ENRIQUE T. GARCIA, ET AL., PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND LUCILA PAYUMO, ET. AL., RESPONDENTS.

The
EDSA revolution of 1986 restored the reality that the people’s might is not a
myth. The 1987 Constitution then
included people power as an article of faith and Congress was mandated to pass
laws for its effective exercise. The Local Government Code of 1991 was enacted providing for two (2)
modes of initiating the recall from office of local elective officials who
appear to have lost the confidence of the electorate. One of these modes is recall through the initiative of a
preparatory recall assembly. In the
case at bench, petitioners assail this mode
of initiatory recall as unconstitutional. The challenge cannot succeed.

We shall first
unfurl the facts.

Petitioner
Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of the province of Bataan in the May 11,
1992 elections. In the early evening of
July 1, 1993, some mayors, vice mayors and members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province met at the National
Power Corporation compound in Bagac, Bataan. At about 12:30 A.M. of the following day, July 2, 1993, they proceeded
to the Bagac town plaza where they constituted themselves into a Preparatory
Recall Assembly to initiate the
recall election of petitioner Garcia. The mayor of Mariveles, Honorable Oscar de los Reyes, and the mayor of
Dinalupihan, the Honorable Lucila Payumo, were chosen as Presiding
Officer and Secretary of the Assembly, respectively. Thereafter, the Vice-Mayor of Limay, the Honorable Ruben Roque,
was recognized and he moved that a resolution
be passed for the recall of the petitioner Garcia on the ground of “loss
of confidence.”^[1] The motion was “unanimously
seconded.”^[2] The resolution, states:

RESOLUTION NO. 1

Whereas, the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly in the Province of Bataan have voluntarily constituted themselves for
the purpose of the recall of the incumbent provincial governor of the province
of Bataan, Honorable Enrique T. Garcia pursuant to the provisions of Section
70, paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code of 1991;

Whereas, the total number of all the members of the Preparatory
Recall Assembly in the province of Bataan is One Hundred and Forty-Six (146)
composed of all mayors, vice-mayors and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of all
the 12 towns of the province of Bataan;

Whereas, the majority of all the members of the Preparatory Recall
Assembly, after a serious and careful deliberation have decided to adopt this
resolution for the recall of the incumbent provincial governor Enrique T.
Garcia for loss of confidence;

Now, therefore, be it resolved as it is hereby resolved that having
lost confidence on the incumbent provincial governor of Bataan, Enrique T.
Garcia, recall proceedings be immediately initiated against him;

Resolved Further, that copy of this resolution be furnished the
Honorable Commission on Elections, Manila and the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Balanga, Bataan.

One
hundred forty-six (146) names appeared in Resolution No. 1 but only eighty (80)
carried the signatures of the members of the PRA. Of the eighty (80) signatures, only seventy-four (74) were
found genuine.^[3]
The PRAC of the province had a membership of one hundred forty-four (144)^[4]
and its majority was seventy-three (73).

On July 7, 1993,
petitioners filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition to deny due course to
said Resolution No. 1. Petitioners alleged that the PRAC failed to comply with the
“substantive and procedural requirements” laid down in Section 70 of
R.A. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. In a per curiam Resolution
promulgated August 31, 1993, the respondent COMELEC dismissed the petition and
scheduled the recall elections for the position of Governor of Bataan on
October 11, 1993. Petitioners then
filed with Us a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of
preliminary injunction to annul the said Resolution of the respondent COMELEC
on various grounds. They urged that
section 70 of R.A. 7160 allowing recall through the initiative of the PRAC is
unconstitutional because: (1) the people have the sole and exclusive right to
decide whether or not to initiate recall proceedings, and (2) it violated the
right of elected local public officials belonging
to the political minority to equal protection of law. They also argued that the proceedings
followed by the PRAC in passing Resolution No. 1 suffered from numerous
defects, the most fatal of which was the deliberate failure to send notices of
the meeting to sixty-five (65) members of the assembly. On September 7, 1993, We required the
respondents to file their Comments within
a non-extendible period of ten (10) days.^[5] On September 16, 1993, We set the
petition for hearing on September 21, 1993 at 11 A.M. After the hearing, We granted the petition
on the narrow ground that the sending of selective notices to members of the
PRAC violated the due process protection of the Constitution and fatally flawed
the enactment of Resolution No. 1. We
ruled:

