CARLOS M. SISON, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLEE, VS. GONZALO D. DAVID, DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT.

The first is to the effect:

“That
on page 18 of the Decision, it was erroneously stated that
P1,000,000.00 was borrowed from the RFC to construct Priscila Building
No. 3 when the undisputed fact was: only P100,000.00 was borrowed.”

It is interesting to note that plaintiff has not cited any evidence of
record in support of his claim. In fact the same is refuted by his own
testimony. We quote from pages 128-129 of the transcript of the
stenographic notes:

Direct Examination By Mr. Dominguez

Q—	Will you please state, Mr. Sison, why ‘Building Priscila 3’ located at the corner of Rizal Avenue and Ronquillo was your conjugal property with your wife, Mrs. Sison?
A.—	It was conjugal property because when we decided to construct that building, we borrowed from the RFC P1,000,000.00 and the condition of that loan was payment on installment plan of 120 installments. The RFC gave us the loan and we constructed the building and the loan is being paid from the rentals of the building, which, under the law, is conjugal.”

The second decision refers to the following paragraph of our decision:

“What is more, plaintiff and his wife organized a corporation, entitled CMS Estate, Inc., to
which some properties of Priscila Estate, Inc., (most of which had been
originally inherited by Mrs. Sison from Margarita David) were
transferred. The CMS Estate, Inc. had a capital stock of one
million pesos (P1,000,000.00), divided into 1,000 shares of the par
value of P1,000 each, of which 950 are non-voting preferred shares, 50 are common voting shares. All of these common voting shares, were subscribed by the plaintiff, whereas his wife had 96 non-voting preferred shares and no common shares. Four (4) other persons had each a nominal holding of one (1) non-voting preferred share. As the sole holder of all
the voting common shares, plaintiff had absolute, exclusive and
permanent control over the management of this new corporation. In fact
the letters ‘C M S’, which are the initials of his name, Carlos Moran
Sison, appear in the corporate name of C M. Estate, Inc. for the
seeming purpose of representing to the public that plaintiff was, for all intents and purposes, the corporation itself.”

Plaintiff admits the facts set forth in this paragraph, but he alleges
that the last sentence therein places him “unjustly in bad light”: (1)
because, in using his initials in the corporate name “C M S Estate,
Inc.,” he was “just following the trend of the time”, as illustrated by
the examples set by “Andres Soriano and Company”, “Puyat Steel
Company”, and “Soriente-Santos Company”; and (2) because his alleged
purpose in organizing “C M S Estate, Inc.” was noble, namely, to
protect the interest of his, wife and their seven (7) children should
she contract a subsequent marriage with an irresponsible man, in case
plaintiff predeceased her.

It is obvious, however, that the
corporate names, “Andres Soriano and Company”, Puyat Steel Company,”
and “Soriente-Santos Company”, indicate that the corporations concerned
are owned and controlled by Soriano, Puyat and Soriente-Santos,
respectively.

As regards petitioner’s alleged purpose in creating the “C M S Estate, Inc.,” suffice it to say that:

(a) Said alleged purpose has no connection whatsoever with the choice of the corporate name.

(b) Said purpose does not appear in the record before us, no evidence having been introduced or offered in connection therewith.

(c)
The paragraph above-quoted merely tends to indicate that it was only
natural for a creditor or claimant, like defendant herein, to feel
that, under the facts given, the properties of the estate of Margarita
David were being placed beyond his reach and under the complete control
of plaintiff herein, who, he believes, was not friendly to him.

Third ground of plaintiff’s motion, for reconsideration refers to the following paragraphs of our decision:

“At
any rate, the allegations in question in defendant’s petition for bond
were neither malicious nor unfounded. Thus, it is a fact that most, or
at least, several of the most valuable properties transmitted by
Margarita David to Mrs. Sison were mortgaged. Those subsequently
assigned by Mrs. Sison to Priscila Estate, Inc. were encumbered
altogether for P397,717.00. In order to construct the Priscila Building
No. 3 on a paraphernal land of Mrs. Sison, it had been necessary to
borrow ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) from the RFC. The Priscila
Estate, Inc., of which plaintiff is the president, began its operations
with an overdraft line of P236,517.00. Most of the paraphernal
properties of Mrs. Sison were transferred to said corporation. In fact,
the same asked that the annotation; on the certificate of title of one
of those properties, of the adverse claims of the defendant and Jose
Teodoro Sr., be cancelled, upon the ground that said property now
belongs to the corporation, not to Mrs. Sison.

