G.R. No. 110289. October 07, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SALVADOR BALISTEROS Y FLORES, NILO AVESTRO Y CARDONA AND ERNESTO GALVANTE Y BALISTEROS, ACCUSED, SALVADOR BALISTEROS Y FLORES …

Decisions / Signed Resolutions October 7, 1994 SECOND DIVISION REGALADO, J.:
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REGALADO, J.:


This case originated from the Regional Trial Court of Malolos,
Bulacan, Branch 14, wherein the original three accused where charged with
murder in Criminal Case No. 1794-M-91 for the killing of one Romeo Abad on
August 16, 1991 in Pandi, Bulacan, the information therefor alleging that said
accused acted in conspiracy and committed the felony with treachery and evident
premeditation.[1]

Upon arraignment, the three accused pleaded not guilty. During the trial of the case, the
prosecution moved for the exclusion of accused Ernesto Galvante from the
information for murder so that he could become a witness for the Government as particeps
criminis.
[2]
In an order dated April 22, 1992, the lower court discharged said accused
from the information to be utilized as a state witness.[3]

A year later, or on April 6, 1993, the trial court rendered its
decision finding herein accused-appellant Salvador Balisteros and Nilo Avestro
guilty as charged, with the punitive fallo thereof disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered, finding the accused Salvador
Balisteros and Nilo Avestroz guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder committed with the attendant aggravating circumstances of Abuse of
Superior strength, committed in an uninhabited place, the killing augmented by
another wrong not necessary for its commission (slashing of the intestines),
the court hereby sentences each of the accused to Reclusion Perpetua.

To indemnify the heirs of the victim P100,000.00 (as) compensatory
damages. To pay P50,000.00 moral
damage(s). With costs.

The provincial Warden of Malolos, Bulacan is ordered to commit the
accused to the National Penitentiary (Muntinlupa) immediately upon receipt
hereof.[4]

The material facts of this case are narrated in the aforestated
decision of the court a quo which we find to be sustained by the
evidence, hence we adopt and reproduce the same at length hereunder, with some
editing corrections:

On August 16, 1991 at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning Eliza
Merceada**
reported for work at the store of Romeo Abad. (U)pon arriving, she wiped and cleaned the tables and the places where
the merchandise are placed. At about
8:00 o’clock, she brought the merienda of the farm laborers of Romeo, who were
busy working at the ricefield. (S)he
had to walk alone. On her way to the ricefield, she saw Nilo Avestros,
Salvador Balisteros and Ernesto Galvante in the hut of Salvador Balisteros,
whom she call(ed) Mang Badong, drinking liquor (Gin). When she arrived in the ricefield she served the merienda to the
farm laborers and after the latter had finished their merienda, she returned to
the house of Romeo at Engkanto. (I)t
was about eleven o’clock noon when she arrived. It did not take long, (and) she had to return to the
ricefield. (T)his time she was bringing
the food for lunch of the laborers, aboard the truck with Romeo. When they reached the National Highway, they
alighted from the truck after parking it, and walked going to the
ricefield. When they passed by the hut
of Balisteros, Romeo was left in the hut while she proceeded to the
ricefield. (U)pon arrival, she served
the lunch to the laborers. After the
laborers ha(d) finished eating, Romeo arrived, but he did not stay long because
he went to ropegraze (sic) (isinuga) his horse. After several minutes passed, she left and proceeded to the place
where the truck was parked at the highway. That on her way, near the bamboo gr(o)ve, she heard two shouts saying,
“huwag, huwag”, then she called for Nilo, whom she believed was in
the hut, but no one answered her call so she proceeded. (O)n the way, she saw the three (3), Mang
Badong, Nilo and Ernesto coming out from the bamboo gr(o)ve. Mang Badong was half-naked, wearing a pant
(sic) and carrying a bolo. (H)e was in
a hurry, followed by Nilo who was wearing a polo shirt, a short (sic) and
barefooted, so with Ernesto who was wearing a short pant (sic) and
barefooted. (T)hey were all in a hurry
going to the hut of Mang Badong. When
she saw Mang Badong, after she heard the two (2) shouts, Badong asked her where
Romeo Abad was, then she also asked Badong if they have seen Romeo Abad, but
Badong did not answer. That while she
was walking going to the highway, she noticed Badong, Nilo and Ernesto were
following her at a distance of about 4 meters. Badong had his clothes on, carrying a bag. Nilo was wearing a T-shirt and short(s). Ernesto was wearing a T-shirt and shorts
(and) both were barefooted. When she
reached the highway, she boarded the truck of Romeo and watched the three (3)
accused going to the highway. Then she
left the truck and went to the store of Romeo but she did not see her Kuya Romy
at home. At about 2:00 o’clock p.m.,
she and her comadre, Yolanda Herno, brought the merienda of the workers in the
ricefield. (W)hen they arrived her Kuya
Romy was not there, so she and Yolanda looked for Romy at the bamboo gr(o)ve
where she previously heard the two shouts and there, they saw blood and the
body of Romeo Abad inside the bamboo gr(o)ve, his neck cut and a big wound on
his stomach. Then they asked Norberto
de Leon to help them and Norberto called his companions Tony and Domeng who
were in the ricefield and when they arrived, they brought the body of Romeo Abad
to the house of his brother, Amado Abad, at Engkanto, Angat, Bulacan.

