SOUTHERN NEGROS DEVELOPMENT BANK, INC., PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND SPOUSES LEONARDO AND MERCEDES YAP, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari, assailing the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated September 7, 1993 in CA-G.R. CV No. 39966, which denied petitioner’s
motion to dismiss and required petitioner to file its brief as appellee.

In an Urgent Ex Parte Motion for a Restraining
Order filed on March 3, 1994, petitioner sought to enjoin the appellate court
from taking further action in the case, following petitioner’s receipt of that
court’s Resolution dated February 4, 1994, where the case was deemed submitted
for decision and for raffle to the ponente without petitioner’s
Appellee’s Brief.

We grant the petition.

I

Private respondents filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19,
Roxas City, a complaint against petitioner for “Annulment and/or
Reformation of Contract with Damages.”

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that venue
was improperly laid, invoking the stipulation in the Dacion En Pago
with Lease-Purchase Agreement, subject of the complaint. In the agreement, the parties stipulated
that any action arising therefrom was to be filed only in the municipal or
regional trial court in Bacolod City. Private respondents filed their Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss.

In an Order dated August 20, 1992, the trial court granted
petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, upholding petitioner’s contention as to
improper venue and ruling further that petitioner was estopped from questioning
the validity of the contract.

Private respondents filed an “Omnibus Motion to Admit
Complaint, for Reconsideration,” attaching thereto an Amended Complaint.

In the Order dated October 26, 1992, the trial court denied the
Omnibus Motion for lack of merit.

On November 4, private respondents filed with the trial court a
notice of appeal. Subsequently, private
respondents filed in the Court of Appeals their Appellants’ Brief.

Petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss private respondents’
appeal. It argued that because private
respondents raised purely issues of law in their Appellants’ Brief, it was
error on their part to appeal to the Court of Appeals by mere notice of
appeal. It also argued that private
respondents should have filed a petition for review on certiorari with
the Supreme Court. Petitioner insisted
that the Court of Appeals was without jurisdiction over the appealed case and
should consequently dismiss it.

II

Before us, petitioner reiterates that the Court of Appeals is
without appellate jurisdiction over the case, which involved only issues of
law.

Petitioner is
correct that the proper mode of appeal from judgments of the Regional Trial
Court on pure questions of law is a petition for review on certiorari to
the Supreme Court in the form and manner provided for in Rule 45 of the Revised
Rules of Court.

The Court, in Atlas Consolidated Mining and
Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,
201 SCRA 51 (1991) had occasion to pass upon the issue at hand, as follows:

“Under Section 5, subparagraph (2) (e), Article VII of the
1987 Constitution, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to review,
revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in
all cases in which only an error or question of law is involved. A similar provision is contained in Section
17, fourth paragraph, subparagraph (4) of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended
by Republic Act No. 5440. And, in such
cases where only questions of law are involved, Section 25 of the Interim Rules
and Guidelines implementing Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, in conjunction with
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 5440, provides that the appeal to the Supreme
Court shall be taken by petition for certiorari which shall be governed
by Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

The rule, therefore, is that direct appeals to this Court from the
trial court on questions of law have to be through the filing of a petition for
review on certiorari.

x x x                              x
x x                                  x x x

By way of implementation of the aforestated provisions of law, this
Court issued on March 9, 1990, Circular No. 2-90, paragraph 2 of which
provides:

2. Appeals from Regional Trial Courts to the Supreme Court. — Except in criminal cases where the penalty imposed is life imprisonment or reclusion
perpetua, judgments of regional trial courts may be appealed to the
Supreme Court only by petition for review on certiorari in accordance
with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary
Act of 1948, as amended, this being the clear intendment of the provision of
the Interim Rules that ‘(a)ppeals to the Supreme Court shall be taken by
petition for certiorari which shall be governed by Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court.'”

It is incumbent upon private respondent qua appellants to
utilize the correct mode of appeal of the decisions of trial courts to the
appellate courts. In the mistaken
choice of their remedy, they can blame no one but themselves (Jocson v. Baguio,
179 SCRA 550 [1989]; Yucuanseh Drug Co. v. National Labor Union, 101 Phil. 409
[1957]).

Private respondents, in their Appellants’ Brief filed with the
appellate court, raised the following issues: (1) Did the trial court err in dismissing the compliant for improper venue?;
(2) Did the trial court err in not admitting the Amended Complaint?; and (3)
Did the trial court disregard the rule that in filing a motion to dismiss,
petitioner was deemed to have admitted all the allegations in the complaint?

The issue of whether the trial court erred in holding that the
venue of an action was improperly laid is a question of law (See Philippine
Banking Corporation v. Hon. Tensuan,
G.R. No. 104649, February 28, 1994).

The second issue likewise involves a question of law. What is called for in the resolution of such
issue is the application or interpretation of a provision of law. Petitioner contends that the trial court
erred in not allowing him to amend his complaint as a matter of right pursuant
to Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Anent the third issue raised in their Appellants’ Brief, private
respondents argue that “the trial court clearly violated the cardinal rule
on hypothetical admissions in basing its order of dismissal on estoppel and
assuming that the agreement was valid and/or freely, knowingly and voluntarily
executed by the plaintiffs-appellants” (At p. 8). Clearly, private respondents were assailing
the legal conclusions made by the trial court. A resolution of the issue would not require an examination of the
probative value of the evidence of the parties, as in fact none were presented.

Pursuant to Section 4 of Circular No. 2-90, which provides that
“[a]n appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by
the wrong mode or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed,” the only course
of action of the Court to which an erroneous appeal is made is to dismiss the
same. There is no longer any
justification for allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to
another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93869, November 12, 1990, First
Division, Minute Resolution).

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Resolution of the Court of
Appeals dated September 7, 1993 is SET
ASIDE and the appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 39966 is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.