JULIO TAPEC AND PRISCA GALANO, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND LORETO RAGUIRAG, RESPONDENTS.

In resolving the issue of which document should be given more weight
in deciding ownership, the trial court and the Court of Appeals arrived at
irreconcilably conflicting judgments. The former held that the deeds of sale in favor of the petitioners,
being duly acknowledged before a notary public and registered under Act No.
3344, although executed much later, should prevail over a prior conveyance in a
private document in favor of the private respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest. On appeal by
the private respondent, the Court of Appeals held otherwise on the ground that
the private document is an ancient document under the rules of evidence and
overturned the decision of the trial court.

Hence this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court.

There can be no question that the determination of which of the
two documents should prevail, in the manner it was done by the courts below, is
a question of law. At its heart,
however, is a question of fact which, under the general rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review, should not be
entertained by this Court. The instant
case, however, falls within one of the exceptions to such rule: that the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.^[1]
Accordingly, we gave due course to this petition.

The procedural and factual antecedents are disclosed by the
pleadings.

On 4 December 1994, the petitioners, who are husband and wife,
filed a complaint for recovery of ownership with the Regional Trial Court at
Batac, Ilocos Norte, against David Cabuyadao and herein private respondent
Loreto Raguirag. The petitioners
alleged in their complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of land with an
area of 11,850 square meters, located at Barangay No. 26, Oaiag-Upay, Paoay, Ilocos
Norte, more specifically described as follows:

“RURAL, part of which
is riceland and the rest a pasture, bounded on the North by the Heirs of
Oligario Cabuyadao and others; on the East, by Tony Cac (formerly Luis Bacud);
on the South, by Rufino Macoco et al.; and, on the West by the successors of
Eusebio Agdeppa and Luis Cueva, with an area of 11,850 square meters more or
less.”

They further averred that during the
cadastral survey of Paoay, Ilocos Norte, unknown to them and without their
consent, the above-described property was surveyed and subdivided into Lot Nos.
7452, 7444, and 7450, and that under baseless claims of ownership, David
Cabuyadao and Loreto Raguirag threatened to enter Lot No. 7452 and Lot No.
7444, respectively. The petitioners then
prayed that they be declared the owners of Lot Nos. 7452 and 7444 and that a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued ordering the defendants and their
agents and representatives to desist from entering the lots.

David Cabuyadao was declared in default^[2] for
failure to file his answer.

In his answer with counterclaim,^[3]
private respondent (defendant) Loreto Raguirag denied having knowledge of the
property claimed by the petitioners but by way of special defense asserted that
he is the absolute owner of the parcel of land described as follows:

“UNCULTIVATED LAND —
situated at Dumalaoaig, # 19, Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with an area of 3,487 sq.
meters, more or less, designated as Lot No. 7444, Cad. 445D of Paoay, Ilocos
Norte. Bounded on the north by Benigno
Raguirag; on the East by Manuel Raguirag; on the South by Felipe Cueva, and on
the West by Gregorio Agdeppa.”

The petitioners’ claim of ownership is based on two deeds of
absolute sale, one executed on 2 January 1950 by Trinidad Gonzales in favor of
petitioner Julio Tapec,^[4] and
the other executed on 28 May 1949 by Rosario Gonzales in favor of the
petitioners,^[5]
both acknowledged before the same notary public and duly registered with the
Office of the Register of Deeds under Act No. 3344 on 8 March 1950 and 29 July
1949, respectively.

The property subject of the sale by Trinidad Gonzales is
described as follows:

“A parcel of an unirrigated riceland measuring 4832 sq. m. and
pasto^[6]
measuring 2380 sq. m. and both bounded on the North by Aquilino Oamil and
others, East Rufino Diaz and others, South Leocadio Macoco and others and West
Felipe Cueva and others and that said land is valued at P180.00 for this
current year as per Tax No. 016399 (previously under Tax No. 68663) in the name
of Miguel Gonzales….”

while the parcel sold by Rosario Gonzales
is described thus:

“A parcel of unirrigated riceland measuring 4832 sq. m. and
bounded on the North by Oligario Cabuyadao, Manuel Raguirag and Aquilino Oamil,
East by Luis Bacud and Rufino Diaz, South by Leocadio Macoco and Ariston Cueva,
and West by Eusebio Agdeppa and Felipe Cueva. It is valued at P180 for this current year as per Tax No. 016399 under the name of the late Miguel Gonzales….”

