PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROEL PONAYO Y VILLANUEVA, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Charged with murder in an Information reading –

That on or about 12:30 o’clock early in the morning of January 26,
1991, at Barangay Mampurog, municipality of San Lorenzo Ruiz, province of
Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, with deliberate intent to kill with treachery and evident
premeditation assault, attack and stab one ROLANDO GAZA Y SABAS with a deadly
weapon (knife), thereby inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal stab
wounds which were the proximate cause of the death of said Rolando S. Gaza, to the damage and prejudice of the
heirs of the victim.

(p. 7,
Rollo.)

accused, after trial, was convicted by
the trial court in a decision the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of murder, and hereby sentence him to suffer imprisonment of
16 years and 1 day to 20 years medium degree of reclusion temporal to
death.

He is likewise ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of
P50,000.00.

(p. 17,
Rollo; p. 112, Record.)

From the above verdict of conviction, the instant appeal was
interposed, with accused-appellant arguing that the trial court erred –

I

. . . in giving full faith and credence to the inconsistent and
improbable testimonies of the prosecution witnesses Rodel Labag and Leny Cao.

II

. . . in concluding that there was
treachery even if the same was not proven clearly as the crime itself.

III

. . . in finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged despite the clear and convincing evidence of self-defense which
justifies the killing of the victim Rolando Gaza.

IV

. . . in disregarding the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender despite clear evidence on the matter.

(p. 29,
Rollo.)

The facts of the case as established by the evidence were
summarized by the Office of the Solicitor General in its brief as follows:

At around 12:30 o’clock in the morning of January 26, 1991,
prosecution witnesses Leny Cao and Roel Labag, together with the victim Rolando
Gaza and one Anna Rose Gantong, were walking home to Barangay Mampurog, San
Lorenzo Ruiz, Camarines Norte. Labag
and Gantong were a few steps ahead of Cao and Gaza. The group just came from a dance at Barangay Dagutdutan. Suddenly, appellant, who came from behind,
stabbed the victim on the left side near the spinal cord. Upon being hit, the victim ran towards
Barangay Mampurog. Appellant chased
him. Labag, who got frightened, went
straight home, while Cao and Gantong stopped walking for a while and thereafter
continued. After walking a certain
distance, Cao and Gantong saw the victim, sprawled on the ground bathed in his
own blood and already dead. Cao sought
help from the residents but no one responded. Cao and Gantong proceeded to the nearby police station and reported the
incident (pp. 14-22, tsn, November 20, 1991, testimony of Leny Cao).

(pp. 4-5,
Appellee’s Brief; ff. p. 54, Rollo.)

Accused-appellant impugns the testimony of prosecution witnesses
Leny Cao and Rodel Labag as characterized by inconsistencies and
contradictions. He points out that on
the witness stand prosecution witness Leny Cao testified that after seeing the
victim, Rolando Gaza, sprawled on the ground and already dead, Leny Cao
immediately called out for help and that, since nobody responded to her cry for
help, she and her companion, Anna Rose Gantong, left and reported the matter to the police. This is contrasted to Cao’s affidavit where she declared that she
went home and did not report the killing to the police. With regard to prosecution witness Rodel
Labag, it is argued that his testimony that after being stabbed, Gaza ran,
leaving accused-appellant behind who then approached the witness is
inconsistent with Labag’s subsequent testimony that he was approached by
accused-appellant before the stabbing happened. Further, accused-appellant asserts that
Cao’s testimony that while they were walking, Labag and Gantong were ahead of
Gaza who was beside her while accused-appellant was behind the group, is at
variance with the testimony of Labag that at the time of the stabbing he was
walking on the left side of Gaza.

The above inconsistencies and contradictions are minor, trivial,
and inconsequential, and cannot impair the credibility of the witnesses. On the contrary, it has been held,
inconsistencies and discrepancies on minor details of the testimony of a
witness serve to strengthen the credibility of the witness (People vs. Buka,
205 SCRA 567 [1992]). They are badges
of truth rather than indicia of falsehood. Whether Leny Cao called out for help after the stabbing and immediately
reported the stabbing to the police or went home is clearly immaterial for she
in fact reported the matter to the police as she executed her affidavit at the
police station of San Lorenzo Ruiz, Camarines Norte on January 28, 1991
(pp. 6-7, Original Record). Whether accused-appellant approached Rodel
Labag before or after the stabbing is likewise immaterial. Due to the occurrence of the startling
event, said witness might have confused the sequence of events. What can not be erased is the fact that this
witness actually saw the stabbing. Again, the particular positions of the victim, Cao, Labag, and Gantong
while they were walking home are inconsequential for they could have changed
positions while conversing and walking. Further, whenever there is an
inconsistency between the affidavit and the testimony of a witness, the
testimony commands greater weight (People vs. Loveria, 187 SCRA 47
[1990]).