According to Eliza Mercaeda, Romeo had a hut on the ricefield aside
from the hut of Balisteros. That the
hut of Romeo is around 30 meters away from the bamboo gr(o)ve while the hut of
Badong is 20 meters away from the bamboo gr(o)ve. That when she heard the shouts from the bamboo gr(o)ve, she
already became apprehensive that the voice was the voice of Romeo Abad but she
did not ask Badong when she saw him coming out of the bamboo gr(o)ve together
with Nilo and Ernesto as to who shouted because she was afraid.

The accused upon reaching the national highway proceeded to the
store of Liberato Antonio located two (2) meters away from the national road at
Siling Matanda, Pandi, Bulacan, where Nilo and Ernesto bought two (2) pairs of
sandals. After buying sandals, they
boarded the jeepney of Florencio dela Cruz near the (G)reenfield piggery farm
at Siling Matanda and alighted at a corner in Pandi going to Balagtas and Sta.
Maria.

The death of Romeo Abad was reported to the police station of
Pandi, Bulacan and also the suspects who boarded a bus. (T)hen Policemen Alejandro Sagala, Camacho
and Parulan boarded their service jeep and chased the bus where the suspects
(were) reported to have boarded but when they overtook the bus at Brgy. Pulong
Gubat, Balagtas, Bulacan, the suspects were not on board, so they fetch(ed) a
photographer and proceeded to the house of Amado Abad where they took pictures of the victim. Then they interviewed Eliza Merceada who
informed them about the suspects Nilo Avestroz, Badong Balisteros and Nestor
Galvante. After the interview, they
proceeded to the scene of the crime at the bamboo gr(o)ve where they saw
bloodstains and recovered a jungle bolo, Exhibit M.

The police then formed two (2) groups: one group composed of policemen from Angat and another group
composed of policemen from San Jose del Monte. Their group proceeded to Batangas while the group from San Jose del
Monte proceeded to Plaza Lawton, Manila.

Upon arrival in Manila, Policemen Sagala and Parulan proceeded to
the terminal of JM Transit where they waited for the passengers going to
Mindoro. That around 2:00 o’clock in
the morning, the suspects arrived riding in a taxi and immediately they
arrested the suspects Salvador
Balisteros, Nilo Avestroz and Ernesto Galvante, whom he identified inside the
courtroom. (T)hey brought the suspects
to their headquarters at Pandi, Bulacan. The following day, August 17, 1991, he went to the place of (the)
incident where they recovered a butcher(‘s) knife, Exhibit B, B-1 sheath. Then the statement of Eliza Mercaeda, (D)ela
Cruz, and Amado Abad were taken, Exhibits L, L-1, L-2, M, N, respectively.

