ENGR. ISAGANI MERCADO, PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition to review on certiorari the decision of
the Court of Appeals, affirming the conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
the petitioner, Isagani Mercado, for estafa under art. 315, par. 2(a) of the
Revised Penal Code.

Five prosecution witnesses testified at the trial that they and
six others each gave P5,000 to the petitioner on the latter’s representation
that he would help them find jobs overseas; that they gave the money to him on
November 5, 1984, at around 9:00 a.m., in the house of Julian Garcia, Sr. in
Lumban, Laguna; that they knew and trusted him because he was their townmate
and some of them were even related by blood to him; that for the entire amount
of P55,000.00 petitioner issued only one receipt which was signed by him in
front of them; and that the promises of the petitioner that they would be able
to travel and work abroad never materialized.

Petitioner claimed that he could not have been in Lumban, Laguna
at 9:00 a.m. on November 5, 1984, because he had been admitted as a patient of
the Manila Sanitarium in Pasay City at 4:00 a.m. on that day for PTB minimal
reaction and acute bronchitis, and was confined there for four days until
November 9, 1984. To prove this, he
produced a certification from the Manila Sanitarium which he later admitted was
issued only on September 14, 1987.

A medical records employee of the hospital, Jeremiah Lovenaria,
testified that, based on the Radiological Report, Physician Notes, Urinalysis,
and Hermatology Report of the petitioner, as well as the certification issued
by his department head, Dr. Pacita Timonera, on April 18, 1990, petitioner was
confined at the Manila Sanitarium from November 5-9, 1984. On cross examination, the witness testified
that his records did not show the time petitioner was confined.

The RTC rejected petitioner’s alibi because it was not shown that
it was impossible for petitioner to be in Lumban, Laguna at 9:00 o’clock on the
morning of November 5, 1984. Even if he
was admitted to the hospital at 4:00 o’clock in the morning of that day, this
fact would not prevent him from being in Lumban, Laguna at 9:00 o’clock, as it
would take only one and 1/2 hours to travel from Manila to Lumban. Petitioner could have gone out of the
hospital on a pass and later returned, as he was not shown to be seriously ill.

The court also noted that the petitioner did not question the
genuineness of his signature on the receipt given to the witnesses. He did not deny the claim of witnesses, made
in his presence, that he signed the receipt himself. This was deemed by the RTC to be an admission. The RTC, therefore, found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of estafa.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, finding that the
petitioner’s claim that he had been admitted to the hospital at 4:00 o’clock in
the morning of November 5, 1984 was not supported by hospital records, as the
time of admission was not indicated therein. It took into account the fact that five prosecution witnesses gave
similar versions of what transpired on November 5, 1984 in the house of Julian
Garcia, Sr. The appellate court considered
inconsistencies in their testimonies to be minor lapses which did not affect
their credibility. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the decision of the trial court, with the modification that the
minimum of the indeterminate sentence was reduced from 5 years, 2 months, and
11 days to 4 months and 2 days.

Petitioner seeks a reversal of the decision of the Court of
Appeals based on the following assignment of errors:

I

FIRST
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THAT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRE­TION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
IN RELYING ON THE DECISIONS CITED BY THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (PAGE
6 AND 7 DECISION) REFERRING TO THE CASE OF
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ABAYA 188 SCRA 419 WHICH ALLEGED AS
FOLLOWS:

“Taken as a whole, the prosecu­tion
witnesses were consistent in their narration as to how the crime of estafa was
committed by appel­lant. Minor lapses
in the testimony of the witnesses do not necessarily brand them as liars as long as their testimonies are in whole
consistent and believable.”

WHICH CITATION IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THIS
CASE. HENCE, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED
CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS WHICH WERE NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES, WHICH IF
PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.

II

SECOND
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE CERTIFICATION OF A WELL KNOWN PRACTISING DOCTOR, DR.
PACITA TIMONERA OF THE MANILA SANITARIUM AND HOSPITAL WHO CERTIFIED AMONG
OTHERS THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ISAGANI MERCADO’S PERIOD OF CONFINEMENT FROM
NOVEMBER 5, 1984 TO NOVEMBER 9, 1984, WHICH FACT WAS NEVER DISPUTED BY THE
PROSECUTION.

III

THIRD
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACTS OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONFLICTING.

Anent the first assignment of error, we do not believe that the
testimonies of the witnesses suffer from any major discrepancies. What is important is that all of the
prosecution witnesses positively identified petitioner as the person to whom
they paid money. They could not be
mistaken as to his identity because he is well-known to them being their
town-mate who is even related to some of them. Any inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses are the understandable result of natural
differences in perception of the same set of facts.

On the second assignment of error, it appears that the only
evidence supporting petitioner’s alibi that he was confined in the Manila
Sanitarium at 9:00 a.m. when the crime was committed is his own self-serving
testimony. This alone is not enough to
over­turn the overwhelming evidence against
him.

On the third assignment
of error, the RTC held that
petitioner did not question the genuineness of the signature on the
receipt and, therefore, he is deemed
to have admitted the same. However, according to petitioner, the appellate court found that he did
question the authenticity of the signature on the receipt. There are thus
conflicting findings, according to him.

The conflict is more
apparent than real. As the appellate court explained, at the suggestion of
petitioner, the receipt was submitted to the NBI for determination of the authenticity of the signature. Accordingly, the judge suspended the
proceedings. Later, however, the
petitioner’s counsel withdrew from the case and his new counsel proceeded with
the trial without waiting for the results of the NBI examination. In addition the NBI needed five genuine
signatures of petitioner but the
latter did not comply with this request.

Indeed, the appellate court found that what the petitioner was
questioning was what appeared on top of the signature, which he alleged was
only superimposed on the receipt, and therefore, not the signature itself.

We find, therefore, no reversible error warranting reversal of
the appealed decision. The questions
are factual and the rule is that factual findings of the appellate court will
not be disturbed unless shown to be contrary to the evidence on the record,
which petitioner has not shown in this case.

Upon further consideration, therefore, the Court RESOLVED
to RECONSIDER its resolution of February 23, 1994 giving due course to the
petition for review on certiorari in this case and to DENY the petition
for review.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Padilla, Regalado, and Puno, JJ., concur.