DAVID ODSIGUE, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, AND ARMANDO ANGELES, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
decision of Court of Appeals,^[1] affirming
the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Morong, Rizal, which in turn had
affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, ordering the ejectment of
petitioner.

The subject of this ejectment suit is a parcel of land covered by
Original Certificate of Title No. 4050 and situated at Lagundi, Morong,
Rizal. Since 1972, petitioner has been
in possession of this land by tolerance of the owner, Platon Espiritu
Santo. In 1989 Espiritu Santo died and
was succeeded by his heirs, among whom was
private respondent Armando Angeles.

On January 10, 1991, private respondent Armando Angeles, as
co-owner and assignee of the other heirs, sent a letter of demand to petitioner
to vacate the premises. The letter was
delivered to the petitioner by the Barangay Captain of Lagundi, Fernando
Austria, who, in a sworn affidavit, stated that he tried to deliver the letter
to petitioner but petitioner had refused to receive it.

On February 8, 1991, private respondent brought this suit for
unlawful detainer in the MTC. In his
answer, petitioner set forth, inter
alia, the following
affirmative defenses:

(a) the jurisdictional requirement of a formal
demand has not been complied with;

(b) the property involved has not been
sufficiently identified; and

(c) the herein petitioner was instituted as a
tenant by the assignor’s (Felisa Angeles) predecessor, Platon Espiritu Santo,
as original owner of the property, therefore [petitioner] is an occupant-tiller
within the meaning of existing agrarian reform laws, having planted and
cultivated numerous fruit-bearing trees and intro­duced improvements on the
parcel of land in question.

On December 10, 1991, the MTC rendered a decision ordering the
petitioner to vacate the premises. On
appeal the RTC and, later, the CA, affirmed the decision of the MTC. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but
his motion was denied by the appellate court, which found no new matters which
would warrant a reversal of its decision. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Without giving due course to the petition, we required
respondents to comment.

On November 11, 1993, respondents filed their comment, refuting
petitioner’s assignment of errors and contending that the petition raises
factual issues the determination of which
by the appellate court are conclusive on us.

On March 21, 1994, petitioner manifested that he was adopting his
petition as reply to the respondents’ comment.

Petitioner makes the following assignment of errors:

(1) THE RESPONDENT
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THERE WAS A VALID SERVICE OF A DEMAND LETTER ON
PETITIONER BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT WHICH IS A JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENT IN
UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASES;

(2) THE RESPONDENT
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S PROPERTY HAS BEEN PROPERLY
IDENTIFIED IN LINE WITH ART. 424 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE FOR PURPOSES OF UNLAWFUL
DETAINER;

(3) THE RESPONDENT
COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER COULD BE SUMMARILY EJECTED FROM THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY.

We find the petition to be without merit.

First. In
support of the first ground of his petition, petitioner claims that no demand
was made upon him to vacate the premises and that there is no proof to show
that he received the demand letter sent to him on January 10, 1991.

He contends that the affidavit of Barangay Captain Fernando Austria
is not entitled to any weight
because no trial on the merits was held in the MTC, as a result of which he was not given the opportunity to cross
examine the witness regarding his affidavit. Additionally, he contends that any demand made as alleged by private
respondent was not made in accordance with Rule 70, sec. 2, of the Rules of
Court.

In his affidavit Fernando Austria stated that private
respondent’s letters to petitioner, demanding that the latter vacate the
premises and surrender possession of the same, were personally handed by him to
petitioner but that petitioner refused to receive them. This affidavit is entitled to great respect,
in the absence of anything to show the contrary.

Petitioner’s contention that the affidavit should be given no
evidentiary value because he was not able to cross examine the Barangay Captain
has no basis in law. The Rule on
Summary Procedure precisely provides for the submission by the parties of
affidavits and position papers and enjoins courts to hold hearing only where it
is necessary to do so to clarify factual matters. This procedure is in keeping with the objective of the Rule of
promoting the expedi­tious and inexpensive determination of cases.

There is no basis either for petitioner’s allegation that
“there is nothing in the record to show that the case before said court
was in line with Summary Procedure.” As the Court of Appeals found:

The case was set for prelimi­nary conference, which resulted in a
failure to reach any agreement, hence, they were required to submit their
position paper, after which, the case was deemed submitted, resulting, as
already stated in the earlier part of this Decision, to a decision by the
Municipal Trial Court in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants,
which on appeal was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court.^[2]

Second. Petitioner
contends that private respondents have not identified the property sought to be
recovered as required by art. 434 of the Civil Code. He alleges that Sitio Aduas, where the land in question is
located, is at the boundary of Barangay May-Iba, Teresa, Rizal, and Barangay
Lagundi, Morong, Rizal. On the other
hand, petitioner maintains, the parcel of land he is occupying is located in
Barangay May-Iba. He claims that the
technical description in the title does not sufficiently identify the property
of private respondent and that a geodetic
survey to determine which of his
improvements should be demolished should first have been conducted by the
private respondent. Petitioner
theorizes:

[I]t is a possibility that the questioned
property may be within the boundary of Sitio Aduas, both within the territorial
jurisdiction of Barangay May-Iba, Teresa, Rizal, or of Barangay Lagundi, Morong
Rizal, particularly in the case of the residential house and other structural
improvements wherein the place must be relocated so as to determine the extent
of the premises to be subject of
vacating or removal.^[3]

But private respondent’s title (OCT No. 4050) indicates that the
property is located in Barangay Lagundi. Likewise, the certification issued by the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Officer at Morong, Rizal stated that petitioner was occupying a landholding at
Barangay Lagundi.

For our purposes, a survey is not necessary. A certificate of title is conclusive
evidence not only of ownership of the land referred but also its location. The subject of these proceedings is the land
covered by OCT No. 4050. Accordingly,
petitioners will be required to demolish
only whatever is constructed within its boundaries.

Third. Petitioner
contends that he had been instituted as tenant by the private respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest nearly twenty years before the present action was
brought and as such he is entitled to “certain justiceable and equitable
remedies.” He does not, however, specify what “equitable
remedies” he is entitled to. What
is clear is that one whose stay, like that of petitioner, is merely tolerated
becomes a deforciant illegally occupying the land the moment he is required to
leave.

Nor is there any basis for petitioner’s claim that he is an
agricultural tenant. One of the
essential requisites for the existence of a tenancy relationship is sharing, by
the landowner and tenant, of the produce and no proof of this fact has been
shown in this case. As we have held:

All these requisites are neces­sary in order to create tenancy
relationship between the parties and the absence of one or more requi­sites
does not make the alleged tenant a de jure tenant as contra-distinguished
from a de facto ten­ant.^[4]

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Puno, JJ.,
concur.

^[1]
Special Former Seventh Division, composed of De la Fuente, J., Chairman,
Imperial (ponente) and Garcia, JJ.

^[2]
Rollo, p. 20.

^[3]
Rollo, p. 14.

^[4]
De la Cruz v. Bautista, G.R. No. 39695, June 14, 1990, 186 SCRA 517.