operation in the area in question
including the vicinity which is the right side upstream of the Cagbas Creek
within three kilometers from the third bridge as mentioned in your letter of
August 29, 1956, until this conflict is settled. This reiterates our similar
injunction in connection with this case.

“Since the undersigned is going to the field on Monday to establish your
common boundary, it will be appreciated that you give this matter your
understanding and cooperation.”

On the same date (September 8, 1956), Patanao instituted Civil Case No. 507
of the Court of First Instance of Agusan, against Mrs. Villanueva. In his
complaint therein, Patanao alleged that in August, 1956, “and on the succeeding
days thereafter,” Mrs. Villanueva had, through her agents and without his
consent, entered and cut down commercial timber and hauled and transported the
same from his forest concession, for which reason it was prayed that Mrs.
Villanueva be ordered to pay damages, and that, during the pendency of the case,
she be enjoined from “entering, cutting, hauling, transportation and otherwise
disposing timber in said portion of the forest area aforementioned, including
her agents, cutters, loggers, contractors, and persons under her, and that after
trial the injunction be made permanent.” By an order dated September 12, 1956,
said court, presided over by Hon. Montano A. Ortiz, Judge, authorized the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for upon the posting of a
P5,000 bond. Said writ having been issued on September 13, 1956, the clerk of
court wrote to the district forester a letter, dated September 14, requesting
his cooperation in the determination of the boundary line between the two (2)
concessions. In reply thereto, the office of the district forester supplied, on
September 15, 1956, the following information:

“I have the honor to inform you that as of this date, the boundary line
between Mrs. Villanueva and Mr. Patanao has not as yet been establish. However,
survey of the allegedly Cagbas Creek from the last point of the survey of the
Bureau of Lands to a point supposed to be the source of the said creek and
marked on a nearby tree ‘6/102’, and the survey of the Mayhag Creek from its
junction with Cagbas Creek to a point marked in our survey as ‘5/22’ on the said
Mayhag Creek, have already been made. We will continue to survey the Mayhag
Creek to its source.

“Survey of these two branches of Cagbas Creek has to be made in order to
determining the extent of the area in question, determine the layout of these
creeks on the ground so that the boundary in question could be properly
established.

“A copy of this letter is furnished the Provincial Sheriff, Butuan City, for
his information and record.”

On October 4, 1956, Mrs. Villanueva filed a motion to dismiss and a motion to
dissolve the aforementioned writ of preliminary injunction. Both motions were
predicated upon the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the court over the “subject
matter of the writ.” In support of this pretense, Mrs. Villanueva alleged, among
other things, that the issue posed by the complaint of Patanao was merely the
effect of a conflict on the boundaries of their respective concessions, as
indicated in the above-quoted letters, of the District Forester, dated September
1 and 8, 1956, copies of which were attached to the motion to dissolve the writ
of preliminary injunction; that said conflict should first be settled
administratively by the Bureau of Forestry and the Department of Agriculture and
Natural Resources; and that Patanao does not appear to have previously exhausted
the administrative remedies. These motions were set for hearing on October 6,
1956. Patanao then filed an opposition, to which Mrs. Villanueva replied on
October 8, 1956. Although said motions were, thus, deemed submitted on the date
last mentioned, respondent Judge took no action thereon.

Meanwhile, or on October 11, 1956, Patanao, in turn, filed a motion praying
that an alias writ of preliminary injunction be issued against Pero Toyon,
Felizardo Conay, Roque Nayve, Romeo Calo, Genaro Balud, Cantidio Calo and
Florencio Tabao, upon the ground that, despite the writ issued on September 13,
1956, said persons, as agents of Mrs. Villanueva, had entered the area in
dispute, and cut, hauled and taken away timber therefrom. Patanao, likewise,
prayed that they be declared in contempt of court. By order dated October 15,
1956, repondent Judge granted the motion, insofar as the alias writ of
preliminary injunction was concerned, which alias writ was issued on the same
date. As regards the contempt proceedings, the hearing was “postponed until
after the return of the presiding Judge * * * from Oroquieta.”

Soon thereafter, or on October 23, 1956, Mrs. Villanueva and the persons
against whom said alias writ of preliminary injunction was issued, instituted
the present action against Hon. Montano A. Ortiz, as Judge of First Instance of
Agusan, the Provincial Sheriff of Agusan and Pedro B. Patanao. It is alleged in
the petition herein that, taking” cognizance of said Civil Case No. 507 of said
court of first instance and in issuing said writ of preliminary injunction, as
well as the alias writ of preliminary injunction, respondent Judge had acted
without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, thereby excluding the
petitioners from the use and enjoyment of a right to which they are entitled,
and that they have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, except the present petition, for which reason they pray that,
pending the final determination of this case, an ex parte writ of preliminary
injunction be issued restraining the respondents and their agents or
representatives from enforcing the aforementioned writs and from molesting,
disturbing or interfering with the logging operations of the petitioners in the
area covered and described in the license of Mrs. Villanueva, and ordering and
commanding the respondent Judge to desist from further proceedings in said Civil
Case No., 507, and that, after due hearing, the writ preliminary injunction
issued by this Court be made final and permanent and respondent Judge ordered to
dismiss said Civil Case No. 507 for lack of jurisdiction, with costs against
respondent Patanao.