Respondent Loreto Raguirag, on the other hand, anchored his
defense on a document, dated 15 May 1931^[7] and
handwritten in Ilocano, wherein the brothers Victoriano, Gregorio, Matias, and
Alejandro, all surnamed Gonzales,^[8] sold
to the spouses Manuel Raguirag and Clara Tapec, grandparents of respondent
Raguirag, for a consideration of P150.00
a pasture situated in Dumalaoing, Paoay, Ilocos Norte, with an area of
3,450 sq. meters and bounded:

“… as follows, North Victoriano
Gonzalis I, East Alejandro Gonzalis, Miguel Gonzalis and others, South Pelipi
Cuyba West Grigorio Agdippa.”^[9]

Witnesses to the said handwritten document were Manuel Raguirag,
Cornelio Cabuyao, and Miguel Gonzales.

At the trial, petitioner Julio Tapec identified the deeds of sale
executed by Trinidad and Rosario Gonzales and the sketch plan of Lot Nos. 7444,
7450, and 7452 of the Paoay Cadastre^[10] and
declared that the area sold by Trinidad corresponds to Lot Nos. 7450 and 7452
while the parcel sold by Rosario corresponds to Lot No. 7444.^[11]
He further alleged that he has been in possession of the lots since he
purchased them and had them declared for taxation purposes in his name in 1950^[12]
and that before he bought the property of Trinidad Gonzales, he had to first
redeem it from Ireneo Raguirag to whom it was mortgaged by Trinidad for P100.00
on 10 November 1947 and who (Trinidad) was in possession thereof.^[13]

On the other hand, private respondent Raguirag presented the 1931
private writing which, according to him, was shown to him when he was a boy by
his grandfather, Manuel Raguirag, who said, “all of these are our
properties of which I bought from Alejandro Gonzales.”^[14]
He claimed that his grandfather was in possession of the property until his
death during the Japanese occupation. Then his father, Ireneo Raguirag, continued such possession until he
died in 1967.^[15]
Ireneo had the property declared for taxation purposes in 1962.^[16]
After his father’s death, Loreto took over the possession of the property and
during the cadastral survey of Paoay, it was claimed by Leoncia Raguirag, a
sister of Ireneo. The private
respondent is merely possessing it as tenant-administrator. Thus:

“ATTY. LUMBO -?

q     I
understand that the land in suit has already a lot number, do you know who is
the survey claimant of the lot in suit?

x x x

a     Leoncia
Raguirag, sir.

q     Who
is this Leoncia Raguirag?

a     A
sister of my father, sir.

q You said that from the death of your late father up to the present you
are the one possessing this land in suit, my question is, why are you in
possession of this property?

a     Yes,
sir, because my father is no longer living.

q And since according to you this survey claimant is Leoncia Raguirag, a
sister of your late father, in what capacity are you possessing the land in
suit?

a     As
a tenant-administrator, sir.

q     Tiller-administrator
of what?

a     That
pastureland in the land of my father, sir.

q     What
is that pastureland you are referring to in the name of your father?

a     That
is the pastureland that is being claimed by Julio Tapec, sir.”^[17]

On 31 October 1989, the trial court rendered a decision,^[18]
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

“In view of all the foregoing, it is hereby ordered:

1.     That the plaintiffs are absolute owners of
Lot Nos. 7942^[19]
and 7444.

2.     That the defendants pay the costs.”

In support thereof, it made the following
findings and conclusion:

“That an impartial assessment of the evidence adduced
disclosed that the deed of sale executed in favor of the plaintiffs by the
vendees Trinidad Gonzales and Rosario Gonzales marked as Exh. “A” and
“B” respectively are public documents registered in the Office of the
Register of Deeds of Ilocos Norte while that of the defendant is in a private
document.

That between a deed of sale in a public document and a deed of sale
in private document, the former must prevail;

That a contract may be entered into in whatever form except where
the law requires a document or other special form.

‘When the law requires that a contract be in a public document in
order that it may be valid or enforceable, such as contracts which have for
their object the creation or transmission of rights over immovable property, that
requirement is absolute and indispensable.’ (Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of
Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 35365, 9 April ’87, Second Division).