*           *           *           *           *           *           *

“Considering
that plaintiff is, also, president of the Priscila Estate, Inc., most
of the properties of which had come from Margarita David, and the
antagonism that had arisen between him and the defendant, in the course
of the proceedings for the settlement of estate of Margarita
David—which antagonism was crystalized and sharpened in several
litigations and many acrid, if not virulent incidents between the same
parties—it is understandable, as well as natural and logical for
defendant to he apprehensive about the fate of his aforementioned
adverse claim and that of Jose Teodoro Sr., if the order directing the
cancellation of the annotation thereof were not reconsidered and set
aside, or plaintiff were not required to file a bond to guarantee the
payment of said adverse claims.

The alleged gross
disparity between the amount thereof and the value of said properties
is immaterial to the case at bar. To begin with, the properties were
heavily encumbered. Besides, the transfer thereof to Priscila Estate,
Inc., the subsequent assignment of some to C M S Estate, Inc., and,
then, the sales that had been made and the one sought to be made in
favor of third persons, tended to place said properties beyond the
reach of said claimants. Then too, bad faith should not, and cannot be
imputed to creditors, much less ‘presumed’, merely because they seek
the maximum possible guaranties for the protection of their rights. At
any rate, the alleged bad faith in the annotation of the adverse claims does not warrant an inference of bad faith in the allegations of the petition for bond.” (Decision, pp. 18-21).

Plaintiff maintains that these paragraphs are irrelevant and inaccurate
and should be deleted, because: (1) the amount borrowed from the RFC
was P100,000.00, not P1,000,000.00; (2) the properties in question were
not heavily encumbered; and (3) lack of malice on the part of the
defendant was, according to our decision, unnecessary for the enjoyment
of the absolute privilege accorded to the communication upon which
plaintiff’s action is based.

As pointed out above, the first
premise is belied by the plaintiff’s own testimony. With respect to the
second premise, it should be noted that the immovables assigned to
Priscila Estate, Inc., were originally subject to liabilities
aggregating P397,770.00. According to said testimony of the plaintiff,
a P1,000,000.00 loan was secured from the RFC, so that the aggregate
encumbrance reached P1,397,770.00, which, by all standards, is a heavy
one, even if we assume that the assessed value of said immovables in
1956 were P1,661,000.00, as estimated by plaintiff in his brief,
without any evidence in support thereof. Besides, the communication
complained of was filed five (5) years before, and it is a matter, of
which we may take judicial cognizance, that there has been a sharp
increase in the value of real estate in the City of Manila during the
last decade. Again, although good faith on the part of the defendant
was unnecessary for his absolute privilege, his justification in making
the allegations complained of is certainly material to the
determination of the question whether plaintiff had a reasonable ground
to believe that he had a cause of action against said defendant.

Lastly, plaintiff maintains that the following paragraph of our decision is “obviously unfair” and should be set aside:

“As
regards the fourth cause of action in said counterclaim, it should be
noted that plaintiff is a member of the bar. As such, he must have
known that the petition for bond in question is an absolutely
privileged communication, and that the allegations therein made were
pertinent and relevant to the remedy sought in said petition * * * In
other words, aside from the fact that plaintiff’s complaint is clearly
unfounded, the record strongly indicates that it was filed with a
harassing purpose. In view of the circumstances surrounding this ease,
plaintiff should pay the defendant a reasonable amount for attorney’s
fees and expenses of litigation (Article 2208 (4), Civil Code of the
Philippines).” (Decision, pp. 21-22).

He
says that the decision of the lower court in his favor proves that he
was reasonably justified in believing that the allegations complained
of where irrelevant to the issues before said court. The conclusion
does not necessarily follow from the aforementioned premise. Otherwise,
our statutes and Rules of Court would not have established the writ of
certiorari to nulify or modify, inter alia, judicial decisions or
orders rendered or issued with grave abuse of discretion. In the case
at bar, the surrounding circumstances lead, to our mind, to the
conclusion reached in the paragraph above quoted, the opinion of the
lower court to the contrary notwithstanding.

Wherefore, the motion for reconsideration is hereby denied.

Bengzon, Acting C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J. B. L., Barrera, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.