PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. SAMUEL MARRA Y ZARATE, ALLAN TAN, ALIAS “ALLAN YAO,” PETER DOE, PAUL DOE AND TOM DOE, ACCUSED. SAMUEL MARRA Y ZARATE, ACCUSED-…
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People versus Marra
The Case
This is a criminal appeal in which the People of the Philippines prosecuted Samuel Marra for the fatal shooting of Nelson Tandoc in Dagupan City in the early hours of March 7, 1992. Marra was convicted of murder and elevated his conviction to the Supreme Court, which reviewed the sufficiency of the eyewitness identification, the admissibility of his oral admission to the police, and the aggravating circumstances. The case matters to a reviewee because it is a compact teaching vehicle on three recurring bar topics: the credibility of a single eyewitness under physical conditions of visibility, the precise moment when custodial investigation begins under the Bill of Rights, and the elements of treachery and nighttime as qualifying and aggravating circumstances.
Procedural History
An information for murder was filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, Dagupan City, against Samuel Marra and several persons designated as John Doe, Peter Doe, Paul Doe and Tom Doe. An amended information later substituted Allan Tan, alias Allan Yao, for John Doe. A warrant of arrest was issued against Allan Tan but was returned unserved, so trial proceeded against Samuel Marra alone. Upon arraignment, duly assisted by counsel, Marra pleaded not guilty. After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment on October 8, 1992, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder attended by the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay the heirs of Nelson Tandoc 50,000 pesos as death indemnity, 50,000 pesos as actual damages, 100,000 pesos as moral damages, and the costs. Marra appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court, which decided the case on September 20, 1994.
Facts
At around two o'clock in the morning of March 7, 1992, Jimmy Din and his friend Nelson Tandoc were conversing in front of the Lucky Hotel on M. H. del Pilar Street, Dagupan City, a hotel owned by Din's father and administered by Din. A man passing on the opposite side of the street made a dirty sign with his finger, and when Din told Tandoc about it, the man repeated the offensive act and waved them over. Infuriated, Din and Tandoc followed him until he stopped in front of the Dunkin' Donuts store at the corner of Arellano and Fernandez streets, where they demanded an explanation and received none. Two men then arrived and one asked what was going on; Tandoc unexpectedly slapped one of them, and a brawl ensued, with Tandoc fighting the two men while Din exchanged blows with the man who had made the sign. Their three opponents then ran away westward.
Tandoc and Din walked back to the hotel, but as they were about to enter, they saw the same men running toward them. They ran inside the annex building and locked the sliding outer door, waited ten to fifteen minutes in a room, and then, thinking the men had gone, decided to go home. As Tandoc pushed the sliding door open, Din saw Marra, then wearing a security guard's uniform, shoot Tandoc with a revolver. A fluorescent bulb on the front wall of the hotel illuminated the scene. Tandoc, shot in the middle of the chest, fell and told Din, "Tol, I was shot." Din tried to chase the assailant and his companions but failed, and Tandoc was brought to Villaflor Hospital, where he expired an hour later.
At about 3:45 in the morning, SPO3 Reynaldo de Vera received a report of the shooting and proceeded to the scene with other officers, then to the hospital, where Din said he could recognize the killer, who had been wearing a security guard's polo shirt. At an eatery called Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw, a security guard of a nearby bus company told them he had seen the guard of that eatery, with companions, chasing two persons, and pointed to a man eating inside who was no longer in uniform. The man admitted he was the security guard of Linda's Ihaw-Ihaw and identified himself as Samuel Marra, saying his tour of duty ran from seven in the evening to six in the morning and that his firearm was in his house. They went to his residence, where Marra took a .38 caliber revolver from a cabinet and handed it to De Vera, who also found five live bullets and one spent shell and smelled gunpowder on the barrel. When asked point-blank why he shot Tandoc, Marra first denied it, but when told that someone saw him, he admitted shooting the victim once and claimed self-defense, saying Tandoc had a samurai sword, which the police could not locate. Marra was taken to the police station, where Din positively identified him, and De Vera learned that Marra had no firearm license. An autopsy showed a gunshot wound entering the left anterior chest wall and exiting at the lower left portion of the right shoulder.
Issues
- Whether or not the eyewitness Jimmy Din positively and credibly identified Samuel Marra as the assailant despite the distance and the door of the hotel.
- Whether or not Marra's admission to the police that he shot Tandoc was made during custodial investigation and is therefore inadmissible for want of the constitutional warnings.
- Whether or not the crime was murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by nighttime.
Applicable Provisions
Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice.
This fixes the point at which the rights of a suspect attach, and the Court used it to test whether Marra's admission was made during custodial investigation.
Section 33, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, as cited in the decision, provides:
The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him.
This is the basis for receiving Marra's oral admission, which the Court also regarded as part of the res gestae.
Ruling
On the first issue, the Court held that Din was in a position to identify the assailant. Din had taken a good look at the men during the earlier brawl and during the chase, when he turned around and saw them in front of the well-lighted Balingit Trading store, so he knew them by their previous encounter. The sliding door did not block his view, because its weakened spring hinge took time to close, and at the moment Tandoc pushed it open Din stood at Tandoc's left, four to five meters from the assailant. The place was brightly lit by a 20-watt fluorescent bulb on the wall in front of the hotel, and Marra was only about three meters from it. The Court also rejected the argument that Marra was not in uniform when seen by the police, since by his own account he had gone home to change clothes after his tour of duty ended at four in the morning, while the shooting occurred at around two, when he was still on duty.
On the second issue, the Court held that Marra was not under custodial investigation when he admitted the shooting. Custodial investigation, the Court explained, involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, and the rule operates only after the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect who is taken into custody and interrogated in a manner tending to elicit incriminating statements. Here there was no coercion, the police inquiry had not yet focused on Marra as a particular suspect, and he could have refused to answer from the start. His statement was a spontaneous admission, competent evidence against him under the rule on admissions and in a sense part of the res gestae, and De Vera's testimony destroyed the defense of denial and alibi. In any event, the Court added, the case was established even without the admission.
On the third issue, the Court agreed that the killing was murder qualified by treachery, but rejected nighttime as an aggravating circumstance, since no evidence showed that nocturnity was specially sought or taken advantage of to facilitate the crime or ensure immunity from capture. Whether or not it was appreciated would not affect the penalty, given the proscription against the death penalty at the time the offense was committed.
Doctrine
First, the right to counsel and to silence under Section 12, paragraph 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution attaches only at the start of custodial investigation, which begins when the general inquiry into an unsolved crime focuses on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody and is interrogated in a way that tends to elicit incriminating statements; statements made before that point are spontaneous admissions, not confessions, and are admissible.
Second, the declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against him under Section 33, Rule 130, and an oral admission heard and understood by a witness may be testified to in substance.
Third, identification testimony is weighed against the physical conditions of visibility, the witness's familiarity with the assailant from a prior encounter, and the witness's proximity to the scene.
Fourth, nighttime is not aggravating unless it was specially sought or taken advantage of to facilitate the crime or to ensure immunity from capture.
Disposition
The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court finding Samuel Marra guilty of murder and imposing reclusion perpetua and the stated civil liabilities, with costs.
Remember This
Memorize the line that custodial investigation begins only when the general inquiry into an unsolved crime focuses on a particular suspect who is taken into custody and interrogated to elicit incriminating statements. Examiners use this case to test the threshold of custodial investigation and the admissibility of spontaneous oral admissions, and to test when nighttime may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.