REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT

The four (4) herein consolidated petitions have as their common
prayer the nullification of the already approved and partially implemented
compromise agreement dated November 3, 1990 executed between Roberto S.
Benedicto and the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) represented
by its then Chairman, David M. Castro, and the setting aside of the
Sandiganbayan decision dated October 2, 1992 approving the compromise agreement
and rendering judgment in accordance with its terms. G.R. No. 108548-49 and 108550 were filed by eleven (11) sugar
cane planters and two (2) corporations engaged in the milling of sugar cane who
additionally ask for permission to intervene and to be admitted as parties to
Civil Cases No. 0024 and No. 0028 before the Sandiganbayan.

The subject matters of the disputed compromise agreement are
Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0009, Civil Case No. 00234, Civil Case No. 0034,
the Phil-Asia case before the Tanodbayan and
PCGG I.S. No. 1. The cases arose
from complaints for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
damages against former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, members of his family,
and alleged cronies, one of whom is said to be respondent Roberto S. Benedicto.

The compromise agreement involved in these petitions is the third
one in a series of global settle­ments effected between the Republic and
respondent Benedicto. In March, 1990
the cases brought by the Republic against Benedicto in the United States were
settled through a plea bargaining agreement approved by the New York Court and
a “Settlement and Partial Release of Claims” approved by the
California Court of Los Angeles. On
July 20 and 23, 1990, the cases in Switzerland involving Benedicto’s bank
deposits in that country were settled by another agreement between the Republic
and Benedicto. In fact, as early as
December, 1986, the PCGG and Benedicto had already entered into temporary
arrangements covering the management and operations of Benedicto’s media
business – BBC Channel 2, IBC Channel 13, Sining Makulay (CATV), and the Daily
Express. No questions have been raised
against the first two settlements. The
management issue at Broadcast City was decided by this Court in Benedicto vs. Board of Administrators of
Television Stations RPN,
BBC and IBC (207 SCRA
659 [1992]).

Under the compromise agreement, Benedicto and his
group-controlled corporations ceded to the government certain pieces of
property listed in Annex A of the agreement and assigned or transferred
whatever rights he may have, if any, to the government over all corporate
assets listed in Annex B of the agreement (pp. 115-125, Rollo in G.R. No.
108292).

The PCGG in turn, lifted the sequestrations over the property
listed in Annex C (p. 125, Rollo) as well as other assets mentioned in the
agreement. The Government also extended
absolute immunity to Benedicto, members of his family, and officers and
employees of the listed corporations such that there would be no criminal
investigation or prosecution for acts or omissions prior to February 25, 1986
that may be alleged to have violated penal laws, including Republic Act NO.
3019, in relation to the acquisition of the assets under the agreement.

The government agreed to recognize the constitutional right to
travel of Mr. and Mrs. Benedicto and to interpose no objections to the issuance
or restoration of their passports by the government office concerned.

According to the PCGG G.R. No. 108292 and G.R. No. 108368,
respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion approving an agreement
containing provisions contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy, and
public order. The PCGG contends that
its consent was obtained through fraud and misrepresentation; that it is not in
estoppel to question the validity of the agreement; and that the respondent
court was wrong in passing upon the PCGG’s inability to return what was ceded
to it should the agreement be disapproved.

The authority of the PCGG to enter into compro­mise agreements in
civil cases and to grant immunity, under certain circumstances, in criminal
cases is now settled and established. In Republic of the Philippines
and Jose O. Campos, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan, et al. (173 SCRA 72, [1989]), this Court
categorically stated that amicable settlements and compromises are not only allowed
but actually encouraged in civil cases. A specific grant of immunity from criminal prosecutions was also
sustained. In Benedicto vs.
Board of Administrators of Television Stations RPN,
BBC, and IBC (207 SCRA 659 [1992]), the
Court ruled that the authority of the PCGG to validly enter into compromise
agreements for the purpose of avoiding litigation or putting an end to one
already commenced was indisputable. The
Court took cognizance of the fact that the compromise agreement which is now
the subject of the present petitions was pending before the Sandiganbayan for
determination and approval and, therefore, dismissed the petition directed
against the agreement’s implementation and enforcement.

