QUINTIN F. FELIZARDO, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS & NEMESIO B. JOSE, RESPONDENTS.

Private respondent Nemesio B. Jose, as owner-lessor of a house and
lot located at No. 63-20th St., East Bajac-Bajac, Olongapo City, filed on
February 24, 1992, an action for ejectment with an application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against petitioner Quintin
Felizardo.^[1]
This was docketed as Civil Case No. 3163 in the Municipal Trial Court of
Olongapo City.

On February 27, 1992, summons was issued directing the petitioner
to file an answer and informing him that the Rule on Summary Procedure would be
applied.^[2]

In his answer, the petitioner averred inter alia that the
private respondent’s allegations to support his prayer for a preliminary
injunction were utterly false and intended only to evade the requirements of
P.D. 1508^[3]
for prior barangay conciliation.^[4]

At the preliminary conference and in his position paper, the
petitioner questioned the jurisdiction of the court and the sufficiency of the
private respondent’s cause of action for non-compliance with the said decree.

On September 1, 1992, judgment was rendered against the
petitioner.^[5]
On September 17, 1992, upon motion of the private respondent, the court issued
an order for the execution of its decision.^[6]

On that same date, the petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Olongapo City a petition for certiorari with an application for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction.^[7]

On October 7, 1992, that court issued a temporary restraining
order against the enforcement of the writ of execution.^[8]
Later, however, on October 23, 1992, it dismissed the petition on the ground
that certiorari with injunction was not the proper remedy of the
petitioner, appeal being then still available to him.^[9]

The dismissal was sustained by the respondent Court of Appeals.^[10]
His motion for a reconsideration having been denied,^[11]
Felizardo is now before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The core issue is the propriety of the special civil action for certiorari
instituted by the petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo
City to challenge the judgment rendered by the court a quo.

The petition has no merit.

It is settled that the writ of certiorari is available
only where the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial functions has
acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law.^[12] It
is also the rule that this special civil action should not be allowed as a
substitute for an ordinary appeal or where there are other remedies available.^[13]

There is no doubt that the Municipal Trial Court of Olongapo City
had jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the case lodged by the private
respondent and over the person of the petitioner, who had filed his answer to
the complaint. The only question is
whether that court, in continuing to act on the case despite the lack of prior
barangay conciliation as required by the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law,
committed a mere error of judgment that could be reversed in an ordinary appeal
or an error of jurisdiction correctible by certiorari.

Section 412 of the Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law provides:

SEC. 412. Conciliation. – (a)
Pre-condition to filing of complaint in court. – No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving any matter
within the authority of the Lupon shall be filed or instituted directly in
court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has been a
confrontation between the parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and
that no conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the lupon
secretary or the pangkat secretary, attested to by the lupon chairman or
pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been repudiated by the parties
thereto.

(b)  Where the parties may go directly to
court. – The parties may go directly to
court in the following instances:

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal liberty
calling for habeas corpus proceedings;

(3) Where actions
are coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,
attachment, delivery of personal property and support pendente lite; and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute of
limitations.

x x x

In the case at bar, the complaint for ejectment filed by the
private respondent contained an application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction, as allowed under Section 33 of BP 129. The suit would, therefore, ostensibly fall
under the exception mentioned in Section 412 (b) of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Law. A different conclusion must be
reached, however, after a closer look at the attendant circumstances in light
of the following allegations made by the private respondent in his complaint:

x x x

9.    Such act of subdividing and subleasing said
property by the defendant to other persons has resulted in great irreparable
loss and great injustice to the plaintiff and as a result thereof plaintiff
incurred actual damages to be proven during the proceedings.

10.   Plaintiff is entitled to the relief demanded
which consists of immediately restraining the further subdivision or alteration
and subleasing of the property and enjoining the defendant from proceeding with
any alteration, subdivision or subleasing of the properties subject of the
controversy.

11.   Defendant is doing, or about to do, is
procuring or suffering to be done, the act herein complained of, in violation
of plaintiff’s right and tending the judgment of the case ineffectual.

As correctly pointed out by the petitioner, the issue of the
subdividing and subleasing of the property may no longer be raised again in
this case because it had already been adjudicated in the antecedent case
between the petitioner and the private respondent. This was Civil Case No. 3031, where it was held:

On the matter of subleasing the property, plaintiff underscored the
contention of the defendant that since part of the provisions in the contract
between them is to the effect that he may use the premises in question for
business purposes, this is controverted by the specific provision thereat that
the same should not be subleased to other persons. While the terms appear to be so broad as to be susceptible of different
interpretations and while the court likewise does not countenance that a
specific provision controls a general provision in a contract, however, it is
to be noticed that the intent of the parties to a contract should also be given
credence. It likewise cannot be
countenanced by this court that the plaintiff has no knowledge about this
alleged violation affecting the subleasing, in a way that when the rooms were
constructed, it was with the knowledge of the plaintiff as contained in the
affidavits submitted by the defendant forming part of his position paper to
this effect. Therefore there appears to
be an implied consent upon the plaintiff as it is quite impossible that the
plaintiff would not notice that a construction was going on the leased premises. The plaintiff therefore is estopped from
claiming otherwise. (Cited in the CA
decision, p. 7.)

