MARTIN CENTENO, PETITIONER, VS. HON. VICTORIA VILLALON­-PORNILLOS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALOLOS, BULACAN, BRANCH 10, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,…

It is indeed unfortunate that a group of elderly men, who were
moved by their desire to devote their remaining years to the service of their
Creator by forming their own civic organization for that purpose, should find
themselves enmeshed in a criminal case for making a solicitation from a
community member allegedly without the required permit from the Department of
Social Welfare and Development.

The records of this case reveal that sometime in the last quarter
of 1985, the officers of a civic organization known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay
launched a fund drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan. Petitioner Martin Centeno, the chairman of
the group, together with Vicente Yco, approached Judge Adoracion G. Angeles, a
resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was
made without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and Development.

As a consequence, based
on the complaint of Judge Angeles, an information^[1] was filed against petitioner Martin Centeno,
together with Religio Evaristo and Vicente Yco, for violation of Presidential
Decree No. 1564, or the Solicitation Permit Law, before the Municipal Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 2, and docketed as Criminal Case No. 2602. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the
information^[2] on the ground that the facts alleged therein
do not constitute an offense, claiming that Presidential Decree No. 1564 only
covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare purposes, but not
those made for a religious purpose such as the construction of a chapel. This was denied^[3] by the trial court, and petitioner’s motion
for reconsideration having met the same fate, trial on the merits ensued.

On December 29, 1992, the
said trial court rendered judgment^[4] finding accused Vicente Yco and petitioner
Centeno guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentencing them to each pay a fine
of P200.00. Nevertheless, the trial court
recommended that the accused be pardoned on the basis of its finding
that they acted in good faith, plus the fact that it believed that the latter should not have been criminally
liable were it not for the existence of Presidential Decree No. 1564 which the
court opined it had the duty to apply in the instant case.

Both accused Centeno and Yco appealed to the Regional Trial Court
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10. However, accused Yco subsequently withdrew his appeal, hence the case
proceeded only with respect to petitioner Centeno. On May 21, 1993, respondent nudge
Villalon-Pornillos affirmed the decision of the lower court but modified
the penalty, allegedly because of the perversity of the act committed which
caused damage and prejudice to the complainant, by sentencing petitioner
Centeno to suffer an increased penalty of imprisonment of 6 months and a fine of P1,000.00, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.^[5] The
motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the court.^[6]

Thus it is that a
fine of P200.00 imposed as a penalty by the lowest court in the judicial
heirarchy eventually reached this highest
tribunal, challenged on the sole issue of whether solicitations for religious purposes are within the
ambit of Presidential Decree No. 1564. Quantitatively, the financial
sanction is a nominal imposition
but, on a question of principle, it is not a trifling matter. This Court
is gratified that it can now grant this case the benefit of a final
adjudication.

Petitioner questions the
applicability of Presidential Decree No. 1564 to solicitations for
contributions intended for religious purposes with the submissions that (1) the
term “religious purpose” is not expressly included in the provisions of the
statute, hence what the law does not include, it excludes; (2) penal laws are
to be construed strictly against the State and liberally in favor of the
accused; and (3) to subject to State regulation solicitations made for a
religious purpose would constitute an abridgment of the right to freedom of
religion guaranteed under the Constitution.

Presidential Decree No.
1564 (which amended Act No. 4075, otherwise known as the Solicitation
Permit Law), provides as follows:

“Sec. 2. Any person,
corporation, organization, or association desiring to solicit or receive
contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes shall first secure a
permit from the Regional Offices of the Department of Social Services and
Development as provided in the Integrated Reorganization Plan. Upon the filing of a written application for
a permit in the form prescribed by the Regional Offices of the Department of
Social Services and Development, the Regional Director or his duly authorized
representative may, in his discretion, issue a permanent or temporary permit or
disapprove the application. In the
interest of the public, he may in his
discretion renew or revoke any permit issued under Act 4075.”