Since this Court specifically ordered the Sandiganbayan to act on
the compromise agreement between the PCGG and Benedicto, what remains to be
done is to ascertain the propriety of the action of the Sandiganbayan in
approving the agreement, and the validity of the agreement itself.

The Sandiganbayan stated in its decision that the contract on its
face does not appear to be contrary to law, morals, or public policy and that
it was entered into freely and voluntarily by the parties (p. 79, Rollo in G.R.
No. 108292). There is no intimation of
vitiated consent on the part of the PCGG. On its finding that the compromise agreement was entered into by the
parties freely, voluntarily, and with full understanding of its consequences,
respondent court stated that the agreement is conclusive and binding upon it.

We agree with the following observations of the Sandiganbayan:

A party that availed himself of and complied with the provisions of
a judicial compromise is under estoppel to question its validity. (Serrano vs. Miave, 13 SCRA 461). In a regime of law and order, repudiation of
an agreement validly entered into cannot be made without any ground or reason
in law or in fact for such
repudiation. (Rodriguez vs. Alikpala,
57 SCRA 455).

It is in consequences of this that the Supreme Court in Mayuga vs.
Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 309, held that a compromise upon
its perfection became binding upon the parties and has
the effect and authority of res judicata
even if not judicially
approved. (Underlining supplied)

In this connection, therefore, We hold that plaintiff is in estoppel
to question the validity of the herein Compromise Agreement since it had
already received benefits thereunder, such as:

“1. Full take over and control of Oriental
Petroleum shares of stocks owned by Piedras Mining and the exercise by the
latter company of the pre-emptive rights granted by Oriental Petroleum. Said shares have a total value now of P1,094,816,379.00
(P.0675 and P.0775/per A and B shares, respectively.

2. Full take over, control and management of
Broadcast City (Channel 13) inspite of Supreme Court decision in G.A. No. L-87710 that the Board of Administration,
created under Executive Order NO. 11, continued management is no longer legally
possible, upon formal representation and that Benedicto will comply fully with
the terms and conditions of the Compromise Agreement. Said assets have a total estimated value of P450 million.

3. Complete turnover of California Overseas
Bank, with capital account of US$18 Million (P406 million), to the Philippine Government
which was in turn sold by the Philippine Government to the PNB.

4. Receipt of US$16.271 million (P386.0
million – P23.71/$1.00). The total
value of the aforesaid assets transferred to the Philippine Government amount
to P2.336 Billion.”

In Katipunan Labor Union vs. Caltex, 101 Phils. 1224, the Supreme
Court, through Justice J. B. L. Reyes, stated in effect that a compromise is
governed by the basic principle that the obligations arising therefrom have the
force of law between the parties (citing Article 1159, New Civil Code), which means that neither party
may unilaterally and upon his own
exclusive volition escape his obligation under
the contract.

x x x

Since a compromise has, upon the parties and their
successors-in-interest, the effect of res judicata, it can only be rescinded on
the ground of vitiated consent, and, this is true even if the compromise turns
out to be unsatisfactory to either of the parties (Castro vs. Castro, 97 Phils.
705). By merely asking for a
renegotiation of the agreement, the PCGG herein has impliedly admitted that the
agreement is not contrary to law, public policy or morals nor was there any
circumstance which had vitiated or does now vitiate consent.”

(Decision, pp. 26-27; pp.
104-105, Rollo in G.R. No. 108292)

In fact, the Court has consistently ruled that a party to a
compromise cannot ask for a rescission after it has enjoyed its benefits. Thus in Barairo vs. Mendoza
(G.R. No. 82545, May 15, 1989 Resolution), re-echoing 5 Ruling Case Law, 883 (1914) it was held:

Compromises are to be favored, without regard to the nature of the
controversy compromised. They cannot be
set aside because the event shows all the gain to have been on one side, and
all the sacrifice on the other, if the parties have acted in good faith and
with a belief of the actual existence of a settlement be made, free from fraud
or mistake, whereby there is a surrender or
satisfaction, in whole or in part,
of a claim upon one side in exchange for or in consideration of a surrender of
value, upon the other, however baseless may be the claim upon either side or
harsh the terms as to either of the parties, the other cannot
successfully impeach the agreement in a
court of justice which re-echoed 5 Ruling Case Laws 883 (914).

