🎧 Case Brief Lecture

DY CHUAN LENG ET AL,, PETITIONERS, VS. BYRON S. AMBLER, JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 1120. December 08, 1902 December 8, 1902

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Dy Chuan Leng versus Ambler

The Case

This is an original action for the extraordinary writs of prohibition and injunction, brought in the Supreme Court by Dy Chuan Leng and Lee Gu against the judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila. The petitioners ask the Court to stop the trial judge from continuing a preliminary injunction and from appointing a receiver in a pending suit for the dissolution of a partnership. The case matters because it draws the line every bar candidate must know: a court that has jurisdiction over the action and the power to issue the ancillary writs does not lose that jurisdiction merely because it commits errors in exercising it. The remedy for error is appeal, not prohibition.

Procedural History

Ang Ban Ka commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Dy Chuan Leng and Lee Gu, praying for the dissolution of a partnership alleged to exist between them. The complaint also prayed for a preliminary injunction and for the appointment of a receiver. The trial court granted a preliminary injunction ex parte, and denied the defendants' motion to dissolve it. The defendants then demurred to the complaint, and that demurrer remained pending decision. The court notified the defendants that it intended to appoint a receiver. Thereupon the defendants filed a complaint in the Supreme Court, invoking the Code of Civil Procedure, asking that the judge of the part where the action was pending be prohibited from continuing the preliminary injunction and from appointing a receiver, and also asking for an injunction. The Supreme Court resolved the matter on the prayer for a preliminary injunction.

Facts

Ang Ban Ka sued Dy Chuan Leng and Lee Gu in the Court of First Instance of Manila, seeking to dissolve a partnership he claimed existed between them. His complaint carried prayers for a preliminary injunction and for the appointment of a receiver.

The court granted a preliminary injunction ex parte and refused to dissolve it. The defendants demurred to the complaint, and while that demurrer was still awaiting decision, the court gave notice that it intended to appoint a receiver.

The defendants then came to the Supreme Court, complaining of a series of supposed irregularities: that the complaint was ambiguous; that the judge believed the plaintiff was a partner although the defendants denied it; that he fixed the bond at one thousand dollars instead of the thirty thousand dollars the defendants requested; that the writ of injunction did not mention the bond; that he refused to hear the defendants' witnesses; and that he refused to dissolve the injunction upon a bond the defendants offered to give.

Issues

  • Whether or not the writ of prohibition may issue against a judge who, having jurisdiction over the action and the power to grant a preliminary injunction and to appoint a receiver, is alleged to have committed errors in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
  • Whether or not the Supreme Court may grant a preliminary injunction in the petitioners' action when the complaint filed in that action fails to show that the petitioners are entitled to the relief they seek.

Applicable Provisions

The decision refers to article 164 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which empowers the Court of First Instance to grant a preliminary injunction in an action pending before it. The Court treats this as the source of the trial court's power, and the existence of that power is what defeats the petition for prohibition.

The decision also refers to article 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which empowers the Court of First Instance to appoint a receiver. The Court likewise treats this as a power vested in the trial court, so that its exercise, however erroneous, is reviewable only on appeal.

The decision refers to article 516 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which the petitioners filed their complaint in the Supreme Court. This is the procedural vehicle by which they sought the writs, and the Court measures their entitlement against the requirements for injunctive relief.

The decision refers to article 518 of the Code of Civil Procedure, under which the petitioners asked for an injunction. The Court holds that an injunction under this provision cannot be granted unless the requirements of articles 164 and 166 are met.

The decision refers to articles 164 and 166 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which govern the issuance of a preliminary injunction. The Court requires compliance with these articles, and holds that it must appear from the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in the action.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the writ of prohibition could not issue. The trial court had jurisdiction over the action to dissolve the partnership. In that action it had the power to grant a preliminary injunction under article 164 and to appoint a receiver under article 174. Having those powers, any errors committed in exercising them could be corrected only on appeal from the final judgment. The Court put the rule plainly:

Having those powers, if in the exercise of them any errors were committed, they could be corrected only on appeal from the final judgment.

The Court went through the petitioners' list of grievances and held that none of them showed the court was acting outside its jurisdiction. At most they showed that the court had committed certain errors in exercising its jurisdiction, errors which must be corrected by appeal. The Court distinguished its earlier ruling in Yangco versus Rohde, where prohibition was allowed because the Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction at all to grant temporary alimony once the fact of marriage was denied. Here, by contrast, the power existed.

On the second issue, the Court held that it could not grant an injunction under article 518 unless there was compliance with articles 164 and 166. It must appear from the complaint that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in the action, and if the complaint states no cause of action, no preliminary injunction can be issued. The complaint filed in the Supreme Court was defective in this respect, since it showed on its face that the petitioners were not entitled to an order of prohibition against the court below. The Court acknowledged that in passing upon the preliminary motion it had virtually decided the case upon the present complaint, but it saw no escape from that result.

Doctrine

Prohibition lies only to restrain a court acting without or in excess of its jurisdiction. Where the court has jurisdiction over the action and is vested by law with the power to grant a preliminary injunction and to appoint a receiver, errors in the exercise of that power, such as fixing an improper bond, refusing to hear witnesses, or refusing to dissolve an injunction, do not amount to lack of jurisdiction. They are errors of judgment correctable only by appeal from the final judgment. The doctrine is tied to articles 164 and 174 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which supply the trial court's power, and to the distinction drawn from Yangco versus Rohde, where the court had no jurisdiction at all. A preliminary injunction under article 518 requires compliance with articles 164 and 166, and the complaint must show on its face that the plaintiff is entitled to recover in the action.

Disposition

The Supreme Court denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, and the petitioners did not obtain the writs of prohibition and injunction they sought against the trial judge.

Remember This

Memorize this line: where the court has jurisdiction and the power to issue the ancillary writs, errors in exercising that power are corrected by appeal, not by prohibition. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between lack of jurisdiction, which justifies prohibition, and errors of judgment, which do not.