The main issue to be resolved here is whether the phrase
“charitable purposes” should be construed in its broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose. We hold in the negative.

I.   Indeed, it is an elementary rule of statutory
construction that the express mention of one person, thing, act, or consequence
excludes all others. This rule is
expressed in the familiar maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius.”
Where a statute, by its terms, is
expressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to others. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have
made specified enumerations in a statute had the intention been not to restrict
its meaning and to confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned.^[7]

It will be observed that
the 1987 Constitution, as well as several other statutes, treat the words
“charitable” and “religious” separately and independently of each other. Thus, the word “charitable” is only one of
three descriptive words used in Section 28 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
which provides that “charitable institutions, churches and parsonages x x x, and all lands, buildings, and improvements, actually, directly, and
exclusively used for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be
exempt from taxation.” There are certain provisions in statutes wherein these
two terms are likewise dissociated and individually mentioned, as for instance,
Sections 26 (e) (corporations exempt from income tax) and 28 (8) (E)
(exclusions from gross income) of the National Internal Revenue Code; Section
88 (purposes for the organization of non-stock corporations) of the Corporation
Code; and Section 234 (b) (exemptions from real property tax) of the Local
Government Code.

That these legislative
enactments specifically spelled out “charitable” and “religious” in an
enumeration, whereas Presidential Decree No. 1564 merely stated “charitable or
public welfare purposes,” only goes to show that the framers of the law in
question never intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within
its coverage. Otherwise, there is no
reason why it would not have so stated expressly.

All contributions
designed to promote the work of the church are “charitable” in nature, since
religious activities depend for their support on voluntary contributions.^[8] However, “religious purpose” is not
interchangeable with the expression “charitable purpose.” While it is true that
there is no religious purpose which is not also a charitable
purpose, yet the converse is not equally true, for there may be a “charitable”
purpose which is not “religious” in the legal sense of the term.^[9] Although the term “charitable” may include
matters which are “religious,” it is a broader term and includes matters which
are not “religious,” and, accordingly, there is a distinction between
“charitable purpose” and “religious purpose,” except where the two terms
are obviously used synonymously, or where the distinction has been done away
with by statute.^[10]
The word “charitable,” therefore, like most other words, is capable of
different significations. For example,
in the law, exempting charitable uses from taxation, it has a very wide
meaning, but under Presidential Decree No. 1564 which is a penal law, it cannot
be given such a broad application since it would be prejudicial to petitioners.

To illustrate, the rule is that tax exemptions are generally construed
strictly against the taxpayer. However,
there are cases wherein claims for exemption from tax for “religious purposes”
have been liberally construed as covered in the law granting tax exemptions for
“charitable purposes.” Thus, the term “charitable purposes,” within the meaning
of a statute providing that the succession of any property passing to or for
the use of any institution for purposes only of public charity shall not be
subject to succession tax, is deemed to include religious purposes.^[11]
A gift for “religious purposes” was considered as a bequest for “charitable use” as regards exemption from
inheritance tax.^[12]

On the other hand, to subsume the “religious” purpose of the
solicitation within the concept of “charitable” purpose which under Presidential
Decree No. 1564 requires a prior permit from the Department of Social Services
and Development; under pain of penal liability in the absence thereof, would be
prejudicial to petitioner. Accordingly,
the term “charitable” should be strictly construed so as to exclude
solicitations for “religious” purposes. Thereby, we adhere to the fundamental doctrine underlying virtually all
penal legislations that such interpretation should be adopted as would favor the
accused.

