EDWARD R. RETA, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION AND ARPAPHIL SHIPPING CORPORATION, TARPON SHIPPING CO. AND LUZON SURETY CO., INC. RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court to annul the Resolution dated March 31, 1993 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 003657-92, which
affirmed the decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration
(POEA) dated March 11, 1992, dismissing petitioner’s complaint against private
respondents for illegal dismissal.

I

Petitioner was hired as
Second Officer on board the M.V. “Bulk Tupaz” by respondent Arpaphil
Shipping Corp. (ARPAPHIL), the manning agent of respondent Tarpon Shipping
Company. His employment was for a 12-month
period effective December 3, 1990 with a monthly salary of US$825.00 and an
overtime pay at the rate of $2.10 per hour.

On December 11, 1990, while on duty on board the ship, petitioner
was caught watching television at the smoking room instead of being at his
post. On December 12, he failed to take
proper positions of the vessel, rendering his observations unreliable. On December 18, he forgot to take sun
observation and to keep track of the vessel’s proper position. Thereafter, he made a wrong entry in the
logbook. On December 26, petitioner was
required to work overtime, but he refused.

The worst infractions committed by petitioner were: (1) on December 27, when by reason of his
faulty maneuvering, the vessel barely missed colliding with another vessel; (2)
on January 1, 1991, while he was in
charge of loading fuel oil into the holds of the vessel, he left his watch and
other duties and went to the dining room; and (3) on January 8, while the ship
was going through strong current, he let loose the mooring line of the vessel,
so that it moved away from the
loading berth. The vessel had to be
moored by a tug boat. All the crew,
except petitioner, responded to the call for help in mooring the vessel.

In a span of two months, petitioner committed eight infractions,
all of which boil down to insubordination, incompetence and inefficiency. Due to these infractions, the master of the
vessel discharged petitioner on February 27 while the vessel was docked at
Pireau, Greece.

Consequently, on May 8, petitioner filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal with the POEA. Finding
petitioner’s dismissal to be justified, the POEA dismissed his petition. On appeal to the NLRC, the POEA decision was
affirmed.

Hence, this petition.

II

The sole issue to be resolved in this case is whether the NLRC
committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the decision of the POEA,
which found petitioner’s dismissal to have been for legal cause.

The petition is devoid of
merit.

Contracts are the law
between the contracting parties and, as such, they are expected to abide with
good faith in their contractual commitments (Toyota Motor Philippines
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 216 SCRA 236 [1992]). One of the stipulations in the employment
contract of the petitioner provides that:

“x x x [t]he Master shall have the right to discharge or sign
off the seaman xxx.

(a) If the seaman is incompetent x x x; or

(b) If the seaman’s conduct shows that his
continued presence on board is likely prejudicial to the safety of the vessel
or those on board or to the maintenance of good order xxx” (Annex
“D”, p. 8; Comment of the Solicitor General, p. 6).

In the case at bench, petitioner should have seen his dismissal
coming, considering the number and seriousness of the infractions he committed
during the two-month period he was on board the vessel. If petitioner does not consider his
infractions as just causes for his dismissal, then inefficiency, negligence and
insubordination should be removed from the statute books as grounds for
dismissal. Both the POEA and the NLRC
found petitioner culpable of the infractions charged against him by private
respondents. We have no grounds to
disturb the findings of fact of these two administrative agencies (Baguio
Colleges Foundation v. National Labor Relations Commission, 222 SCRA 604
[1993]; Five J Taxi v. National Labor Relations Commission, 212 SCRA 225
[1992]).

However, while his employee had a legal cause to dismiss
petitioner, they did not follow the proper procedure for the dismissal.

Article 277 of the Labor Code of the Philippine as amended by
Section 33, R.A. No. 6715 (Herrera-Veloso Law), provides:

x x x  x
x x  x x x

“(b) Subject to the constitutional right of
workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal
except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement
of notice under Article [283] 285 of this Code, [the clearance to terminate
employment shall no longer be necessary. However,] the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to he terminated a written notice containing a statement
of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to depend himself
with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the [Ministry] Department of Labor and
Employment. x x x” (Underscoring
supplied).

An employee cannot just be
separated from his employment without according him his constitutional right of
due process, consisting of the
proper notice and hearing. No notice of
any form, apprising of the proffered charges, was served on petitioner, much
less was a hearing conducted wherein he could have defended himself. The fact that the defense interposed at the
hearing would be outlandish or pure nonsense, is not a ground to cut short the
procedure for dismissal. As this Court
ruled in Seahorse Maritime Corporation v.
National Labor Relations Commission, 173 SCRA 390 (1989), that before a seaman can be dismissed and discharged from the
vessel, it is required that he be given a written notice regarding the charges against him and that he be
afforded a formal investigation where he could defend himself personally or
through a representative. Fear of any
possible trouble that might be caused by the dismissed employee on board the
vessel upon being informed of his dismissal is not a reason to dispense with
the requirement.

As to the consequence of
the failure to observe the requirement of due process in the dismissal of an employee, we ruled in Aurelio v. National Labor Relations Commission,
221 SCRA 432 (1993):

“In cases where there was a valid ground to dismiss an employee but there wan
non-observance of due process,
this Court held that only a sanction must be imposed upon the employer for failure to give formal notice and
to conduct an investigation required by law before dismissing the
employee in consonance with the ruling in Wenphil v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69
(1989); Shoemart, Inc. v. NLRC, supra; and in Pacific Mills, Inc. v. Zenaida
Alonzo, 199 SCRA 617 [1991]). xxx In
the Pacific Mills, Inc. and Wenphil cases, this Court merely awarded P1,000.00 as penalty for non?observance
of due process” (Underscoring supplied).

Considering that petitioner was given his walking papers and was
forced to leave his ship in a foreign port, the penalty to be imposed on his
employer for the non-observance of the requirements of due process in
dismissing him is higher than that imposed in the cited cases.

WHEREFORE, the
decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that private respondents should pay petitioner P10,000.00 as penalty
for failure to comply with the due process requirement.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., (Chairman), on
leave.