Art. 1358 N.C.C. (No. 1). Acts and contracts which have for their object the creation,
transmission, modification or extinguishment of real rights over immovable
property must appear in a public document (Gallardo vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, G.R. No. 67742, 21 Oct. ’87, First Division).”

Loreto Raguirag appealed from the decision to the Court of
Appeals which docketed the appeal as CA-G.R. CV No. 26093.

In its decision^[20] of
20 September 1993, the Court of Appeals reversed the appealed decision. It declared:

“The plaintiffs-appellees raise for the first time, on appeal,
the question of the genuineness of the Deed of Sale offered as documentary
evidence by the defendants-appellants. It has been decided by the Supreme Court that objection to the admission
of evidence must be made seasonably, at the time it is introduced or offered,
otherwise they are deemed waived and will not be entertained for the first time
on appeal. (People of the Philippines
vs. Benjamin Bañares, G.R. No. 68298, November 25, 1986, 145 SCRA 680) The rule
is that evidence not objected to is deemed admitted and may be validly
considered by the court in arriving at its judgment. This is true even if by its nature the evidence is inadmissible
and would have surely been rejected if it had been challenged at the proper
time. (Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs.
Rufo Aviles and Josephine Aviles, G.R. No. 86062, June 6, 1990, 186 SCRA 385).

Aside from that, a private document may be exempted from proof of
due execution and authenticity under the ‘ancient document rule.’ Section 22,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that:

‘SEC. 22. Evidence of
execution not necessary. — Where a private writing is more than thirty years
old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion,
no other evidence of its execution and authenticity need be given.’

In this case, the Deed of Sale dated 15 May 1931 complies with the
first requirement of Section 22 since it was offered in evidence in 1986. It was presented in court by the proper
custodian thereof who is an heir of the person who would naturally keep it
complying with the requirement that it be produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine. (Resurreccion Bartolome, et
al., vs. The Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 76792, March 12, 1990, 183 SCRA 102) Neither is there
any evidence of alterations or any circumstances that would cause a doubt on
the genuineness of the document.

Thus, all the elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458
of the Civil Code, are present, such as: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter; and
(3) price certain in money or its equivalent. In addition, Article 1477 of the same Code provides that ‘the ownership
of the thing sold shall be transferred to the vendee upon actual or
constructive delivery thereof.’ The plaintiff-appellee Julio Tapec himself,
testified during cross-examination that Ireneo Raguirag (father of
defendants-appellants) was already in possession of the parcel of land when the
subject land was offered to him by the vendor, Rosario Gonzales. (Original Records, TSN, June 26, 1986, p. 8)
Moreover, Constancia Gonzales, a sister of the vendor of the
plaintiffs-appellees, and a witness for the defendants-appellants, testified
that the subject pastureland was sold to the grandfather of the
defendants-appellants as told to her by her parents; and that the
predecessors-in-interest of the defendants-appellants have been in possession
of the property since they bought it. (Original Records, TSN, November 23, 1988, pp. 2-3).

The validity of the sale of the subject pasture­land to the
predecessors-in-interest of the defendants-appellants cannot be disputed. Contracts shall be obligatory, in whatever
form they may have been entered into, provided all the essential requisites for
their validity are present. (Article
1356, New Civil Code) We do not agree with the ruling of the trial judge that
under Article 1358 of the New Civil Code, a contract which have for their
object the creation, transmission, modification or extinguishment of real
rights over immovable property, must appear in a public document to be valid
and enforceable.

Article 1358 of the New Civil Code enumerates certain contracts
that must appear in public or private documents. This provision does not require such form in order to validate
the act or contract but to insure its efficacy. Contracts enumerated by this article are, therefore, valid as
between the contracting parties, even when they have not been reduced to public
or private writings. (Tolentino, Arturo
M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Volume
Four, 1985 ed., pp. 549-550) Therefore, the Deed of Sale in favor of the
predecessor-in-interest of the defendants-appellants is considered valid and
enforceable, even if it was only embodied in a private writing.

In upholding the validity of the 1931 sale of the subject
pastureland, we can only conclude that when the land was sold to the
plaintiffs-appellees in 1950, the vendor had no right to sell the subject
property since at that time her family no longer owned the land and thus no
legal right was transferred by the vendor to the plaintiffs-appellees. Article 1459 of the New Civil Code requires
that the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership thereof at the time
it is delivered, otherwise the contract of sale is void.

