ANTONIO M. BOLASTIG, PETITIONER, VS. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.
Bolastig versus Sandiganbayan
The Case
This is a petition for certiorari brought by Antonio M. Bolastig, the governor of Samar, against the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, and the People of the Philippines. The governor was criminally charged with overpricing office supplies in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the Sandiganbayan ordered him suspended from office while the case was pending. He asks the Supreme Court to set that suspension aside. The case matters because it settles a question every public officer charged under the anti-graft law will ask: is preventive suspension automatic upon the filing of a valid information, or must the court first satisfy itself that suspension is actually needed?
Procedural History
An information was filed against the governor and two other provincial officials before the Sandiganbayan. The governor was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. The Special Prosecution Officer then moved for his suspension from office, invoking Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The governor opposed the motion, arguing that suspension could not be a mechanical exercise and that it would injure the electorate of Samar. The Sandiganbayan rejected the argument and ordered his suspension for ninety days, holding that preventive suspension is mandatory and that all the court needs is a finding that the accused stands charged under a valid information. Implementation was held in abeyance to allow a motion for reconsideration, which the Sandiganbayan later denied. The governor then came to the Supreme Court by petition for certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion.
Facts
Antonio M. Bolastig was the governor of Samar. On August 31, 1989, an information was filed against him, together with Pedro Ason and Prudencio Macabenta, who were the provincial treasurer and the property officer. The three were members of the Bids and Awards Committee responsible for purchasing office supplies for the provincial government.
The information alleged that on or about June 24, 1986, in Catbalogan, Samar, the three, acting through manifest partiality and evident bad faith, entered into a purchase contract with a private citizen for one hundred reams of onion skin paper at a unit price of 550 pesos, or a total of 55,000 pesos. The prevailing unit price for the same item was only 55 pesos, or a total of 5,500 pesos. The government was thus allegedly injured in the amount of 49,500 pesos.
The governor was arraigned on January 5, 1993, and pleaded not guilty. On January 25, 1993, the Special Prosecution Officer moved for his suspension. The Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered a ninety-day suspension, and it denied reconsideration. Hence the petition.
Issues
- Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the preventive suspension of the governor without any showing of public interest to be served or injury to be prevented.
- Whether or not the court must go beyond the filing of a valid information and determine the necessity of preventive suspension in light of the spirit and intent of the anti-graft law.
- Whether or not the ninety-day period of preventive suspension may be shortened at the discretion of the court.
- Whether or not the suspension may be lifted because the prosecution has finished presenting its evidence, or because it deprives the people of Samar of the services of their elected governor.
Applicable Provisions
Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act provides:
Section 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property, whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office.
This is the provision the Sandiganbayan applied, and the entire question is whether the word "shall" leaves the court any discretion.
Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides:
Section 52. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. When the administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension herein provided.
The Court uses this provision to explain where the ninety-day period comes from, since Section 13 itself does not mention any period.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the contention has no merit. Section 13 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information is filed charging a violation of the anti-graft law, Title 7 of Book II of the Revised Penal Code, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property. The court trying the case has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from intimidating witnesses or frustrating his prosecution. The presumption is that unless the accused is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of malfeasance, or do both, just as the law requires a judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon a finding of probable cause without asking whether the accused is likely to escape.
On the second issue, the Court rejected the call to look beyond the information. The duty to suspend arises upon the filing of a valid information, and that holding disposes of the argument that the danger of intimidating witnesses has passed because the prosecution has rested. The possibility of intimidating witnesses is only one ground for suspension; the other is to prevent the accused from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office.
On the third issue, the Court explained that the ninety-day period is not found in Section 13 but was adopted from the Civil Service Decree, now Section 52 of the Administrative Code of 1987. The duration of preventive suspension is coeval with the period prescribed for deciding administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is decided before ninety days, the suspension lasts less than ninety days; if not, it lasts ninety days. The period varies with the time it takes the court to decide, not with any discretion lodged in the court. Were the Sandiganbayan given discretion to impose a shorter period, it would have the power not to suspend at all, which would be contrary to the command of Section 13.
On the fourth issue, the Court held that the temporary deprivation of the people of Samar of the services of their elected official is not a sufficient basis for reducing a mandatory period prescribed by law. The vice governor, who is likewise elected by them, will act as governor. The Constitution itself authorizes the suspension of members of Congress found guilty of disorderly behavior, which shows that suspension is not foreign to representative office.
Doctrine
Preventive suspension under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act is mandatory, not discretionary. Upon a finding that a valid information has been filed for a crime covered by that section, the court has neither discretion nor duty to determine whether suspension is necessary; it must order the suspension. The ninety-day period is not written in Section 13 but is drawn from the administrative law on preventive suspension, and it is not a ceiling the court may shorten at will. The duration varies only with the time the court takes to decide the case. The possibility that the accused may intimidate witnesses is only one justification; preventing further acts of malfeasance is another. And the temporary loss of an elected official's services does not defeat the mandatory suspension, because the vice governor acts in his stead.
Disposition
The petition for certiorari was dismissed, and the preventive suspension ordered by the Sandiganbayan was upheld as according to law.
Remember This
Memorize the line: a valid information under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act makes preventive suspension mandatory, and the court has neither discretion nor duty to inquire into its necessity. Examiners use this case to test the mandatory character of preventive suspension, the source of the ninety-day period, and the rule that the court cannot shorten that period at will.