ROSA DUPILAS, ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED, CECILIO ALUMISING, PLAINTIFF AND APPELLANT, VS. VLCTORIANO CABACUNGAN ET AL., DEFENDANTS AND APPELLEES.

On September 29, 1892, Gregorio Cabacungan, Marcelino Cabacungan,
and Mariano Cabacungan obtained from the Spanish government state
grants for the following parcels of land located in the sitio

of Patalan, municipality of Paniqui, Province of Tarlac:

“Gregorio Cabacuñgan: Parcel 1.—Bounded on the north by
lands of Ramon Gonzales and Felipe Madolora; on the east by the Patalan
Road; on the south by lands of Marcelino Cabacungan; and on the west by
land of Lorenzo Tabios. Area, 22.46 hectares.

“Parcel 2.—Bounded in the north by the land of Mariano
Cabacungan; on the east by the Patalan Road; on the south by the lands
of Cristobal Lopez and Romualdo Tiamsing; and on the west by land of
Romualdo Tiamsing. Area, 18.40 hectares.

“Parcel 3.—Bounded on the north by land of Marcelino
Cabacuñgan; on the east by lands of Tomas Dacoma and Juan Dacoma; on
the south by the division line between Paniqui and Gerona; and on the
west by land of Felizardo Tiamsing. Area, 25.48 hectares.

“Marcelino Cabacuñgan: Parcel 1.—Bounded on the north by
land of Mariano Cabacungan; on the east by lands of Martin Villanueva
and Tomas Dacoma; on the south by land of Gregorio Cabacuñgan; and on
the west by the Patalan Road. Area, 28.365 hectares.

“Parcel 2.—Bounded on the north by the land of Gregorio
Cabacuñgan; on the east by the Patalan Road; on the south by the land
of Mariano Cabacuñgan; and on the west by the land of Lorenzo Tabios.
Area, 17.40 hectares.

“Mariano Cabacuñgan: Parcel 1.—Bounded
on the north by the lands of Julian Macaraeg, Mariano Domingo, and Juan
Mendoza; on the east by lands of Esteban Salazar and Leonardo Beltran;
on the south by land of Marcelino Cabacungan; and on the west by the
Patalan Road.. Area, 28.665 hectares.

“Parcel 2.—Bounded on the north by land of Marcelino
Cabacuñgan; on the east by the Patalan Road; on the south by land of
Gregorio Cabacuñgan; and on the west by land of Romualdo Tiamsing. Area,
20.40 hectares.”

The titles were duly registered on November 9, 1892. On May 4, 1895,
the three grantees appeared before a notary public and duly executed
Exhibits D, E, and F, wherein they acknowledged having sold for cash in
hand on that day their respective parcels of land to Leon Alumising for
the prices stated, and at the same time turning over to Leon Alumising
their state grants. Exhibits D, E, and F were likewise duly registered
on June 18, 1896. Leon Alumising died in 1897, leaving surviving him
his wife, Alejandra Pacquing, and two daughters, Angela and Agripina.
Alejandra Pacquing sold the lands to Cecilio Alumising, brother of Leon
Alumising, on the 30th of March, 1905. This purchase and sale is
evidenced by a duly executed and ratified notarial document, but not
registered. Subsequent to the death of Cecilio Alumising and on
September 12, 1912, Rosa Dupilas, as administratrix of the estate of
the deceased Cecilio Alumising instituted this action for the purpose
of recovering the possession of the following described parcel of land,
together with damages for the illegal detention of the same:

“A parcel of land located in the barrio of Patalan, Paniqui, Tarlac,
bounded on the north by Ramon Gonzales, Felipe Madolora, Juliana
Macaraeg, Mariano Domingo, and Juan Mendoza; on the east by Esteban
Salazar, Leonardo Beltran, Martin Villanueva, and Tomas Dacoma; on the
south by the division line between the towns of Paniqui and Gerona, now
Pura, and Cristobal Lopez and Romualdo Tiamsing; and on the west by
Felizardo Tiamsing, Romualdo Tiamsing, and Lorenzo Tabios. Valued at
P34,100, with an area of 160 hectares and 71 ares.”

