ZORAYDA AMELIA C. ALONZO, IN HER CAPACITY AS CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF HOME DEVELOPMENT MUTUAL FUND, PETITIONER, VS. HON. IGNACIO M. CAPULONG, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL T…

Alonzo versus Capulong

The Case

This is a petition for certiorari filed by Zorayda Alonzo, in her capacity as Chief Executive Officer of the Home Development Mutual Fund, against Judge Ignacio Capulong of the Regional Trial Court of Makati. The petitioner asks the Supreme Court to set aside the trial court's order granting a writ of preliminary injunction, which stopped her from preventively suspending Juliet Fajardo, the manager of the Administrative Services Department of the Fund. The case matters because it draws the line between a preventive suspension, which is a preliminary step in an administrative investigation, and a penalty, which requires a prior hearing. It teaches when the disciplining authority may suspend an employee without first hearing her, and when a trial court gravely abuses its discretion by interfering.

Procedural History

Juliet Fajardo filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court of Makati, assailing the order of preventive suspension issued against her. She complained that the order was issued without giving her the right to be heard. The trial court, through Judge Capulong, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioner from executing the order of preventive suspension. This was followed by the order of March 31, 1993 granting the writ of preliminary injunction. The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the trial court denied her motion in an order dated May 14, 1993. Hence, the petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari. The Supreme Court required the private respondent to comment and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the trial court from further proceeding with the case.

Facts

Juliet Fajardo was the manager of the Administrative Services Department of the Home Development Mutual Fund, also known as the Pag-ibig Fund. On December 17, 1992, Celeste Al-Jawazneh, who had been supplying office uniforms and providing transportation service to Fund employees, wrote a letter to Chief Executive Officer Zorayda Alonzo complaining against Fajardo. The letter alleged that Fajardo had obtained several loans from her, that the loans remained unpaid, and that Fajardo had shown hostility toward her business. The letter also asked that Fajardo be replaced on the panel for the bidding of transportation services.

Acting on the complaint, the petitioner directed the legal department of the Fund to investigate. The legal department found a prima facie case against Fajardo and recommended that she be preventively suspended pending formal investigation. On December 28, 1992, a formal charge was filed against her for dishonesty, misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, contracting loans of money from persons with whom her office had business relations, and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The charge alleged that she had borrowed a total of 65,000 pesos from Al-Jawazneh, which remained unpaid, and that she had used her office to secure paid professional services in connection with a promise to award a transportation contract.

Fajardo was required to answer the charges and to indicate whether she desired a formal investigation. Meanwhile, she was placed under preventive suspension for 90 days effective December 29, 1992, pursuant to Section 41 of the Civil Service Law. The formal charge and the order of preventive suspension were served on her on the same day. Instead of answering, she went to the trial court.

Issues

• Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case and in enjoining the preventive suspension of the private respondent.
• Whether or not a preventive suspension of a civil service employee may be ordered without a prior hearing.

Applicable Provisions

Section 47 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:

Section 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction.

This provision establishes that the petitioner, as head of the agency, is the proper disciplining authority over the private respondent.

Section 51 of the same Code provides:

Section 51. Preventive Suspension. The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service.

This provision is the source of the petitioner's power to suspend the private respondent pending investigation, and it is the provision the trial court disregarded.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the petition is impressed with merit. The order of preventive suspension was issued upon the recommendation of the legal department, which found a prima facie case against the private respondent. It was issued as a preliminary step to the investigation of the charges, pursuant to the Administrative Code of 1987. As Chief Executive Officer of the Fund, the petitioner is the proper disciplining authority within the meaning of Section 51, and her power to order the preventive suspension of any employee under her was not denied by the private respondent.

On the second issue, the Court held that prior notice and hearing was not required. The private respondent claimed that she was suspended on the basis of an unverified letter and without being heard. The Court found this claim without basis. Although the letter-complaint was not sworn to, it was supported by an affidavit and by the sworn statements of several witnesses. The private respondent was required to answer the charges and to inform the office whether she wanted a formal investigation, but she did not do so. Instead, she brought the action below. She cannot therefore complain of lack of due process.

The Court explained that the preventive suspension of a civil service employee may be ordered even without a hearing because such suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. Its purpose is to prevent the accused from using her position or office to influence prospective witnesses or tamper with the records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against her. In this case, the private respondent was manager of the Administrative Services Department and was in a position to influence employees under her or otherwise impede the investigation. The trial court's order that there must be a hearing before preventive suspension may be imposed was thus a virtual disregard of the settled rule and constituted a grave abuse of discretion.

Doctrine

A preventive suspension of a civil service employee or officer may be ordered even without a prior hearing, because such suspension is not a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose is to prevent the accused from using his position or office to influence prospective witnesses or tamper with the records which may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from the service. A trial court that requires a hearing before preventive suspension may be imposed disregards this settled rule and commits grave abuse of discretion.

Disposition

The petition for certiorari was granted; the writ of preliminary injunction was annulled and set aside; and the special civil action in the trial court was dismissed. The petitioner won.

Remember This

Memorize this line: a preventive suspension is not a penalty but a preliminary step in an administrative investigation, so it may be ordered even without a prior hearing. Examiners use this case to test the distinction between preventive suspension and disciplinary penalty, and to test when a trial court's injunction against an administrative order amounts to grave abuse of discretion.