Ernesto B. Galvante, who was discharged from the information to be
a State witness, testified that:

On August 3, 1991 he went to his uncle’s place (Salvador
Balisteros) at Siling Matanda, Pandi, Bulacan and stayed with him until August
16, 1991. In the morning of August 16,
his uncle Salvador Balisteros, ordered two (2) bottles of beer and two (2)
bottles of gin then the three (3) of them, he, Salvador and Nilo and another
whom he does not know, ha(d) a drinking spree in the hut of Salvador.

While they were drinking, Salvador and Nilo were talking about the
riceland which Romeo Abad bought and where the hut of Salvador was
erected. According to Salvador, Romeo
gave him a grace period of one (1) month to remove his hut and vacate the
premises. During their conversation, he
was beside the window, so he could hear what Salvador and Nilo (were) talking
about. He heard the plan of Salvador
and Nilo to kill Romeo who was then in his house far from the hut of
Salvador. That he could hear all their
conversation because he was just two (2) meters away from them.

After they ha(d) finished drinking, they rested for about 30
minutes then they proceeded to the ricefield near the bamboo gr(o)ve. (T)his time Salvador was carrying a small
knife (kampit) while Nilo ha(d) a “taris” which Ernesto identified in
court. When they arrived in the place,
they waited for Romeo and after some few minutes, Romeo arrived. (H)e asked Nilo where is his horse and Nilo
told Romeo, his horse is tied in the place where it was rope-grazed (sic). That while Romeo was asking Nilo, he was
walking and when his back was turned towards Salvador, the latter suddenly held
him by the neck and stabbed him three (3) times on the stomach and Romeo
shouted, “huwag, huwag”, then he fell on the ground. While Romeo was lying on the ground, Nilo
stabbed him for more than three (3) times until his intestines came out, then
Nilo slashed it (hiniwa-hiwa). That he
(Ernesto) vomi(t)ed because he could not bear watching Nilo slashing the
intestine(s) of Romeo so he ran (to) the back of the bamboo gr(o)ve where he
saw Salvador coming out followed by Nilo, so he followed them and they
proceeded to the hut of Salvador.

Upon arrival in the hut, they took all their belongings and went to
the store where they bought slippers then they boarded a jeepney on the highway
and alighted at Balagtas where they took a tricycle and proceeded to
Bocaue. When they arrived in Bocaue,
they took their clothes from the house of Ernesto’s mother and proceeded to
Tondo, Manila. When they arrived in
Tondo, they went to the house of Nilo’s mother where they rested for about
three (3) hours before proceeding to Plaza Lawton, Manila, where they will take
a ride in going to Batangas and from there to Mindoro. After they ha(d) rested they took a taxi and
then they proceeded to Plaza Lawton. (U)pon arrival at Plaza Lawton they were arrested by the police the
moment they alighted from the taxi, then they were brought back to Pandi,
Bulacan.

According to Ernesto, he failed to stop Salvador and Nilo from
their plan to kill Romeo because he was then drunk but he could understand what
they were talking about. He also failed
to warn Romeo of the impending danger to his life neither was he able to call the barangay Captain or the police because
Salvador was guarding him and sternly looking at him.

According to Amado Abad when he saw Romeo Abad, his brother, inside
the bamboo gr(o)ve at Siling Matanda at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon of
August 16, 1991, Romeo was already lifeless, his throat was slashed and his
abdomen was cut and his body bore plenty of stab wounds, so he boarded the body
of Romeo in his car and brought him (to) his house at Engkanto, Angat,
Bulacan. That at 6:00 o’clock in the
evening of the same day, August 16, 1991, his mother arrived and brought the
body of Romeo to their house at Malabon where Romeo was laid in wake for six
(6) days and six (6) nights. (D)uring
the wake, they spent P2,000.00 a night.[5]

x x x

The corpse of the victim was autopsied by Dr. Juan Zaldarriaga,
Jr., a medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of Investigation, on August
17, 1991 at the Floresco Funeral Homes in Kalookan City. According to Autopsy Report No. 91-2097,
which was introduced in evidence as Exhibit A-32 for the prosecution, the
victim sustained twelve stab and hack wounds, eight of which were fatal. Dr. Zaldarriaga testified that the victim
and his assailant could have been at arms length from each other and that the
assailant who inflicted the wounds in the back and front of victim was behind
and in front of the latter in doing so.[6]