Gregorio Cabacungan died in 1906 and Mariano Cabacuñgan died some
time later, but before the commencement of this action. The original
defendants are Victoriano Cabacuñgan, Marcelino Cabacuñgan, Liberate
Mateo, Gabino Donato, and Juan de los Reyes. Marcelino, Mariano, and
Victoriano are the sons of Gregorio Cabacungan. Theother three above
named defendants are in no wise related to the Cabacungan family. The
complaint was amended on February 10, 1914, making various other
parties defendants, none of whom are related to the Cabacuñgans, unless
Silvestre Domingo is the same person referred to as Silvestra Domingo,
a descendant of Gregorio Cabacuñgan. There are some sixteen other
descendants of Gregorio Cabacuñgan who were not made defendants. On
March 22,1913, Marcelino Cabacuñgan and Victoriano Cabacuñgan answered,
denying all the allegations in the complaint, and interposed a
counterclaim in which they alleged that Leon Alumising obtained the
deeds (Exhibits D, E, and F) and the possession of the state grants by
means of fraud, and prayed for affirmative relief to the effect that
the deeds and the state grants be returned to them. On March 22, 1913,
Juan de los Reyes filed his answer, disclaiming any interest in the
lands in dispute. On the same date Gabino Donato filed a general denial
and alleged as a special defense that he is the exclusive owner of a
parcel of land situated in the sitio of Patalan, bounded on the north
by Rosendo Cortez, on the south and east by Victoriano Cabacuñgan and
on the west by Victoriano Cabacuñgan and Leon Lacayanga with an area of
more than one hectare. This defendant further alleged that a judgment
had been rendered in his favor as defendant in a suit for the
possession of this small parcel of land in which the deceased Cecilio
Alumising was the plaintiff. Liberate Mateo in his answer filed on
March 22d, alleged, after making a general denial, as a special
defense, that he is the sole owner of a parcel of land situated in the
sitio of Patalan, bounded on the north by Teodoro Andres; on the east
by Martin Villanueva; and on the south and west by Victoriano
Cabacuñgan. Dionisio Macadangdang and Angelo Austria entered a general
denial on March 11,1914. The other named defendants filed a joint
answer on February 28, 1914, denying the allegations in the complaint
and set up, as a special defense, that they are simply tenants of their
co-defendants, Victoriano Cabacuñgan and Marcelino Cabacuñgan.

From a judgment in favor of the defendants dismissing the complaint
upon the merits, with costs, and ordering the return of the deeds and
state grants, plaintiff appealed and now urges that the court erred (1)
in finding that the seven parcels of land all belonged to Gregorio
Cabacuñgan; (2) in finding that the sales to Leon Alumising were
fictitious and made for the sole purpose of enabling him to raise a loan
on the lands in order that Gregorio Cabacungan might pay him a debt of
P77.50; (3) in finding that the letters, Exhibits Nos. 2, 3, and 4 of
the defendants, are authentic and not forged; (4) in finding that Leon
Alumising had never been in possession of the land up to the time of
his death; and (5) in finding that Gregorio Cabacuñgan and his heirs
have been in continuous, peaceable, and quiet possession of the lands
since and before the issuance of the state grants. All of these alleged
errors may be considered together.

The three letters, Exhibits Nos. 2, 3, and 4, read as follows:

“[Exhibit 2.]

“Apo Gorio: As they do not believe in Manila that you have in trusted
the sale of your land to me, even when I show them your title, for the
reason that there has not decided to write you in order that you may
come here to Moncada, that then we may go together to Tarlac to make an
instrument of sale, for in this manner it will be easier to negotiate
the sale; have no fear of the step I propose nor feel that I will
deceive you in the future, for you have already that contract which was
made there.

“Yours, etc.,

“LEON ALUMISING MEND.A.

“[Exhibit 3.]

“SIR: It is strange to me that you did not go to Tarlac with your
children on the day we fixed to go before a notary for the purpose of
executing the instrument, and it hurts me to think that you seem to have
doubts. I entreat you to banish that doubt from your mind, since you
have the contract and these my letters in your hands. Therefore come so
that we may agree on the day most convenient for you to go to Tarlac
with the object of executing the instrument as if it were a sale, and
if the notary asks you if you have already received the money tell him
yes, nothing more, for you have this letter of mine which is proof that
you have not really received any, except the P77.50 for that which was
given me as guaranty.