x x x

“After deliberation, the Court opts not to resolve the alleged
constitutional infirmity of sec. 70 of R.A. No. 7160 for its resolution is not
unavoidable to decide the merits of the petition. The petition can be decided on the equally fundamental issues of:
(1) whether or not all the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly were
notified of its meeting; and (2) assuming lack of notice, whether or not it
would vitiate the proceedings of the assembly including its Resolution No. 1.

The failure to give notice to all members of the assembly,
especially to the members known to be political allies of petitioner Garcia was
admitted by both counsels of the respondents. They did not deny that only those inclined to agree with the resolution
of recall were notified as a matter of political strategy and security. They justified these selective notices on
the ground that the law does not specifically mandate the giving of notice.

We reject this submission of the respondents. The due process clause of the Constitution
requiring notice as an element of fairness is inviolable and should always be
considered as part and parcel of every law in case of its silence. The need for notice to all the members of
the assembly is also imperative for these members represent the different
sectors of the electorate of Bataan. To
the extent that they are not notified of the meeting of the assembly, to that
extent is the sovereign voice of the people they represent nullified. The resolution to recall should articulate
the majority will of the members of the assembly but the majority will can be
genuinely determined only after all the members of the assembly have been given
a fair opportunity to express the will of their constituents. Needless to stress, the requirement of
notice is mandatory for it is indispensable in determining the collective
wisdom of the members of the Preparatory Recall Assembly. Its non-observance is fatal to the validity
of the resolution to recall petitioner Garcia as Governor of the province of
Bataan.

The petition raises other issues that are not only prima impressionis
but also of transcendental importance to the rightful exercise of the sovereign
right of the people to recall their elected officials. The Court shall discuss these issues in a
more extended decision.”

In accord with
this Resolution, it appears that on September 22, 1993, the Honorable Mayor of
Dinalupihan, Oscar de los Reyes again sent Notice of Session to the members of
the PRAC to “convene in session on September 26, 1993 at the town plaza of
Balanga, Bataan at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.”^[6] From news reports, the PRAC
convened in session and eighty-seven (87) of its members once more passed a
resolution calling for the recall of petitioner Garcia.^[7] On September 27, 1993, petitioners
filed with Us a Supplemental Petition and Reiteration of Extremely Urgent
Motion pressing for a resolution of their contention that section 70 of R.A.
7160 is unconstitutional.

We find the
original Petition and the Supplemental Petition assailing the constitutionality
of section 70 of R.A. 7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall assembly
to initiate the recall of local elective officials as bereft of merit.

Every law enjoys
the presumption of validity. The
presumption rests on the respect due to the wisdom, integrity, and the
patriotism of the legislative, by which the law is passed, and the Chief
Executive, by whom the law is approved.^[8] For upholding the Constitution is
not the responsibility of the judiciary alone but also the duty of the
legislative and executive.^[9] To strike down a law as
unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the
fundamental law prohibits, the statute permits.^[10] The annulment cannot be decreed on
a doubtful and arguable implication. The universal rule of legal hermeneutics is that all reasonable doubts
should be resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a law.^[11]

Recall is a mode
of removal of a public officer by the people before the end of his term of
office. The people’s prerogative to
remove a public officer is an incident of their sovereign power and in the
absence of constitutional restraint, the power is implied in all governmental
operations. Such power has been held to
be indispensable for the proper administration of public affairs.^[12] Not undeservedly, it is frequently
described as a fundamental right of the people in a representative democracy.^[13]

Recall as a mode
of removal of elective local officials made its maiden appearance in our 1973
Constitution.^[14] It was mandated in section 2 of
Article XI entitled Local Government, viz:

