UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS AND DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI IN HER CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF THE BOARD, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN IN HER CAPACITY AS PRE…

In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.)
truly the university of the people, the U.P. administration conceptualized and
implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee payments through the
Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP), popularly known as the
“Iskolar ng Bayan” program. Spawned by the public clamor to overcome what was perceived as the
sharpening elitist profile of the U.P. studentry, the STFAP aspired to expand
the coverage of government educational subsidies so as to include the deserving
in the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder.

After broad consultations with the various university
constituencies by U.P. President Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents
issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution establishing the STFAP. A year later, it we granted official
recognition when the Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the
National Budget for the implementation of the program.

In the interest of democratizing admission to the State
University, all students are entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include
reduction in tuition fees, living and book subsidies and student assistantships
which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by
working for the University.

Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where,
among others, they state the amount and source of the annual income of the
family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which
the University may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of
which they are categorized into brackets. At the end of the application form, the student applicant, as well as
his parent, signs a sworn statement, as follows:

“Statement of the
Student

I hereby certify, upon my honor, that all the data and information
which I have furnished are accurate and complete. I understand that any willful misinformation
and/or withholding of information will automatically
disqualify me from receiving any financial
assistance or subsidy, and may serve as
ground for my expulsion from the University. Furthermore, if such
misinformation and/or withholding of information
on my part is discovered
after I have been awarded tuition scholarship
or any form of financial assistance. I will be required to
reimburse all financial benefits plus the
legal rate of interest prevailing at the
time of reimbursement without prejudice to
the filing of charges against me. (Underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding
team to visit my home/residence to verify the veracity of the information
provided in this application and I will give my utmost cooperation in this
regard. I also understand that my
refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding team may mean suspension or
withdrawal of STFAP benefits and privileges.

_________________

Student’s
Signature

Statement of the Applicant’s
Parent or Guardian

I hereby certify to the truthfulness
and completeness of the information which
my son/daughter/dependent has furnished in this
application together with all the documents attached. I further recognize that in signing this
application form, I share with my son/daughter/dependent the responsibility for
the truthfulness and completeness of the information supplied herein. (Underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding
team to visit my home/residence to verify the information provided in this
application and I will give my utmost cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my refusal to
cooperate with the fact-finding team may mean suspension or withdrawal of STFAP
benefits and privileges of my son/daughter/dependent.

______________________________________

Parent’s/Legal
Guardian’s/Spouse’s Signature”^[1]

From the early stages of its implementation, measures were
adopted to safeguard the integrity of the program. One such precautionary measure was the inclusion as one of the
punishable acts under Section 2 (a) of the Rules and Regulations on Student
Conduct and Discipline of the University the deliberate falsification or
suppression/withholding of any material information required in the application
form.

To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling
scheme of verification of data indicated in a student’s application form is
undertaken. Among those who applied for
STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled
in the College of Law.

On March 14, 1991, a team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose
Carlo Manalo conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal at 31
Twinpeaks Drive, Blue Ridge, Quezon City. Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadal’s aunt, was interviewed and the team
submitted a home visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies
between the report and Nadal’s application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M. Villanueva, head of the Office of
Scholarships and Student Services, presented the matter to the Diliman
Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance.^[2]

In compliance with the said Committee’s directive, Bella
Villanueva wrote Nadal informing him that the investigation showed that he had
failed to declare, not only the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977
Corolla car which was owned by his brother but also the income of his mother
who was supporting his brothers Antonio and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had
reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989,
unless he could submit “proofs to the contrary.” Nadal was required
“to pay back the equivalent amount of full school fees” with
“interest based on current commercial rates.” Failure to settle his
account would mean the suspension of his registration privileges and the
withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also warned that his case might be referred to the Student
Disciplinary Tribunal for further investigation.^[3]

On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating, among
other things, that his mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because
her residency status had not yet been legalized, she had not been able to find
a “stable, regular, well-paying employment.” He also stated that his
mother, jointly with his brother Virgilio, Jr., was shouldering the expenses of
the college education of his two younger brothers.^[4]

Noting further discrepancies between Nadal’s application form and
the certification, the U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary
Tribunal (SDT) on August 23, 1991 with the following:

