🎧 Case Brief Lecture

BLISS DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, TERESITA LEJANO AND RODOLFO ANGELES. RESPONDENTS.

G.R. No. 111017. August 31, 1995 August 31, 1995

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Bliss Development Corporation versus National Labor Relations Commission

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari brought by Bliss Development Corporation against the National Labor Relations Commission and its two former employees, Teresita Lejano and Rodolfo Angeles. The company does not deny that it dismissed them illegally. What it contests is the money. The labor arbiter, in executing a final judgment for reinstatement and backwages, awarded the two employees far more than the judgment ever granted. The case matters because it fixes two enduring rules: backwages for a dismissal that happened before the amendatory law took effect are capped at three years, and a writ of execution that exceeds the judgment it enforces is void as to the excess, even if the judgment has long become final.

Procedural History

Teresita Lejano and Rodolfo Angeles filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the National Labor Relations Commission. The labor arbiter, Nieves Vivar de Castro, rendered a decision ordering their reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment of full backwages from the date of dismissal to actual reinstatement. The company appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which dismissed the appeal for failure to post the required bond. The company then went up to the Supreme Court on certiorari, and that petition was likewise dismissed, so the labor arbiter's decision became final and executory.

The employees moved for execution. The labor arbiter issued a writ of execution, and later granted a final motion for execution with additional awards. The company appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission, which set aside the labor arbiter's order and dismissed the final motion for execution, holding that backwages should be confined to basic salary, regular allowance and thirteenth month pay, and should not exceed three years. From that resolution the company filed this petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court, raising a single issue: whether the Commission gravely abused its discretion in failing to order the employees to refund the excess they had already received.

Facts

Teresita Lejano served as Head of the Accounting Task Force and Rodolfo Angeles as Acting Division Chief of the Systems Department Finance Group of Bliss Development Corporation. On 6 February 1987, the company terminated both of them on the ground of loss of trust and confidence. They filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, and on 16 August 1989 the labor arbiter ruled in their favor, ordering reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and full backwages from 6 February 1987 to actual reinstatement, with a sample computation of backwages.

The company's appeal was dismissed for failure to post a bond, and its petition before the Supreme Court was dismissed as well. The decision thus became final and was partially executed. On 29 October 1991, the labor arbiter issued a writ of execution for computed monetary benefits totaling more than one million pesos, including allowances, medical benefits, employer contributions, thirteenth month pay, leave credits, and attorney's fees of ten percent. On 6 June 1992, the employees filed a final motion for execution claiming salaries and benefits up to 31 May 1992 and separation benefits in lieu of reinstatement, since the company was to be dissolved on 30 June 1992. The labor arbiter granted the motion on 22 October 1992 and ordered additional payments.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission set aside that order and dismissed the final motion for execution. It found a patent departure from jurisprudence: the computation covered about four years and six months, included items outside the term backwages, and added attorney's fees never awarded in the 16 August 1989 decision. It also held that the employees were entitled to separation pay in lieu of reinstatement because of the dissolution, but that those amounts were already covered by what they had received.

Issues

  • Whether or not the backwages awarded to the illegally dismissed employees should be limited to three years, without qualification or deduction, notwithstanding that the judgment had become final and executory.
  • Whether or not the employees were entitled to attorney's fees and to benefits beyond those awarded in the decision of 16 August 1989.
  • Whether or not the National Labor Relations Commission gravely abused its discretion in failing to order the refund of the excess payments already received by the employees.

Applicable Provisions

Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act Number 6715, provides:

An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.

This is the amendatory provision that allowed full backwages, and the Court holds that it took effect on 21 March 1989, after the employees were dismissed, so it cannot apply to them retroactively.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court ruled that the employees are entitled only to three years of backwages. The amendatory provision took effect on 21 March 1989, two years after the dismissal on 6 February 1987, and the Court has consistently held that the amendment has no retroactive effect. The policy of awarding backwages limited to three years, without qualification or deduction, known as the Mercury Drug Rule, therefore prevails. The Court rejected the argument that finality shields the award, quoting its own doctrine:

We have constantly adopted the policy of awarding backwages to illegally dismissed employees to three years without qualification or deduction. This policy applies even to final decisions awarding backwages in excess of three years.

Any decision or order granting backwages beyond three years is null and void as to the excess, and a departure from this rule constitutes grave abuse of discretion.

On the second issue, the Court found no justification for attorney's fees. The decision of 16 August 1989 was limited to reinstatement and backwages; attorney's fees were never awarded, and the record shows no grant of the employees' motion to correct or modify. The Court restated the rule that when a writ of execution is not in harmony with, and exceeds, the judgment that gives it life, the writ has no validity to that extent. Execution must conform to the dispositive portion of the decision.

On the third issue, the Court held that the National Labor Relations Commission, though correct in its findings, was remiss in its duty. Having found the computation defective, it should have modified or recomputed the award to conform to its ruling instead of simply dismissing the motion. The Court also held that the employees' separation pay, in lieu of reinstatement because of the dissolution, was already covered by the amounts they had received.

Doctrine

First, the amendatory provision of Republic Act Number 6715 granting full backwages does not apply retroactively; a dismissal occurring before its effectivity on 21 March 1989 carries backwages limited to three years, without qualification or deduction, under the Mercury Drug Rule. Second, this three-year cap applies even to final and executory judgments, and any award beyond it is void as to the excess. Third, a writ of execution must conform to the dispositive portion of the judgment it enforces; a writ that exceeds the judgment is void as to the excess and is issued without or in excess of jurisdiction. Fourth, the National Labor Relations Commission has the authority, and indeed the duty, to correct the execution of a decision and to recompute the award to conform to law.

Disposition

The petition was granted. The decision of the National Labor Relations Commission was affirmed subject to modification: backwages were limited to three years without qualification or deduction, with any excess refunded to the company, and the company was ordered to pay separation pay of 123,578 pesos to Teresita Lejano and 76,518 pesos to Rodolfo Angeles in lieu of reinstatement.

Remember This

Memorize this line: the three-year cap on backwages applies even to final judgments, and a writ of execution that exceeds the judgment is void as to the excess. Examiners use this case to test the non-retroactivity of Republic Act Number 6715 and the rule that execution must conform to the dispositive portion of the decision.