SEC. 2. The Batasang Pambansa shall enact a local government code
which may not thereafter be amended except by a majority vote of all its
Members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure
with an effective system of recall,
allocating among the different local government units their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election
and removal, term, salaries, powers, functions, and duties of local officials,
and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local
units. However, any change in the
existing form of local government shall not take effect until ratified by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose. (Underscoring supplied)

The Batasang Pambansa then
enacted BP 337 entitled “The Local Government Code of 1983.” Section
54 of its Chapter 3 provided only one mode of initiating the recall elections
of local elective officials, i.e., by petition of at least twenty-five percent
(25%) of the total number of registered voters in the local government unit
concerned, viz:

Sec. 54. By Whom
Exercised; Requisites. –
(1) The power of recall shall be exercised by the registered voters of the unit
to which the local elective official subject to such recall belongs.

(2)  Recall shall be validly initiated only upon
petition of at least twenty-five percent of the total number of registered
voters in the local government unit concerned based on the election in which
the local official sought to be recalled was elected.

Our
legal history does not reveal any instance when this power of recall as
provided by BP 337 was exercised by our people.

In
February 1986, however, our people more than exercised their right of recall
for they resorted to revolution and
they booted out of
office the highest elective officials of the land.

The successful use of people power to remove public officials who have
forfeited the trust of the electorate led to its firm institutionalization in the
1987 Constitution. Its Article XIII expressly
recognized the Role and Rights of People’s Organizations, viz:

Sec. 15. The State shall respect the role of independent people’s
organizations to enable the people to pursue and protect, within the democratic
framework, their legitimate and collective interests and aspirations through
peaceful and lawful means.

People’s
organizations are bona
fide associations
of citizens with demonstrated capacity to promote the public interest and with
identifiable leadership, membership, and structure.

Sec. 16. The right of the
people and their organizations to effective and reasonable
participation at all levels of social, political, and economic decision-making
shall not be abridged. The State shall, by laws, facilitate
the establishment of adequate consultation mechanisms.

Section
3 of its Article X also reiterated the mandate for Congress to enact a local
government code which “shall provide for a more responsive and accountable
local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with
effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum…,” viz:

Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which
shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure
instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of
recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local
government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for
the qualifications, election, appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the
organization and operation of the local units.”

In
response to this constitutional call, Congress enacted R.A. 7160, otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991, which took effect on January 1,
1992. In this Code, Congress provided
for a second mode of initiating the recall process through a preparatory recall
assembly which in the provincial level is composed of all mayors, vice-mayors
and sanggunian members of the municipalities and
component cities. We quote the
pertinent provisions of R.A. 7160, viz:

CHAPTER 5 – RECALL

Sec. 69. By Whom Exercised. – The power of recall for
loss of confidence shall be exercised by the registered voters of a local
government unit to which the local elective official subject to such recall
belongs.

Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall
may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters
of the local government unit to which the local elective official subject to
such recall belongs.

(b)  There shall be a preparatory recall assembly
in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be composed of
the following:

(1) Provincial level. – all mayors,
vice-mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities;

(2) City level. – All punong barangay
and sangguniang barangay members in the city;

(3)  Legislative District level. – In cases
where sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all elective
municipal officials in the district; and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod
members are elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the
district; and

(4)   Municipal level. – All punong barangay
and sangguniang barangay members in the municipality.

(c)  A majority of all the preparatory recall
assembly members may convene in session in a public place and initiate a recall
proceeding against any elective official in the local government unit
concerned. Recall of provincial, city,
or municipal officials shall be validly initiated through a resolution adopted
by a majority of all the members of the preparatory recall assembly concerned
during its session called for the purpose.

(d) Recall of any
elective provincial, city, municipal, or barangay official may be validly
initiated upon petition of at least twenty-five (25) percent of the total
number of registered voters in the local government unit concerned during the
election in which the local official sought to be recalled was elected.

Sec. 71. Election Recall – Upon the filing of a valid
resolution or petition for recall with the appropriate local office of the
Comelec, the Commission or its duly authorized representative shall set the date of
the election on recall, which shall not be later than thirty (30) days after
the filing of the resolution or petition for recall in the case of the
barangay, city, or municipal officials, and forty-five (45) days in the case of
provincial officials. The official or
officials sought to be recalled shall automatically be considered as duly
registered candidate or candidates to the pertinent positions and, like other
candidates, shall be entitled to be voted upon.

