G.R. No. 108453. July 11, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. DONALD DISMUKE Y PAMARITO, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
In an information[1] filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and docketed therein
as Criminal Case No. 994-V-92, accused Donald Dismuke y Pamarito was charged with the violation of Section 4, Article
II of R.A. No. 6425, as amended, committed in this wise:
“That on or about the 8th day of February 1992 in Valenzuela,
MM. and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, without having been authorized by law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously deliver, sell and give away to one PO2 Nelson
Labrador two tea bags of marijuana flowering tops for one Twenty peso bill with
SN QB65721, knowing the same to be a prohibited drug under the provision of the
above-cited law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.”
The accused pleaded not guilty at his arraignment on 24 February
1992.
After trial on the merits, the lower court promulgated on 28
August 1992 its decision[2]
finding the accused guilty of the crime charged and sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to pay a fine of P20,000.00, and to
pay the costs.
In the main, the prosecution’s case drew its support from the
uncorroborated testimony of PO3 Nelson Labrador of the Northern Police District
Anti-Narcotics Unit (NPD-ANU). He had
joined the National Police Service on 5 November 1991.[3]
According to him, at about 3:00 p.m. of 8 February 1992 (barely three months
after he had joined the service), he was at the office of the NPD-ANU at
Sangandaan, Caloocan City, when an informer arrived and told him that a certain
“Donald” was selling marijuana.[4] He
then decided to conduct a buy-bust operation, with himself acting as the buyer,
and with PO3 Eliseo Gargaritano and PO3 Wilfredo Lumba as the other team
members. Together with the informer,
they proceeded to Consuelo Street, Doña Ata Subdivision, Marulas, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila. They arrived at their
destination at about 5:00 p.m. and while cruising around, their informer
pointed to a man near a sari-sari store as Donald, the accused in this
case. Labrador, who was in plainclothes,
approached Donald and told the latter of his “intention to buy P20.00 worth of marijuana.” Since
Donald “trusted” him, he (Labrador) “gave him the buy/bust
money” and Donald in turn gave the former “two teabags of
marijuana.”[5]
Then, pursuant to the team’s pre-arranged signal, Labrador held Donald’s right
hand. Responding thereto, the other
members of the team came out from their strategic locations, identified
themselves, and assisted Labrador in arresting Donald. The team then brought Donald to the NPD-ANU
office in Sangandaan, Caloocan City, where he was turned over to the unit’s
investigator, a certain Reynaldo Lichido, for proper disposition and
investigation. The latter prepared a
referral-letter to the PC Laboratory for examination of the tea bags.
Labrador, however, could only produce in court a photocopy of the
alleged marked money (Exhibit “E”) because the bill itself was
allegedly in the custody of PO3 Gargaritano. The bill had supposedly been marked by Gargaritano on the “Saligang
Batas” portion thereof.[6] The
latter, despite subpoenas sent to him, failed
to appear, thereby causing the postponement of the hearing and prompting the
trial court to issue orders requiring him to show cause why he should not be
held in contempt of court.[7]
Although he subsequently appeared, the prosecution did not present him as a
witness in the case.
Through Ms. Tita V. Advincula, a forensic chemist of the PNP
Central Laboratory Section, Central Police District, Manila, the prosecution
also proved that the contents of the two heat-sealed transparent plastic bags
(Exhibits “B-1” and “B-2”), which were transmitted to her
office by PNP Inspector Asuncion S. Santos of the District Dangerous Drug Enforcement Division of the Northern Police
District Command, were found positive “for marijuana, a prohibited
drug.”[8]
On the other hand, through the testimonies of the accused and
Dennis Pinpin, the defense presented a different version of the incident. According to the accused, in the afternoon
of 8 February 1992, he and his friends, namely, Dennis Pinpin, Ricky Pinpin,
and Erwin Soriano were at Consuelo Street, Marulas, Valenzuela, helping their
friend, Allan Olequino, transfer residence.[9]
Suddenly, a tricycle stopped, and PO3 Nelson Labrador and his two companions,
Erning and Vicente, alighted from the tricycle. Labrador asked who among them had quarreled with his
brother. Labrador’s companions pointed
to the accused and so Nelson
told him to board the tricycle and picked up a piece of wood which he
brandished at him. The three forced him
to board the tricycle. The accused
protested that he had not done anything, but he was told to do his explaining
at the police headquarters. He was not,
however, brought to the headquarters but to a place near the barangay hall at
F. Bautista Street in Marulas where he was questioned about the identities of
the pushers in the area. When he failed
to name or pinpoint any pusher, he was taken to the Sangandaan police
headquarters where PO3 Labrador took out two plastic teabags of marijuana which
Labrador threatened to use against him if he would still refuse to name the
pushers. Nonetheless, he insisted that
he did not know any pusher. He was
detained at the said headquarters for about two days. Thereafter, he was brought before a fiscal in Caloocan City after
being warned not to say anything against them.[10]
The accused further testified that during his school days at the
Valenzuela Municipal High School in 1990, he intervened in a fight between his