“That respondent RAMON P. NADAL (UP Student No. 83-11640), a
student of the College of Law,
UP System, Diliman, Quezon City, and STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN) recipient
(Bracket 4 for SY 1989-1990; Bracket 5 for SY 1990-1991) in his applications
for STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN) benefits which he filed for Schoolyear 1989-1990,
and schoolyear 1990-1991, with the Office of Scholarship and Student Services
(formerly Scholarship and Financial Assistance Service) voluntarily and
willfully withheld and did not declare the following:

(a) That he has and
maintains a car (Toyota Corolla, Model 1977); and

(b) The income of his
mother (Natividad Packing Nadal) in the U.S.A. in support of the studies of his
brothers Antonio and Federico,

which acts of willfully withholding
information is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in
violation of paragraph (a), Section 2, of the Rules and Regulations on Student
Conduct and Discipline, as amended. (Approved by the B.O.R. at its 876th meeting on 02 September 1976,
amended at the 923rd B.O.R. meeting on 31 January 1980, and further amended, at
its 1017th B.O.R. meeting on 08 December 1988).”^[5]

On October 27, 1992, after hearing, the SDT^[6]
rendered a decision in SDT Case No. 91-026 exculpating Nadal of the charge of
deliberately withholding in his STFAP application form information that he was
maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but finding him guilty of “wilfully and
deliberately withholding information about the income of his mother, who is
living abroad, in support of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico,^[7]
which is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his studies in violation
of paragraph [a], Section 2 of the Rules [now covered by paragraph (i), Section
2 of the Rules, as amended 25 June 1992].” As such, the SDT imposed upon
Nadal the penalty of expulsion
from the University and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had
received but if he does not voluntarily make reimbursement, it shall be
“effected by the University thru outside legal action.”^[8]

The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the
Executive Committee, of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P.
Rules on Student Conduct and Discipline. On November 26, 1992, the Executive Committee, voting 13:4, affirmed the
decision of the SDT; whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents (BOR). The appeal was included in the agenda of the
BOR meeting on January 25, 1993.^[9]

On January 18, 1993, upon her assumption to the Chairmanship of
the Senate Committee on Education, thereby making her automatically a member of
the BOR, Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani wrote the BOR a letter expressing her
view that, after a close review of Nadal’s case by her legal staff, “it is
only fair and just to find Mr. Nadal’s appeal meritorious and his arguments
worthy of belief. Consequently, he
should be allowed to graduate and take the bar examinations this year.”^[10]

At its January 25, 1993 meeting, the BOR affirmed the decision of
the SDT but because “the Board was willing to grant a degree of compassion
to the appellant in view of the alleged status and predicament of the mother as
an immigrant ‘TNT’ in the United States,” the penalty was modified
“from Expulsion to One Year Suspension, effective immediately, plus
reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal
interest.” The BOR also decided against giving Nadal a certification of
good moral character.^[11]

Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR
decision, allegedly against the advice of his counsel.^[12]
The motion was placed on the agenda of the February 25, 1993 meeting of the
BOR. A day before said date, Senator
Shahani wrote the BOR another
letter requesting that deliberation on Nadal’s case be deferred until such time
as she could attend a BOR meeting.

On March 15, 1993, the U.P. filed an opposition to Nadal’s motion
for reconsideration. Thereafter, the
BOR held a special meeting to accommodate the request of Regent Shahani with
Nadal’s case as the sole item on its agenda. Again, Nadal’s motion for reconsideration was included in the March 23,
1993 agenda but in view of the absence of Senator Shahani, the decision thereon
was deferred.

At the special meeting of the BOR on March 28, 1993 at the Board
Room of the Manila Polo Club in Forbes Park, Makati, Regent Antonio T. Carpio
raised the “material importance” of verifying the truth of Nadal’s
claim that earlier, he was a beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid
from the Ateneo de Manila University (AdeMU). Learning that the “certification issued by the AdeMU that it had
not given Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through a
telephone call,” Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet “no
direct evidence in the records to substantiate the charge.” According to
Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal falsely stated that he received
such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross and material
misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion. Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would
depend on the verification of Nadal’s claim on the matter.

