ANTONIO V. A. TAN, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RUSTICO T. ILAGAN, REGIONAL ELECTION DIRECTOR, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGION XI, DAVAO CITY, AND SENFORIANO B. ALTE…

On 10 May 1992, petitioner, as incumbent City Prosecutor of Davao
City, was designated by the Commission on Elections (“COMELEC”) as
Vice-Chairman of the City Board of Canvassers of Davao City for the 11th May
1992 synchronized national and local elections conformably with the provisions
of Section 20(a) of Republic Act No. 6646 and Section 221(b) of the Omnibus
Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881).

On the basis of the votes canvassed by the Board of Canvassers,
Manuel Garcia was proclaimed the winning candidate for a congressional seat to
represent the Second District of Davao City in the House of Representatives.

Private respondent Alterado, himself a candidate for the
position, filed a number of cases questioning the validity of the proclamation
of Manuel Garcia and accusing the members of the City Board of Canvassers of
“unlawful, erroneous, incomplete and irregular canvass.” Meanwhile,
the electoral protest of private respondent Alterado was dismissed by the House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (“HRET”). The criminal complaint for “Falsification of Public
Documents and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act”
before the Office of the Ombudsman was likewise dismissed on the ground of lack
of criminal intent on the part of therein respondents. Still pending is an administrative charge,
the case now before us, instituted in the COMELEC against the City Board of
Canvassers, including herein petitioner, for “Misconduct, Neglect of Duty,
Gross, Incompetence and Acts Inimical to the Service.”

Petitioner moved to dismiss the administrative complaint against
him for alleged lack of jurisdiction of the COMELEC thereover, he being under
the Executive Department of the government. The COMELEC denied petitioner’s motion to dismiss.

Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner contends that the COMELEC has committed grave abuse of
discretion and acted without jurisdiction in continuing to take action on the
administrative case. He argues that –

“1)     Petitioner is the City
Prosecutor of Davao City. His office
belongs to the executive branch of the government, more particularly to the
Department of Justice. As such, he is
under the administrative jurisdiction of the said department and not of
respondent COMELEC.

“2)     The Civil Service Law
provides that department heads ‘shall have jurisdiction to investigate and
decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers under their
jurisdiction’ (Section 47[b], P.D. 807).

“3)     Section 2, Article IX
of the 1987 Constitution which authorizes respondent COMELEC to deputize public
officers belonging to the executive department is for the purpose of insuring
free, orderly and honest elections. It
does not include and comprehend administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over
officials belonging to the executive branch of government. That jurisdiction over deputized executive
officers cannot be deemed to include such powers as would allow encroachment
into the domain of the executive branch under guise of administering laws
relative to elections.

“4)     Section 38 of P.D. 807
cited by respondents COMELEC and Ilagan as basis for their authority to
investigate petitioner (Annex G) offers no help to said respondents. The said provision merely lays down the
procedure for administrative cases against non-presidential appointees. Petitioner here, the city prosecutor for
Davao City is a presidential appointee.”^[1]

We find ourselves being unable to sustain the petition.

The COMELEC’s authority under Section 2(6-8), Article IX, of the Constitution is virtually
all encompassing when it comes to election matters. In respect particularly to sanctions against election offenses,
we quote:

“SEC. 2. The
Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:

“xxx               xxx                   xxx.

“(6)    File, upon a
verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion
or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election
frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

“xxx               xxx                   xxx.

“(8)    Recommend to the
President the removal of any officer or employee it has deputized or the
imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.”

Additionally, Section 52, Article VII, of
the Omnibus Election Code, provides:

“SEC. 52. Powers and
functions of the Commission on Elections. – In addition to the powers and
functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the Commission shall have
exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to
the conduct of elections for the purpose of insuring free, orderly and honest
elections, and shall:

“a. Exercise direct
and immediate supervision and control over national and local officials or employees,
including members of any national or local law enforcement agency and
instrumentality of the government required by law to perform duties relative to
the conduct of elections. In addition,
it may authorize CMP Cadets eighteen years of age and above to act as its
deputies for the purpose of enforcing its orders.

“The Commission may relieve any officer or employee referred
to in the preceding paragraph from the performance of his duties relating to
electoral processes who violates the election law or fails to comply with its
instructions, orders, decisions or rulings, and appoint his substitute. Upon recommendation of the Commission, the
corresponding proper authority shall suspend or remove from office any or all
of such officers or employees who may, after due process, be found guilty of
such violation or failure.”

It should be stressed that the administrative case against
petitioner, taken cognizance of by, and still pending with, the COMELEC, is in relation
to the performance of his duties as an election canvasser and not as a city
prosecutor. The COMELEC’s mandate
includes its authority to exercise direct and immediate supervision and control
over national and local officials or employees, including members of any
national or local law enforcement agency and instrumentality of the government,
required by law to perform duties relative to the conduct of elections. In order to help ensure that such duly
deputized officials and employees of government carry out their respective
assigned tasks, the law has also provided that upon the COMELEC’s
recommendation, the corresponding proper authority (the Secretary of the
Department of Justice in the case at bar) shall take appropriate action, either
to suspend or remove from office the officer or employee who may, after due
process, be found guilty of violation of election laws or failure to comply
with instructions, orders, decisions or rulings of the COMELEC.

Unavoidably, the COMELEC, prior to making its recommendation,
must first satisfy itself that there indeed has been an infraction of the law,
or of its directives issued conformably therewith, by the person
administratively charged. It also
stands to reason that it is the COMELEC, being in the best position to assess
how its deputized officials and employees perform or have performed in their
duties, that should conduct the administrative inquiry. To say that the COMELEC is without
jurisdiction to look into charges of election offenses committed by officials
and employees of government outside the regular employ of the COMELEC would be to unduly deny to it
the proper and sound exercise of such recommendatory power and, perhaps more
than that, even a possible denial of due process to the official or employee
concerned.

Observe, nevertheless, that the COMELEC merely may issue a recommendation for disciplinary action
but that it is the executive department to which the charged official or
employee belongs which has the ultimate authority to impose the disciplinary
penalty. The law then does not detract
from, but is congruent with, the general administrative authority of the
department of government concerned over its own personnel.

Petitioner’s assertion that private respondent Alterado has
resorted to forum-shopping is unacceptable. The investigation then being conducted by the Ombudsman on the criminal
case for falsification and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, on the one hand, and the inquiry into the administrative charges by the COMELEC, on the other hand, are
entirely independent proceedings. Neither would the results in one conclude the other. Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge
is not a bar to an administrative prosecution (Office of the Court
Administrator vs. Enriquez, 218 SCRA 1), or vice versa. So, also, the dismissal by the COMELEC of
SPC Case No. 92-232 on the ground that the case constituted an electoral
protest within the jurisdiction of the HRET and not of the COMELEC (affirmed by
this Court in G.R. No. 106452) does not necessarily foreclose the matter of
possible liability, if warranted, of those who might have improperly acted in
the canvass of votes.

There are other issues, mainly factual, that are raised and
averred to show petitioner’s innocence from the administrative charges. Petitioner’s allegations may well be true
but this petition at bench may not preempt the determination of those factual
matters yet to be passed upon in the pending administrative proceedings.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Kapunan, and Mendoza,
JJ., concur.

Padilla and Bidin, JJ., on leave.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 211-212.