Sec. 72. Effectivity of Recall. – The recall of an
elective local official shall be effective only upon the election and
proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate receiving the
highest number of votes cast during the election on recall. Should the official sought to be recalled
receive the highest number of votes, confidence in him is thereby affirmed, and
he shall continue in office.

Sec. 73. Prohibition from Resignation. – The elective
local official sought to be recalled shall not be allowed to resign while the
recall process is in progress.

Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. – (a) Any elective
local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his
term of office for loss of confidence.

(b)  No recall shall take place within one (1) year
from the date of the official’s assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular election.

A reading of the
legislative history of these recall provisions will reveal that the idea of
empowering a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall from office of local
elective officials originated from the House of Representatives and not the
Senate.^[15] The legislative records reveal that
there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of
initiating the recall process thru an assembly was adopted, viz: (a) to
diminish the difficulty of initiating recall thru the direct action of the
people; and (b) to cut down on its expenses.^[16] Our
lawmakers took note of the undesirable fact that the mechanism of initiating
recall by direct action of the electorate was utilized only once in the City of
Angeles, Pampanga, but even this lone attempt to recall the city mayor
failed. Former Congressman Wilfredo
Cainglet explained that this initiatory process by direct action of the people
was too cumbersome, too expensive and almost impossible to implement.^[17]
Consequently, our legislators added in the Code a second mode of initiating the
recall of local officials, i.e., thru a preparatory recall assembly. They brushed aside the argument that this
second mode may cause instability in the local government units due to its
imagined ease.

We have
belabored the genesis of our recall law for it can light up many of the
unillumined interstices of the law. In
resolving constitutional disputes, We should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence
some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different
constitutional settings and needs. Prescinding from this proposition, We shall now resolve the contention
of petitioners that the alternative mode of allowing a preparatory recall
assembly to initiate the process of recall is unconstitutional.

It is first postulated by the petitioners that “the right to
recall does not extend merely to the prerogative of the electorate to reconfirm
or withdraw their confidence on the official sought to be recalled at a special election. Such prerogative necessarily includes the
sole and exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceedings
or not.”^[18]

We do not agree. Petitioners cannot point to any specific provision of the Constitution
that will sustain this submission. To
be sure, there is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that
the people have the “sole and exclusive right
to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding.” The Constitution did not provide for
any mode, let alone a single mode, of initiating recall elections.^[19] Neither did it prohibit the
adoption of multiple modes of initiating recall elections. The mandate given by section 3 of Article X
of the Constitution is for Congress to “enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government
structure through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms
of recall, initiative,
and referendum x x x” By this constitutional
mandate, Congress was clearly given the power to choose the effective mechanisms
of recall as its
discernment dictates. The power given
was to select which among the means and methods of initiating recall elections
are effective to carry out the judgment of the electorate. Congress was not straightjacketed to one
particular mechanism of initiating recall elections. What the Constitution simply required is
that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by Congress should
be effective. Using its
constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative
mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation
by direct action of the people. Congress has made its choice as called for by the Constitution and it is
not the prerogative of this Court to supplant this judgment. The choice may be erroneous but even then,
the remedy against a bad law is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
legislative. By the principle of
separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.^[20]

Petitioners
also posit the thesis that in passing Resolution No. 1, the Bataan Preparatory Recall Assembly did not only initiate
the process of recall but had de
facto recalled
petitioner Garcia from office, a power reserved to the people alone. To quote the exact language of the
petitioners: “The initiation of a recall through the PRA effectively
shortens and ends the term of the incumbent local officials. Precisely, in the case of Gov.
Garcia, an election was scheduled by the COMELEC on 11 October 1993 to
determine who has the right to assume the unexpired portion of his term of
office which should have been until June 1995. Having been relegated to the status of a mere candidate for the same
position of governor (by operation of law) he has, therefore, been effectively
recalled.”^[21]
In their Extremely Urgent Clarificatory Manifestation,^[22]
petitioners put the proposition more bluntly by stating that a “PRA
resolution of recall is the recall itself.”