The defense presented appellants Salvador Balisteros and Nilo
Avestro who denied the charges filed against them and interposed the defense of
alibi. Both appellants concurred in
their version which was to the effect that on August 16, 1991, Salvador was at
Siling Matanda with his children and Nilo. At about 11:30 A.M., Salvador and Nilo, who had been joined by Ernesto
Galvante, left the house to proceed to Mindoro where, among other things, a job
was supposedly waiting for Nilo. They
first went to see Nilo’s mother at Salitre, Tondo, Manila, and they spent that
night in her house. At around 3:00 A.M.
the following day, they left the house and proceeded to Plaza Lawton in the
city to take a bus for Batangas. Upon
reaching the bus station, the three were arrested by policemen and were brought
to Pandi, Bulacan.[7]

The lower court gave full faith and credit to the prosecution’s
version and concluded that “the defense of denial and alibi of the accused
has no weight after Ernesto Galvante, an eyewitness, positively identified and
pointed to Salvador Balisteros and Nilo Avestroz as the killers of the deceased
Romeo Abad. Besides, the accused ha(ve)
not shown any motive why Ernesto Galvante, nephew of Salvador Balisteros and
first cousin of Nilo Avestroz, would testify against them.”[8]

Appellants now complain to us that the trial court gravely erred
(1) in finding that the killing took place in an uninhabited place and was
deliberately augmented by another wrong not necessary for its commission; (2)
in giving weight and substance to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
and disregarding the theory of the accused-appellants; and (3) in finding the
accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime.[9]

A thorough examination of the evidence on record convinces us
that we have no other recourse but to affirm the conviction of appellants. Their appeal hinges on the issue of
credibility and they have utterly failed to present convincing reasons why the
respect which appellate courts give to findings of trial courts should not be
maintained in this case.

With reasoned consistency, we have reiterated that much leeway is
given to the trial court in assessing the credibility of the person testifying
before it. Its conclusions on this
matter are accorded great weight on appeal in the absence of a showing that
they were reached arbitrarily.[10]
It has had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witness on the stand
and is able to better ascertain therefrom whether he is telling the truth or
lying. Through its observations during
the entire proceedings, it can be expected to determine, with reasonable
discretion, whose testimony to accept and which witness to disbelieve.[11]

We agree with the court below that the prosecution’s witnesses
are more credible. None of these
witnesses had any motive for testifying falsely against appellants. When there is no evidence and nothing to
indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was actuated by
improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so actuated and his
testimony is entitled to full faith and credit.[12]
In the present case, that absence of ill motive on the part of the prosecution
witnesses was even affirmed by both appellants who testified that they do not
know of any reason why said witnesses would fabricate a serious charge like
murder against them.[13]

In an effort to impair the credibility of witness Eliza Marceada,
the appellants maintain that her failure to tell anybody about the incident,
after she heard the words “huwag, huwag” coming from the
bamboo grove, defies the common experience of mankind and thus renders her
testimony doubtful.[14]
It is undeniable, however, that not every witness to or victim of a crime can
be expected to act reasonably and conformably to the usual expectations of
everyone. Besides, as she explained on
the witness stand, she was afraid.[15]

Eliza Marceada’s reaction on that occasion is to be expected from
a simple 31-year old household helper who was walking alone when she heard
those words of remonstration and then saw the armed appellants suddenly emerge
from the bamboo grove where the cry came from. Also, we have ruled in a number of cases[16]
that people may react differently to the same situation. One person’s spontaneous or unthinking, or
even instinctive, response to a horrid and repulsive stimulus may be
aggression, while another’s may be cold indifference.