“Yours,

“LEON ALUMISING MEND.A.

“[Exhibit 4.]

“SIR: Don’t be grieved if I deliver now to other persons the land
which you gave me in guaranty, as I have not been able to sell it at
the price I wanted in order that both of us might make a profit; at any
time, if you will give me the P77.50, I will deliver your land. I am
informed that you are continually worried because of the instrument of
sale which we had executed, but I tell you you have no cause to be
anxious, because I will take them there when I go if I do not forget
them as I did that other time I went. My papers are out of place; I do
not trust them to any one because I am uneasy.

“Yours, etc.,

“LEON ALUMISING MEND.A.”

Marcelino Cabacungan identified Exhibits Nos. 2, 3, and 4 and
testified that each bore the signature of Leon Alumising. Paulino
Villafuerte testified to the same effect. Santiago de Jesus testified
that the signatures to Exhibits Nos. 2 and 3 are those of Leon
Alumising. Both Paulino and Santiago were employees with Leon Alumising
in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac for sometime
prior to the death of Leon Alumising in 1897. When Exhibits Nos. 2, and
3, and 4 were offered in evidence counsel for the plaintiff asked time
within which to read and examine them. Later on the court asked counsel
what he desired to say with reference to these exhibits. Counsel
replied as follows: “We object to the introduction of Exhibits 2, 3,
and 4 because they are impertinent, for the reason that they are not
dated and it is not known to what they refer; they speak of an
indeterminate parcel of land,” Court: “Exhibits 2, 3, and 4 are
admitted.” No exception was taken. No effort whatsoever was made by the
plaintiff in the court below to show that the letters were not written
by Leon Alumising. Neither did the plaintiff attempt to prove that
these letters referred to other lands than those in question. That the
three letters were written by Leon Alumising and that they refer to the
lands covered by Exhibits D, E, and F and the state grants, there can
be no question.

The history of the transactions relating to the execution of
Exhibits D, E, and F and the turning over to Leon Alumising of the
state grants is stated by Marcelino Cabacuñgan substantially as
follows: Gregorio Cabacuñgan obtained the state grants from the Spanish
government. The land was divided, as appears in the state grants, by the
surveyor. Notwithstanding the fact that the titles were issued in the
names of the three Cabacuñgans, the whole of the land belonged to
Gregorio Cabacuñgan. Gregorio Cabacuñgan owed Leon Alumising the sum of
P77.50. Gregorio could not meet this obligation at the time the payment
was demanded by Leon. Thereupon Leon proposed that he be given a power
of attorney to pledge the three titles in Manila. The titles were then
turned over to Leon. Sometime later Leon informed Gregorio that he was
unable to pledge the titles and requested that the necessary documents
be executed, purporting to sell the lands to Leon, Gregorio to make the
simulated sales, which was done, as appears from Exhibits D, E and F.
No money was received by the Cabacuñgan as a result of the execution of
those documents. The only purpose of executing the documents was to
authorize Leon to sell or pledge the lands. On receipt of the letter,
Exhibit 4, the Cabacuñgans took the P77.50 to Moncada for the purpose
of paying Gregorio’s debt and obtaining the deeds and state grants. The
debt was then paid to Leon, but the documents were not returned, Leon
saying that they had been mislaid. Leon promised to return the
documents as soon as they could be found. After the death of Leon the
Cabacuñgans made a demand upon Leon’s family for the return of the
documents. The members of the family stated that they did not know
where the titles were. In 1908 Cecilio Alumising instituted an action
in the justice of the peace court for the possession of the land, but
failed, the Cabacuñgans being absolved. Later Cecilio instituted
another action against Donato, which suit was abandoned by Cecilio in
the Court of First Instance.

The defendants, Dionisio Macadangdang and Angelo Austria, have
established that they are the owners, with other parties, of the
parcels of land occupied by them. This ownership is evidenced by Torrens
title issued on March 5, 1908, and November 11, 1910, respectively. The
trial court found that the Cabacungans and their heirs are now, and
have been since sometime prior to the issuance of the state grants, in
the open, peaceable, and quiet possession as owners of the remainder of
the land in question and that neither Leon Alumising nor anyone
pretending to hold under him has ever been in the possession of the
whole or any part of these lands, nor received at any time any of the
products therefrom.