Article 1544 of the New Civil Code on double sales does not apply
in this case. The article provides that
if an immovable property should have been sold to different vendees, the
ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it who in good faith first
recorded it in the Registry Property. In order that the abovementioned provision may be invoked, it is necessary
that the conveyance must have been made by a party who has an existing right in
the thing, and the power to dispose of it. It cannot, therefore, be invoked in a case where the two different
contracts of sale are made by two different persons, one of them not being the
owner of the property sold. (Tolentino,
Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines,
Volume Five, 1959, pp. 83- 84).”^[21]

Before us, the petitioners raise the sole issue of whether the deeds of sale to them, which were embodied
in public instruments and registered under Act No. 3344,^[22]
should prevail over the alleged sale to the ancestors of respondent Raguirag
executed much earlier in a private
instrument.

It appears that the petitioners no longer question the validity and
due execution of the 1931 deed of conveyance. Nevertheless, they stand firm on their argument that such instrument is
valid and enforceable only as to the parties thereto and cannot bind third
persons and innocent purchasers.^[23]

We agree with the Court of Appeals that Exhibit “1” for
the private respondent, the deed of sale in a private writing executed on 15
May 1931 in favor of Manuel Raguirag and Clara Tapec, private respondent’s
grandparents, is an ancient document whose proof of authenticity was no longer
necessary because of the concurrence of the requisites in Section 21,^[24]
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.^[25] It
was already more than thirty years old at the time it was offered in evidence
in 1986.^[26]
It was produced from the custody of respondent Raguirag, an heir of the vendees
in the said instrument. And it is
unblemished by any alteration or circumstances of suspicion.

As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the said private
instrument is a deed of sale in which all the requisites of a valid contract
are present and which is binding upon the parties. The trial court erroneously held that it is invalid because it is
not in a public document as required by Article 1358 of the Civil Code and pursuant to Manotok
Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals.^[27] Article
1358 does not invalidate the acts or contracts enumerated therein if they are
not embodied in public documents. As
one noted civilian has said:

“This Article enumerates certain contracts that must appear in
public or private documents. This
provision does not require such form in order to validate the act or contract
but to insure its efficacy. It is limited to an enumeration of the acts
and contracts which should be reduced to writing in a public or private
instrument. The reduction to writing in
a public or private document, required in this article, is not an essential
requisite for the existence of the contract, but is simply a coercive power
granted to the contracting parties by which they can reciprocally compel the
observance of these formal requisites. Contracts enumerated by this article are, therefore, valid as between
the contracting parties, even when they have not been reduced to public or
private writings. Except in certain
cases where public instruments and registration are required for the validity
of the contract itself, the legalization of a contract by means of a public
writing and its entry in the register are not essential solemnities or
requisites for the validity of the contract as between the contracting parties,
but are required for the purpose of making it effective as against third person.”^[28]

What the trial court referred to in Manotok is not the ruling of this Court but the claim of the
petitioner therein. What this Court
stated was that “the sale
made by Legarda to Lucero should have been embodied in a public instrument in
accordance with Article 1358 of the Civil Code and should have
been duly registered with the Register
of Deeds to make it binding against
third persons.” (emphasis
supplied).

While we uphold the ruling of the Court of Appeals that the 15
May 1931 sale in favor of the private respondent’s grandparents was valid and
enforceable, we cannot, however, accept its findings that:

“In upholding the validity of the 1931 sale of the subject
pastureland, We can only conclude that when the land was sold to the
plaintiffs-appellees [petitioners herein] in 1950, the vendor had no right to
sell the subject property since at the time her family no longer owned the land
and thus no legal right was transferred by the vendor to the
plaintiffs-appellees.”

Firstly, it should be remembered that per the testimony of
petitioner Julio Tapec, the sale in 1950 was that executed on 2 January 1950 by
Trinidad Gonzales and the property subject thereof corresponds to Lot Nos. 7450
and 7452,^[29]
while the sale executed on 28 May 1949 by Rosario Gonzales^[30]
corresponds to Lot No. 7444. It is the
latter lot which is claimed by the private respondent.^[31]
The original owner of the property sold by Trinidad and Rosario was their
father, Miguel Gonzales,^[32] and
as indicated in the deeds of sale they executed, the portion each sold was
declared for taxation purposes in the name of their father.^[33]
With respect to the 1931 sale, Miguel Gonzales was not a vendor therein but a
mere witness thereto. The vendors were
Victoriano, Matias, Alejandro, and Gregorio, all surnamed Gonzales. Obviously, the Court of Appeals erred in
finding that Trinidad had no more right to sell the property.

