🎧 Case Brief Lecture

HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, PETITIONER, VS. MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, VICE-MAYOR JOSE L. ATIENZA, CITY TREASURER ANTHONY ACEVEDO, SANGGUNIANG P…

G.R. No. 112497. August 04, 1994 August 4, 1994

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Drilon versus Lim

The Case

This is a petition brought by the Secretary of Justice against the City of Manila and its officials, asking the Supreme Court to reverse a lower court ruling that struck down a provision of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional. The case matters because it draws the dividing line between the power of control and the power of supervision over local governments, and because it tests whether the Secretary of Justice may review and annul a local tax ordinance without offending the constitutional policy of local autonomy.

Procedural History

On appeal to the Secretary of Justice by four oil companies and a taxpayer, the Secretary declared Ordinance Number 7794, the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in enacting tax ordinances and for containing provisions contrary to law and public policy. The City of Manila then filed a petition for certiorari with the Regional Trial Court of Manila. That court, through Judge Rodolfo Palattao, revoked the Secretary's resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding that the procedural requirements had been observed and, more importantly, declaring Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional for vesting in the Secretary of Justice a power of control over local governments. The Secretary brought the present petition to the Supreme Court. The petition was at first dismissed for non-compliance with Circular 1-88 because the Solicitor General failed to submit a certified true copy of the challenged decision, but on motion for reconsideration with the certified copy attached, the Court reinstated the petition in view of the importance of the issues raised.

Facts

The City of Manila enacted Ordinance Number 7794, known as the Manila Revenue Code. Four oil companies and a taxpayer appealed to the Secretary of Justice, who reviewed the ordinance under Section 187 of the Local Government Code. The Secretary found that no written notices of public hearings were sent to interested parties, that copies of the proposed ordinance were not published in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation, that no minutes showed the obligatory public hearings had been held, that copies of the approved measure were not posted in prominent places, and that the ordinance was not translated into Pilipino or Tagalog and disseminated. On these grounds he declared the ordinance null and void.

The City of Manila challenged the Secretary's resolution before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The trial court sustained the ordinance, finding that the procedural requirements had been observed and that the City had failed to prove compliance before the Secretary only because it had been given just five days to gather and present the twenty-five exhibits it later submitted to the trial court. The trial court also declared Section 187 unconstitutional.

Before the Supreme Court, the Court granted the respondents' motion and called for the elevation of those exhibits. After examining every one of them, the Court agreed with the trial court that the procedural requirements had indeed been observed, with the posting of the approved ordinance as the only exception, an omission that did not affect its validity because publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation satisfies due process.

Issues

  • Whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is constitutional, considering that it authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review and set aside local tax ordinances.
  • Whether or not the procedural requirements for the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code were observed.

Applicable Provisions

Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the provision whose constitutionality is in question, provides:

Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory Public Hearings. - The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.

This is the very provision the trial court annulled, and the Court upholds it as an exercise of mere supervision.

Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution, which the trial court invoked, provides:

Section 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over local governments. Provinces with respect to component cities and municipalities, and cities and municipalities with respect to component barangays shall ensure that the acts of their component units are within the scope of their prescribed powers and functions.

This fixes the constitutional standard of supervision, against which Section 187 is measured.

Section 5 of Article X of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees, and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.

This is the local taxing power and the policy of local autonomy that the trial court said Section 187 violated.

Section 2 of the Local Autonomy Act, an earlier and similar rule, provides:

A tax ordinance shall go into effect on the fifteenth day after its passage, unless the ordinance shall provide otherwise: Provided, however, That the Secretary of Finance shall have authority to suspend the effectivity of any ordinance within one hundred and twenty days after receipt by him of a copy thereof, if, in his opinion, the tax or fee therein levied or imposed is unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, or when it is contrary to declared national economy policy, and when the said Secretary exercises this authority the effectivity of such ordinance shall be suspended, either in part or as a whole, for a period of thirty days within which period the local legislative body may either modify the tax ordinance to meet the objections thereto, or file an appeal with a court of competent jurisdiction; otherwise, the tax ordinance or the part or parts thereof declared suspended, shall be considered as revoked. Thereafter, the local legislative body may not reimpose the same tax or fee until such time as the grounds for the suspension thereof shall have ceased to exist.

The Court contrasts this broader power, which would smack of control, with the narrower authority given to the Secretary of Justice under Section 187.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held Section 187 constitutional. The lower court was rather hasty in invalidating the provision. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both of these grounds. When he alters, modifies, or sets aside a tax ordinance, he is not permitted to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the local government that enacted it. Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version, did not pronounce it unwise or unreasonable, and did not say it was a bad law. He found only that it was illegal. The Court explained the distinction this way:

An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If they are not followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, he may order the work done or re-done but only to conform to the prescribed rules. He may not prescribe his own manner for the doing of the act. He has no judgment on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.

What the Secretary did was an act not of control but of mere supervision. The Court also noted that the Secretary of Justice is not given the latitude of the Secretary of Finance under the Local Autonomy Act, who could suspend an ordinance if in his opinion the tax was unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory, a determination involving judgment and discretion.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the trial court that the procedural requirements had been observed. Notices of public hearings were sent to interested parties, the minutes of the hearings existed, the proposed ordinances were published, and the approved ordinance was published in successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation. The failure to post the approved ordinance did not affect its validity because publication satisfies due process, and the translation and dissemination requirement applies to local development plans and public investment programs, not to tax ordinances. The Court made no ruling on the substantive provisions of the Manila Revenue Code, as their validity was not raised in the petition.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the power of control is the power of an officer to alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate has done and to substitute his own judgment for the latter's; the power of supervision is merely the power to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance with law. Second, Section 187 of the Local Government Code confers on the Secretary of Justice only the power to ascertain the constitutionality or legality of a local tax ordinance, not to judge its wisdom, reasonableness, or oppressiveness; hence it is an exercise of supervision, not control, and does not violate the constitutional policy of local autonomy under Article X. Third, the presumption of constitutionality stands, and to doubt is to sustain; a law is struck down only on the clearest showing of an infraction of the Constitution.

Disposition

The Court reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court insofar as it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code unconstitutional, but affirmed its finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of the Manila Revenue Code had been observed, with no pronouncement as to costs.

Remember This

The line to memorize is that the Secretary of Justice under Section 187 exercises supervision, not control, because he may check legality but may not substitute his judgment for that of the local legislative body. Examiners use this case to test the control versus supervision distinction and the limits of the Secretary of Justice's power over local tax ordinances.