The result is that the Cabacuñgans, as a matter of fact, never sold
the lands to Leon Alumising. Exhibits D, E, and F were executed at the
instance of Leon Alumising in order that he might sell or pledge the
lands for the Cabacuñgans. The Gregorio Cabacungan debt to Leon of
P77.50 was paid during the lifetime of the latter. At the time Leon’s
widow attempted to sell the lands to Cecilio Alumising, Cecilio, who
lived in the same community, knew that the lands were then in the
possession of the Cabacuñgans and had been all the time. He also knew
that neither Leon nor Alexandra had ever been in possession and had
ever received any of the products from the land. If he paid the widow
the amount stated in the document, he did so with full knowledge of
these facts.

The question now arises whether Cecilio Alumising acquired title to
the lands by virtue of the document executed in his favor by Alejandra.
The solution of this question depends upon the effect produced by the
registration of Exhibits D, E, and F. It is urged that Cecilio
Alumising acquired absolute title to the lands by purchase from, as it
is said, the registered owner and that Exhibits D, E, and F and the
facts stated therein are binding upon the contracting parties and their
successors in interest. Counsel in support of these contentions cite
and rely upon articles 1215,1218, and 1219 of the Civil Code, and
Escario vs. Regis (31 Phil. Rep., 618) ; Cacnio vs. Baens (5 Phil.Rep., 742); Nolan vs. Salas (7 Phil. Rep., 1) ; Mendoza vs. Fulgencio and De Asis (8 Phil. Rep., 243); and Dancel and Mina vs. Ventura (24 Phil. Rep., 421).

Article 1215 of the Civil Code provides that proof of obligations may
be given by instruments, by confessions, by witnesses, etc. Article
1218 reads:

“Public instruments are evidence, even against a third person, of
the fact which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the
latter.

“They shall also be evidence against the contracting parties and
their legal representatives with regard to the declarations the former
may have made therein.”

Article 1219 provides that public instruments, made for the purpose
of impairing a former instrument, between the same parties, shall be
effective against third parties only when the contents of the former
should have been entered in the proper public registry or in the margin
of the original instrument, and in that of the transcript or copy, by
virtue of which the third person may have acted.

Article 1215 and 1219 have no special application to the question
under consideration. Article 1218 establishes a rule of evidence with
reference to the probative force of public documents. This rule is not
absolute in the sense that the contents of a public document is
conclusive evidence against the contracting parties as to the
truthfulness of the statements made therein. The supreme court of
Spain, in its decision of July 10, 1896, said:

“Neither from articles 1218 and 1248 of the Civil Code, nor from any
other provision of law, may it be concluded that public documents have
always greater weight than any other evidence.”

Manresa, in commenting upon article 1218, says in volume 8 at page 465, that—

“It having been determined who are to be considered as third persons,
the provisions of article 1218 leave no room for doubt; public
instruments, public documents in general, are perfect evidence, even
against third persons, if the act which the officer witnessed and
certified to or the date .written by him in the document are not shown
to be false; but they are not perfect evidence with respect to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested parties.”

Section 285 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that,—

“When the terms of an agreement have been reduced to writing by the
parties, it is to be considered as containing all those terms, and
therefore there can be, between the parties and their representatives
or successors in interest, no evidence of the terms of agreement other
than the contents of the writing, except in the following cases:

“1. Where a mistake or imperfection of the writing, or its failure to
express the true intent and agreement of the parties, is put in issue
by the pleadings;

“2. Where the validity of the agreement is the fact in dispute. But
this section does not exclude other evidence of the circumstances under
which the agreement was made, or to which it relates, or to explain an
intrinsic ambiguity, or to establish its illegality of fraud. The term
‘agreement’ includes deeds and instruments conveying real estate, and
wills as well as contracts between parties.”

Consequently, the defendants in the instant case had a right to
offer any competent evidence for the purpose of establishing their
defense to the effect that the execution of the deeds, Exhibits D, E,
and F, were obtained in the manner indicated above.