A careful review of the pertinent transcripts of the stenographic
notes showed that Eliza Marceada remained consistent even during a very
exhaustive cross-examination conducted by the defense counsel. In fact, her narration was confirmed by
government witness Galvante. Merceada
gave this detailed and graphic account on the witness stand:

x x x

Q. Where were you in particular when you heard the shouts ‘huwag, huwag‘?

A.    I
was near the bamboo grove, sir.

Q.   When
you heard the shouts ‘huwag, huwag‘ what did you do, if any?

A.    I
called Nilo, sir.

Q.   Who
is that Nilo that you called for?

A.    A
helper of Kuya Romy, sir.

Q.   Is
that the same Nilo you pointed to in this Court a while ago?

A.    Yes, sir.

Q.   Did you receive any reply
from Nilo?

A.    None,
sir.

Q.   Then,
what happened thereafter?

A.    While
I was walking then and when I turned my face (to) my left side, I saw them
coming out from the bamboo grove, sir.

Q.   And
you said you saw them, who were they that you are referring to?

A.    The
three (3) of them, sir.

Q.   Name
them if you know?

A.    The
first one was Mang Badong, sir.

Q.   Is
he the same Badong that you pointed to earlier this morning?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   And
what was the physical appearance of Mang Badong when you saw him coming from
the bamboo grove?

A.    He
was naked up (sic) without T-shirt, sir.

Q.   How
about the lower position?

A.    He
was wearing long pants.

Q.   Was
he carrying anything?

x x x

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   What
was he carrying?

A.    A
bolo, sir.

Q.   Tell
us, was he walking slowly, walking fast or running or standing when you saw
him?

A.    He
was walking fast, sir.

Q.   You
said you saw those three (3), who were the other persons that you saw following
Mang Badong?

A.    The
tall man, sir.

Q.   Please
point to him?

A.    WITNESS
POINTING TO A PERSON WHO STOOD UP AND GAVE HIS NAME AS ERNESTO GALVANTE.

Q.   Was
he also walking fast or not?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   How
far was he from Mang Badong?

A.    About
three (3) meters away, sir.

Q.   And
can you describe his physical appearance?

A.    No,
it was only on that time when I saw him. He was wearing a T-shirt, sir.

Q.   Was
he with pants?

A.    He
was wearing short pants (puruntong).

Q.   Was
he wearing any shoes?

A.    None,
sir.

Q.   Was
he barefooted?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   And
to what direction was he going?

A.    He
was following Mang Badong, sir.

Q.   You
say you saw three (3) people, who was the third person that you saw on that
particular occasion?

A.    Nilo,
sir.

Q.   Is
he the same Nilo that you pointed to a while ago?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   And
how far was he from Mang Badong at the time that you saw him?

A.    About
four (4) meters away, sir.

Q.   Can
you describe the physical appearance of Nilo while he was following Mang Badong?

A.    He
was wearing a polo shirt, sir.

Q.   What
about the lower portion?

A.    He
was also wearing a short (sic) called puruntong, sir.

Q.   How
about his feet, was he wearing anything?

A.    He
was barefooted at the time, sir.[17]

x x x

Marceada’s aforequoted testimony was corroborated by state
witness Ernesto Galvante who pertinently testified in broader scope, to wit:

Q. Did you hear any conversation between the
two (2), between Salvador Balisteros and Romeo Abad after Romeo Abad has been
stabbed at the stomach three (3) times?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   What
did you hear?

A.    “Huwag.”

Q.   How
many times?

A.    Three
(3) times, sir.

Q.   Who
said that “huwag, huwag” three (3) times?

A.    Romeo
Abad, sir.

Q.   Then,
what happened next?

A.    Romeo
Abad fell on his back, sir.

Q.   Fell
face upward?

A.    Yes,
sir.

Q.   And
after that, what happened?

A.    Nilo
followed and stabbed Romeo, sir.

Q.   How
many times, if any?

x x x

A.    More
than three times, sir.

Q.   What
else happened after Nilo stabbed several times the fall(en) Romeo Abad?

x x x

A.    Nilo
slash(ed) the intestine(s) of Romeo Abad, sir.

x x x

Q.   After
you vomi(t)ed, what happened next?

A.    I
saw Salvador Balisteros getting out of the bamboo grove, sir.

Q.   And
you, what did you do, if any?

A.    I
followed him, sir.

Q.   Did
you notice what Nilo did after you followed Salvador Balisteros?

A.    Nilo
was following me, sir.

Q.   And
where did you and Salvador Balisteros and Nilo go after coming from the bamboo
gr(o)ve?

A.    To
the hut, sir.[18]

Appellants likewise endeavored to impeach the credibility of
Police Officer Alejandro Sagala who conducted the investigation of that
gruesome killing. Appellants argued
that said police officer “appeared to be a very ideal and devoted
investigator in his testimonies casting doubt on the same,” and that
“the defense is just puzzled on the zealousness shown by Sagala in
handling the investigation of the case.”[19]
This is preposterous.

