SOTENIA GONO-JAVIER, TEBURCIO GONO, ANUNCIACION G. JAVIER, GERMANA G. GULAY, LUCIO GONO, RAMON GONO, ALFREDO GONO AND MANUEL GONO, PETITIONERS, VS. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RE…

Juan Casocot, the alleged natural grandfather of petitioners, was
said to have owned during his lifetime five (5) parcels of land in Nasipit, Agusan,
covered by Tax Declaration (“T.D.”) No. 2667, 3227, 1209, 738 and 2666.

On 13 February 1978, petitioners filed a case with the Regional
Trial Court (“RTC”) of Butuan City for the recovery of ownership and possession
of the above five
(5) parcels which they claimed were merely held in trust for them by private
respondents. Petitioners averred that
they were the children of deceased Catalino Gono, an acknowledged natural child
of Juan
Casocot, who, by intestate succession, should thus be held to be the owners of the property. Additionally, they asserted that petitioner
Anunciacion Gono-Javier purchased the parcels of land on 20 June 1956 from the
Provincial Government of Agusan following the levy thereof (on 28 May 1956) for
tax delinquency.

In their answer, private respondents, all nephews and nieces of
Juan Casocot except for Carlos Monte de Ramos, a grandnephew, and Nonito
Marave, a stranger, to whom a portion of one of the parcels of land had been
sold, contended that since the complaint had failed to state that Catalino Gono had been recognized by Juan Casocot either in a record of
birth or in a will, an independent
action for voluntary recognition should have first been instituted to permit
any intestate successional right to legally pass to petitioners. Also alleged in the answer was that, with
the exception of the parcel covered by T.D. No. 738, the questioned property
had been sold by Juan Casocot to private respondents Restituta and Fermin
Casocot on 19 April 1960 and a portion to private respondent Marave. Private respondents belied the claim that petitioner Gono-Javier purchased the
property from the Provincial Government of Agusan. Finally, the defense of prescription
was raised on the ground that private respondents had been in possession of the
disputed property in good faith and for value for more than 17 years before
petitioners’ action was instituted.

After trial, the Butuan RTC rendered judgment for petitioners
declaring them to be the lawful owners of the property. The court, in rejecting the claim of
ownership made by private respondents, opined that the deed of sale executed by
Juan Casocot on 19 April 1960, when he was already 80 years old, in favor of respondents Restituta and Fermin
Casocot was absolutely simulated and void. It ruled that petitioners’ father, Catalino Gono, had been duly
recognized by Juan Casocot since 1954 to be his natural child that thereby
entitled petitioners to inherit the parcels of land in question. The trial court likewise held that the
property had been sold to petitioner Anunciacion Gono-Javier on 05 and 20 June
1956 after it had been levied by the Provincial Government for non-payment of
taxes.

The trial court thus nullified Transfer Certificate of Title
(“TCT”) No. RT-349, issued in the names of Restituta and Fermin Casocot, with
respect to the parcel of land covered by T.D. No. 1209, and all certificates of title issued in
the names of transferees, Felipe Yonson, Alicia Yonson, Adriano Casocot, Carlos
Monte de Ramos, Regina Duglas, Restituta, Fermin Casocot and Nonito Marave.

On appeal by private respondents, the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court’s decision, and ordered the dismissal of the complaint by petitioners for the
recovery of title and possession of the
disputed parcels. The appellate
court ratiocinated and concluded:

“First. The trial court
declared Catalino Gono to be the acknowledged natural child of Juan Casocot on
the basis of a statement in a deed of donation which he made in favor of
Eugenia Gonzales, widow of Catalino Gono, to the effect that among the reasons
for making the donation was the fact that the donee ‘is the surviving spouse of
my son had with my common law wife.’ (Exh. G)

“The deed of donation conveyed to Eugenia Gonzales the parcel of
land covered by TD 738 (Exh. E). It was
made on March 29, 1954, about 11 years after the death of Catalino Gono in 1942
or 1943. In the first place, the
statement therein describing Eugenia Gonzales ‘the surviving spouse of my son
had with my common law wife’ is only, if at all, an indirect acknowledgement of
Catalino Gono as the son of Juan Casocot. This falls short of the requirement that the voluntary recognition of a
natural child must be expressly made either in the record of birth, or in a
will, or in a statement before the court of record or in any authentic
writing. (Civil Code, art. 278)

“In the second place, according to the testimony of
plaintiff-appellee Sotenia Gono herself, Catalino Gono died in 1942 or
1943. (TSN, p. 24, Dec. 10, 1980) On the
other hand, his supposed acknowledgment was made only in 1954. Now, art. 281 requires that if the child is
of age, his recognition must be with his consent. Obviously, therefore, it was not possible for Catalino Gono to
have given his consent, even if the indirect reference to him in the deed of
donation as the son of Juan Casocot were considered a sufficient
acknowledgment.