For, it is a
well-entrenched rule that penal laws are to be construed strictly against the
State and liberally in favor of the accused. They are not to be extended or enlarged by implications, intendments,
analogies or equitable considerations. They are not to be strained by construction to spell out a new offense,
enlarge the field of crime or multiply felonies. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is
to subject it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to
safeguard the rights of the accused. If the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but
contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be
preferred. The principle is that acts
in and of themselves innocent and lawful cannot be held to be criminal unless
there is a clear and unequivocal expression of the legislative intent to make
them such. Whatever is not plainly
within the provisions of a penal statute should be regarded as without its
intendment.^[13]

The purpose of strict construction is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise
definition of forbidden acts.^[14] The
word “charitable” is a matter of description rather than of precise definition,
and each case involving a determination
of that which is charitable must be decided on its own, particular facts and
circumstances.^[15]
The law does not operate in vacuo nor should its
applicability be determined by circumstances in the abstract.

Furthermore, in the provisions of the Constitution and the
statutes mentioned above, the enumerations therein given which include the
words “charitable” and “religious” make use of the disjunctive “or.” In its
elementary sense, “or” as used in a statute is a disjunctive article indicating an alternative. It often connects a series of words or
propositions indicating a choice of either. When “or” is used, the various members of the enumeration are to be taken
separately.^[16]
Accordingly, “charitable” and “religious,” which are integral parts of an
enumeration using the disjunctive “or” should be given different, distinct, and
disparate meanings. There is no
compelling consideration why the same treatment or usage of these words cannot
be made applicable to the questioned provisions of Presidential Decree No.
1564.

II.  Petitioner
next avers that solicitations for religious purposes cannot be penalized under
the law for, otherwise, it will constitute an abridgment or restriction on the
free exercise clause guaranteed under the Constitution.

It may be conceded that
the construction of a church is a social concern of the people and,
consequently, solicitations appurtenant thereto would necessarily involve
public welfare. Prefatorily, it is not
implausible that the regulatory powers of the State may, to a certain degree,
extend to solicitations of this nature. Considering, however, that such an activity is within the cloak of the
free exercise clause under the
right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the Constitution, it becomes
imperative to delve into the efficaciousness of a statutory grant of the power
to regulate the exercise of this constitutional right and the allowable
restrictions which may possibly be imposed thereon.

The constitutional inhibition of legislation on the subject of religion
has a double aspect. On the one hand,
it forestalls compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice
of any form of worship. Freedom of
conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other hand, it safeguards the free
exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus, the constitution embraces two concepts, that is, freedom to believe and freedom to act. The first is absolute but,
in the nature of things, the second cannot be. Conduct remains subject to regulation for the protection of
society. The freedom to act must have
appropriate definitions to preserve the enforcement of that protection. In every case, the power to regulate must be
so exercised, in attaining a permissible end, as not to unduly infringe on the
protected freedom.^[17]

Whence, even the exercise
of religion may be regulated, at some slight inconvenience, in order that the
State may protect its citizens from injury. Without doubt, a State may protect its citizens from fraudulent
solicitation by requiring a stranger in the community, before permitting him
publicly to solicit funds for any purpose, to establish his identity and his
authority to act for the cause which he purports to represent. The State is likewise free to regulate the
time and manner of solicitation generally, in the interest of public safety,
peace, comfort, or convenience.^[18]

It does not follow, therefore,
from the constitutional guaranties of the free exercise of religion that
everything which may be so called can be tolerated.^[19] It has been said that a law advancing a legitimate governmental interest is not necessarily
invalid as one interfering with the “free exercise” of religion merely because
it also incidentally has a detrimental effect on the adherents of one or
more religion.^[20]
Thus, the general regulation, in the public interest, of solicitation, which
does not involve any religious test and does not unreasonably obstruct or delay
the collection of funds, is not open to any constitutional objection, even
though the collection be for a religious purpose. Such regulation would not constitute a prohibited previous
restraint on the free exercise of religion or interpose an inadmissible
obstacle to its exercise.^[21]