Again, the
contention cannot command our concurrence. Petitioners have misconstrued the nature of the initiatory process of
recall by the PRAC. They have embraced
the view that initiation by the PRAC is not initiation by the people. This is a misimpression for initiation by
the PRAC is also initiation by the people, albeit done indirectly through their
representatives. It is not
constitutionally impermissible for the people to act through their elected representatives. Nothing less than the paramount task of
drafting our Constitution is delegated by the people to their representatives,
elected either to act as a constitutional convention or as a congressional
constituent assembly. The initiation of
a recall process is a lesser act and there is no rhyme or reason why it cannot
be entrusted to and exercised by the elected representatives of the
people. More far out is petitioners’
stance that a PRA resolution of recall is the recall itself. It cannot be seriously doubted that a PRA
resolution of recall merely starts the process. It is part of the process but is not the whole process. This ought to be self evident for a PRA resolution
of recall that is not submitted to the COMELEC for validation will not recall
its subject official. Likewise, a PRA
resolution of recall that is rejected by the people in the election called for
the purpose bears no effect whatsoever. The initiatory resolution merely sets the stage for the official
concerned to appear before the tribunal of the people so he can justify why he
should be allowed to continue in office. Before the people render their sovereign judgment, the official
concerned remains in office but his right to continue in office is subject to
question. This is clear in section 72
of the Local Government Code which explicitly states that “the recall of
an elective local official shall be
effective only upon
the election and proclamation of a successor in the person of the candidate
receiving the highest number of votes cast during the election on recall.”

We shall next
settle the contention of petitioners that the disputed law infracts the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioners asseverate:

5.01.2. It denied
petitioners the equal protection of the laws for the local officials
constituting the majority party can constitute itself into a PRA and initiate
the recall of a duly elected provincial official belonging to the minority
party thus rendering ineffectual his election by popular mandate. Relevantly, the assembly could, to the
prejudice of the minority (or even partyless) incumbent official, effectively
declare a local elective position vacant (and demand the holding of a special
election) for purely partisan political ends regardless of the mandate of the
electorate. In the case at bar, 64 of
the 74 signatories to the recall resolution have been political opponents of
petitioner Garcia, not only did they not vote for him but they even campaigned
against him in the 1992 elections.

Petitioners’
argument does not really assail the law but its possible abuse by the members
of the PRAC while exercising their right to initiate recall proceedings. More specifically, the fear is expressed
that the members of the PRAC may inject political color in their decision as
they may initiate recall proceedings only against their political opponents
especially those belonging to the minority. A careful reading of the law, however, will ineluctably show that it
does not give an asymmetrical treatment to locally elected officials belonging
to the political minority. First to be
considered is the politically neutral composition of the preparatory recall
assembly. Sec. 70 (b) of the Code
provides:

Sec. 70. Initiation of the Recall Process. (a) Recall
may be initiated by a preparatory recall assembly or by the registered voters
of the local government unit to which the local elective official subject to
such recall belongs.

(b)  There shall be a preparatory recall assembly
in every province, city, district, and municipality which shall be composed of
the following:

(1) Provincial level. – All mayors, vice
mayors and sanggunian members of the municipalities and component cities;

(2) City level. – All punong barangay
and sangguniang barangay members in the city;

(3)  Legislative District level. – In cases
where sangguniang panlalawigan members are elected by district, all elective
municipal officials in the district; and in cases where sangguniang panlungsod
members are
elected by district, all elective barangay officials in the district; and

(4) 
Municipal level. – All punong barangay and sangguniang
barangay members in the municipality.

