VICENTE SAPTO, LAUREANA SAPTO AND DORA (BAGOBA), PLAINTIFFS AND APPELLANTS, VS. APOLONIO FABIANA, DEFENDANT AND APPELLEE.

Sapto (Moro), now deceased, was the registered owner of a parcel of land
located in Alambre, Toril, Davao City, under Transfer Certificate of Title No.
T-5701 (0-28) of the Register of Deeds of Davao City. When Sapto died, he left
his children Samuel, Constancio, and Ramon as heirs of the property in question.
Ramon pre-deceased his two brothers, leaving no other heirs. On June 6, 1931,
Samuel and Constancio Sapto executed a deed of sale of a portion of four
hectares of the land aforementioned in favor of defendant Apolonio Fabiana, in
consideration of the amount of P245.00. The sale was duly approved by the
Provincial Governor of Davao, but was never registered. Possession of the land
conveyed was, however, transferred to Fabiana and the latter has been in the
possession thereof from 1931 up to the present.

Thereafter, Constancio Sapto died without any issue, Samuel Sapto married one
Dora (Bagoba) and upon his death was survived by his widow and two children,
Laureana and Vicente Sapto. On October 19, 1954, the widow and children of
Samuel Sapto filed this action in the Court of First Instance of Davao for the
recovery of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors to defendant Apolonio
Fabiana in 1931. After trial, the lower court held that although the sale
between Samuel and Constancio Sapto and defendant in 1931 was never registered,
it was valid and binding upon the parties and the vendors’ heirs, and ordered
the plaintiffs to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in defendant’s favor
and its annotation in the certificate of title. From this judgment, plaintiffs
appealed to this Court.

The issue is whether the deed of sale executed by appellants’ predecessors in
favor of the appellee over the land in question, although never registered, is
valid and binding on appellants and operated to convey title and ownership to
the appellee.

The question is not new. In a long line of cases already
decided by this Court, we have consistently interpreted sec. 50 of the Land
Registration Act providing that “no deed * * * shall take effect as a conveyance
or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and
as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration”
in the sense that as between the parties to a sale registration is not necessary
to make it valid and effective, for actual notice is equivalent to registration
(Obras Pias vs. Devera Ignacio, 17 Phil., 45; Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil.,
442; Quimson vs. Suarez, 45 Phil., 001; Winkleman vs. Veluz, 43 Phil, 609 ;
Galasinao vs. Austria, 51 Off. Gaz. No. 6, 2874; Carillo vs. Salak, 91 Phil.,
265). “The peculiar force of a title under Act No. 492”, we said in Medina vs.
Imaz and Warner Barnes & Co., 27 Phil., 314 (syllabus), “is exhibited only
when the purchaser has sold to innocent third parties the Sand described in the
conveyance. Generally speaking, as between vendor and vendee, the same rights
and remedies exist in relation to land not so registered”. In Galanza vs. Nuesa,
95 Phil., 713, we held that “registration is intended to protect the buyer
against claims of third persons arising from subsequent alienations by the
vendor, and is certainly not necessary to give effect as between the parties to
their deed of sale”. And in the recent case of Gasica vs. Villanueva, G.R. No.
L-9590, April 30, 1957, we reiterated that “the purpose of registration is
merely to notify and protect the interests of strangers to a given transaction,
who may be ignorant thereof, and the non-registration of the deed evidencing
said transaction does not relieve the parties thereto of their obligations
thereunder”.

No right of innocent third persons or subsequent transferees of the property
in question is involved herein. The property has remained and still is in the
possession of the vendee of appellants’ predecessors, herein appellee. It is
therefore, clear that the conveyance between appellee and his vendors is valid
and binding upon the latter, and is equally binding and effective against the
heirs of the vendors, herein appellants. To hold otherwise would make of the
Torrens system a shield for the commission of fraud by the vendors or his heirs
(Gustilo vs. Maravilla, 48 Phil., 442), who would then be able to reconvey the
same property to other persons.

Appellants cite several cases wherein we have held that under the Torrens
system, registration is the operative act that gives validity to the transfer or
creates a lien upon the land. The authorities cited refer, however, to cases
involving conflicting rights over registered property and those of innocent
transferees who relied on the clean titles of the properties in question. These
cases have, therefore, no bearing- on the instant case, where the appellee has
always, remained in the possession of the land in question and no subsequent
transfer thereof to other persons has been made either by appellants or their
predecessors-in-interest.

The appellants aver that it was error to require them to execute a deed of
conveyance in favor of the plaintiff-appellee, and argue that the latter’s
action to obtain it, had long prescribed, twenty years having elapsed since the
original sale. This contention must be overruled, being predicated on the
assumption that the reconveyance is sought by way of performance of the contract
of sale entered into in 1931. No enforcement of the contract is in fact needed,
since the delivery of possession of the land sold had consummated the sale and
transferred title to the purchaser, registration of the contract not being
indispensable as between the parties. Actually the action for conveyance was one
to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud cast upon appellee’s ownership by the
refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their predecessors. This
action accrued only when appellants, initiated their suit to recover the land in
1954. Furthermore, it is an established rule of American jurisprudence (made
applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code) that actions
to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are
imprescriptible (44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L. R. A. 930; Inland
Empire Land Co. vs. Grant County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14).

“The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to
land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien
thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual
possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule
being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or
suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of
equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his
title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor. He may wait until his
possession is disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to
vindicate his right. But the rule that the statute of limitations is not
available as a defense to an action to remove a cloud from title can only be
invoked by a complaint when he is in possession. One who claims property which
is in the possession of another must, it seems, invoke his remedy within the
statutory period.” (44 Am. Jur., p. 47)

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed. Costs against appellants.

So ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.