ESPERANZA P. SUMULONG, REPRESENTED BY MARIO P. SUMULONG, PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND INLAND TRAILWAYS, INC., RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the decision^[1] of
the Court of Appeals of 28 January 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27987^[2]
affirming the decision of Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila
of 23 April 1992 in Civil Case No. 91-58122.^[3] The
RTC judgment had reversed the decision of Branch 9 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court (MTC) of Manila of 3 June 1991^[4] in
Civil Case No. 132844-CV, a complaint denominated as one for forcible entry and
entitled “Esperanza P. Sumulong vs. Inland Trailways, Inc. The dispositive portion of the MTC decision
reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:

1.   Ordering Defendant and anyone acting in its
behalf to vacate the premises located at M. Earnshaw Street, Sampaloc, Manila,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 102994 and 102995;

2.   To pay to Plaintiff reasonable compensation
for the use of the premises at the rate of P70,000.00 a month starting from
June, 1989 until it finally vacates the premises, deducting therefrom any and
all amount heretofore advanced by Defendant to Plaintiff;

3.   Ordering Defendant to pay to Plaintiff the
sum of P5,000.00 as and for attorney’s fees; and

4.   To pay the costs.”^[5]

The MTC sustained the theory of plaintiff Esperanza P. Sumulong
(hereinafter Sumulong) that the defendant (hereinafter INLAND)
entered the premises “by stealth and strategy, since it has no sublease when it
entered the premises and remained because it misrepresented itself as owned by
Jopson and also because it asked to negotiate for a new lease.”^[6]
The MTC disregarded the defense of INLAND that the proper action should have
been for unlawful detainer.^[7]

On appeal to the RTC by INLAND (Civil Case No. 91-58122), the MTC
decision was reversed. The RTC held
that the MTC’s ruling “betrays a misapplication and/or misinterpretation of the
law and jurisprudence on Forcible Entry,”^[8] and
that although Sumulong had constructive possession of the subject premises, she
was, nevertheless, not in prior physical and actual possession thereof. The latter kind of possession is an
essential element in forcible entry; accordingly, her action for forcible entry
should fail. It concluded:

“Under the facts as
established and the evidence adduced before the Court a quo, in relation to the applicable law and
jurisprudence, the complaint for Forcible Entry as instituted cannot be
sustained. Plaintiff’s assertion of its
right to the possession of the subject properties may nevertheless be ventilated by way of another action,
not for Forcible Entry.”^[9]

Hence, it ordered the dismissal of Civil
Case No. 132844-CV.

Sumulong filed a petition for review with the respondent Court of
Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 27987.^[10]
Sumulong contended therein that the RTC seriously erred in holding that she had
failed to establish prior physical possession of the subject premises despite
overwhelming evidence to the contrary and in disregarding long established law
and jurisprudence when it ordered the dismissal of the complaint for forcible
entry.^[11]

In its challenged Decision of 28 January 1993, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the RTC decision on the ground that Sumulong failed to
specifically aver in her complaint facts which would clearly show that her
cause of action is for forcible entry. It held:

“Those pertinent allegations in the complaint as well as Mario Sumulong’s
testimony are facts, intimate and intertwined, proving that private
respondent’s entry, possession and occupation of the premises were upon the
broad knowledge and acquiescence, if not express upon the implied permission of
petitioner. And thus, the private
respondent, is admittedly in the actual possession of the premises in
question. All doubts should be resolved
in his [sic] favor, it being the rule of law that the present possessor is to
be preferred should a question arise regarding the fact of possession (Art.
539, NCC). We, therefore, find and so
hold that petitioner failed to specifically aver in her complaint facts which
would clearly show that her cause of action should be for forcible entry, well
supporting the findings of the RTC that the petitioner has not shown that she
has been deprived of the possession of the premises by force, intimidation,
stealth, threat or strategy. On this
basis, the complaint for forcible entry cannot be sustained on the ground of
lack of cause of action and which should be dismissed on that ground (sec.
1-[g], Rule 16, Revised Rules of Court). To use the words in [S]arona vs. Villegas [22 SCRA 1257] the failure of
a plaintiff to specifically aver in the complaint facts which would definitely
show that plaintiff’s action is for forcible entry — that defendant’s entry
into the land is illegal — ‘is not to be lightly treated.’ The reason and
philosophy behind this rule, apart from the fact that there is distinct
difference between the cause of action for forcible entry, on the one hand, and
unlawful detainer, on the other hand, is that whatever may be the character of
one’s prior possession, if he has in his favor priority of time, he has the security that entitles him to
stay on the property until he is lawfully ejected by a person having a better
right to such possession.”^[12]

In the instant petition filed on 23 March 1993, Sumulong avers
that the Court of Appeals gravely erred in holding that she has no cause of action for forcible entry against INLAND and
asserts that she was the prior physical possessor of the premises in question
and that INLAND’s intrusion, occupation, and possession of the subject premises
were effected through stealth and strategy.^[13] She
argues that the prior possession for purposes of the action for forcible entry
is not to be reckoned from June 1989 when INLAND first entered the premises, as
held by the RTC and the Court of Appeals, but from November 1989, when she
“successfully regained actual physical possession of the subject premises” from
INLAND which “failed to resist the physical take-over and re-entry.”^[14]

She further contends that the claim of INLAND that it had entered
the property in June 1989 by virtue of an oral sublease contract between it and
Jopson Management and Development Corp. (hereinafter Jopson), which was,
allegedly, part of the consideration for the purchase by INLAND of the
adjoining Jopson Supermarket, is untenable because the Deed of Sale executed by
Jopson makes no stipulation regarding the sublease, and even granting arguendo
that such sublease was made, it was void because the lessee-sublessor (Jopson)
had no more authority to sublease it since the contract of lease in its favor
had been cancelled and terminated in view of its abandonment of the premises. Moreover, pursuant to Section VIII of the
Lease Contract, Jopson’s right to sublease refers only to the improvements it
had introduced on the leased lots and not to the latter.

In its comment to the petition, INLAND maintains that the
complaint in Civil Case No. 132844-CV shows that Sumulong has no cause of
action for forcible entry, that Jopson did not abandon the leased premises,
that Sumulong had no prior physical possession of the premises, and that INLAND
did not employ stealth and strategy to gain possession thereof.

After the filing of the reply to the comment, this Court resolved
to give due course to the petition and to require the parties to submit their memoranda,^[15] which they subsequently did.

The chief issues for our resolution are (1) whether the complaint
in Civil Case No. 132844-CV before the MTC fails to state a cause of action for
forcible entry; and (2) assuming that it does not, whether it, in fact,
contains sufficient allegations for unlawful detainer for which judgment may be
rendered accordingly.

Settled is the rule that the lack of a cause of action, which is
a ground for a motion to dismiss under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of
Court, must appear on the face of the complaint, i.e., it must be
determined from the allegations of the complaint and from none other. A complaint should not be dismissed for
insufficiency unless it appears clearly from the face of the complaint that the
plaintiff is not entitled to any relief under any state of facts which could be
proved within the facts alleged therein. Stated otherwise, though the allegations in the complaint are ambiguous,
indefinite or uncertain but, nevertheless, a cause of action can, in any
manner, be made out therefrom, and the plaintiff would be entitled to recover
in any aspect of the facts or any combination of the facts alleged, if they
were to be proved, then the motion to dismiss should be denied.^[16]

When a defendant perceives that the complaint states no cause of
action, the better procedure would be to file a motion to dismiss. If, however, none is filed, that defense may
be pleaded as an affirmative defense in accordance with Section 5, Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court. And, pursuant to
Section 2 of Rule 9, even if it is not so pleaded, that defense is not deemed
waived; it may be pleaded in a later pleading, if one is permitted, by motion
for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits. In the last instance, however, the motion
shall be disposed of in the light of any evidence which may have been received.

Accordingly, the issues thus defined can only be properly
resolved by an examination and evaluation of the allegations in the complaint
in Civil Case No. 132844-CV of the MTC of
Manila, whose subject matter involves two adjoining lots owned by Sumulong
located along M. Earnshaw Street,
Sampaloc, Manila, and covered by
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 102994 and 102995. The pertinent paragraphs of the complaint
read:

“4. On November 27, 1975, plaintiff,
represented by her then attorney-in-fact, Juan Sumulong III, entered into a
Contract of Lease with Jopson Management and Development Corporation
(hereinafter ‘Jopson’), covering the premises set forth in TCT Nos. 102994 and
102995, thru its President, Mr. Hernan Jopson. The properties subject of the said Contract of Lease (which are also the
properties subject of this complaint) adjoin the Jopson Supermarket
owned and operated by Jopson, and were utilized by Jopson as parking lot and
warehouse of goods/products sold in the supermarket. A copy of said Contract of Lease is hereto attached, marked as
Annex “B,” and made an integral part hereof;

5. Pertinently, Section III of the Contract of Lease provides:

‘x x x If LESSEE shall at
any time fail or neglect to perform or comply with any of the covenants,
conditions or restrictions, stipulated, or if LESSEE shall become bankrupt or insolvent, or the LESSEE abandons the property or
refuses to pay the rent for six (6) months, then, in any such cases, this lease contract shall become
automatically terminated and cancelled, and
premises subject of this lease shall be vacated peacefully by LESSEE for LESSOR to hold and enjoy henceforth. x x x Upon cancellation of this contract,
LESSEE hereby grants to LESSOR the right to enter and take possession of
the premises. x x x
(Underscoring supplied).’

Likewise, paragraph two (2), Sec. VII of the Contract of Lease
provides:

‘VII. ENTRY AND
INSPECTION OF PROPERTY.

x x x

In case the premises shall be deserted or vacated before the
expiration of this lease, the LESSOR shall have the right to enter the same, as
agent of the LESSEE, without being liable for any prosecution of damages
therefor, and the LESSOR shall have the option to re-let the same, as the agent
of the LESSEE, and received the rent therefor to be applied in payment of the
rentals and damages due hereunder, holding the LESSEE liable for any
deficiency.’

6.    Sometime in 1988, Jopson Supermarket
(adjoining the leased premises) was beset with a strike by its laborers. Consequently, it ceased operations for about
two (2) years;

7.    Thereafter, in 1989, plaintiff’s
representatives were informed through the print media, of the sale of Jopson’s
business (supermarket) to Inland Supermarket;

8.    Thus, upon her arrival from the United
States in the second quarter of 1989, plaintiff instructed her representatives
to inspect the leased premises adjoining Jopson Supermarket, pursuant to
Section VII of the lease contract. True
indeed, plaintiff discovered, after a series of inspections done by plaintiff’s
representatives, that Jopson had vacated and deserted the leased premises
covered under the Contract of Lease (Annex “B”). Even worse, plaintiff discovered that Jopson tolerated the
illegal entry of defendant Inland Trailways into the property, without any
valid agreement;

9.    Accordingly, pursuant to Section III of the
Contract of Lease, the plaintiff’s lease contract with Jopson was rendered
automatically terminated and canceled. In November 1989, by virtue of Sections II and VII of the Contract of
Lease, plaintiff through her attorney-in-fact, Mario P. Sumulong, took
possession of the subject properties. Defendant Inland which was then occupying the subject properties,
offered no resistance to the take over, since defendant Inland Trailways could
not present any valid agreement granting it the right of possession over the
subject properties. (It is noteworthy
that alleged sublease procured by defendant Inland Trailways from Jopson was
executed only on April 2, 1990.)

10.    A couple of days later, defendant Inland
Trailways misrepresented to plaintiff that Mr. Hernan Jopson is also the owner
of Inland Supermarket, and that Jopson Supermarket had resumed operations under
the name of Inland Supermarket. Because
of defendant Inland Trailways’ misrepresentation, plaintiff was misled into
accepting a check payment from defendant Inland Trailways. x x x

11.    However, in December 1989, upon verification
by plaintiff’s representatives, plaintiff discovered that Jopson does not have
any interest in Inland Supermarket, or in Inland Trailways and that Jopson and
Inland Supermarket/Inland Trailways have a totally different set of directors
and stockholders. When confronted by
plaintiff’s representative, defendant’s representatives admitted such fact, and
further admitted that defendant Inland Trailways has no sub-lease agreement
with Jopson. Worse, neither defendant
Inland Trailways nor Inland Supermarket has any written contract with
plaintiff;

12.    Consequently, but still in December 1989,
upon discovering the misrepresentation, plaintiff notified Jopson of the
termination and cancellation of their lease contract, and took possession of
the subject properties. Again,
defendant Inland Trailways offered no resistance for lack of a valid agreement
granting it the right of possession over the subject properties;

13.    Thereafter, during the take over by the
plaintiff, defendant Inland Trailways, through its representatives Riza Moises
and Evelyn Castro, persuaded plaintiff’s representative Mario P. Sumulong, to
grant defendant Inland Trailways the temporary use of the subject properties,
pending negotiations for the lease of the premises. Anticipating in good faith that a lease contract would be
finalized, plaintiff agreed to let defendant Inland Trailways occupy the
subject properties. Negotiations were
then held from February 1 to March 1, 1990;

14.    However, due to defendant’s insistence on an
unreasonably low amount of the lease rental, plaintiff decided not to lease her
properties to defendant Inland Trailways. This was made known to the defendant in a letter dated March 14, 1990 by
plaintiff’s son, Mario P. Sumulong. A
copy of said letter is hereto attached, marked as Annex “D,” and made an
integral part hereof;

15.    At the same time, to fully protect her
interest, on March 14, 1990, plaintiff, thru her son Mario P. Sumulong,
formally notified Jopson of the termination of the Contract of Lease due to
abandonment of the leased premises. A
copy of said letter is hereto attached, marked as Annex “E,” and made an
integral part hereof;

16.    Likewise, on April 25, 1990, plaintiff, thru
counsel, confirmed of such termination. A copy of said letter is hereto attached, marked as Annex “F,” and made
an integral part hereof;

17.    However, on April 25, 1990, without
plaintiff’s knowledge, defendant Inland Trailways, through strategy and
stealth, procured a sub-lease agreement from Jopson, despite the fact that
plaintiff’s lease contract with Jopson had earlier been terminated and
cancelled. x x x It is significant that
the monthly rental of ELEVEN THOUSAND (P11,000.00) PESOS for the sub-lease of
the subject properties as contained in the sub-lease agreement, is grossly
disproportionate to the prevailing rental rates of real properties in the area,
and therefore show that the sub-lease agreement is a mere sham or ploy designed
to enable defendant Inland Trailways to gain entry and possession of the
subject properties without any valid lease contract with the plaintiff, and
after plaintiff decided not to lease the subject properties to the defendant. Furthermore, it bears to emphasize that the
sub-lease agreement was entered into only after Jopson had been served with the
notice of termination of its lease contract with plaintiff, and only after
defendant Inland Trailways was informed by plaintiff that she is not leasing
her premises to defendant;

18.    This alarming development compelled
plaintiff, through her representatives, to take over the physical possession of
the leased premises on April 4, 1990. However, on the night of April 4, 1990, defendant Inland Trailways again
misrepresented to plaintiff that it was ready to finalize the appropriate lease
contract with plaintiff. Such
misrepresentation misled plaintiff into allowing defendant Inland Trailways
once more to enter the subject properties;

19.    However, after defendant Inland Trailways
took possession of the subject properties, it maliciously refused to execute
and enter into a lease contract with plaintiff, and failed to deliver the
agreed monetary consideration for the temporary use of subject premises, or to
peacefully return possession of the same;

20.    Through such stealth and strategy, defendant
Inland Trailways illegally deprived plaintiff of the possession of the subject
properties to plaintiff’s great damage and prejudice;

21.    Except those times when plaintiff took over
the subject properties for a while, defendant Inland Trailways has remained in
illegal possession of the said premises, since June 1989, and, up to the
present, still retains such possession thereof;

22.    Despite repeated demands, defendant Inland
Trailways refuses to vacate the subject properties’ premises and to turn over
the peaceful possession thereof to plaintiff, having repeatedly threatened to
use ‘goons,’ the military, judges and senators to repel any attempt of
plaintiff to peacefully enforce her right. A copy of counsel’s latest
demand letter to defendant dated April 25, 1990 is hereto attached, marked as
Annex “H,” and made an integral part hereof;

23.    The reasonable rental value of said premises
based on an estimated fair market value of P6,500.00 per square meter is EIGHTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P80,000.00) a month;”^[17]

Forcible entry and unlawful detainer are two distinct causes of
action defined in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court. In forcible entry, one is deprived of physical
possession of any land or building by means of force, intimidation, threat,
strategy, or stealth. In unlawful
detainer, one unlawfully withholds possession thereof after the expiration or
termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, express or
implied. In forcible entry, the
possession is illegal from the beginning and the only issue is who has the
prior possession de facto. In
unlawful detainer, possession was originally lawful but became unlawful by the
expiration or termination of the right to possess and the issue of rightful
possession is the one decisive, for in such action, the defendant is the party
in actual possession and the plaintiff’s cause of action is the termination of
the defendant’s right to continue in possession.^[18]

Accordingly, in forcible entry, the plaintiff must allege in the
complaint and prove that he was in prior physical possession of the property in
litigation until he was deprived thereof by the defendant, but in unlawful
detainer, the plaintiff need not have prior physical possession of the
property,^[19]
or, elsewise stated, prior physical possession is not an indispensable
requirement in an unlawful detainer case.^[20]

The aforequoted allegations in the complaint of Sumulong
indubitably show that she anchors her claim of prior physical possession on her
peaceful take-over of the leased premises in November 1989 from INLAND who had
been in possession thereof since June 1989 allegedly by virtue of an oral
sublease contract. She overlooks,
however, that as her allegations show, she allowed INLAND to re-occupy the
premises in December 1989 when it misrepresented to her that Jopson was also
its (INLAND’s) owner. When it was
ascertained that Jopson was not, she again re-took possession of the premises,
only, thereafter, to allow again INLAND to temporarily re-occupy the premises
because of its representation that it will negotiate with her a contract of
lease in its favor. Such negotiations
were undertaken from 1 February 1990 to 1 March 1990.

However, since the parties could not agree on the rate of
rentals, and INLAND procured through “strategy and stealth” a sublease
agreement from Jopson on 2 April 1990, Sumulong re-took the physical possession
of the leased premises on 4 April 1990. However, on the night of the said date, INLAND misrepresented to her
that it was ready to finalize the appropriate lease contract and because of
that misrepresentation, INLAND was again able to re-occupy the premises. It is clear then that since Sumulong’s first
re-taking of possession in November 1989, INLAND was permitted to re-occupy the
premises thrice.

The words strategy and stealth, as means of
forcible entry, are used by Sumulong in paragraphs 17 and 20 of her
complaint. They refer, however, to the
procurement by INLAND of the sublease agreement on 2 April 1990 and its
misrepresentation that it was ready to finalize the appropriate lease
contract. Assuming them to be true,
those acts hardly constitute either strategy or stealth as a
means of forcible entry. “Strategy” in this
regard could only mean machination or artifice and considering that the parties
tangled for weeks to reach an agreement on the terms and conditions of a
contract of lease, no such machination or artifice could be said to have been
employed by INLAND. “Stealth,” on the
other hand, is defined as any secret, sly, or clandestine act to avoid
discovery and to gain entrance into or remain within residence of another
without permission.^[21] The
allegations then in paragraphs 17 and 20 of the complaint that INLAND employed
“strategy” and “stealth” are conclusions which are not supported by the
material operative facts averred in the complaint. On the contrary, they are negated by paragraph 21 which reads:

“21. Except those
times when plaintiff took over the subject properties for a while, defendant
Inland Trailways has remained in illegal
possession of the said premises, since
June 1989, and, up to the present,
still retains such possession thereof.”
(Emphasis supplied).

This paragraph and Sumulong’s allegations of strategy and stealth
on 4 April 1990 also refute her argument that for purposes of determining prior
physical possession, her retaking of the property in November 1989 should be
the basis in determining her cause of action for forcible entry. It must be stated, however, that whatever
illegality may have tainted INLAND’s entry in June 1989 was removed by
Sumulong’s acceptance of rentals from INLAND after her November 1989 take-over,
even if such acceptance was thru the latter’s misrepresentation that Jopson is
also its owner. INLAND’s succeeding
acts of re-­occupying the premises twice thereafter were tolerated by Sumulong
for the reasons earlier adverted to. We
thus agree with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the complaint fails to
show a cause of action for forcible entry. Neither was Sumulong able to prove it by her evidence, which on the
contrary, established that she allowed INLAND to re-occupy the premises, not
because of the claim of the latter of an oral sublease agreement and then of a
written sublease agreement, but because of the allegation that Jopson is the
owner of INLAND; that INLAND would negotiate for a formal lease contract; and
that INLAND was ready to finalize the lease contract.

Also, from the allegations in the complaint, the nullity of the
sublease agreement which INLAND allegedly obtained from Jopson on 2 April 1990
is beyond question. Jopson had no right
to sublease the property since the contract of lease in its favor had already
been automatically cancelled pursuant to Section III thereof and Jopson was
properly notified of such automatic cancellation first in December 1989 and
then on 14 March 1990. Neither party
proved that Jopson protested the cancellation of the contract of lease. A sublessee can invoke no right superior to
that of his sublessor.^[22]
Consequently, as correctly held by the MTC, “the written sublease was only
resorted to by Defendant [INLAND] when the parties could not agree as to the
terms of a new lease,”^[23] which,
however, the MTC erroneously considered as the act which constituted “stealth
and strategy.”^[24]

Notwithstanding the foregoing, the complaint should not have been
dismissed merely for its failure to state a cause of action for forcible entry,
for although Sumulong has designated or denominated it in the caption as one
for forcible entry, her allegations in the body thereof
sufficiently establish a cause of action for unlawful detainer. Well-settled is the rule that what
determines the nature of the action as well as the court which has jurisdiction
over the case are the allegations in the complaint.^[25]
The cause of action in a complaint is not what the designation of the complaint
states, but what the allegations in the body of the complaint define or describe. The designation or caption is not
controlling, more than the allegations in the complaint themselves are, for it
is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.^[26]
It is equally settled that in an action for unlawful detainer, an allegation
that the defendant is unlawfully withholding possession from the plaintiff is
deemed sufficient,^[27] and
a complaint for unlawful detainer is sufficient if it alleges that the
withholding of possession or the refusal to vacate is unlawful without
necessarily employing the terminology of the law.^[28]

It is easily discernible from the allegations in the complaint
that the re-occupation by INLAND of the premises in question in December 1989
— after it was discovered that INLAND was not owned by Jopson — was by virtue
of Sumulong’s tolerance because INLAND promised to negotiate for a contract of
lease and consequently, its continuance in possession was conditioned on the
execution of a lease contract. Possession by tolerance is lawful.^[29]
However, a person who occupies the land of another at the latter’s tolerance or
permission without any contract between them is
necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against him.^[30] So
here, as alleged in the complaint, when the negotiations for a lease contract
fell through and Sumulong made “repeated demands”^[31]
for INLAND to vacate the Sumulong property but “defendant Inland Trailways
refuse[d] to vacate the subject properties’ premises and to turn over the
peaceful possession thereof to plaintiff,”^[32]
INLAND’s possession became unlawful. Such repeated demands for INLAND to vacate the property are sufficient
compliance with the jurisdictional requirement of demand in an unlawful
detainer case. In Hautea vs. Magallon,^[33] we held that an allegation in an
original complaint for illegal detainer that
in spite of demands made by the plaintiff the defendants had refused to
restore the land is considered sufficient compliance with the jurisdictional requirement
of previous demand.