Accused-appellant next assails the findings of the trial court
that the attack upon the victim was characterized by treachery.

The contention is devoid of merit.

The evidence unquestionably supports the findings of the trial
court that treachery attended the killing. Rodel Labag testified that while he, the victim, Ana Rose Gantong, and
Leny Cao, were walking towards home in Barangay Mampurog, coming from a dance
at Barrio Dagutdutan, accused-appellant, approaching from behind suddenly
stabbed the victim, Roland Gaza, at the back and pursued the victim when the
victim tried to escape (pp. 5-8, t.s.n., September 19, 1991), and that he, the
witness, was only an arm’s length away from the victim when accused-appellant
stabbed the latter (p. 5, id.). Leny
Cao fully corroborated the testimony of Labag that the attack was sudden and
unexpected and came from behind (pp. 14-19, t.s.n., November 20, 1991). These declarations indisputably establish
that the attack of accused-appellant upon the victim was sudden, unexpected,
and without warning coming from behind upon a totally unarmed victim, thus
insuring accused-appellant’s safety from any defensive or retaliatory act on
the part of the victim.

The attendance of treachery as a qualifying circumstance is found
in the concurrence of two conditions: (1) the employment of means, method, or manner of execution which would
insure the offender’s safety from defensive or retaliatory acts on the part of
the offended party, which means that no opportunity is given the latter to
defend himself or to retaliate; and (2) that such means, methods, or manner of
execution was deliberately or consciously chosen (People vs. Samonte, Jr.,
64 SCRA 319 [1975]; People vs. de la Cruz, 207 SCRA 632 [1992]). Said conditions are undoubtedly present in
this case. The essence of treachery is
a swift and unexpected attack on an unarmed victim without the slightest
provocation on the part of the victim (People vs. Alcantara, 206, SCRA
662 [1992]; People vs. Gonzales, 210 SCRA 44 [1992];

Finally, accused-appellant sets up the defense of self-defense in
his bid for reversal. To prove
self-defense, an accused must establish three concurring requisites,
namely: (a) unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to repel the
aggression; and (c) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused
(Article 11, No. 1, Revised Penal Code; People vs. Aquino, 54 SCRA 409
[1973]; People vs. Morato, 224 SCRA 361 [1993]). The foremost element that must be proved to
establish self-defense is unlawful aggression, for the absence of this
essential element negates the validity of the plea of self-defense (People
vs. Morato, supra; People vs. Curaraton, 224 SCRA 372 [1993]). A review of the facts of the case clearly
shows the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim who was
coming from a barrio dance in the company of friends, conversing with them
along the way, when suddenly accused-appellant, coming from behind the group,
stabbed the victim, who was unarmed and totally unaware of the impending
attack. There was, therefore, no hint
of aggression whatsoever, much less unlawful aggression, initiated by the
victim. Absent this essential element,
there is thus no need to discuss the other elements of self-defense for if
there is no unlawful aggression there is nothing to prevent or to repel and the
second element of self-defense would have no basis (People vs. Morato, supra;
People vs. Curaraton, supra).

The Solicitor General recommends that the mitigating circumstance
of voluntary surrender should be appreciated. We concur. The Chief of Police
of the Municipality of San Lorenzo Ruiz, Chief Police Inspector Gil Gangan,
testified that accused-appellant, accompanied by his aunt, walked into the
police, a few hours after the stabbing and voluntarily surrendered himself
without having been arrested and without any physical compulsion by any
person. In order that the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender may be properly appreciated it must appear
that (a) the accused had not been actually arrested; (b) he surrendered himself
to a person in authority or his agent; and (c) his surrender is voluntary (People
vs. Molo, 88 SCRA 22 [1979]). All
the requisites are present in this case. An accused was held to be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender where he proceeded to the municipal building where he was
placed under arrest (People vs. Besara, Jr., 64 SCRA 84 [1975]). The fact that herein accused-appellant was
accompanied by his aunt when he surrendered does not detract from his act of
voluntary surrender for there is no evidence to show that his aunt compelled
him to surrender.

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is punishable
by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Republic Act No.
7659 amending said article cannot be given retroactive effect as it would be
unfavorable to accused-appellant for said Republic Act imposes the graver
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death). There being the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender,
the imposable penalty is the minimum of said penalty or 17 years, 4 months, and
1 day to 20 years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next lower in degree is prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period (10 years and 1 day of prision mayor to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion
temporal).

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED,
but with the modification that the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is
hereby reduced to an indeterminate sentence of ten (10) years, and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months, and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as
maximum. (People vs. Sarol, 139 SCRA 125 [1985]).

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, (Chairman), Bidin, Romero, and Vitug, JJ., concur.