U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered
by stating that “a decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of
information which he considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole
pattern of the respondent’s dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been
established in the investigation and the reviews.” He added that “the
respondent’s eligibility for his AdeMU high school scholarship and financial
assistance from 1979 to 1983 does not in any way establish that he is ‘not
guilty as charged’ before the SDT,” since the formal charges against him
do not include withholding of information regarding scholarship grants received
from other schools.

At the said March 28, 1993 special meeting, the Board decided to
go into executive session where the following transpired:

“The Chairman of the Board, together with the President,
directed the Secretary to reflect in the minutes of the meeting the following
decisions of the Board in executive session, with only the Board members
present.

A vote was held by secret ballot on whether Ramon P. Nadal was
guilty or not guilty as charged of willful withholding of information in
relation to his application for Socialized Tuition and Financial Assistance
Program (STFAP) benefits which he filed for Schoolyears 1989-1990 and 1990-1991
which is tantamount to act of dishonesty in relation to his studies, in
violation of paragraph (a), Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on Student
Conduct and Discipline, as amended.

The Chairman gave the following results of the Board action during
the Executive Session: four (4) voted
guilty; three (3) voted not guilty; and three (3) gave conditional votes,
pending verification with Father Raymond Holscher of Ateneo de Manila
University of Ramon P. Nadal’s statement in his STFAP application that he was
granted scholarship while he was in high school. Should Ateneo confirm that Nadal had not received financial
assistance, then the conditional votes would be considered as guilty, and if
otherwise, then not guilty. The
Chairman requested the President to make the verification as soon as possible
the next day. In answer to a query, the
Chairman clarified that once the information was received from Ateneo, there
would be no need for another meeting to validate the decision.

The President reiterated his objections to the casting of conditional
votes.

The Chairman himself did not vote.”^[13]

In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a
certification to the effect that Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship
grant from 1979 to 1983. That evening,
the BOR met again at a special meeting at the Westin Philippine Plaza
Hotel. According to Regent Carpio, in
executive session, the BOR found Nadal “guilty” as the members voted
as follows: six members – guilty, three members – not guilty, and three members
abstained.^[14]
Consequently, the BOR imposed on Nadal the penalties of suspension for one (1)
year effective March 29, 1993, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral
character during the suspension and/or as long as Nadal has not reimbursed the
STFAP benefits he had received with 12% interest per annum from March 30, 1993
and non-issuance of his transcript of records until he has settled his
financial obligations with the university.^[15]

On March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a handwritten
letter stating that “after learning of the latest decision” of the
BOR, he had been “intensely concentrating on (his) job so that (he) can earn
enough to be able to pay for (his) financial obligations to the
University.” Alleging that he was “now letting nature take its
course,” Nadal begged President Abueva not to issue any press release
regarding the case.^[16]

However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, a petition for mandamus with preliminary
injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against President
Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and
Olivia C. Caoili. The petition prayed:

“After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows:

a.       Making the
preliminary injunction permanent;

b.       Ordering respondents
to uphold and implement their decision rendered on 28 March 1993, exonerating
petitioner from all the charges against him, and accordingly dismissing SDT
Case No. 91-026;

c.       Ordering respondents
jointly and severally to pay petitioner litigation expenses of at least
P150,000.00.

Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for.”^[17]

The motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and
the writ of preliminary injunction was immediately set for hearing. At the May 10, 1993 hearing, the lower court
declared that the only issue to be resolved was “whether or not the
respondents in Civil Case No. 93-15665 violated (Nadal’s) right to due process
when it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him”
during the March 29, 1993 meeting. After the respondents had presented their first witness, Dr. Olivia C.
Caoili, the lower court asked respondents’ counsel whether they were amenable
to maintaining the status quo. Said
counsel replied in the negative asserting the University’s prerogative to
discipline students found guilty of violating its rules of discipline.^[18]

On the same day, the lower court^[19]
issued the following Order:

“The parties were heard on their respective positions on the incident
(application for preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining
order and opposition thereto). For lack
of material time set this for continuation on May 17 and 18, 1993 both at 2:30
p.m.