In Escario vs. Regis, supra, the subject-matter of
the action was the ownership of three parcels of land. The plaintiff’s
ownership was evidenced by a state grant. The defendant sought to
overcome the state grant by oral testimony alone. This Court held that—

“The possessor of a title issued in due form has in his favor the
legal presumption that in the issuance thereof all the requisites
prescribed therefor by law have been fulfilled. * * *

“If titles duly issued by the Government under the laws in force
could be destroyed or invalidated by purely parol evidence nobody would
be secure in his property, and even one who had the very best title
would be in danger of losing it, if parol evidence could in any manner
prevail as a general rule over documentary proof. (In the decision of
the case of Dancel and Mina vs. Ventura, 24 Phil. Rep., 421,
the principle was laid down that the grantee of a tract of unoccupied
land who has obtained a composition title issued by and in the name of
the Government and duly inscribed in the property registry is the sole
owner of the land granted that appears in his name in the registry,
until his title be annulled or canceled by a final judgment of the
courts.)

“So long as the composition title secured by the plaintiff Gregorio
Escario, through a final judgment rendered after a hearing had in due
form and according to the provisions of the laws that treat of the
efficacy and validity of the titles granted by the state with reference
to sale and composition, has not been declared null and void and
without force or effect, he is the only one to be regarded as the
ligitimate owner of the lands in question, to the exclusion of anybody
else who cannot exhibit better right and title thereto.

“The sum of the parol evidence adduced by the defendants has not
satisfactorily demonstrated that said composition title was
fraudulently obtained or vitiated by any defect that would nullify it,
and therefore no legal reason exists to declare it null and void.”

In Cacnio vs. Baens, supra, the defendant
presented a duly registered state grant covering the land in
litigation. The validity of the state grant was denied by the
plaintiff. The court, after holding that public instruments are
admissible in evidence, even against a third party, as to the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date thereof, said:

“The inscription, therefore, of the instruments in question
prejudices the plaintiffs, Cacnio and Cruz, notwithstanding the fact
that they did not participate in the proceedings relating to the
composition of the said land between the state and the defendant, and
in view of the provisions of article 27 of the Mortgage Law there can
be no doubt that the said plaintiffs should be considered as third
persons, whom the execution of the deed or instrument of the defendant
and the inscription thereof in the registry of property affected and
prejudiced.

“It has not been shown that the deed or patent issued by the Direccion General de Administration Civil
had any substantial defect which would render it null and void, nor has
it been proved that the party failed to publish the necessary notice as
to the possession of the land to which the said deed refers; and under
paragraph 31 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it must be
presumed that this was done in accordance with the law until the
contrary is shown.”

In Nolan vs. Salas, supra, the plaintiff sought to
recover a credit of P690.18 assigned to him by a certain Chinaman.
Three notes signed by the defendant, amounting to were introduced in
evidence. The trial court entered judgment for this amount and rejected
the remainder of the claim. On appeal this court held (quoting from the
syllabus) that, “the entries and other writings of a deceased person
made at or near the time of the transaction provided for in section 328
of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions, are not admissible in
evidence until after the authenticity of the manuscript in question has
been first satisfactorily established.”

In Mendoza vs. Fulgencio and De Asis, supra, the
court laid down the rule that an action to recover property appertains
to the owner of the thing, and he may proceed not only against the
person who is in actual possession, but also against the person
unlawfully detaining it. The mere holding or material occupation of
property, without the circumstances and conditions prescribed by law
does not constitute legal possession, but is simply an intrusion with
the intention of securing control over it, and is ineffectual in every
way to confer any right of possession.

In Dancel and Mina vs. Ventura supra, the court,
after observing that the possessor of real property must be respected in
his possession so long as no other claimant appears with a better right
and that the usurpation or detention of the property creates no right on
the part of the usurper to the prejudice of the lawful owner, held
(quoting from the syllabus) that, “the concessionary of an
unappropriated tract of land who has obtained a composition title
thereto, issued by and in the name of the Government and duly
registered, is the sole owner of the property appearing in his name in
the property registry, until his title be annulled or cancelled by a
final judgment of the courts.”