“For these reasons, it was error for the trial court to declare the
plaintiff-appellees, the children of Catalino Gono, to be the owners of the
four parcels of land covered by TD No. 2667 (Exh. B), TD No. 3227 (Exh. C), TD
No. 1209 (Exh. D), and TD No. 2666 (Exh. F) by right of inheritance.

“Second. Nor may the
plaintiff-appellees base their claim of ownership on the fact that one of them
(Anunciacion Gono-Javier) allegedly repurchased the lands in question after
they had been forfeited to the Province of Agusan for nonpayment of taxes. The records show that while it is true that
Anunciacion Gono-Javier was issued a Certificate of Repurchase of Real Property
after Sale (Exh. N) on June 20, 1956, it is equally true that on February 3,
1959, she was refunded the amount she had paid. This is evidenced by a municipal voucher issued on February 3,
1959 (Exh. P) by which she acknowledged receipt of P850.00 from Eduardo V.
Amber, Treasurer of Nasipit, Agusan, from the partial payment previously made
by Juan Casocot for taxes covering the period May 29, 1956 to February 2,
1959. Indeed, the Final Bill of Sale
(Exh. M) to her, dated February 3, 1959, which had been prepared, was never
executed as the Provincial Treasurer of Agusan never signed it, apparently
because the day (February 2, 1959), Juan Casocot had repurchased the
properties. That is the reason why on
February 3, 1959 a municipal voucher (Exh. P) for the payment of P850.00 to
Anunciacion G. Javier was made and Anunciacion G. Javier was actually refunded
what she had paid. The trial court,
therefore, erred in holding that, in the alternative, plaintiff-appellees are
owners of the lands in question by virtue of a right of repurchase from the
Provincial Government of Agusan.

“Third. The four parcels of
land covered by TD No. 2667 (Exh. B), TD No. 3227 (Exh. C), TD No. 12009 (Exh.
D), and TD No. 2666 (Exh. F) were sold to Restituta and Fermin Casocot by
virtue of a deed of sale made by Juan Casocot on April 19, 1960. However, the trial court declared the sale
to be simulated and therefore void based on its finding that Juan Casocot was
already in his 80’s when he signed the contract in 1960. There is, however, no proof that he did not
know the contents of the documents or that he did not intend the deed of sale
at all. The trial court unwarrantedly
theorized that because the properties were valuable properties, Juan Casocot
could not have intended to sell them.

“Indeed, the fact is that the deed of sale was duly notarized and
the notary public, Atty. Noli G. Cortel, testified that from his observation,
there was nothing either in the mental or physical condition of Juan Casocot to
indicate that he was not in the full possession of his mental faculties when he
executed the deed of sale in favor of Restituta and Fermin Casocot. Moreover, Atty. Cortel testified that he
interpreted the contents of the document in the Visayan dialect to Juan Casocot
and that afterward Juan Casocot voluntarily affixed his signature to the
document. (TSN, pp. 9, 11-12, Sept. 6,
1991) Needless to say, a public document, which is executed with all the
solemnities of the law, should not be set aside on such slender grounds as
those cited by the trial court.

“Fourth. The trial court
also erred in not ruling that the present action is barred by the order of
Court of First Instance of Agusan in Civil Case No. 896 (Juan Casocot v.
Restituta Casocot and Fermin Casocot), dismissing a complaint for the
nullification of the deed of sale. (Exh. U) That order, issued on August 10, 1965, became final and it
constitutes res judicata in this case, as no appeal appears to have been taken
from it. The trial court found the
dismissal erroneous allegedly because Juan Casocot had not been notified of the
hearing on July 24, 1965 in Civil Case No. 896. But the trial court did not have the power to reopen that case. It was improper for it to do so, since the
order of dismissal was final.

“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the
complaint in this case is DISMISSED in so far as it seeks the recovery of the
title and possession of four parcels of land covered by TD No. 2667 (Exh. B),
TD No. 3227 (Exh. C), TD No. 1209 (Exh. D), TD No. 2666 (Exh. F). In other respects, the decision appealed
from is AFFIRMED.”^[1]

In this petition for review, petitioners raise the following
assignment of errors:

“1.   The appellate court gravely erred in
reversing the trial court’s decision holding that Catalino Gono was the
acknowledged natural child of Juan Casocot by his common law wife, and that the
deceased Juan Casocot’s declaration in his deed of donation to Eugenia
Gonzales, wife of Catalino Gono, that the deceased was giving the land in
donation to the surviving wife of my son is sufficient recognition.

“2.   The appellate court gravely erred in
reversing the trial court’s decision holding that when the land in question was
sold at public auction for failure to pay taxes the same was bought by
Anunciacion Gono-Javier who is one of the petitioners’ herein, hence the
questioned land belongs to the petitioners.

