🎧 Case Brief Lecture

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. VIRGILIO TAÑEDO, BERLITO LACHICA, AND DANILO MERCADAL, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

G.R. No. 110405. January 02, 1997 January 2, 1997

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People versus Tañedo

The Case

This is a criminal case in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Virgilio Tañedo, Berlito Lachica, Danilo Mercadal and three others for the killing of Domingo Nepal. The accused were charged with murder, with the information alleging conspiracy, treachery and evident premeditation. The case matters to the reviewee because it is a compact illustration of three doctrines that appear again and again in criminal law: the weight given to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility, the strict requirements of the defense of alibi, and the appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance that raises a killing from homicide to murder.

Procedural History

The Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon, Branch 62, tried the six accused and, on 14 December 1990, rendered a decision convicting all of them of murder as charged. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the trial court sentenced each of them to twelve years of prision mayor to twenty years of reclusion temporal, ordered them to indemnify the heirs of Domingo Nepal in the amount of 30,000 pesos, and imposed the accessory penalties of the law.

Only four of the accused appealed their conviction to the Court of Appeals: Virgilio Tañedo, Berlito Lachica, Jesus Lachica and Danilo Mercadal. While the appeal was pending, Jesus Lachica died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital. The appellate court then declared his criminal and civil liabilities extinguished under Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code and deemed his appeal closed and terminated. On 14 January 1993, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, but modified the sentence to reclusion perpetua and increased the indemnity to 50,000 pesos. It then certified the case to the Supreme Court for review under Rule 124, Section 13, of the Rules of Court.

Facts

On the evening of 25 April 1982, the brothers Domingo and Dominador Nepal passed by the store of Merly Pelago in Barangay San Isidro, General Luna, Quezon. At the store, Barangay Captain Pacito Agoncillo and several companions were having a drinking spree. Berlito Lachica and Danilo Mercadal were with the group but were not drinking. An altercation broke out. Dominador saw Danilo Mercadal carrying a bolo and about to hack Domingo, who seized a piece of wood and drove Danilo away. Berlito Lachica, also armed with a bolo, followed Danilo toward the mountain.

At about seven o'clock that evening, as the Nepal brothers were about to leave, Ruben Agoncillo, already drunk, asked them to accompany him to the barangay captain to complain. The brothers left him with another person and proceeded home. Domingo walked ahead, with Dominador some four meters behind. Suddenly, Virgilio Tañedo, Berlito Lachica, Jesus Lachica, Enrico Gepaya and Mercurio Lemina, all armed with bladed weapons, emerged from a banana grove and from the nearby house of Nuestro Tañedo, which was well lit by an electric light from its balcony. Danilo boloed Domingo on the right side of his head, causing him to stagger backwards. The others surrounded Domingo, and Virgilio gave him a final thrust with his balisong. Dominador shouted for help, but it was in vain. The assailants disappeared, leaving Domingo prostrate and bleeding profusely from hacking wounds, including one that went through his chest and lacerated his right lung.

Maxima Remuyan, the mother of Domingo, was about five meters away and saw her son assaulted by the accused, who were all armed and seemed to have come from all directions. She cried out for help, but her son was already slain when those who responded arrived. At trial, the accused disavowed any involvement in the killing. Jesus Lachica, Berlito Lachica and Danilo Mercadal claimed they were at the store until late in the evening. Virgilio Tañedo relied on alibi, presenting a barangay health worker who testified that he was in her house the whole night. A defense witness, Sofio Pollo, pointed to Mercurio Lemina and Enrico Gepaya as the assailants and belied the participation of the other accused.

Issues

  • Whether or not the trial court erred in appreciating the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and in disregarding the testimonies of the defense witnesses.
  • Whether or not the defense of alibi of the accused-appellants should prosper.
  • Whether or not the killing of Domingo Nepal was qualified by treachery, making the crime murder rather than homicide.

Applicable Provisions

Paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code defines treachery as follows:

There is also treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

This is the qualifying circumstance the Court applies to raise the killing from homicide to murder.

Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes murder, provides:

Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and shall be punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, if committed with any of the following attendant circumstances: 1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

The Court cites this provision, in relation to paragraph 16 of Article 14, as the basis for the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that there is no merit in the appeal. It reiterated the settled rule that findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses command great weight and respect, because the trial court had the opportunity to observe their demeanor while they testified. The lower court did not disregard the testimonies of the defense witnesses; it simply found them unbelievable while those of the prosecution witnesses credible. On the alleged misappreciation of the testimony of Maxima Remuyan, the Court held that the fact she heard her son call out the names of Mercurio Lemina and Enrico Gepaya during the assault did not preclude the participation of the other accused, since she categorically named all the persons she saw ganging up on her son.

On the second issue, the Court held that alibi is the weakest of all defenses. For it to prosper, the accused has the burden of proving that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be there. The defense failed to satisfy these requirements.

On the third issue, the Court rejected the argument that the crime was only homicide. The records showed that the assailants hid behind the banana grove and in the house of Nuestro Tañedo, waiting for their quarry. Upon seeing Domingo, they all came out from their hiding places and simultaneously assaulted him with bladed weapons. Surprised and outnumbered, Domingo was easily overcome by the coordinated moves of the felons, who made sure he could not put up a shred of defense. The killing was therefore not the result of a casual encounter. The Court quoted the definition of treachery and held that the trial court and the appellate court correctly ruled that treachery qualified the killing to murder, committed by the accused in conspiracy with one another. The trial court's observation, which the Court sustained, was that the concerted action of the armed attackers who lay in wait for the unsuspecting, unarmed victim insured the killing without risk to the assailants, and that abuse of superior strength and nighttime, although present, were absorbed by treachery.

Doctrine

Three rules must be retained. First, findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses command great weight and respect on appeal, because of the trial court's opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor. Second, alibi is the weakest of all defenses; it prospers only if the accused proves that he was not at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission and that it was physically impossible for him to be there. Third, treachery, as defined in paragraph 16 of Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code, qualifies a killing to murder under Article 248 when the offender employs means, methods or forms in the execution of the crime that tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from any defense the offended party might make. Where the attackers lie in wait and simultaneously assault an unsuspecting and unarmed victim, the killing is not a casual encounter, and abuse of superior strength and nighttime are absorbed by treachery.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of Virgilio Tañedo, Berlito Lachica and Danilo Mercadal for murder qualified by treachery, sentenced each of them to reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties, and ordered them to indemnify the heirs of Domingo Nepal in the amount of 50,000 pesos, with costs against them.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that alibi is the weakest of all defenses, and treachery qualifies a killing to murder when the attackers lie in wait and strike an unsuspecting, unarmed victim without risk to themselves. Examiners use this case to test the requisites of alibi, the deference given to the trial court's credibility findings, and the appreciation of treachery as a qualifying circumstance that absorbs abuse of superior strength and nighttime.