neighbor and Noel Labrador, a brother of PO3 Labrador. When he failed to pacify them, he boxed
Noel, hitting him on the chin. This
incident came to the knowledge of the school principal who then called them to
a conference, which PO3 Labrador attended. He had personally known PO3 Labrador for a long time because the
latter’s residence is at F. Bautista Street, Marulas, Valenzuela, which is
merely within “walking distance” from where he, the accused, lived.[11]
Dennis Pinpin, a neighbor, friend, and former schoolmate of
Donald, corroborated the latter’s testimony on the incident of 8 February 1992.[12]
He also testified that he was the one who had a misunderstanding with Noel
Labrador in 1990. He reported the
matter to Donald who tried to settle their differences but Donald ended up
fighting with Noel. He, Donald, and
Noel were called to the principal’s office and were reprimanded by the
principal. At the said conference,
Noel’s parents and PO3 Labrador were present. Thereafter, Noel threatened them by saying that the fight was not yet
over.[13]
The lower court found the testimony of PO3 Labrador to be
credible and positive and dismissed the accused’s claim that he was framed and
that the charge was ill-motivated. It
said:
“The alleged quarrel happened in 1990
almost two years ago and was allegedly patched up and settled by the school
principal in the presence of PO2 Nelson Labrador. If it is true that there was a fight/quarrel, the Labradors will
not wait that long a time to take the alleged vindictive move.”[14]
In his Appellant’s Brief,
the accused asserts that the trial court erred:
“I
X X X IN GIVING WEIGHT AND CREDENCE TO THE IMPROBABLE AND
INCREDIBLE TESTIMONY OF THE PROSECUTION LONE EYEWITNESS.
II
X X X IN ADMITTING IN
EVIDENCE THE TWO TEA BAGS OF MARIJUANA WHICH WAS PLANTED BY POLICE OFFICER
NELSON LABRADOR IN BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE ACCUSED[‘S] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS.
III
X X X IN NOT HOLDING
THAT THE PROSECUTION MISERABLY FAILED TO PROVE THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.”[15]
At the heart of these
assigned errors is the issue of credibility of witnesses. It is well-settled that this Court will not
interfere with the judgment of the trial court in passing on the credibility of
the witnesses, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has
been misapprehended or misinterpreted.[16] The reason for this is that the trial court
is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the
trial.[17]
A careful review of the
records of this case and a meticulous evaluation of the evidence of the parties
reveal vital facts and circumstances which the trial court overlooked or
misapprehended and which if taken into account would alter the result of this
case.
For one thing, the accused personally knew PO3 Labrador; they had
met in 1990 in the principal’s office of the Valenzuela Municipal High School during
a confrontation between PO3 Labrador’s brother, Nelson, on the one hand, and
Dennis Pinpin and the accused on the other, after the accused had intervened in
the fight between Nelson and Dennis and boxed Nelson on his chin. It is, therefore, most unlikely that the
accused would sell a prohibited drug to a brother of former foe who, after the
confrontation, had warned that the fight was not yet over.[18]
This incident could have provided PO3 Labrador with a motive against the
accused. The trial court is of the view
that it could not have, because the incident happened two years earlier, the
dispute was settled by the principal, and if Labrador desired revenge, he would
not have waited for two years. We do
not agree. While time may heal wounds
of conflict, it does not necessarily extinguish the desire for vengeance, which
may just hibernate until the circumstances become favorable.
In the instant case, the favorable circumstances could have
arisen when PO3 Labrador joined the PNP in November of 1991. Within three months thereafter, he conducted
the alleged buy-bust operation against the accused solely on the basis of an
alleged tip from an informer given two hours before he conducted the
operation. It may be noted that PO3
Labrador did not testify that he had obtained other derogatory information
against the accused or that he had known the accused to be a drug dealer,
pusher, or user. His conduct in this
case tainted the presumption of regularity in the performance of his duty.
For another, we have serious doubts on the existence of the
alleged marked money. There is no
evidence as to who provided it and as to when and where it was allegedly marked
by PO3 Gargaritano. What Labrador
produced was a mere photocopy of the alleged marked money (Exhibit
“E”). He claimed that the
marked money itself was in the possession of Gargaritano. If it was in Gargaritano’s possession, we
cannot understand why he was not called anymore to the witness stand to testify
for the prosecution when he finally appeared in court in compliance with its
orders.
While the presentation in evidence of the marked money in drugs
cases resulting from buy-bust operations may not be indispensable,[19]
the peculiar circumstances of this case, heightened by the attempt of the
alleged poseur-buyer to present a photocopy of what he claims to be the
buy-bust money and the unexplained failure of the prosecution to call to the
witness stand the claimed custodian of the marked money although the latter had already appeared in court,
only taint further the veracity of PO3 Labrador’s story.
Exhibit “E” is not admissible in evidence under the
best evidence rule.[20] To
be admissible as secondary evidence, the prosecution should have shown that the
original marked money has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court
or that it is in the custody of the adverse party.[21]
The prosecution did not.