Even with numerous
regulative laws in existence, it is surprising how many operations are carried
on by persons and associations who, secreting their activities under the guise
of benevolent purposes, succeed in cheating and defrauding a generous
public. It is in fact amazing how
profitable the fraudulent schemes and practices are to people who manipulate
them. The State has authority under the
exercise of its police power to determine whether or not there shall be
restrictions on soliciting by unscrupulous persons or for unworthy causes or
for fraudulent purposes. That
solicitation of contributions under the guise of charitable and benevolent purposes
is grossly abused is a matter of common knowledge. Certainly the solicitation of contributions
in good faith for worthy purposes should not be denied, but somewhere should be
lodged the power to determine within reasonable limits the worthy from the
unworthy.^[22]
The objectionable practices of unscrupulous persons are prejudicial to worthy
and proper charities which naturally suffer when the confidence of the public
in campaigns for the raising of money
for charity is lessened or destroyed.^[23] Some regulation of public solicitation is,
therefore, in the public interest.^[24]

To conclude, solicitation for religious purposes may be subject
to proper regulation by the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar, considering
that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not within the coverage
of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor.

As a final note, we reject the reason advanced by respondent
judge for increasing the penalty imposed by the trial court, premised on the
supposed perversity of petitioner’s act which thereby caused damage to the
complainant. It must be here emphasized
that the trial court, in the dispositive portion of its decision, even
recommended executive clemency in favor of petitioner and the other accused
after finding that the latter acted in good faith in making the solicitation
from the complainant, an observation with which we fully agree. After all, mistake upon a doubtful and
difficult question of law can be the basis of good faith, especially for a
layman.

There is likewise nothing
in the findings of respondent judge which would indicate, impliedly or
otherwise, that petitioner and his co-accused acted abusively or malevolently. This could be reflective upon her
objectivity, considering that the complainant in this case is herself a judge
of the Regional Trial Court at Kalookan City. It bears stressing at this point that a judge is required to so behave
at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary,^[25]
should be vigilant against any attempt to subvert its independence, and must
resist any pressure from whatever
source.^[26]

WHEREFORE, the
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE, and petitioner
Martin Centeno is ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), and
Puno, J., concur.

Padilla, J., joins J. Mendoza
in his separate concurring opinion.

Mendoza, J., see separate
concurring opinion.

^[1]
Annex A, Petition; Rollo, 25.

^[2]
Annex B, id.; ibid., 20.

^[3]
Annex D, id.; ibid., 34.

^[4]
Annex G, id.; ibid., 40.

^[5]
Annex H, id.; ibid.,
44.

^[6]
Annex J, id.; ibid., 64.

^[7]
Commissioner of Customs vs.
Court of Tax Appeals, et al., G.R. Nos. 48886-88, July 21, 1993, 224 SCRA 665.

^[8]
Scobey vs. Beckman, 41 N.E. 2d
84.

^[9]
See Adye vs. Smith, 26 Am. Rep.
424.

^[10]
See Read vs. McLean, 200 So. 109.

^[11]
In re Seaman’s Estate, 139 N.E. 2d 17.

^[12]
In re Clark’s Estate, 159 A. 500.

^[13]
Martin, Statutory Construction, 1979
ed., 183.

^[14]
Gaanan vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, et el., G.R. No.
69809, October 16, 1986, 145 SCRA 112.

^[15]
Topeka Presbyterian Manor, Inc. vs. Board, 402 P. ed 802.

^[16]
Martin, op. cit., 81.

^[17]
Cantwell vs. Connecticut, 301 U.S. 296 (1940).

^[18]
Id., loc. cit.

^[19]
16 Am. Jur. 2d, Constitutional Law, 283.

^[20]
Ibid., id., 282.

^[21]
Cantwell vs. Connecticut, supra.

^[22]
Id., loc. cit.

^[23]
City of Seattle vs. Rogers, 106 P. 2d 598.

^[24]
Commonwealth vs. Creighton, et al., 170 A. 720.

^[25]
Rule 2.01, Code of Judicial Conduct.

^[26]
Rule 1.03. id.

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