In the meantime, in order that the proceedings of this case may not
be rendered moot and academic, the respondents herein, namely: Jose V. Abueva,
President of the University of the Philippines and Vice-Chairman of the U.P.
Board of Regents, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura and Armand V. Fabella,
members of the U.P. Board of Regents, Olivia C. Caoili, the officers, agents,
representatives, and all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby temporarily
restrained from implementing their decision rendered on March 29, 1993 in
Administrative SDT Case No. 91-026 entitled University of the Philippines vs.
Ramon P. Nadal, as reflected in the Minutes of the 1062nd meeting of the Board
of Regents, U.P. held at the Romblon Room, Westin Phil. Plaza, Manila, until
further order from this Court.

SO ORDERED.”

Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents Emerenciana Y.
Arcellana, Ariel P. Tanangonan, Leticia R. Shahani and Antonio T. Carpio. The University, on the other hand, presented
Dr. Olivia Caoili and Nadal himself as a hostile witness. On May 29, 1993, the lower court issued the
following Order:

“The petitioner complains that he
was not afforded due process when, after the Board Meeting on SDT Case No.
91-026 on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a decision of “NOT GUILTY”
in his favor, the Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents, without notice to the
herein petitioner, called another meeting the following day to deliberate on
his (the Chairman’s) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, which this time resulted in a
decision of “GUILTY.” While the main issue of violation of due
process raised in the petition pends trial and resolution, the petitioner prays
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting the
respondents from further proceeding with SDT Case No. 91-026 and from
suspending the petitioner for one year.

It is a basic requirement in the issuance of the preliminary
injunctive writ that there must be a right to be protected. As the issue in the case at bar is due
process in the March 29 Board meeting, there is, indeed, a right to be protected
for, in administrative proceedings, a respondent’s right to due process exists
not only at the early stages but also at the final stage thereof.

With the circulation to the members of the Board of Regents, as
well as to other UP personnel, of the Minutes of the March 29, 1993 meeting,
even after this case had already been filed, the Court is convinced that there
now exists a threat to the petitioner (respondent in SDT Case No. 91-026) that
the decision of the Board of Regents finally finding him guilty of willfully
withholding information material to his application for Socialized Tuition and
Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits, will be implemented at any time,
especially during the enrolment period, and that this implementation would work
injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and,
consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job. The injury thus caused would be irreparable.

‘Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule where there
is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable
accuracy. Where the damage is
susceptible of mathematical computation, it is not irreparable.’ (Social
Security Commission v. Bayona, et al., G.R. No. L-13555, May 30, 1962).

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and so as not to render moot the issues
in the instant proceedings, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
restraining the respondents, their officers, agent(s), representatives, and all
persons acting in their behalf, from further proceeding with SDT Case No.
91-026, and from suspending petitioner, upon the latter’s filing a bond in the
amount of P3,000.00.

IT IS SO ORDERED.^[20]

Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the
petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for the issuance of an injunction or temporary restraining order,
raising the following issues: whether or not Nadal was denied due process in
the administrative disciplinary proceedings against him, and, whether or not
the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing the May 29, 1993
writ of preliminary injunction thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the
one-year suspension penalty it had imposed on Nadal.

Before proceeding with the discussion of the merits of the
instant petition, we shall confront a threshold issue raised by private
respondent, namely, that Dr. Caoili, not having been authorized by the Board of
Regents as a collegial body to file the instant petition, and Dr. Abueva, who
verified the petition, not being the “Board of Regents” nor “the
University of the Philippines,” they are not the real parties in interest
who should file the same.^[21]

A real party in interest is one “who stands to be benefited
or injured by the judgment or the party entitled to the avails of the
suit. ‘Interest’ within the meaning of
the rule means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by
the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a
mere incidental interest.”^[22]
Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to protect inasmuch as
what is in issue here is its power to impose disciplinary action against a
student who violated the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and
Discipline by withholding information in connection with his application for
STFAP benefits, which information, if disclosed, would have sufficed to
disqualify him from receiving the financial assistance he sought. Such dishonesty, if left unpunished, would
have the effect of subverting a commendable program into which the University
officials had devoted much time and expended precious resources, from the
conceptualization to the implementation stage, to rationalize the socialized
scheme of tuition fee payments in order that more students may benefit from the
public funds allocated to the State University.

Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents
in the petition for mandamus that he filed below, Nadal is now estopped
from questioning their personality to file the instant petition.^[23]
Moreover, under Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter (Act 1870) and Sec. 11 of the
University Code “all process” against the BOR shall be served on
“the president or secretary thereof.” It is in accordance with these
legal provisions that Dr. Caoili is named as a petitioner. Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the University
President and member of the BOR, has to verify the petition. It is not mandatory, however, that each and
every member of the BOR be named petitioners. As the Court has time and again held, an action may be entertained,
notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where it appears
that the naming of the party would be but a formality.^[24]

No longer novel, as this is not a case of first impression, is
the issue on the right of an academic institution to refuse admission to a
student arising from the imposition upon him of an administrative disciplinary sanction. In our recent decision in Ateneo de Manila University
v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong,^[25] wherein certain law students were
dismissed for hazing resulting in the death of another, we held that the matter
of admission of students is within the ambit of academic freedom and therefore,
beyond the province of the courts to decide. Certain fundamental principles bear stressing.

One of the arguments of
Nadal in his petition for mandamus below was that he was denied due
process. To clarify, the so-called
lack of due process referred only to the March 29, 1993 meeting of the
BOR. As stated by respondent’s
counsel: “What was conceded by
undersigned counsel was that Nadal was afforded due process from the start of the administrative proceeding up to the
meeting of the Board of Regents on March 28, 1993.”^[26]

With respect to the March
29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as “unquestionably void
for lack of due process” inasmuch as he was not sent a notice of said
meeting. Counsel cites the
ruling in Non v. Dames II^[27]
that imposition of sanctions on
students requires “observance of procedural due process,”^[28]
the phrase obviously referring to the
sending of notice of the meeting.

Attention is drawn to the disparate factual environments
obtaining in Non v. Dames II and in the instant
case. In the former case, the students
were refused admission for having led or participated in student mass actions
against the school, thereby posing a collision between constitutionally
cherished rights – freedom of expression and academic freedom. In the case at bar, Nadal was suspended for
having breached the University’s disciplinary rules. In the Non case, the Court ruled that the students were
not afforded due process for even the refusal to re-enroll them appeared to
have been a mere afterthought on the part of the school administrators. Here, Nadal does not dispute the fact that
his right to due process was held inviolate until the BOR decided to meet on
March 29, 1993 with his case as the sole item on the agenda.

In any event, it is gross error to equate due process in the
instant case with the sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to
respondent. University rules do not
require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included
as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students whose disciplinary cases have been
appealed to the Board of Regents as the final review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack
of notice given to him to attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings
where his case was up for deliberation. He would make an exception of the March 29,1993 meeting for it was
“supposed to reconsider the decision made on March 28, 1993 exonerating
respondent Nadal from all administrative charges against him.”^[29]

Regent Antonio T. Carpio, in his testimony before the lower court
on May 25, 1993 admitted that there was no final verdict at the March 28, 1993
meeting in view of the conditional votes resulting from his assertion that he
was “not morally convinced that there was sufficient evidence to make a
finding of guilty against Nadal because there was no direct evidence that his
mother received income from the United States and this income was sent to the
Philippines to support the studies of the children.”^[30]
Two regents shared the view of Regent Carpio, with the following result: four voted guilty, three, not guilty, and
three cast conditional votes. The BOR
agreed that, upon the suggestion of Regent Carpio, they would still verify from
the AdeMU about Nadal’s alleged scholarship as a student in said
institution. Consequently, no
definitive decision was arrived at by the BOR on March 28, 1993. Much less was a verdict of exoneration
handed down as averred by respondent.

Regent Carpio testified, with respect to the March 29, 1993
meeting where all twelve members of the BOR were present, that all of them
participated in the voting held to reconsider the previous day’s decision. He stated: “I remember Regent Arcellana questioning the voting again on the
ground that there was already a final decision, but there was a vote taken on
whether a motion for reconsideration can be decided by the board, and a
majority of the board ruled that the matter can be reconsidered again upon
motion of the chairman.”^[31]

At said meeting, six (6) regents voted to find respondent guilty,
three (3) voted that he was not guilty and three (3) abstained. As succinctly announced by Regent Carpio,
the final decision was that which was rendered on March 29, 1993 as “no
other decision was made by the Board with respect to the same issue.”^[32]

Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that his client
was “not given due process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon
which he was again convicted was not the same as the original charge.”^[33]
Obviously, he was referring to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28,
i.e., whether or not Nadal was telling the truth when he claimed that he
received a scholarship grant from the AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was
“exactly the same charge” of withholding information on the income of
Nadal’s mother.^[34]
It should be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a verification of Nadal’s
claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent Carpio was not
“morally convinced” yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he sought additional insights
into the character of Nadal through the information that would be obtained from
the AdeMU.