Secondly, while the petitioners sufficiently established the
identity of the property claimed by them, the private respondent failed to
prove the identity of the property covered by Exhibit “1.” Since he
specified in his special defenses the property he claimed and asked the court
in his prayer that he be declared “the lawful owner and possessor”
thereof, the burden was on him to prove its identity.^[34]

Thirdly, it was established that Trinidad Gonzales had mortgaged
her property to the private respondent’s father, Ireneo Raguirag, on 10
November 1947.^[35]
The mortgage was redeemed only shortly before its sale to the petitioners in
1950. If Ireneo were its owner as heir
of Manuel Raguirag, there was no reason
for Ireneo to have accepted the mortgage thereof.

Finally, the private respondent categorically admitted that he is
only a tenant-administrator of Lot No. 7444. This admission belies any claim of ownership. It was his aunt, Leoncia Raguirag, who claimed ownership over it
during the cadastral survey.^[36]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 26093 is hereby REVERSED, and the dispositive portion
of the decision of Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court at Batac, Ilocos
Norte, in Civil Case No. 1669-17 is REINSTATED, subject to the correction of
the portion therein which reads “Lot Nos. 7942” to “Lot Nos.
7452.”

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138 [1988]; Medina vs. Asistio, 191
SCRA 218 [1990]; Misa vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 217 [1992]; Borillo
vs. Court of Appeals, 209 SCRA 130 [1992].

^[2]
OR, 14.

^[3]
Id., 5-8.

^[4]
Exhibit “A”; Id., 61.

^[5]
Exhibit “B”; OR, 62.

^[6]
So in original. Probably should be
“pasture.”

^[7]
Exhibit “1”; OR.

^[8]
Written in the document as “Gonzalis.”

^[9]
Translation of Exhibit “1”; OR, 139.

^[10]
Exhibit “C.”

^[11]
TSN, 16 January 1986, 4.

^[12]
Exhibit “D.”

^[13]
Exhibits “K” and “K-1” (Translation); TSN, 27 August 1986,
1-3.

^[14]
TSN, 6 November 1986, 2.

^[15]
TSN, 6 November 1986, 5.

^[16]
Exhibit “2.”

^[17]
TSN, 6 November 1986, 6-7.

^[18]
OR, 150-155; Rollo, 17-22. Per
Judge Jose P. Tabanda.

^[19]
Should be 7452.

^[20]
Per Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola, with the concurrence of Associate Justices Ricardo J.
Francisco and Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros.

^[21]
Rollo, 27-30.

^[22]
Act No. 3344 is the law amending Act No. 2837, which in turn amended Section
194 of the Administrative Code, otherwise known as the SYSTEM OF RECORDING FOR UNREGISTERED REAL
ESTATE.

^[23]
Rollo, 13.

^[24]
It used to be Section 22, as referred to by the Court of Appeals. Said Section 21 reads:

“SEC. 21. When evidence of authenticity of private
document not necessary. — Where a private document is more than thirty
years old, is produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine, and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion,
no other evidence of its authenticity need be given.”

^[25]
See Claveris vs. Quingco, 207 SCRA 66 [1992].

^[26]
See RICARDO J. FRANCISCO, Evidence (Rules of Court in
the Philippines, Rules 128-134), 1993 ed., 507.

^[27]
149 SCRA 174 [1987].

^[28]
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. IV, 1985 ed., 549-550.

^[29]
Exhibit “A”; OR 61.

^[30]
Exhibit “B”; Id., 62.

^[31]
Paragraph 1, Special Defense and Counterclaim; Id., 5-6.

^[32]
TSN, 26 June 1986, 6-7 (a.m.).

^[33]
Exhibit “G”; OR, 78; TSN, 6 January 1986, 6.

^[34]
Misa vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 217 [1992].

^[35]
Exhibits “K” and “K-1” (Translation).

^[36]
TSN, 6 November 1986, 7.