Upon the filing of the petition herein, respondents were
required to answer thereto within ten (10) days from notice. As petitioners,
thereafter, renewed their petition for a writ of preliminary injunction,
respondents were required to comment thereon within five (5) days from notice.
Subsequently, respondents filed their opposition to said petition for a writ of
preliminary injunctions, after which we ordered, on November 13, 1956, the
issuance of said writ, upon the filing of a P10,000 bond. This condition having
been fulfilled, the writ prayed for was issued by this Court on December 6,
1956.

In his answer, respondent Patanao alleged that the forest area in dispute is
covered by the license issued in his favor; that the motions of Mrs. Villanueva
to dismiss Civil Case No. 507 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan and to
dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued are still pending
resolution in said court; that the issue between the parties herein is one
involving a purely private right, wm’ch does not require previous administrative
determination; that petitioners have a plain, adequate and speedy remedy in the
ordinary course of law, which is to writ for the outcome of said Case No. 507,
particularly the action of the Court of First Instance of Agusan on petitioners’
motions to dismiss said case and to dissolve said writ of preliminary injunction
issued by respondent Judge; and that the co-petitioners of Mrs. Villanueva are
her agents, laborers and persons acting in her behalf.

At the outset, respondents allege in their answer herein that petitioners’
motions to dismiss Case No. 507 and to dissolve the writ of preliminary
injunction issued therein were still pending when the case at bar was instituted
on October 23, 1956, and that by agreement of the parties, said motions were set
for hearing on November 3, 1956. Thus, respondents, in effect, maintain that
petitioners had no cause of action for either certiorari, or prohibition or
mandamus. However, as adverted to above, said motions were set for hearing on
October 6, 1956. Patanao then filed his answer thereto, to which Mrs. Villanueva
replied on October 8, 1956. Accordingly, the motions were then deemed submitted
for resolution and, yet, respondent Judge took no action thereon before October
23, 1956, when this case was begun. Instead said respondent issued an alias writ
of preliminary injunction on October 15, 1956, which petitioners herein regarded
as implying a denial of said motions. Indeed, the aforementioned alias, writ
constituted a reaffirmation of the writ of injunction complained of, and,
consequently, indicated that respondent Judge did not favor the dissolution
thereof. Under the circumstances, petitioners were not bound to wait
indefinitely for an explicit denial of said motions. They were justified in
taking appropriate measures for the protection of their rights, particularly
because there was a move to deal with them for alleged contempt of court.

Upon the other hand, it is not true that the issue in this case affects,
rights which are purely private in nature. As holders of ordinary timber
license, Mrs. Villanueva and respondent Patanao were permitted to enter public
forests, cut timber therein and take the same therefrom. These are privileges
emanating from the Government and affecting public property, as well as public
interest and public policy. Indeed, the issue between the parties was one
involving exclusively the boundary of their respective concessions, which, in
turn, depended upon the extent of the grant made by the Government in their
favor. What is more, the above-quoted official communications attached to the
motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent
Judge-the authenticity of which communications was not questioned by
Patanao-showed clearly that the common boundary of said concessions was an
unsettled matter; that the very Bureau of Forestry-which has direct authority
over public forests and over timber concessions-was not, as yet, in a position
to determine said common boundary; and that steps were still being taken to
ascertain the same. In other words, there were sufficient facts before
respondent Judge to show that the alleged right of Patanao to the writ prayed
for in the complaint was, to say the least, debatable or dubious. Hence, said
respondent should have forthwith dissolved the writ of preliminary inj unction
and the alias writ of preliminary injunction complained of. (Cordillo vs. Del
Rosario, 39 Phil., 829; Kodulfa vs. Alfonso, 76 Phil, 225; Calo vs. Roldan, 76
Phil., 445; Calo vs. Ortega et al., L-4673 and L-4675, January 25, 1952.)

In fact, upon investigation and physical check up by ranger-sealer Moises R.
Babalos of the Bureau of Forestry, it was eventually verified, and the Director
of Forestry officially declared, on November 15, 1956, that the disputed area is
part of the concession of Mrs. Villanueva, and outside that of Mr. Patanao.

Lastly, it was apparent from the aforementioned communications, annexed to
the motion to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent
Judge, that the controversy between Mrs. Villanueva and respondent Patanao was
still pending investigation by the Bureau of Forestry, the office charged by law
with the duty of administering our public forests, of issuing licenses for the
cutting of timber therefrom and of seeing” to it that the concessionaires comply
with their ‘obligations under their respective licenses and the pertinent laws
and regulations. Thus, it was patent from the record before respondent Judge,
upon the filing of said motion, that Patanao had, not only failed to exhaust the
administrative remedies available to him, but, also, failed to complete even the
initial and indispensable step for the redress of his alleged grievance against
Mrs. Villanueva-the determination of the common boundary of their concession. In
other words, Patanao had no cause of action, as yet, against Mrs. Villanueva. It
is well settled that before one resorts to the courts of justice, such
administrative remedies as may be available should first be exhausted (Miguel et
al. vs. Vda. de Reyes et ah, 93 Phil., 542; Lubugan et al. vs. Castrillo et al.,
L-10521, May 29, 1957; Cabo Kho vs. Rodriguez, L-9032, September 28, 1957; Heirs
of Lachica vs. Ducusin, 102 Phil., 551; and Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil.,
706).

Wherefore, the orders of repondent Judge dated September 12 and October 15,
1956, and the writ of preliminary injunction and the alias writ of preliminary
injunction issued on September 13 and October 15, 1956, in pursuance of said
orders, are hereby set aside and annulled, and the writ of preliminary
injunction issued by this Court on December 6, 1956, is made final and
permanent, with costs against respondent, Pedro B. Patanao. It is so
ordered.

Paras, C.J, Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur.