FELICITO BASBACIO, PETITIONER, VS. OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FRANKLIN DRILON IN HIS CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, RESPONDENT.

This case presents for determination the scope of the State’s
liability under Rep. Act No. 7309, which among other things provides
compensation for persons who are unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned but
on appeal are acquitted and ordered released.

Petitioner Felicito Basbacio and his son-in-law, Wilfredo
Balderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated
murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of the latter’s wife
Florida and his son Tirso at Palo, Calanuga, Rapu-Rapu, Albay, on the night of
June 26, 1988. The motive for the
killing was apparently a land dispute between the Boyons and petitioner. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced
to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been
cancelled.

Petitioner and his son-in-law appealed. Only petitioner’s appeal proceeded to judgment, however, as the
appeal of the other accused was dismissed for failure to file his brief.

On June 22, 1992 the Court of Appeals rendered a decision
acquitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove
conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. He had been pointed to by a daughter of Federico Boyon as the companion
of Balderrama when the latter barged into their hut and without warning started
shooting, but the appellate court ruled that because petitioner did nothing
more, petitioner’s presence at the scene of the crime was insufficient to show
conspiracy.

Based on his acquittal, petitioner filed a claim under Rep. Act
No. 7309, sec. 3(a), which provides for the payment of compensation to “any
person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgment
of acquittal.”^[1]
The claim was filed with the Board of Claims of the Department of Justice, but
the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner’s presence at the
scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable
doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased
as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his
son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was “probably guilty.”

On appeal, respondent Secretary of Justice affirmed the Board’s
ruling. Said the Secretary of Justice
in his resolution dated March 11, 1993:

It is believed therefore that the phrase “any person . . . unjustly
accused, convicted and imprisoned” in Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7309 refers to
an individual who was wrongly accused and imprisoned for a crime he did not
commit, thereby making him “a victim of unjust imprisonment.” In the instant
case, however, Claimant/Appellant cannot be deemed such a victim since a
reading of the decision of his acquittal shows that his exculpation is not
based on his innocence, but upon, in effect a finding of reasonable doubt.

Petitioner brought this petition for review on certiorari. Neither Rule 45 nor Rep. Act No. 7309,
however, provides for review by certiorari of the decisions of the
Secretary of Justice. Nonetheless, in
view of the importance of the question tendered, the Court resolved to treat
the petition as a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.

Petitioner questions the basis of the respondent’s ruling that to
be able to recover under sec. 3(a) of the law the claimant must on appeal be
found to be innocent of the crimes of which he was convicted in the trial
court. Through counsel he contends that
the language of sec. 3(a) is clear and does not call for interpretation. The “mere fact that the claimant was
imprisoned for a crime which he was subsequently acquitted of is already unjust
in itself,” he contends. To deny his
claim because he was not declared innocent would be to say that his
imprisonment for two years while his appeal was pending was justified. Petitioner argues that there is only one
requirement for conviction in criminal cases and that is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. If the prosecution
fails to present such proof, the presumption that the accused is innocent stands
and, therefore, there is no reason for requiring that he be declared innocent
of the crime before he can recover compensation for his imprisonment.

Petitioner’s contention has no merit. It would require that every time an accused is acquitted on
appeal he must be given compensation on the theory that he was “unjustly
convicted” by the trial court. Such a
reading of sec. 3(a) is contrary to petitioner’s professed canon of
construction that when the language of the statute is clear it should be given
its natural meaning. It leaves out of
the provision in question the qualifying word “unjustly” so that the provision
would simply read: “The following may
file claims for compensation before the Board: (a) any person who was accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently
released by virtue of a judgment of acquittal.”

But sec. 3(a) requires that the claimant be “unjustly
accused, convicted [and] imprisoned.” The fact that his conviction is reversed
and the accused is acquitted is not itself proof that the previous conviction
was “unjust.” An accused may be acquitted for a number of reasons and his
conviction by the trial court may, for any of these reasons be set aside. For example, he may be acquitted not because
he is innocent of the crime charged but because of reasonable doubt, in which
case he may be found civilly liable to the complainant because while the
evidence against him does not satisfy the quantum of proof required for
conviction, it may nonetheless be sufficient to sustain a civil action for
damages.^[2]
In one case the accused, an alien, was acquitted of statutory rape with
homicide because of doubt as to the ages of the offended parties who consented
to have sex with him. Nonetheless the
accused was ordered to pay moral and exemplary damages and ordered deported.^[3]
In such a case to pay the accused compensation for having been “unjustly
convicted” by the trial court would be utterly inconsistent with his liability
to the complainant. Yet to follow
petitioner’s theory such an accused would be entitled to compensation under
sec. 3(a).

The truth is that the presumption of innocence has never been
intended as evidence of innocence of the accused but only to shift the burden
of proof that he is guilty to the prosecution. If “accusation is not synonymous with guilt,”^[4] so is
the presumption of innocence not a proof thereof. It is one thing to say that the accused is presumed to be
innocent in order to place on the prosecution the burden of proving beyond
reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. It is quite another thing to say that he is innocent and if he is
convicted that he has been “unjustly convicted.” As this Court held in a case:

Though we are acquitting the appellant for
the crime of rape with homicide, we emphasize that we are not ruling that he is
innocent or blameless. It is only the
constitutional presumption of innocence and the failure of the prosecution to
build an airtight case for conviction which saved him, not that the facts of
unlawful conduct do not exist.^[5]

To say then that an accused has been “unjustly convicted” has to
do with the manner of his conviction rather than with his
innocence. An accused may on appeal be
acquitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does not necessarily
mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an “unjust
conviction.” If his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the
evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unjust. That is why it is not, on the other hand,
correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation
depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.

