PRIMITIVO P. CAMMAYO, PETITIONER AND APPELLANT,, VS. GUILLERMO VIÑA, IN SUBSTITUTION FOR THE DECEASED CELESTINO V. RAMOS, RESPONDENT AND APPELLEE.

Cammayo versus Viña

The Case

This is a quo warranto action brought by Primitivo Cammayo, a duly appointed Assistant Fiscal of Manila, against Guillermo Viña, who appears in substitution for the deceased Celestino Ramos, the officer appointed to take his place. Cammayo asks the Court to declare illegal and unconstitutional Administrative Order Number 73 of the President of the Philippines, which removed him from office, and to oust the respondent from the position. The case matters because it fixes the standard for removing a presidential appointee from the civil service: what "cause as provided by law" means, and whether misconduct unconnected with official duties can still justify dismissal. It is a compact lesson on due process in administrative removal and on the moral fitness demanded of a fiscal.

Procedural History

Cammayo instituted the action for quo warranto in the court below to test the legality and constitutionality of Administrative Order Number 73 and of the appointment of Celestino Ramos as Assistant Fiscal of Manila in his place. After due hearing, the trial court dismissed the case. It held that the petitioner had been legally separated and removed from office; that the administrative order rested on an investigation in which he was given an opportunity to be heard and to present his defense; that the investigation was conducted by order of the Secretary of Justice, who has general supervision of the office of the City Fiscal; and that the finding of dishonest conduct was based on facts established during the hearing, a finding the court had no authority to alter. Cammayo appealed, assigning four errors: that he was illegally removed although the dishonest conduct imputed to him was not related to the performance of his official duties and he was never prosecuted in court; that his removal violated due process because he was not given a fair and impartial hearing; that the position did not become vacant upon his removal and there was no unlawful holding of office by the respondent; and that the trial court erred in denying the petition and in not reinstating him with emoluments. The case reached the Supreme Court on appeal from the dismissal.

Facts

Primitivo Cammayo was a duly appointed Assistant Fiscal of Manila who took his oath of office on June 1, 1951. On July 19, 1954, letters he had written to Domingo Bebania, a prisoner serving sentence for parricide at the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinglupa, Rizal, were found in the prisoner's hut during a routinary inspection. The letters were confiscated, and at the investigation of the prisoner, Bebania executed an affidavit stating, among other things, that the petitioner asked him for the sum of 200 pesos and a rooster so that he could work for Bebania's pardon.

The Secretary of Justice then charged the petitioner with dishonest conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of the service, giving him five days to submit a detailed answer and advising him that if he so elected, a formal investigation would be conducted where he could defend himself personally or by counsel. The petitioner chose a formal investigation, so the Department of Justice appointed a special investigator who conducted a formal hearing where evidence was adduced both in support of the charges and in defense of the petitioner. The investigator found him guilty as charged, and on the basis of those findings the Secretary of Justice recommended his dismissal to the President.

The President then issued Administrative Order Number 73, finding the petitioner guilty of dishonest conduct highly prejudicial to the best interest of the service and removing him effective upon receipt. The order noted that the petitioner's efforts for Bebania consisted in writing and filing two petitions for executive clemency, the last denied on June 23, 1954; that whatever expenses these entailed could not possibly have come up to 200 pesos; and that even assuming the fighting cock was intended for co-employees, he again sought to take advantage of a poverty-stricken prisoner. The order stressed that while his actuations had no connection with the discharge of his official duties and he may not have actually succeeded in obtaining what he sought, his acts clearly showed his moral unfitness for public service. The petitioner received copy of the order on November 15, 1954, and his petition for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. Celestino Ramos was appointed ad interim Assistant Fiscal to replace him, and the petitioner immediately instituted this case.

Issues

• Whether or not the petitioner was removed from office without due process of law.
• Whether or not the facts proven against him during the investigation constitute sufficient legal ground for his removal, considering that the misconduct was not connected with the discharge of his official duties.
• Whether or not the position of Assistant Fiscal of Manila became vacant upon his removal, so that there was no unlawful holding of the office by the respondent.
• Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to reinstatement with the emoluments of the office.

Applicable Provisions

Article Twelve, Section Four of the Constitution provides:

No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law.

This is the constitutional guarantee the petitioner invokes, and the Court measures his removal against it.

Section 6 of Rule Thirteen of the Civil Service Rules provides:

Dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service are sufficient grounds for removal.

The Court relies on this rule to supply the "cause as provided by law" that the Constitution requires.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that due process was complied with. The petitioner himself did not deny that there was a formal hearing of the charges filed by the Department of Justice; that in that hearing he was given the opportunity to defend himself; that the investigator found him guilty; that the Department recommended his removal to the President; and that the President approved the recommendation and dismissed him for moral unfitness. On these facts, the Court said, it cannot be pretended that the constitutional requirement of due process was not observed.

On the second issue, the Court concurred with the trial court that the acts committed by the appellant, as conclusively established by the evidence, do constitute disgraceful conduct and show his moral unfitness for public service, especially for the position of a fiscal, an officer entrusted with the duty to prosecute crimes. The Court rejected the argument that the cause was not one "provided by law," reasoning that the cause for which the petitioner was removed does constitute dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, which are sufficient grounds for removal under the Civil Service Rules. And since the President is the administrative head of the Government and as such is empowered to dismiss from the service, after due investigation, any presidential appointee found guilty of the acts mentioned in that rule, the removal was valid.

On the third and fourth issues, it followed that the petitioner had been properly removed, the position became vacant, and the action had no foundation in fact and in law. The trial court correctly dismissed it, and the petitioner was not entitled to reinstatement or emoluments.

Doctrine

First, the constitutional guarantee that no officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law is satisfied when the officer is given notice of the charges, a formal investigation, and the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself personally or by counsel. Second, dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service are sufficient grounds for removal under the Civil Service Rules, and these supply the "cause as provided by law." Third, misconduct need not be connected with the discharge of official duties; moral unfitness for public service is itself a valid ground, especially for a fiscal entrusted with the prosecution of crimes. Fourth, the President, as administrative head of the Government, may dismiss after due investigation any presidential appointee found guilty under the Civil Service Rules, and courts will not alter the factual findings made in that investigation.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision appealed from in its entirety, without costs; the petitioner lost, and the respondent retained the office.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing: removal for cause under the Constitution is satisfied by dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, even if the misconduct is unconnected with official duties, provided there was notice and a formal hearing. Examiners use this case to test the scope of "cause as provided by law" in civil service removal and the moral fitness standard for prosecutors.