The laudable efforts of police officer Sagala in investigating
and eventually solving the case should even be commended and emulated, rather
than condemned or doubted. In fact,
Sagala’s demonstrated dedication to his duties is indicative of the strength of
his character and fortifies his credibility as a witness. Furthermore, credence is accorded to the
testimonies of prosecution witnesses who are law enforcers for it is presumed
that they have regularly performed their duty, in the absence of convincing
proof to the contrary.[20]

Appellants end their diatribe with the generalized claim that the
People failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, on the theory
that, without the testimony of Galvante, the prosecution had not presented a
witness who saw the actual killing of the victim. We are not at all persuaded by this criticism.

As correctly submitted by the People:

It is axiomatic that a person’s guilt may be established not only
by direct evidence but also by circumstantial evidence, which is sufficient to
convict as long as: (a) there is more
than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
a conviction beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Pajarito, G.R. No. 82770,
October 19, 1992, 214 SCRA 678).

The following circumstances, borne out by the records, indubitably
point to appellants as the culprits:

1. On August 16, 1991, at around 8:00 a.m.,
appellants were having a drinking spree in the hut of appellant Balisteros
which is located inside the victim’s ricefield at Siling Matanda, Pandi,
Bulacan (TSN, January 27, 1992, pp. 12-15).

2. The victim, Romeo Abad, dropped by the
house of appellant Balisteros, then proceeded to the ricefield (Id., p.
18).

3. Upon arriving at his ricefield at past
12:00 noon, Abad left again to graze his horse near the bamboo grove (Id.,
p. 19).

4. The helper, Eliza Marceada, on her way
home, heard two shouts “huwag, huwag” coming from the bamboo
grove. Then, she suddenly saw
appellants coming out of the grove, Balisteros, carrying a bolo and walking fast and Avestroz and Galvante, both
barefooted (Id., pp. 21-25).

5. When Marceada found out that Abad was not
home, nor was he at the ricefield, she went near the bamboo grove where she
heard the shouts and found the lifeless body of Abad (Id., pp. 30-33).

6. At past one 1:00 o’clock that day,
appellants took a ride in a passenger jeepney driven by Florencio de la Cruz
along the road at Siling Matanda, then alighted at Pandi in a corner going to
Balagtas and Sta. Maria, Bulacan (Id., February 3, 1992, pp. 5-10).

7. Liberato Antonio, a store vendor, also saw
appellant Balisteros and Avestroz and Galvante, at his store at around 2:00
p.m. that day, the latter two, both barefooted. They bought pairs of slippers from him and left thereafter (Id.,
pp. 24-31).

8. The policemen who chased appellants
eventually caught them at Plaza Lawton, about to take a bus ride going to
Mindoro (Id., February 12, 1992, pp. 25-26).

9. Galvante confessed to appellant’s plan to kill the victim, who wanted to
eject appellant Balisteros from his house inside said victim’s ricefield. (Id., April 29, 1992, pp.
12-16). He also claimed that appellants
armed themselves with a “taris” and a small knife; then, they all
proceeded to the ricefield near the bamboo grove and waited until Abad came,
asking for his horse from Nilo, who replied that it was tied. All of a sudden, when Abad turned his back,
appellant Balisteros held the victim by the neck and when the latter turned
around, Balisteros stabbed him three times on the stomach (Id., pp.
26-27).
[21]

It is said that circumstantial evidence consists of such
incidental facts surrounding the main fact in issue and are compared to the
strands in a rope, where no one of them may be strong enough to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The entire conduct of the accused may be looked to for corroborative
circumstances, and if therefrom his connection with the commission of the crime
may be fairly inferred, the corroboration is legally sufficient. Moreover, circumstantial evidence may be
sufficiently cogent to satisfy the judicial conscience, and may be as potent as
direct testimony in tending to connect the accused with the commission of the offense.[22]