The above finding
is now final and conclusive in view of the private respondent’s withdrawal of
his appeal therefrom. As the Regional
Trial Court of Olongapo City observed:

The court notes plaintiff had virtually withdrawn his own appeal
concerning the finding of the lower court that the construction of additional
rooms and the consequent subleasing of the properties to third persons were
with the consent of the plaintiff and which therefore cannot be treated as
additional ground to eject the defendant. x x x. (Cited in CA decision, p.
9.)

That withdrawal
deprived the private respondent’s prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction
of all legal basis and removed his complaint from the operation of Sec. 412 (b)
of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law.

It is also worth noting that during the preliminary conference
and in his position paper, Jose had conveyed the impression that he was no
longer interested in pursuing his application for such provisional remedy and
was limiting his cause of action to the recovery of the unpaid rentals.^[14]
This strengthens all the more the petitioner’s contention that the prayer was
merely a pretense designed to avoid the requirements of the said law.

Whether or not the court acted correctly in proceeding with the
case even without the prior barangay proceeding is a procedural question that
could not be reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari but only
in an ordinary appeal. A similar
observation is made on its declaration that it was incumbent upon the
petitioner to prove that the private respondent’s allegations in support of the
prayer for preliminary injunction was false and that compensation or set-off
was not a proper defense. These
conclusions would at most constitute errors of judgment reviewable only on
appeal and not errors of jurisdiction reviewable by certiorari.

An additional consideration against the petitioner is his
contention that appeal, although available, was not a plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. He errs again.

The judgment in forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases, if in
favor of the plaintiff, must be executed immediately to prevent further damage
to him arising from loss of possession. Nevertheless, the defendant is not entirely without recourse. Under the Rules of Court, he may stay such
immediate execution by a) perfecting an appeal; b) filing a supersedeas bond;
and c) periodically depositing with the appellate court the rentals falling due
during the pendency of the appeal.

These remedies are expressly provided for in Rule 70, Section 8,
of the Rules of Court, reading in part as follows:

SEC. 8. Immediate
execution of judgment. How to stay
same. – If judgment is rendered
against the defendant, execution shall issue immediately, unless an appeal has
been perfected and the defendant to stay execution files a sufficient bond,
approved by the municipal or city court and executed to the plaintiff to enter
the action in the Court of First Instance and to pay the rents, damages, and
costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,
during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the
amount of rent due from time to time under the contract, if any, as found by
the judgment of the municipal or city court to exist. x x x

Although an order
for the execution of the judgment in favor of the private respondent had
already been issued and Felizardo’s ejectment from the leased property was
imminent, he could still prevent the implementation of the said order by
availing himself of the above remedies. But he did not.

His reason was that “there is no way that Mr. Jose can lose
in Olongapo City and there is nothing to prevent him from securing a writ of
execution notwithstanding the filing of a supersedeas bond. This had happened before in the very same
MTCC and in the very same RTC in the first case between him and herein
petitioner.”

It appears, though, that the petitioner’s apprehensions are
unfounded. The record shows that in the
earlier case between him and the private respondent, he was in fact able to
obtain the suspension of the adverse judgment against him during the pendency
of his appeal with the Regional Trial Court by filing a supersedeas bond.^[15]

The petitioner invokes the ruling in the case of Echaus vs. Court
of Appeals^[16]
which reaffirmed Valencia vs. Court of Appeals,^[17]
thus:

x x x, that certiorari lies against an order granting
execution pending appeal where the same is not founded upon good reasons. Also, the fact that the losing party had
appealed from the judgment does not bar the certiorari action filed in
respondent court as the appeal could not be an adequate remedy from such
premature execution.

That petitioner could have resorted to a supersedeas bond to
prevent execution pending appeal, as suggested by the two lower courts, is not
to be held against him. The filing of
such bond does not entitle him to the suspension of execution as a matter of
right. It cannot, therefore, be
categorically considered as a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, no rule requires a losing party so
circumstanced to adopt such remedy in lieu or before availment of other
remedial options at hand.