The phrase “unjustly convicted” has the same meaning as
“knowingly rendering an unjust judgment” in art. 204 of the Revised Penal
Code. What this Court held in In re Rafael C. Climaco^[6] applies:

In order that a judge may be held liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment, it must be shown
beyond doubt that the judgment is unjust as it is contrary to law or is
not supported by the evidence, and the same was made with conscious and
deliberate intent to do an injustice. . . .

To hold a judge liable for the rendition of manifestly unjust
judgment by reason of inexcusable negligence or ignorance, it must be shown,
according to Groizard, that although he has acted without malice, he failed to
observe in the performance of his duty, that diligence prudence and care which
the law is entitled to exact in the rendering
of any public service. Negligence and
ignorance are inexcusable if they imply a manifest injustice which cannot be
explained by a reasonable interpretation. Inexcusable mistake only exists in the legal concept when it implies a
manifest injustice, that is to say, such injustice which cannot be explained by
a reasonable interpretation even though there is a misunderstanding or error of the law applied, yet in the
contrary it results, logically and reasonably, and in a very clear and
indisputable manner, in the notorious violation of the legal precept.

Indeed, sec. 3(a) does not refer solely to an unjust conviction
as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but, in addition, to an unjust
accusation. The accused must have been
“unjustly accused, in consequence of which he is unjustly convicted and then imprisoned. It is important to note this because if from
its inception the prosecution of the accused has been wrongful, his conviction
by the court is, in all probability, also wrongful. Conversely, if the prosecution is not malicious any conviction
even though based on less than the required quantum of proof in criminal cases
may be erroneous but not necessarily unjust.

The reason is that under Rule 112, sec. 4, the question for the prosecutor in filing a case in court is
not whether the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt but only whether
“there is reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and the
accused is probably guilty thereof.” Hence, an accusation which
is based on “probable guilt” is not an unjust accusation and a conviction based
on such degree of proof is not necessarily an unjust judgment but only
an erroneous one. The remedy for such
error is appeal.

In the case at bar there is absolutely no evidence to show that
petitioner’s conviction by the trial court was wrongful or that it was the
product of malice or gross ignorance or gross negligence. To the contrary, the court had reason to
believe that petitioner and his coaccused were in league, because petitioner is
the father-in-law of Wilfredo Balderrama and it was petitioner who bore the
victim a grudge because of a land dispute. Not only that. Petitioner and
his coaccused arrived together in the hut of the victims and forced their way
into it.

The Court of Appeals ruled there was no conspiracy only because
there was no proof that he did or say anything on the occasion. Said the appellate court.

Both eyewitness testimonies fail to show the appellant Felicito
Basbacio to have committed any act at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as having said anything at all. Both fail to show Felicito Basbacio as
having committed anything in furtherance of a conspiracy to commit the crimes
charged against the defendants. It
seems to be a frail and flimsy basis on which to conclude that conspiracy
existed between actual killer Wilfredo Balderrama and Felicito Basbacio to
commit murder and two frustrated murders on that night of June 26, 1988. It may be asked where was the coming
together of the two defendants to an agreement to commit the crimes of murder
and frustrated murder on two counts? Where was Basbacio’s contribution to the commission of the said
crimes? Basbacio was — as the record
shows — nothing but part of the dark shadows of that night. . . .

One may take issue with this ruling because precisely conspiracy
may be shown by concert of action and other circumstances. Why was petitioner with his son-in-law? Why did they apparently flee together? And what about the fact that there was bad
blood between petitioner and the victim Federico Boyon? These questions may no longer be passed upon
in view of the acquittal of petitioner but they are relevant in evaluating his
claim that he had been unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned before he was
released because of his acquittal on appeal. We hold that in view of these circumstances respondent Secretary of
Justice and the Board of Claims did not commit a grave abuse of its discretion
in disallowing petitioner’s claim for compensation under Rep. Act No. 7309.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

^[1]
The statute in pertinent parts provide:

SEC. 3 Who may File Claims. – The following may file claims for
compensation before the Board:

a) any person who was unjustly
accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal;

b) any person who was unjustly
detained and released without being charged;

c) any victim of arbitrary or
illegal detention by the authorities as defined in the Revised Penal Code under
a final judgment of the court; and

d) any person who is a victim of
violent crimes. For purposes of this
Act, violent crimes shall include rape and shall likewise refer to offenses
committed with malice which resulted in death or serious physical and/or
psychological injuries, permanent incapacity or disability, insanity, abortion,
serious trauma, or committed with torture, cruelty or barbarity.

SEC. 4. Award Ceiling. –
For victims of unjust imprisonment or detention, the compensation shall be
based on the number of months of imprisonment or detention and every fraction
thereof shall be considered one month: Provided,
however, That in no case shall such compensation exceed One thousand pesos
(P1,000.00) per month.

In all other cases, the maximum
amount for which the Board may approve a claim shall not exceed Ten thousand
pesos (P10,000.00) or the amount necessary to reimburse the claimant the
expenses incurred for hospitalization, medical treatment, loss of wage, loss of
support or other expenses directly related to the injury, whichever is
lower. This is without prejudice to the
right of the claimant to seek other remedies under existing laws.

^[2]
The Civil Code provides in art. 29: “When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of
evidence. Upon motion of the defendant,
the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in
case the complaint should be found to be malicious.

“If in a criminal case the judgment
of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that
effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the
acquittal is due to that ground.”

^[3]
People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 (1991).

^[4]
People v. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59, 64 (1971).

^[5]
Supra note 3 at 722.

^[6]
55 SCRA 107, 119 (1974).