The cases just examined establish these propositions: (a)
The possessor of a title issued in due form has in his favor the legal
presumption that in the issuance thereof all the requisites prescribed
therefor by law have been fulfilled; (b) parol evidence cannot, as a general rule, prevail over documentary proof, such as titles duly issued by the Government; (c)
so long as state grants secured through a final judgment rendered after
a hearing had in due form and according to the provisions of the laws
that treat of the authenticity and validity of titles granted by the
state have not been declared null and void, the grantee must be
regarded as the true owner of the lands to the exclusion of anyone else
who cannot exhibit a better right and title thereto; (d) the
inscription of state grants prejudice third persons whether they
participated in the proceedings which resulted in the issuance of such
titles or not; and (e) the writings of deceased persons are
not admissible in evidence until after the authenticity of such
writings has been satisfactorily established.

The principal defendants are not attempting to have the state grants
declared null and void. They do not question their validity. The
authenticity of the letters of the deceased Leon Alumising was
satisfactorily established before they were admitted in evidence.
Consequently, the cases relied upon have no direct bearing upon the
question under consideration.

Articles 33 and 34 of the Mortgage Law read as follows:

“Art. 33. The record of instruments or contracts which are null in accordance with the law are not validated thereby.

“Art. 34. Notwithstanding the statements contained in the preceding
article, the instruments or contracts executed or covenanted by a
person who, according to the registry,has a right thereto, shall not be
invalidated with regard to third persons, after they have once been
recorded, although later the right of the person executing them is
annulled or determined by virtue of a prior deed not recorded, or for
reasons which do not clearly appear from the registry.

“Only by virtue of a recorded instrument may another later
instrument, also recorded, be invalidated to the prejudice of third
persons, with the exceptions mentioned in article 389.

“The provisions of this article may at no time be applied to the
instrument recorded in accordance with the provisions of article 390,
unless the prescription has validated or secured the interest referred
to therein.”

In Nery Lim-Chingco vs. Terariray (5 Phil. Rep., 120), Lao-Yuco was
the owner of the land in litigation. On the 3d of October, 1889, a
public document evidencing the sale of the land was executed. The
purchaser named in the document was the plaintiff. As seller there
appeared before the justice of the peace, who was acting as judge of
the Court of First Instance, with the power of a notary public, a
person who stated that he was Lao-Yuco. Lao-Yuco was the husband of one
of the defendants and the father of the other. Lao-Yuco died in 1902,
The deed, although a forgery, was duly registered. Lao-Yuco remained in
possession of the land up to the time of his death and the defendants
continued in possession thereafter. This court held:

“This case does not come within article 34 of that law, and the
record of the forged deed could not give the plaintiff any additional
rights. There was nothing decided in the case of the Compania General
de Tabacos vs. Topino (4 Phil. Rep., 33), which is opposed to
this proposition. It is very probable that if the defendants hereafter
wish to record any instruments relating to this land, it will be
necessary for them to procure the cancellation of the record of the
deed in question, but the fact that they have not commenced any such
action does not prohibit them from proving, when they are sued for
possession of the land, that the deed under which the plaintiff claims
is a forgery.”

In Merchant vs. Lafuente (5 Phil. Rep., 638) the facts with
reference to the ownership of the land therein involved were
substantially these: On September 14,1893, one Zamora presented to the
registrar of property certain documents, which as he claimed, proved
that he was the owner of the land and asked that he be inscribed in the
registry of property as the owner thereof. A definite inscription was
not then made, but in lieu thereof the registrar made a precautionary
entry. Zamora afterwards sold the land to one Velarde. On January 25,
1894, Velarde presented his title papers to the registrar of property
and asked that he be inscribed as the owner of the land. The same
action was taken and a precautionary entry was made. On August 3,1901,
Velarde conveyed the land to Roxas. On December4, 1902, Roxas conveyed
the land to Ramirez Hermanos, and on January 5, 1903, Ramirez Hermanos
conveyed it to the defendant Lafuente. All of these last named deeds
were duly recorded in the registry of property. At the time Zamora was
provisionally inscribed in the registry of property as the owner and at
the time Velarde obtained a similar inscription in his name, neither
one was the owner of the land, Veloso was the true owner at that time.
The court held that—