Under
the law, all mayors, vice-mayors and sangguniang members of the
municipalities and component cities are made members of the preparatory recall
assembly at the provincial level. Its
membership is not apportioned to political parties. No significance is given to the political affiliation of
its members. Secondly, the preparatory
recall assembly at the provincial level includes all the elected
officials in the province concerned. Considering their number, the greater
probability is that no one political party can control its majority. Thirdly, sec. 69 of the Code provides that
the only ground to recall a locally elected public official is loss of
confidence of the people. The members
of the PRAC are in the PRAC not in representation of their political parties
but as representatives of the people. By necessary implication, loss of confidence cannot be premised on mere
differences in political party affiliation. Indeed, our Constitution encourages the multi-party system for the existence
of opposition parties is indispensable to the growth and nurture of the
democratic system. Clearly then, the law as crafted cannot be
faulted for discriminating against elected local officials belonging to the
minority.

The fear that a
preparatory recall assembly may be dominated by a political party and that it
may use its power to initiate the recall of officials of opposite political
persuasions, especially those belonging to the minority, is not a ground to
strike down the law as unconstitutional. To be sure, this argument has long been in disuse for there can be no
escape from the reality that all
powers are susceptible of abuse. The
mere possibility of abuse cannot, however, infirm per se the
grant of power to an individual or entity. To deny power simply because it can be abused by the grantee is to
render government powerless and no people need an impotent government. There is no democratic government that can
operate on the basis of fear and distrust of its officials, especially those
elected by the people themselves. On
the contrary, all our laws assume that our officials, whether appointed or elected,
will act in good faith and will regularly perform the duties of their
office. Such a presumption follows the
solemn oath that they took after assumption of office, to faithfully execute
all our laws.

Moreover, the law instituted safeguards to assure that the
initiation of the recall process by a preparatory recall assembly will not be
corrupted by extraneous influences. As
explained above, the diverse and distinct composition of the membership of a
preparatory recall assembly guarantees that all the sectors of the electorate
province shall be heard. It is for this
reason that in Our Resolution of September 21, 1993, We held that notice to all
the members of the recall assembly is a condition sine qua non to
the validity of its proceedings. The
law also requires a qualified majority of all the preparatory recall assembly
members to convene in session and in a public place. It also requires that the recall resolution
by the said majority must be adopted during its session called
for the purpose. The underscored
words carry distinct
legal meanings and purvey some of the parameters limiting the power of the
members of a preparatory recall assembly to initiate recall proceedings. Needless to state, compliance with these
requirements is necessary, otherwise, there will be no valid resolution
of recall which can he given due course by the COMELEC.

Furthermore,
it cannot be asserted with certitude that the members of the Bataan preparatory
recall assembly voted strictly along narrow political lines. Neither the respondent COMELEC nor this
Court made a judicial inquiry as to the reasons that led the members of the
said recall assembly to cast a vote of lack of confidence against petitioner
Garcia. That inquiry was not undertaken
for to do so would require crossing the forbidden borders of the political
thicket. Former Senator Aquilino
Pimentel, Jr., a major author of the subject law in his book The Local Government
Code of 1991: The Key to National Development, stressed the same reason why the
substantive content of a vote of lack of confidence is beyond any inquiry,
thus:

“There is only one ground for the recall of local government
officials: loss of confidence. This
means that the people may petition or the Preparatory Recall Assembly may
resolve to recall any local elective officials without specifying any
particular ground except loss of confidence. There is no need for them to bring up any charge of abuse or corruption
against the local elective officials who are the subject of any recall
petition.

In the case of Evardone vs. Commission on Elections, et al., 204
SCRA 464, 472 (1991), the Court ruled that “loss of confidence” as a
ground for recall is a political question. In the words of the Court, “whether or not the electorate of the
municipality of Sulat has lost confidence in the incumbent mayor is a political
question.”

Any assertion therefore that the members of
the Bataan preparatory recall assembly voted due to their political aversion to
petitioner Garcia is at best a surmise.