Another contention of appellants is the alleged violation of the
Constitution, particularly Section 12 of Article III, when in accordance with
the present rule for the qualification of a state witness,[23]
Galvante executed a sworn statement wherein he categorically admitted his guilt
but without the assistance of a counsel. Appellants also claim that Galvante “made his sworn statement in
the presence of Atty. Alejandro, the counsel of the plaintiff (sic), Mr. Matic,
the two brothers of the deceased, the Mayor of Pandi and another person whom he
did not know. With this battery of
persons surrounding him, we could imagine the pressure exerted on
Galvante.”[24]

Appellants cannot seek solace in the provision they have
invoked. What is provided by the
modified formulation in the 1987 Constitution is that a confession taken in
violation of said Section 12 and Section 17 of the same Article “shall be
inadmissible in evidence against him,” meaning the confessant. This objection can be raised only by the
confessant whose rights have been violated as such right is personal in nature.

It should also be noted that Galvante repeated in court what he
had stated in his affidavit and, although he was likewise subjected to a
thorough cross-examination, he stood fast on his confession and the revelations
therein. Appellants’ imputations of
pressure and coercion are refuted thereby. Also, by repeating his confession in court, Galvante converted it into a
judicial confession which, having been allowed by the trial court, eliminated
the need for assistance of counsel which is required in extrajudicial
confessions. Furthermore, even in
extrajudicial confessions which under jurisprudential doctrines have been held
to be generally binding upon the confessant and not against his co-accused,
Galvante’s confession would readily fall into the exceptions to that rule since
appellants are charged as co-conspirators and said confession is used only as a
corroborating evidence,[25]
or as circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by the
co?conspirator,[26]
or is corroborated by other evidence of record.[27]

Finally, appellant Balisteros testified that the father of
Galvante harbored ill feelings against him because of the money sent to him by
his sister which was previously sent to said father of Galvante. He even presented a letter from Hawaii to
substantiate his claim.[28]
This is not only conjectural since, additionally, a mere perusal of the letter[29]
in question does not prove anything except that it came from a very concerned
sister.

The lower court correctly convicted appellants of murder since
the killing was attended by treachery. Where a victim was totally unprepared for the unexpected attack from
behind and had no weapon to resist it, the stabbing cannot but be considered as
treacherous.[30]
In the case at bar, appellant Balisteros suddenly came from behind, held the
victim by the neck and repeatedly stabbed him. He was then successively stabbed by appellant Avestro as he lay helpless
on the ground. Parenthetically, the
abuse of superior strength, which was considered by the court below, should be
deemed absorbed in the treacherous mode of attack.

Aside from treachery, evident premeditation was also present
since the evidence showed how and when appellants agreed and conspired to kill
the victim, followed by a sufficient interval of time during which they could
reflect on the consequences of their felonious intent but during which period
they instead armed themselves and lay in wait for their unsuspecting prey. This circumstance, which can be either
qualifying or aggravating, will have to be considered here as having aggravated
the liability of appellants.

We see no further need to pass upon the arguments of appellants
questioning the lower court’s appreciation of cruelty and despoblado. Presumably because the same were not alleged
in the information, although they could nevertheless be proved, the
prosecution’s evidence thereon would only result in equivocal theories. Thus, assuming that the victim was still
alive during the entire period of the ordeal to which he was subjected, there
could possibly be cruelty since appellants deliberately augmented the wrong
they committed. On the other hand, if
the victim died immediately after he was stabbed, then appellants could be held
to have outraged his corpse when they fiendishly slashed his intestines to
pieces.[31]
However, neither of these alternative hypotheses was established and, further,
the intervening time between the initial attack and subsequent acts were not
sufficiently established to enable the Court to determine whether they were one
continuous series of acts or were so deliberately spaced as to constitute
either cruelty or outrage.