“Although the title of Velarde was bad, this fact did not appear in
the registry. From the registry Velarde appeared to have authority to
convey. Roxas was entitled to rely upon this registry, and his grantees
and subsequent purchasers have the same right. * * * Veloso was the
owner of the property. His title was recorded in the old registry. He
had the right to transfer it to the new registry. The law gave him an
opportunity to do this before any interests in the land adverse to his
could be obtained. If he had caused the transfer to be made at any time
between 1889 and September 14,1893, the date when Zamora secured his
precautionary entry, the latter could in no event have acquired any
rights against him. The entry which Zamora then secured was only a
precautionary one, and under the terms of the seventh of the transitory
articles of the regulations, it remained such for a year at least.
During this time Veloso might have preserved his rights by making the
transfer.”

In Suiliong & Co. vs. Chio-Taysan (12 Phil. Rep., 13),
a certain tract of land was duly inscribed in the registry in the name
of Avelina Caballero. On March 27, 1903, Avelina borrowed from
Francisca Jose P1,000 and turned over to Francisca the title deeds to
the land as security for the loan, but no entry touching the
transaction was noted in the land registry. Avelina died on June 5,
1903, and as a result of proceedings instituted for the purpose of
obtaining a declaration of heirs, the court, On August 5, 1903, found
and decreed that Silvina Chio-Taysan y Caballero was the sole heir of
the estate of her deceased mother, Avelina Caballero. On March 9, 1904,
the registrar of deeds, by virtue of the above mentioned decree,
entered an inscription in the land registry whereby Silvina Chio-Taysan
was made to appear as the owner of the parcel of land which stood upon
the records in the name of her mother. On May 26, 1904, Silvina
borrowed from the plaintiff company P2,500 and mortgaged the land as
security for the payment of the loan. On October 10, 1906, the
plaintiff company instituted an action praying for a judgment for the
amount of the loan and the foreclosure of the mortgage upon the land.
Francisca Jose intervened and prayed that the court declare the
mortgage rescinded and annul the inscription in the land registry. From
a judgment in favor of the plaintiff company, the intervener appealed
and this court, in reversing the judgment, held that the inscription of
the land in the name of Avelina did not prejudice the lien of the
intervener, citing article 33 of the Mortgage Law.

In the first case Lim-Chingco was a party to the forgery, and the
recording of the forged deed could not, of course, give him any
additional right or validate the deed. In the second, Lafuente was an
innocent purchaser for value from, in so far as he knew, the registered
owner. He had no notice either actual or constructive of any adverse
claims against the lands. He was entitled to rely upon the registry.
And in the third, Suiliong & Company knew from the entry in the
registry, whereby Silvina Chio-Taysan was made to appear as the owner
of the land, that she had inherited it from her mother, who died on
June 5, 1903. The company also knew that under the law the property of
the deceased Avelina was liable for her debts. It was the duty of the
company to make inquiries as to the status of the estate of Avelina
before making the loan.

In the instant case Cecilio Alumising knew at the time he purchased
the lands that the defendants were, and had been for many years, as we
have said, in the actual, open, visible, and exclusive possession of
the entire parcel. These facts were sufficient to put him upon inquiry
as to the claims of the defendants. By a reasonably diligent
investigation he could have ascertained the nature and character of
such claims. The defendants’ possession under claim of ownership was
notice to Cecilio of whatever interest they had in the land. Their
interest being inconsistent with the title of the apparent owner of
record, it necessarily follows that Cecilio’s purchase was subject to
the defendant’s rights and that the recording of Exhibits D, E, and F,
which were obtained by means of fraud, did not validate them as to
Cecilio. It is very probable that if the defendants hereafter wish to
record any instruments relating to this same land, it will be necessary
for them to procure cancellation of the record of the deeds, Exhibits
D, E, and F, but the fact that they had not commenced any such action
did. not prohibit them from proving, when they were sued for the
possession of the land, that the deeds under which the plaintiff claims
were obtained by Leon Alumising by means of fraud.

For the foregoing reasons the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the appellant. So ordered,

Torres, Carson and Araullo, JJ., concur.
Moreland, J., concurs in the result.