In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and a
mere superfluity. In his July 12, 1991 certification
aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, that his mother was a
“TNT” who could not find a “stable, regular, well-paying
employment” but that she was supporting the education of his brothers with
the help of another son. To our mind, this
constitutes sufficient admission that Nadal withheld information on the income,
however measly and irregular, of his mother. Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as
basis for a judgment, in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is required, that which means more
than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds equally reasonable might
conceivably opine otherwise.^[35] In
light of the foregoing circumstances, we find that Nadal has been sufficiently
proven to have violated his undertaking to divulge all information needed when
he applied for the benefits of the STFAP.

Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks
of the professionals who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may
prevail. The sentinels who stand guard
at the portals leading to the hallowed Temples of Justice cannot be overzealous
in admitting only those who are intellectually and morally fit. In those who exhibit duplicity in their
student days, one spots the shady character who is bound to sow the seeds of
chicanery in the practice of his profession.

Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably aware
that the bedrock axiom, Canon I, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility states: “A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
Further on, Canon 7, Rule 7.01 provides: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false
statement or suppressing a material fact
in connection with his application for admission to the bar.”
(Underscoring supplied for emphasis)

Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble
profession of law that honesty and integrity are requirements no less weighty
than hurdling the Bar examinations. This is the reason why a certification of good moral character is one of
the documents that must be submitted in applying to take said examination. In fact, a charge of immoral or deceitful
conduct on the part of an applicant, when proved, is a ground for disqualifying
him.

To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown
sufficiently that respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding
vital information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in
blatant violation of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and
Discipline of petitioner University, the latter’s inherent power and authority
to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked and rightfully exercised.

As a Bohemian proverb puts it: “A school without discipline
is like a mill without water.” Insofar as the water turns the mill, so
does the school’s disciplinary power assure its right to survive and continue
operating. In more relevant terms,
through its power to impose disciplinary sanctions, an educational institution
is able to exercise its academic freedom which is, in the case at bar, the
right to suspend and refuse admission to a student who has subverted its
authority in the implementation of the critically important STFAP.

At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to a
University is encompassed by the right of academic freedom. In Garcia v.
The Faculty Admission Committee,
Loyola School of Theology^[36] the Court stated that a school or college which is possessed
of the right of academic freedom “decides for itself its aims and
objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the
choice of students.” Elucidating,
in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon.
Ignacio M. Capulong,^[37] the Court further expounded:

“Since Garcia v. Loyola School of
Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary proposition that
admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a school,
the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. While under the Education Act of 1982, students
have a right ‘to freely choose their field of study, subject to existing
curricula and to continue their course therein up to graduation,’ such right is
subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and disciplinary
standards laid down by the academic institution.

‘For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules
and regulations for the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to parents
. . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation,
individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools.’

Such rules are ‘incident to the very object of incorporation and
indispensable to the successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing
student discipline.’ Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing
university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student
discipline, may be regarded as vital, if not merely to the smooth and efficient
operation of the institution, but to its very survival.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of
militancy in the academic groves as collectively, the students demanded and
plucked for themselves from the panoply of academic freedom their own rights
encapsulized under the rubric of ‘right to education’ forgetting that, in
Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty, and that is, their duty
to learn under the rules laid down
by the school.”
(Underscoring supplied.)

On the second issue
presented for adjudication, the Court finds that the lower court gravely abused
its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29,
1993. The issuance of the said writ was
based on the lower court’s finding that the implementation of the disciplinary
sanction of suspension on Nadal “would work injustice to the petitioner as
it would delay him in finishing his course, and consequently, in getting a
decent and good paying job.” Sadly, such a ruling considers only the
situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances, clearly of
his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, it has completely
disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which provides more than
ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon an
erring student of an institution of higher learning.