The same is true with respect to whether or not the locus
delicti
was an uninhabited place, since it is not only the distance to the
nearest occupied habitation but also the possibility of securing assistance
that should be considered,[32]
on either of which alternative bases, again, there is no certitude. In any event, even if aggravating
circumstances could be appreciated, under the Constitutional proscription and
the penalty for murder then, the penalty could not be higher than reclusion
perpetua
. On the other hand, even
disregarding all the aggravating circumstances present or which could have been
considered in this case, since there is no mitigating circumstance the penalty
would have to be imposed in the medium period of that provided by law for
murder,[33]
which is likewise reclusion perpetua. The court below, therefore, did not err in the penalty it imposed.

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is
hereby AFFIRMED, with costs against accused-appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Padilla, J., on leave.


* The family name of this
appellant appears and is spelled in some portions of the record as
“Avestros or Avestroz,” and his maternal surname as
“Cardena.”

[1]
Original Record, 1.

[2]
Ibid., 68.

[3]
Ibid., 77.

[4]
Ibid., 158; per Judge Felipe N. Villajuan, Jr.

**
The surname of this witness is spelled
in certain parts of the record as “Mercaida” or “Mercaeda.”

[5]
Ibid., 152-155.

[6]
TSN, January 20, 1992, 3-27.

[7]
Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 19; Rollo,
59.

[8]
Original Record, 158.

[9]
Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 1; Rollo,
41.

[10]
People vs. Telio, G.R. Nos.
72786-88, June 22, 1992, 210 SCRA 169.

[11]
People vs. Diaz, G.R. No.
100752, August 4, 1992, 212 SCRA 147.

[12]
People vs. Ruedas, G.R. No. 83372, February 27, 1991, 194 SCRA 553.

[13]
TSN, October 2, 1992, 16; Ibid., November
11, 1992, 15-16.

[14]
Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 28; Rollo,
68.

[15]
TSN, January 27, 1992, 58.

[16]
See People vs. Danico, G.R. No.
95554, May 7, 1992, 208 SCRA 472; People vs. Kyamko, G.R. No. 103805,
May 17, 1993, 222 SCRA 183, and cases cited therein.

[17]
TSN, January 27, 1992, 21-25.

[18]
Ibid., April 29, 1992, 27-31.

[19]
Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 29,
30; Rollo, 69, 70.

[20]
People vs. Segwaben, G.R. No.
88401, February 19, 1991, 194 SCRA 239.

[21]
Brief for the Plaintiff-Appellee, 19-22; Rollo, 119-122.

[22]
See 2 Wharton’s Criminal Evidence,
1259, 1345.

[23]
Section 9, Rule 119, Rules of Court.

[24]
Brief for the Accused-Appellants, 31; Rollo,
71.

[25]
People vs. Linde, et al.,
L-10358, January 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 38; People vs. Sta. Maria, L-19929,
October 30, 1965, 15 SCRA 222; People vs. Cortez, et al., L-31106; May
31, 1974, 57 SCRA 308.

[26]
People vs. Condemena, et al.,
L-22426, May 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 910; People vs. Pareja, L-21937, November
29, 1969, 30 SCRA 693; People vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 54117, April 27,
1982, 113 SCRA 772.

[27] People vs. Paz, et al., L-15052-53,
August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 667; People vs. Agdeppa, L-17489, December 24,
1969, 30 SCRA 782; People vs. Victor, et al., G.R. Nos. 75154-55,
February 6, 1990, 181 SCRA 818; People vs. Alvares, G.R. No. 88451, September
5, 1991, 201 SCRA 364.

[28]
Ibid., October 2, 1992, 24-27.

[29]
Ibid., id., 127; see Exhibit “I”.

[30]
People vs. Bragaes, et al., G.R.
No. 62359, November 14, 1991, 203 SCRA 555.

[31] See People vs. Binondo, G.R. No.
97227, October 20, 1992, 214 SCRA 764.

[32]
People vs. Rubia, 52 Phil. 172 (1928); People vs. Arpa, et al.,
L-26789, April 25, 1969, 27 SCRA 1037; People vs. Egot, L-35775, June
29, 1984, 130 SCRA 134.

[33]
Article 64(1), Revised Penal Code.