Accordingly, we rule that the allegations in the complaint in
Civil Case No. 132844-CV adequately and sufficiently establish a cause of
action for unlawful detainer and that the prayer therein is equally appropriate
for an action for unlawful detainer. The evidence summarized in the MTC’s decision preponderantly supports
that cause of action. A judgment then
for unlawful detainer could be validly rendered in Civil Case No. 132844-CV and
the dispositive portion of the MTC’s decision therein is consistent with that
for unlawful detainer, except that the fixed reasonable compensation for the
use of the premises should only commence to run from December 1989 and not from
June 1989.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of the Court of
Appeals of 28 January 1993 in CA-G.R. SP No. 27987 and the decision of Branch
51 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila of 23 April 1992 in Civil Case No.
91-58122 are SET ASIDE while the decision of Branch 9 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Manila of 3 June 1991 in Civil
Case No. 132844-CV is REINSTATED, subject to the modification indicated
above.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

^[1]
Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, 9-26; 64-81. Per Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna, concurred in by Associate
Justices Antonio M. Martinez and Ma. Alicia Austria-Martinez.

^[2]
Entitled “Esperanza P. Sumulong, represented by Mario P. Sumulong vs. Hon.
Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 51 and Inland Trailways, Inc..”

^[3]
Annex “D” of Petition; Rollo, 96-98. Per Judge Rustico V. Panganiban.

^[4]
Annex “C” of Petition; Id., 93-95. Per Judge Pedro J. Callejo, Jr.

^[5]
Rollo, 94-95.

^[6]
Id., 94.

^[7]
Id.

^[8]
Id., 96.

^[9]
Rollo, 98.

^[10]
Annex “E” of Petition; Id., 99-117.

^[11]
Id., 107.

^[12]
Rollo, 23-24; 78-79.

^[13]
Id., 48; 51.

^[14]
Rollo, 49-51.

^[15]
Rollo, 180.

^[16]
1 MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 490 (1979 ed.).

^[17]
Rollo, 83-89.

^[18]
????? MANUEL V. MORAN, COMMENTS ON THE RULES OF COURT 312 (1980
ed.).

^[19]
Demamay vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 608, 612 [1990].

^[20]
Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, 43 SCRA 136, 144 [1972].

^[21]
Black’s Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1267.

^[22]
Heirs of Eugenio Sevilla, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 206 SCRA 559
[1992].

^[23]
Rollo, 94.

^[24]
Id.

^[25]
Abrin vs. Campos, 203 SCRA 420 [1991]; Mariategui vs. Court of
Appeals, 205 SCRA 337 [1992]; Abad vs. Court of First Instance, 206 SCRA
567 [1992]; Del Castillo vs. Aguinaldo, 212 SCRA 169 [1992]; Santos vs.
Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 162 [1992].

^[26]
Feranil vs. Arcilla, 88 SCRA 770, 776 [1979].

^[27]
Maddamu vs. Judge of Municipal Court of Manila, 74 Phil. 230 [1943].

^[28]
Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672, 685 [1946]; Valderrama Lumber
Manufacturer’s Co. vs. L.S. Sarmiento Co., 5 SCRA 287, 291 [1962];
Pangilinan vs. Aguilar, supra.

^[29]
Prieto vs. Reyes, 14 SCRA 430, 432 [1965]; Pangilinan vs.
Aguilar, supra.; Peran vs. Presiding Judge,
125 SCRA 78 [1983].

^[30]
Yu vs. de Lara, 6 SCRA 785 [1962]; Pangilinan
vs. Aguilar, supra.; Dakudao vs. Consolacion, 122
SCRA 877 [1983]; Banco de Oro Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. Court of
Appeals, 182 SCRA 464 [1990].

^[31]
Rollo, 89.

^[32]
Id.

^[33]
12 SCRA 514 [1964]. See also Jakihaca vs.
Aquino, 181 SCRA 67 [1990].