IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF R. W. CARR ET AL. FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS.
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Carr versus the Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps
The Case
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus filed in the Supreme Court by R. W. Carr and three other enlisted men of the United States Marine Corps, against the officer holding them in the marine guardhouse at Cavite. The petitioners do not deny that they are marines or that a military offense is charged against them. Their theory is narrower and more interesting: that because the same act also violated the civil law, and because the civil authorities had asked the marines to keep them pending trial by the civil courts, they were in truth civil prisoners held by the military arm, and that no warrant for their detention had ever been issued. The case matters because it fixes, in our early jurisprudence, the rule on concurrent jurisdiction of civil and military authorities over a soldier who offends both the civil and the military law, and it shows how a habeas court treats the return of the officer who holds the prisoner.
Procedural History
The case began in the Supreme Court itself, as an original application. An application for a writ of habeas corpus was presented to the Court in behalf of R. W. Carr and three others, and the Court directed an order to whomsoever might have them in custody, requiring that person to show cause why the writ should not issue. In pursuance of that order, a captain of the Marine Corps appeared and showed cause. The matter was heard on the petition and on the return of the respondent, and the Court decided it in November 1902, with a majority opinion, a concurrence, and a dissent.
Facts
R. W. Carr and three companions were marines in the service of the United States. It was alleged that they had committed an offense in violation of the military laws and regulations by which the Marine Corps is governed. At the time the application for the writ was made, they were confined in the guardhouse of the marines at Cavite, by virtue of an order of the commanding officer of that corps at that place.
The petitioners added a further set of facts. The offense charged against them, they said, was a violation not only of the military law but also of the civil law. They had been arrested by the local police at Cavite on account of it. Because the local jail was insecure, the civil authorities had transferred them to the Marine Corps. They were being held by the marines awaiting trial by the civil authorities. In the language of their counsel, they were civil prisoners held by the military arm, and no warrant for their detention had ever been issued.
On these facts the Court had to decide whether the confinement was illegal. The respondent captain appeared on the order to show cause, and the petitioners did not ask leave, nor offer, to make any answer to his return denying its material allegations.
Issues
- Whether or not the detention of the petitioners by the marine authorities was illegal, they being marines charged with a violation of the military laws and regulations and held in the marine guardhouse by order of the commanding officer.
- Whether or not the confinement became illegal because the offense charged was also a violation of the civil law, because the civil authorities had transferred the petitioners to the marines on account of the insecurity of the local jail, and because no warrant for their detention had ever been issued.
Applicable Provisions
The decision does not quote any statute or constitutional provision. It rests on the settled rule of American authority on the concurrent jurisdiction of civil and military tribunals, which the Court states in its own words and supports by citation of decided cases. The governing statement of the rule, as the Court framed it, is this:
When a soldier commits an offense which makes him amenable both to the civil and military law he can be tried by either.
That sentence is the whole of the case: it answers the petitioners' claim that the civil character of the charge, and the civil authorities' request for custody, stripped the marines of the power to hold them.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that the detention was not illegal. It was proved at the hearing that the four men were marines in the service of the United States, that they were alleged to have committed an offense in violation of the military laws and regulations governing the corps, and that when the application was made they were in the marine guardhouse at Cavite by virtue of an order of the commanding officer. These facts, the Court said, are sufficient to show that they are not illegally detained.
On the second issue, the Court held that the additional facts did not make the confinement illegal. The rule is that a soldier whose offense makes him amenable both to the civil and the military law can be tried by either. The Court put the consequence in these words:
If the military authorities have him in their possession they can turn him over to the civil courts for trial or they can try him themselves.
And further:
The fact that they have agreed to surrender him to the civil courts does not deprive them of jurisdiction to try him before such surrender.
The absence of a warrant did not move the Court, because the marine authorities had jurisdiction over the petitioners when the application was made, and a detention by authorities having jurisdiction is not illegal. On the procedural point raised by the concurring opinion, the Court acted on the return as it stood: the petitioners had not asked leave or offered to answer the return and deny its material allegations, so those facts were taken as admitted.
Doctrine
First, a soldier who commits an offense amenable both to the civil and the military law may be tried by either forum. The two jurisdictions are concurrent, not exclusive, and the pendency of one does not bar the other.
Second, where the military authorities have the soldier in their possession, they may surrender him to the civil courts for trial, or try him themselves; and an agreement to surrender him to the civil courts does not deprive them of jurisdiction to try him before the surrender is made.
Third, on habeas corpus, detention by authorities who have jurisdiction over the person and the offense is not illegal, and the writ will not issue. A prisoner who wishes to contest the facts stated in the respondent's return must ask leave to answer it, or offer to do so; if he does not, the material allegations of the return are deemed admitted.
Disposition
The application for the writ was denied, with costs de oficio, so the petitioners remained in the custody of the marine authorities.
Remember This
Memorize the line: when a soldier commits an offense which makes him amenable both to the civil and military law, he can be tried by either, and the military's promise to surrender him to the civil courts does not strip it of jurisdiction to try him first. Examiners use this case on concurrent civil and military jurisdiction over soldiers, and on the habeas rule that the material allegations of a return not answered or denied are taken as admitted.