MARCELINO C. LIBANAN, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND AGUSTIN B. DOCENA, RESPONDENTS.
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Libanan versus Sandiganbayan
The Case
This is a petition brought by Marcelino Libanan against the Sandiganbayan and Agustin Docena, asking the Supreme Court to undo a preventive suspension order issued against him while a criminal case under the Anti-Graft Law was pending. Libanan had been charged as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar, but by the time the suspension order came down he had already been elected Vice-Governor of the province. The case matters because it fixes two rules every reviewee must know: that preventive suspension under Section 13 of Republic Act Number 3019 is mandatory, and that it attaches to whatever public office the accused may currently be holding, not only to the office he held when charged.
Procedural History
Libanan was among several provincial officials charged before the Sandiganbayan with violating Section 3, paragraph e, of Republic Act Number 3019. On motion of the prosecution, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution suspending Libanan and three other accused from their public positions for ninety days. Libanan and Governor Barbo each filed motions for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan denied. Libanan then elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition, assigning three grounds of error against the suspension order.
Facts
Before the May 1992 elections, Marcelino Libanan was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Eastern Samar. On 25 May 1992, he and several other provincial officials, including Governor Lutgardo Barbo, were charged before the Sandiganbayan with violating Section 3, paragraph e, of Republic Act Number 3019. The information alleged that on or about 8 January 1991, through evident bad faith and manifest partiality, the accused conspired to prevent and exclude Agustin Docena, the duly appointed and qualified replacement of a deceased board member, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. This was done, according to the information, by promulgating a resolution recognizing another lawyer as the official replacement, notwithstanding the recall of his appointment by the Department of Local Government.
Finding that the accused were charged under a valid information, the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan, on motion of the prosecution, issued a resolution suspending Libanan and three others from their respective public positions for ninety days, to commence upon receipt of the resolution.
Libanan and Barbo moved for reconsideration, which was denied. Libanan then brought the matter to the Supreme Court. By this time, he had been elected and was serving as Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar. He argued that a suspension rooted in acts committed while he was a board member could no longer reach him in his new office, that the suspension would deprive him of property without due process, and that it would violate the mandate reposed in him by the people of Eastern Samar.
Issues
- Whether or not the preventive suspension order may still be enforced against Libanan even though he now holds a different public office from the one he held when charged.
- Whether or not the suspension order amounts to a deprivation of property without due process of law.
- Whether or not Libanan's election by the people of Eastern Samar shields him from the suspension order.
- Whether or not the grounds for preventive suspension had ceased to exist.
Applicable Provisions
Section 13 of Republic Act Number 3019, as amended, provides:
Section 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under title 7, book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
This is the provision that authorizes and, as the Court holds, compels the suspension of any incumbent public officer facing a valid information, whatever office he currently holds.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the suspension order reaches Libanan in his present office. It relied on its earlier rulings in Deloso versus Sandiganbayan and Bayot versus Sandiganbayan, where suspensions were sustained even though the accused had moved to a different office from the one held when charged. In both cases the Court ruled that the term office in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding, and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged.
On the second issue, the Court held that no deprivation of property without due process occurs, because public office is a public agency or trust and is not the property envisioned by the constitutional provision Libanan invoked.
On the third issue, the Court held that Libanan's so-called covenant with the people of Eastern Samar cannot cut athwart the long arm of the law. Quoting Oliveros versus Villaluz, the Court said:
Since the criminal prosecution against petitioner-accused is concededly not abated by the fact of his reelection, the pendency of such criminal case under a valid information under Republic Act 3019 may clearly be and supplies the legal basis for his suspension from office in a subsequent term in the event of his reelection by virtue of the provisions of section 13 of the Act.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that the assigned error need not be delved into. When the statute is clear and explicit, there is hardly room for extended ratiocination. Republic Act Number 3019 unequivocally mandates suspension pending criminal prosecution, and the Court has repeatedly held such preventive suspension to be mandatory, with no ifs and buts about it.
Doctrine
Preventive suspension under Section 13 of Republic Act Number 3019 is mandatory once a valid information is pending against an incumbent public officer. The word office in the law refers to any office the accused may currently be holding, not necessarily the office under which he was charged; hence reelection or transfer to another public office does not defeat the order. Public office is a public trust, not property, so suspension from it does not offend due process. And an election mandate cannot override a statutory command; the pendency of a valid criminal information supplies the legal basis for suspension even in a subsequent term.
Disposition
The petition was dismissed and the assailed resolution of the Sandiganbayan was affirmed in its entirety, so Libanan remained suspended for the ninety-day period.
Remember This
Memorize the line that preventive suspension under the Anti-Graft Law is mandatory and brooks no ifs and buts, and that it follows the officer into whatever office he currently holds. Examiners use this case to test the mandatory character of preventive suspension and the rule that reelection does not bar it.