“3.   The appellate court gravely erred in
reversing the trial court’s decision holding that the alleged sale between the
late Juan Casocot and the private respondents herein were simulated hence null
and void.

“4.   The appellate court gravely erred in ruling
that the action for recovery of possession and ownership filed by the herein
petitioners with the trial court is barred by the dismissal of the complaint
for nullification of the Deed of Sale filed by the deceased Juan Casocot
himself during his lifetime, which was dismissed, for his failure to attend the
hearing wherein he was not notified.”^[2]

Petitioners’ first assignment of error would have been impressed
with merit had the acknowledgment in the deed of donation in 1954 been extended
to Catalino prior to his death some time in 1942 or 1943. Juan Casocot himself died in 1964. Article 278 of the New Civil Code, the law
applicable in 1954,^[3]
provided:

“Art. 278. Recognition
shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record, or in any authentic writing.” (Underscoring
ours.)

The statement made in the deed of
donation, a public document, executed by Juan Casocot in favor of Eugenia
Gonzales, widow of Catalino, i.e., that among the reasons for the donation was
that the donee was “the surviving spouse of my son had with my common law
wife,” would have well been explicit enough or, at the very least, sufficient
to make it fall within the purview of the doctrine of
incidental recognition. Unfortunately for petitioners,
however, the recognition came too late. The donation, whereon the questioned statement appeared, was made on 29
March 1954, or about 11 years after the death of Catalino in 1942 or 1943.

The provisions of the Civil Code^[4] on
acknowledgment would readily indicate that voluntary acknowledgment
can legally be effected only during the lifetime of both the acknowledging
parent and the acknowledged illegitimate child. When that voluntary recognition is so timely made, as above, an
action for its judicial declaration can survive the death of either or both
parties (see Gaspay, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102372, 15 November
1994). The reason for this latter rule
is that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing (Art.
278, Civil Code) is, in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the
child, and no further court action is required (see Divinagracia vs.
Bellosillo, 143 SCRA 356), albeit not prohibited, to yet have it
declared as such. When a party is so
minded as to still bring an action on the basis of such voluntary
acknowledgment, no time frame for initiating it would obviously be a
constraint.

Parenthetically, where, a
claim for recognition is predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the applicate
statute of limitations^[5] is essential in order to establish the
child’s acknowledgment. Thus, the mere
possession of status of a child, contrary to the assertion in passing of
petitioners, does not itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground
for the child to compel, by judicial action, recognition by his assumed parent.^[6]

Petitioners, in their second and third assignment of errors,
would want us to reverse the Court of Appeals in finding: (a) that while petitioner Anunciacion
Gono-Javier was issued a Certificate of Repurchase (Exh. “N”) on 20 June 1956, she was, however,
fully refunded for the price paid and actual redemption was, in truth, made by
Juan Casocot and (b) that the deed of sale executed by Juan Casocot, duly
notarized, was validly executed. These
factual findings by the appellate court, having been amply explained and
substantiated by it, should not further be disturbed.

Petitioners take issue, finally, with the Court of Appeals in
holding that petitioners’ action to nullify the deed of sale to private
respondents is, in any event, barred by the order of dismissal thereof by the
then Court of First Instance of Agusan in Civil Case No. 896, entitled “Juan
Casocot vs. Restituta Casocot and Fermin Casocot.” Suffice it to say that an
unconditional dismissal of an action for failure to prosecute under Section 3,
Rule 17, of the Rules of Court is with prejudice and has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits (Guanzon vs. Mapa, 7 SCRA 457; Insular Veneer, Inc.
vs. Plan, 73 SCRA 1).

All told, we find no valid justification for sustaining the
petition.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Bidin, Romero, and Melo,
JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., (Chairman), on
leave.

^[1]
Rollo, pp. 27-30.

^[2]
Rollo, pp. 9-10.

^[3]
Up until the Family Code took effect on 03 August 1988.

^[4]
An example is Article 281 providing thusly:

“Art. 281. A child who is of age cannot be recognized
without his consent.

“When the recognition of a minor
does not take place in a record of birth or in a will, judicial approval shall
be necessary.

“A minor can in any case impugn the
recognition within four years following the attainment of his majority. (133a) –

^[5]
Art. 285. The action for the
recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1)  If the father or mother died during the
minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before the
expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2)  If after the death of the father or of the
mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and in which
either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be
commenced within four years from the finding of the document.

^[6]
The case of Tongoy vs. Court of Appeals (123 SCRA 99), which held that
possession of a child may be considered an acknowledgment itself is an
aberration (see Paulino vs. Paulino, 3 SCRA 730); in any case, it has
since been abrogated in subsequent cases (Cruz vda. de Sy­ Quia vs. SyQuia,
125 SCRA 835; Noble vs. Noble, 18 SCRA 1104; Quismundo vs. WCC,
132 SCRA 590).