Furthermore, a rational interpretation of Section 3, Rule 39 should
be that the requirement for a supersedeas bond presupposed that the case
presents presumptively valid occasion for discretionary execution. Otherwise, even if no good reason exists to
warrant advance execution, the prevailing party would unjustly compel the losing
party to post a supersedeas bond through the simple expedient of filing a
motion for, and the trial court improvidently granting, a writ of execution
pending appeal although the situation is violative of Section 2, Rule 39. x x x

The above observations are not squarely applicable to the case at
bar because what were sought to be reviewed in the certiorari proceedings
instituted by the petitioner in those cases were the orders of execution
pending appeal, which were interlocutory and unappealable. Moreover, the orders of execution in those
cases were for the collection of damages and attorney’s fees and were issued
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court. This section requires good reasons to support
the issuance of the writ. Certiorari
was available to challenge the orders, which were annulled because there
was no showing of such good reasons to sustain the execution pending appeal.

By contrast, what was challenged in the special civil action for certiorari
filed by the herein petitioner with the Regional Trial Court was not merely
the order of execution but the judgment of the court a quo on the merits
of the case. This was final and
appealable. Besides, the writ in this
case was issued under Section 8, Rule 70, of the Rules of Court, under which it
is not necessary to show good reasons for the immediate execution of the
judgment against the defendant. This is
an ejectment case. As the Rules of
Court require the judgment in such cases to be executed immediately, the writ
of execution can be stayed only upon compliance with the requirements of the
said section.

It is understood that the trial court retains its discretion to
issue an order of execution pending appeal even when the defendant posts a
supersedeas bond. Of course, this discretion
is not absolute. The court can still
disregard the supersedeas bond but only when there are special and compelling
reasons justifying immediate execution.^[18] If
that discretion is exercised arbitrarily, the aggrieved party has the right to
question such act in a petition for certiorari.

To recapitulate, when the Municipal Trial Court ruled that it
could act on the complaint for ejectment filed by the private respondent even without
prior barangay conciliation proceedings, it committed a mere error of judgment
and not of jurisdiction. We have held
in many cases that while the referral of a case to the Lupon Tagapayapa is a
condition precedent for the filing of a complaint in court, non-compliance
therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the court has already acquired
over the subject matter and over the person of the defendant.^[19]
Hence, the remedy available to the petitioner was to question the ruling of the
court a quo in an
ordinary appeal and not, as he mistakenly did, in a special action for certiorari.

At any rate, even assuming that the petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner
was the proper remedy, the same cannot be granted as it cannot be said that the
court a quo committed
grave abuse of discretion in finding the allegations for the issuance of
preliminary injunction to be sufficient compliance with the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law. We agree with the
Regional Trial Court that:

Thus, when the lower court allegedly disregarded the counterclaims
of petitioner, when it refused to rule on “compensation off-setting”
and ruled that the application for a provisional remedy in the complaint for
ejectment was not sham or that it was not proved as such, and also when said
court failed to dismiss the case for lack of compliance with the requirement of
PD 1508 – there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower
court. x x x It cannot be said that
respondent judge acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner
to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.

Besides, as already pointed out, the petitioner had other plain,
speedy and adequate remedies available to him under Rule 70, Section 8, of the
Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the appealed
judgment is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioner.

Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Quiason, and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Rollo, p. 31.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 36.

^[3]
Repealed and now replaced by Secs. 399-422, Chap. 7, Title I, Book III &
Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV RA. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991.

^[4]
Rollo p. 37.

^[5]
Decided by Judge Luz V. Tordesillas; Rollo, p. 67.

^[6]
Rollo, p. 73.

^[7]
Rollo, p. 74.

^[8]
Original Record, p. 137.

^[9]
Decided by Judge Leopoldo T. Calderon, Jr.; Rollo, p. 95.

^[10]
Penned by Galvez, J. with Javellana and Elbinias, JJ. concurring; Rollo,
p. 121.

^[11]
Rollo, p. 126.

^[12]
Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court; Ruiz v. Castro, 220 SCRA 490; Salas v.
Castro, 216 SCRA 198; Zagada v. Civil Service Commission, 216 SCRA 114.

^[13]
Yap v. IAC, 220 SCRA 245; Antonio v. IAC, 216 SCRA 214; Aqualyn
Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 307.

^[14]
Rollo, p. 63; CA Rollo, p. 16.

^[15]
Reply, pp. 19-20; Rollo, p. 155.

^[16]
199 SCRA 381.

^[17]
184 SCRA 561.

^[18]
City of Manila vs. Court of Appeals, 72 SCRA 98.

^[19]
Empaynado v. Court of Appeals, 204 SCRA 870; Blardony v.
Cascolluelo, 182 SCRA 825; Fernandez v. Militante, 161 SCRA 695;
Gonzales v. Court of Appeals, 151 SCRA 289; Millare v. Hernando,
151 SCRA 484; Ebol v. Amin, 135 SCRA 438; Royales v. IAC, 127
SCRA 470.