Petitioners
also contend that the resolution of the members of the preparatory recall
assembly subverted the will of the electorate of the province of Bataan who
elected petitioner Garcia with a majority of 12,500 votes. Again, the contention proceeds from the
erroneous premise that the resolution of recall is the recall itself. It refuses to recognize the reality that the resolution of recall is a
mere proposal to the electorate of Bataan to subject petitioner to a new test of faith. The proposal will still be passed upon by
the sovereign electorate of Bataan. As
this judgment has yet to be expressed, it is premature to conclude that the
sovereign will of the electorate of Bataan has been subverted. The electorate of Bataan may or may not
recall petitioner Garcia in an appropriate election. If the electorate re-elects petitioner Garcia, then the
proposal to recall him made by the preparatory recall assembly is
rejected. On the other hand, if the
electorate does not re-elect petitioner Garcia, then he has lost the confidence
of the people which
he once enjoyed. The judgment will
write finis to this political
controversy. For more than judgments of
courts of law, the judgment of the tribunal of the people is final for
“sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates
from them.”

In
sum, the petition at bench appears to champion the sovereignty of the people,
particularly their direct right to initiate and remove elective local officials
thru recall elections. If the petition
would succeed, the result will be a return to the previous system of recall
elections which Congress found should be improved. The alternative mode of initiating recall proceedings thru a
preparatory recall assembly is, however, an innovative attempt by Congress to
remove impediments to the effective exercise by the people of their sovereign
power to check the performance of their elected officials. The power to determine this mode was
specifically given to Congress and is not proscribed by the Constitution.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the original Petition and the
Supplemental Petition assailing the constitutionality of section 70 of R.A.
7160 insofar as it allows a preparatory recall assembly to initiate the recall
process are dismissed for lack of merit. This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Romero, Nocon, and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Griño-Aquino, J., on leave.

Davide, Jr.,J., dissents,
please see dissenting opinion.

Melo, J., joins J. Davide, in
his dissenting opinion.

Quiason, and Vitug, JJ.,
see concurring opinion.

^[1]
Minutes of the meeting of the PRAC held on July 2, 1993, p. 1, Annex
“C” of petition.

^[2]
Ibid.

^[3]
Resolution dated August 31, 1993 of the respondent COMELEC, Annex “H”
of the petition, p. 9.

^[4]
Excluded in the computation of the base figure for the purpose of determining
the majority were the sectoral representatives of the Sangguniang Bayan as
there were yet no elections for the said positions at that time.

^[5]
The Comments of the respondents were filed on September 17, 1993.

^[6]
Annex “A”, Extremely Urgent Motion to Require Respondents to Maintain
Status Quo.

^[7]
Manila Bulletin, issue of September 28, 1993, page 1, reported that the
second recall resolution was signed by 7 of 12 mayors of Bataan, 9 vice mayors
and 61 Sangguniang Bayan members (councilors).

^[8]
Alba vs. Evangelista, 100 Phil. 683 (1957).

^[9]
Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 30 (1978).

^[10]
Morfe vs. Mutuc, 22 SCRA 424 (1968).

^[11]
Heirs of Ordona vs. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 (1983).

^[12]
67 CJS 480.

^[13]
Ibid, p. 682.

^[14]
Even prior to the 1973 Constitution,
however, the National Assembly of the Philippines, under its plenary powers,
had enacted legislation which included a mechanism of recalling local
government officials. (See
Section 8 of Commonwealth Act No. 581, also known as the Festin Act, dated June
8, 1940).

^[15]
This was confirmed by former Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr., who appeared as amicus
curiae in the hearing of September 21, 1993. See also Senate Bill No. 155.

^[16]
The main proponent of this alternative mode was former Congressman Wilfredo
Cainglet.

^[17]
Minutes of the meeting of the Special Committee on Local Government, August 6,
1990.

^[18]
Petition, p. 12.

^[19]
The rule is, the termination of the official relations of a public officer
depends on the law under which his office was created. For incumbents of positions other than
constitutional offices, therefore, the subject of regulating their removal from
office ordinarily forms part of the power of the legislature. This legislative power, however, is not
absolute, since it may be limited or even completely taken away by the
provisions of the Constitution. Thus, where the Constitution prescribes the
method of removal and the causes for the same, the methods and grounds so
established are exclusive; and it is beyond Congress to prescribe any other
means or causes for removal.

^[20]
Tanada vs. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957)

^[21]
Supplemental Petition, p. 3

^[22]
Filed on September 29, 1993.

105

6 pt
6 pt
0
3