PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. GLORIA MITTU Y CINTO AND GERVACIO SOLIDAD Y LLANES, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

People versus Mittu

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Gloria Mittu and Gervacio Solidad, a criminal appeal from a conviction for the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The accused were charged with taking a four year old boy and his fifteen year old nursemaid, holding them captive for several days, and demanding money for their release. The case matters to a reviewee for three reasons: it fixes the elements of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, it clarifies what corpus delicti means, that is, the fact of the commission of the crime and not the things involved in it, and it illustrates how the Court applies the rule on the retroactive effect of a favorable penal law when the death penalty was reimposed after the offense was committed.

Procedural History

After preliminary investigation, an Information for kidnapping for ransom was filed against both accused before the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City, Branch 121. Both entered pleas of not guilty upon arraignment, and trial followed. The trial court rendered its decision on March 15, 1993, finding both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom under the last paragraph of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing each to reclusion perpetua. Both accused appealed, filing separate briefs. The case reached the Supreme Court by ordinary appeal from the trial court's judgment of conviction, and the Court affirmed the conviction.

Facts

On the morning of August 31, 1992, four year old Vik Ramjit Singh and his fifteen year old nursemaid, Mary Gene Coña, were walking toward the Infant Jesus School in Kalookan City. In front of a Catholic church, Gloria Mittu suddenly grabbed them, saying words to the effect of come with me to the house, and loaded them into a tricycle driven by Gervacio Solidad. The two accused then took the victims by taxi to Muntinlupa, where they were detained for two days. In a public market there, Mittu made the boy speak to his father by telephone, threatening to leave him behind if he revealed who had taken them, and the boy could only say, Papa, come and get us here. The victims were later moved to Novaliches and hidden in separate houses.

Meanwhile, the boy's parents learned that he had never reached school and searched for him in vain. An unidentified male caller told them their son was with him and warned them not to report the matter to the police. The following day the same caller demanded one hundred thousand pesos for the boy's release, and similar calls followed. On the morning of September 3, 1992, the spouses went to the National Bureau of Investigation, whose agents instructed them to arrange the payment. On September 4, 1992, the caller directed the father to give the money to Gloria Mittu at the Barrio Fiesta Restaurant along Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Kalookan City that evening.

The agents mapped out an entrapment. Mittu arrived at the restaurant, demanded the whole amount, and refused to release the victims unless half was paid; the father gave her fifty thousand pesos, and she left, promising to return after two hours. Around nine o'clock in the evening, the nursemaid entered the restaurant, and the father went out to a taxicab where he saw his son with both accused. The two accused released the boy to him, and the agents, seeing the child safe, arrested them. Mittu admitted she still had twenty seven thousand pesos of the ransom money, which she surrendered at her house, and said the rest had been used to redeem pawned jewelry.

Issues

• Whether or not the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of kidnapping for ransom because the ransom money was not properly identified in court.
• Whether or not it was contrary to human nature for the accused, who knew the victims' family well, to receive the ransom money in a public place.
• Whether or not the twenty seven thousand pesos confiscated from Mittu was her own money rather than part of the ransom.
• Whether or not Gervacio Solidad is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping for ransom.
• Whether or not the penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed.

Applicable Provisions

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as quoted in the decision, provides:

Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than five days. 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority. 3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to kill him shall have been made. 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in the commission of the offense.

This is the very provision under which the accused were charged and convicted, and it supplies both the elements of the crime and the penalty, including the death penalty when ransom is the purpose.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the failure to identify the ransom money does not amount to a failure to prove the corpus delicti. Corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, which may be proved by the testimony of witnesses who saw it; it does not pertain to the ransom money itself. In any event, the one hundred peso bills amounting to twenty seven thousand pesos were offered in evidence and admitted over the defense's objection. The fact of kidnapping was duly proved by the categorical testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

On the second issue, the Court rejected the argument that the crime was contrary to human nature. The records showed that Mittu had last seen the spouses in 1985, some seven years before the kidnapping, and whatever bond existed had been severed by the years and by the deportation of her husband. The Court added that familiarity with the victims or their families has never rendered the commission of the crime impossible or improbable, but has at times even facilitated it.

On the third issue, the Court found Mittu's claim that the money was her own to be a self-serving statement, unsupported by receipts, and undeserving of weight against the categorical, consistent, and positive identification made by the eyewitnesses, who had no ill motive to testify falsely. The Court also presumed regularity in the performance of the NBI agents' official duties.

On the fourth issue, the Court found that the accused acted in concert, and that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a crime and decide to commit it. Mittu lured the victims into the tricycle driven by Solidad, who drove to her house and left the tricycle there; together they took a taxi to Muntinlupa, later moved the victims to Novaliches, made the repeated calls demanding ransom, and were both apprehended after delivering the victims at the designated meeting place. The Court found the elements of kidnapping proven: the accused are private individuals; they kidnapped or detained the victims in Muntinlupa and transferred them to Novaliches; the detention was illegal; and the persons kidnapped were both minors. The kidnapping was qualified by the demand for ransom.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that although Article 267 prescribes the death penalty for kidnapping for ransom, the death penalty could not be imposed because the kidnapping took place on August 31, 1992, prior to the reimposition of the death penalty. Hence the proper penalty is the penalty next lower in degree, which is reclusion perpetua, an indivisible penalty.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain these rules. First, the elements of kidnapping under Article 267 are: that the offender is a private individual; that he kidnaps or detains another or in any manner deprives him of his liberty; that the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and that in the commission of the offense, any of the circumstances in the four numbered paragraphs is present, such as that the person kidnapped is a minor or a female. Second, the crime is qualified and the death penalty is prescribed when the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom, even if none of the enumerated circumstances were present. Third, corpus delicti is the fact of the commission of the crime, provable by the testimony of witnesses who saw it, and not the ransom money or other things involved in the crime. Fourth, findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal absent a clear showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied facts or circumstances of weight and substance. Fifth, categorical, consistent, and positive identification, without ill motive on the part of the eyewitness, prevails over unconvincing alibi and unsubstantiated denials. Sixth, familiarity with the victims does not render the crime impossible or improbable. Finally, where the death penalty prescribed by Article 267 could not be imposed because the offense was committed before its reimposition, the penalty next lower in degree, reclusion perpetua, is imposed.

Disposition

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision finding Gloria Mittu and Gervacio Solidad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties under the law, with costs against the appellants.

Remember This

Memorize this line: corpus delicti in kidnapping for ransom is the fact of the commission of the crime, not the ransom money. Examiners like to use this case to test the elements of Article 267, the concept of corpus delicti, and the rule on the retroactive application of a favorable penalty when the death penalty was reimposed after the offense was committed.