From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court
should have restrained itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition
filed by Nadal. Mandamus is
never issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the
part of the petitioner being required.^[38] It
is of no avail against an official or government agency whose duty requires the
exercise of discretion or judgment.^[39]

Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower
court dared to tread upon legally forbidden grounds. For, by virtue of the writ, the University’s exercise of academic
freedom was peremptorily curtailed. Moreover, the door was flung wide open for Nadal to do exactly what the
decision of the BOR prohibited him from doing and that is, to violate the
suspension order by enrolling for the first semester of 1993-1994. It must have been with consternation that
the University officials helplessly watched him complete his academic
requirements for taking the Bar.^[40] In
the event that he be allowed to continue with his studies, he would, in effect
render moot and academic the disciplinary sanction of suspension legally
imposed upon him by the BOR’s final decision of March 29, 1993. What is to prevent other aspirants for STFAP
scholarships from misleading the University authorities by misrepresenting
certain facts or as in instant case, withholding vital information and stating
downright falsehoods, in their application forms with impunity? Not only would this undermine the authority
of the U.P. to discipline its students who violate the rules and regulations of
the institution but, more importantly, subvert the very concept and lofty intent
to give financial assistance to poor but deserving students through the STFAP
which, incidentally, has not ceased refining and modifying its operations.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower
court is hereby ordered to DISMISS the petition for mandamus.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, and Vitug, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Rollo, p. 72.

^[2]
Ibid, pp. 133-134.

^[3]
Ibid, p. 74.

^[4]
Ibid, pp. 75-76.

^[5]
Ibid, p. 39.

^[6]
Composed of Fedor E. Santos as Chairman and Emmanuel J. de Guzman and Quintin R. Resurreccion as Members.

^[7]
Antonio was a dentistry student at the UERM while Federico was an economics
student at the De la Salle University (Rollo, p. 85).

^[8]
Rollo, pp. 130, 150-151.

^[9]
Ibid, pp. 153-154.

^[10]
Ibid, p. 155.

^[11]
Minutes of the 1057th Meeting of the BOR, Rollo, pp. 157-158.

^[12]
Petition, p. 10; Rollo, p. 11.

^[13]
Minutes of the 1061st (special) meeting of the BOR, Rollo, pp. 184-186.

^[14]
TSN of the May 25, 1993 hearing at the lower court in SP. Civil Case No.
Q-93-15655; Rollo, p. 192.

^[15]
Petition, p. 13; Rollo, p. 14.

^[16]
Rollo, p. 214.

^[17]
Petition, p. 14; Rollo, p. 15.

^[18]
Ibid, pp. 15-16 or pp. 16-17.

^[19]
Presided by Judge Elsie Ligot-Telan.

^[20]
Rollo, p. 241.

^[21]
Comment, pp. 2-3; Rollo, pp. 244-245.

^[22]
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 90667, November 5, 1991, 203 SCRA
310, 324; Gan Hock v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 70648, May 20, 1991,
197 SCRA 223, 230.

^[23]
Annex “T” to Petition; Rollo, p. 217.

^[24]
Eden v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, G.R. No. 72145, February 28,
1990, 182 SCRA 840 citing Baguio v. Rodriguez, 105 Phil. 1323 (1959).

^[25]
G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993.

^[26]
Comment, p. 14; Rollo, p. 256.

^[27]
G.R. No. 89317, May 20, 1990, 185 SCRA 523.

^[28]
Comment, p. 10; Rollo, p. 252.

^[29]
Comment, p. 10; Rollo, p. 252.

^[30]
TSN, May 25, 1993, p. 3; Rollo, p. 189.

^[31]
TSN, May 25, 1993, p. 16; Rollo, p. 294.

^[32]
Ibid, at p. 18 or p. 203.

^[33]
Ibid, at p. 6 or p. 192.

^[34]
Ibid, at pp. 8 or 194.

^[35]
Lansang v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 480.

^[36]
L-40779, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 277.

^[37]
Supra.

^[38]
University of Pangasinan Faculty Union v. NLRC, G.R. No. 64821-23,
January 29, 1993.

^[39]
Calderon v. Solicitor General, G.R. Nos. 103752-53, November 25, 1992,
215 SCRA 876, 882.

^[40]
Reply, pp. 17-18; Rollo, pp. 422-423.