Then too, the prosecution failed to prove that the specimens
examined by the forensic chemist were the ones purportedly sold by the accused
to PO3 Labrador. According to the
latter, when they arrived at their headquarters after the buy-bust operation,
he turned over the accused to their investigator, a certain Reynaldo Lichido,
for proper disposition and investigation. Lichido also “immediately prepared the referral to the PC
Laboratory for examination in order to be sure if the specimen is
positive.”[22]
What the forensic chemist examined were the contents of “two transparent
plastic bag [sic] containing flowering tops with rolling papers suspected to be
marijuana” transmitted by PNP Inspector Asuncion Santos, Officer-in-Charge
of the District Dangerous Drugs Enforcement Division of the Northern Police
District Command.[23] Both
Lichido and Santos were not presented by the prosecution to testify in this
case. Thus, there is no evidence to
prove that what were allegedly sold by the accused to PO3 Labrador were
actually the ones turned over to Lichido, that what the latter received were
turned over to Santos, and that what Santos transmitted to the forensic chemist
were those allegedly sold by the accused. The failure to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is damaging to
the prosecution’s case.
On the whole then, the scanty evidence for the prosecution casts
serious doubts as to the guilt of the accused. It does not pass the test of
moral certainty and is insufficient to rebut the presumption of innocence which
the Bill of Rights guarantees the accused. It is apropos to repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not,
according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt; the prosecution must
overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.[24]
In the light of the above
disquisition, it is apparent that the law enforcement agency charged with the
enforcement of the Dangerous Drugs Act is partly to be blamed for the result of
this case, assuming that it does have a case against the accused. In People vs. Tantiado,[25]
we exhorted “the law enforcement
agencies, especially those assigned to enforce the Dangerous Drugs Act, to
carefully prepare their plans for buy-bust operations and to efficiently and
effectively carry them out, ever mindful of the possibility that their blunders
may not only frustrate the efforts to eradicate the drug menace but worse,
embolden drug lords, pushers or users into defying the authorities.”
Equally at fault is the prosecuting arm of the Government, whose ineptitude in
prosecuting the case warrants that its attention be likewise directed, as in
the Tantiado case and the
recent case of People vs. Camba,[26]
to what was said in People
vs. Esquivel:[27]
“In this connection it may not be out of place to bring to the
attention of prosecuting attorneys the absolute necessity of laying before the
court the pertinent facts at their disposal with methodical and meticulous attention,
clarifying contradictions and filling up gaps and loopholes in their evidence,
to the end that the court’s mind may not be tortured by doubts, that the
innocent may not suffer and the guilty not escape unpunished. Obvious to all, this is the prosecution’s
prime duty to the court, to the accused, and to the state.”
Again, just like in People vs. Camba,[28] we cannot help but notice that the trial court imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua which
was not the penalty provided for by law at the time the offense charged was
allegedly committed. Although the
penalty imposable is now immaterial, we call the trial court’s attention to the
fact that the penalty then imposable was life imprisonment, if only to underscore
the need to impose only the penalty which the law prescribes.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of Branch 171 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila, in Criminal Case No. 994-V-92 is REVERSED and, on the ground of reasonable doubt, accused-appellant
DONALD DISMUKE y PAMARITO is
hereby ACQUITTED. His immediate release from detention is hereby ordered, unless further detention for any lawful cause
is warranted.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Quiason, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
[1]
Original Records (OR) 1. The
information is dated 10 February 1992.
[2]
OR, 53-58; Rollo, 13-18. Per
Judge Adriano R. Osorio of Branch 171.
[3]
TSN, 24 April 1992, 9; TSN, 13 May 1992, 10.
[4]
TSN, 24 April 1992, 10.
[5]
Id., 9-10.
[6]
TSN, 24 April 1992, 11.
[7]
Orders of 9 March 1992 (OR, 10) and 8 April 1992 (OR, 20).
[8]
Exhibit “C”; OR, 34; TSN, 24 April 1992, 4-6.
[9]
TSN, 6 July 1992, 2-3.
[10]
Id., 3-4.
[11]
TSN, 6 July 1992, 5-6.
[12]
TSN, 27 July 1992, 4-7.
[13]
Id., 9-10.
[14]
OR, 57; Rollo, 17.
[15]
Rollo, 37.
[16]
United States vs. Ambrosio, 17
Phil. 295 [1910].
[17]
People vs. Tismo, 204 SCRA 535
[1991]; People vs. Lee, 204
SCRA 900 [1991]; People vs.
Simon, 209 SCRA 148 [1992]; People vs. Jumamoy, 221 SCRA 333
[1993]; People vs. Kyamko, 222 SCRA 183 [1993].
[18]
TSN, 27 July 1992, 10.
[19]
People vs. Pascual, 208 SCRA 393
[1992].
[20]
Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
[21]
Sections 5 and 6, Rule 130, Rules of Court.
[22]
TSN, 24 April 1992, 12.
[23]
Exhibit “A”; OR, 32.
[24]
People vs. Dramayo, 42 SCRA 59 [1971]; People vs. Garcia, 215
SCRA 349 [1992].
[25]
213 SCRA 365 [1992].
[26]
G.R. No. 97960, 10 May 1994.
[27]
82 Phil. 453, 459 [1948].
[28]
Supra.