WALTER T. YOUNG, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ALBERTO P. ATAS, JUANITO B. ALMOSA, JR., AND ROLANDO C. MALABONGA, MEMBERS, PANEL OF HEARING OFFICES OF THE SEC, RESPON…

Petitioner Walter Young,
in his capacity as “counsel” for Allied Finance and Leasing
Corporation (“ALFC”), filed the instant petition for certiorari
praying for the reversal of the Resolution, dated 5 March 1993, and the Order,
dated 1 June 1993, of the Ombudsman, which dismissed petitioner’s complaint
against herein respondents, all members of the panel of hearing officers in the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), and, ultimately, asking
for an order from us to direct the Ombudsman to charge said hearing
officers with having violated paragraphs (e) and (i) of Section 3, Republic Act
3019, and Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code.

This case is an offshoot of SEC Case No. EB-187, entitled
“In the Matter of Suspension of Payments, Ruby Industrial Corporation
(‘RUBY’), Petitioner,” pending with the SEC en banc.

In an Order, dated 10 August 1984, the SEC created a Management
Committee, headed by a representative of ALFC,
along with, as members,
representatives of the majority and minority stockholders of RUBY. The committee was tasked to manage and to
preserve the latter’s assets. On 29 May
1990, the majority stockholders of RUBY filed a verified “URGENT EX-PARTE PETITION
TO CREATE A NEW MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE AND APPROVE THE REVISED REHABILITATION PLAN OF RUBY INDUSTRIAL
CORPORATION.” After an exchange of pleadings, the SEC en banc referred the petition to herein respondent hearing
officers. On 16 January 1991, the panel
set the case for hearing and directed RUBY to furnish each and every creditor listed
in the petition with a copy of the order. One such copy was sent to the law firm of “Ocampo, Quiroz, Mina and Associates,” counsel for
ALFC and its representative in the management committee.

On 21 May 1991, RUBY manifested that it was submitting the
petition to constitute a new management committee for resolution on the basis
of the pleadings. The minority
stockholders of RUBY, as well as ALFC, however, expressed their desire to
present evidence. Respondent hearing
officers scheduled a hearing for
the purpose. On 19 August 1991, the
panel issued an order, directing the management committee and ALFC to submit
their respective comments and position papers on the rehabilitation plan
prepared by the majority stockholders of RUBY.

The management committee moved for a reconsideration but the
motion was denied.

On 18 September 1991, the hearing officers granted the petition
to create a new management committee and approved a revised rehabilitation
plan.

An appeal to the SEC en
banc was taken by ALFC, as well
as the minority stockholders of RUBY and the still standing management
committee, on 22 October, 21 October and 23 October 1991, respectively. During the pendency of the appeal, RUBY filed an urgent motion to
implement the order of 18 September 1991, which the herein respondent hearing
officers granted on 12 December 1991. The order, however, was interdicted due to the issuance by the SEC en
banc of a writ of preliminary
injunction.

On 13 July 1992, herein
petitioner Walter Young filed a complaint with the Ombudsman against respondent
hearing officers for alleged corrupt practices under Section 3 [(e) and (i) of
Republic Act 3019] and for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment punishable
under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code.

On 5 March 1993, the Office of the Ombudsman dismissed the
petitioner’s complaint. It also denied
the subsequent motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this recourse.

Initially, a fatal defect pointed out by the Solicitor General is
the failure of the petitioner to move, within the reglementary period, for the
reconsideration of the Resolution of 5 March 1993 of the public respondent
dismissing the complaint. In the order,
dated 1 June 1993, denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, the public
respondent said:

“Finally, as correctly
pointed out by respondents in their Opposition, dated May 11, 1993 (Vide: Record, page 239), the subject Motion for
Reconsideration should not be given due course by this Office anymore under
Section 27 of Republic Act 6770, otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of
1989” and its implementing Administrative Order No. 09 issued by this
Office on October 15, 1991, amending Section 7 (a), Rule II of Administrative
Order No. 07, which fixes “an INEXTENSIBLE period of five (5) days from
notice thereof” in that, while complainant admitted having received his
copy of the resolution in question on April 16, 1993, yet he filed his instant
Motion for Reconsideration with this Office only on April 29, 1993 or after the
lapse of more than five (5) days, counted from April 16, 1993.”

Ordinarily, the above infirmity should
warrant the outright dismissal of the petition. Let us, nonetheless, also delve into the propositions advanced in
support of the petition.

The petitioner contends that the management committee has not
been duly notified of the orders, dated 19 August 1991 and 18 September 1991,
and that, instead, said orders have been sent erroneously to the law firm of
“Ocampo, Quiroz, Mina and Associates,” counsel for the representative
of ALFC and chairman of the management committee, and not to the law office of
“Quiroz and Young,” being the counsel for the management committee
itself. On this score, the Office of
the Ombudsman finds, thus:

“x x x (C)ontrary to the allegations of complaint (petitioner
herein), the records of this case clearly show that these hearings as well as
in the other previous hearings by the Commission en banc, it was the Law Firm
of Ocampo, Quiroz, Mina and Associates, represented invariably therein by
either the herein complainant or Atty. Raymundo Quiroz, who appeared not only
for ALFC, but also for the Chairman of the Management Committee (MC), Atty.
Raymundo Quiroz, and who were invariably furnished by respondents with copies of
the assailed orders. Hence, it is not
true as claimed by complainant that the MC was not furnished by respondents
with copies of their Order dated September 18, 1991. The law is clear on this matter that notice to the Law Firm
appearing for a client is notice upon the client himself.

Clearly, we must accord due respect and
weight to the above factual findings of the Office of the Ombudsman. On such basis, the legal conclusion is inevitable, i.e., that the
service of notice has been properly effected.

The petitioner next avers that it is an error on the part of the
public respondent in refusing to consider the respondent hearing officers to
have acted without jurisdiction, and to have thus knowingly rendered an unjust
judgment, when they issued the “implement order” of 12 December 1991. The order, however, along with the other
orders of the hearing officers, are still pending consideration by the SEC en
banc. It would have been unduly
precipitate for the Ombudsman, as it would be for us, to preempt the SEC en
banc on such matter. Simple
courtesy demands it. We can understand
the frustration that litigants, and lawyers alike, would at times encounter in
procedural bureaucracy but imperative justice require our proper observance of indispensable technicalities
precisely designed to ensure its proper dispensation. Surely, we cannot righteously be asked to utterly disregard them.

Furthermore, absent a
clear case of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the
discretion of the Ombudsman, who, depending on his own findings and considered
evaluation of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it. In Ocampo vs. Ombudsman (G.R. No. 103446-47,
30 August 1993), this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Teodoro Padilla,
said:

x x x “The rule is based not only upon respect for the
investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the Constitution to the Office
of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts will be grievously
hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory
proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints
filed before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely
swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an
information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant.”

In
this instance, given the attendant circumstances, we see no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Ombudsman in dismissing the complaint.

All told, we cannot grant the extraordinary relief prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, and Puno, JJ., concur.