And in Pasay City Government vs. CFI
of Manila (132 SCRA 156 [1984]), was most emphatic in ruling that
a party to a compromise agreement cannot ask for its rescission after it has
enjoyed its benefits. Then Jus­tice,
later Chief Justice Makasiar had this to say: –

[I]t is obvious that the respondent-appellee did not only succeed
in enforcing the compromise but said plaintiff-appellee likewise wants to
rescind the said compromise. It is clear from the language of the law,
specifically Article 2041 of the New Civil Code that one of the parties to a
compromise has two options: 1) to
enforce the compromise; or 2) to rescind the same and insist upon his
original demand. The
respondent-appellee in the case herein before Us wants to avail of both of
these options. This can not be done. The respondent-appellee cannot ask for
rescission of the compromise agreement after it has already enjoyed the first
option of enforcing the compromise by asking for a writ of execution resulting
thereby in the garnishment of the Pasay City funds deposited with the
Philippine National Bank which eventually was delivered to the
respondent-appellee. (at p. 168)

It is equally puerile for the PCGG to contend that the agreement
is congenitally defective from the mere happenstance that the agreement was not
authenticated before the consular officials abroad and without the
participation of witnesses and of the Solicitor General. While the rule of lex loci celeborationis
generally governs forms and solemnities of contracts under Article 17 of the
Civil Code (Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1986 First
ed., p. 11), the principle of lex
rei sitae generally applies with
respect to formalities for the acquisition, encumbrance, and alienation of real
and personal property (1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines annotated,
1989 12th ed., p. 107). And relative to
this precept on lex situs, Philippine substantive law is
certainly clear on the matter that contracts are obligatory, in whatever form
they may have been entered into, subject to the existence of all the essential
requisites for their validity (Article 1356, New Civil
Code). The fact that the compromise
agreement was not authenticated before the consular officers abroad, as well as
the absence of witnesses, cannot be of much legal significance under Philippine
law inasmuch as the requirement under Article 1358(a) of the Civil Code, that a
contract intended to extinguish or transmit real rights over the immovables
must be in a public document is merely designed for greater efficacy or
convenience (4 Tolentino, Commen­taries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, 1991 ed., p. 546).

Neither does the absence of the Solicitor General’s participation
render the agreement invalid since under both Executive Order No. 2 and
Executive Order No. 14-A, it is the PCGG which has been “primarily
charged” with the responsibility of recovering illegally acquired or misappropriated assets. It should perhaps be recalled at this
juncture that it was during this period that the OSG withdrew or counsel in
PCGG cases, compelling the latter to hire high-priced and supposedly competent
lawyers of its own. Indeed, these
events were the backdrop of the widely acclaimed and erudite decision penned by
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero wherein the OSG was advised of its duties, the
scope of its authority, the mandate of its office, and thence ordered to
re-enter its appearance in PCGG cases. In fine, the OSG is the least qualified agency to raise the argument
that it had no participation in the
agreement.

The PCGG submits the notion that Benedicto can renege on his
undertaking because the compromise does not have a clause for breach of
warranty. Again, we must point out that
the insinuation (p. 30, Petition; p. 35, Rollo in G.R. No. 108292) along this
line is uncalled for due to the language of Paragraph 4:

IV. Cooperation in
Preservation/Recovery Efforts.

The parties herein
hereby undertake to cooperate with each other in the preservation or recovery
of sequestered properties and business, including joint action or defense in
the enforcement or resistance as the case may be, or claims affecting the
sequestered properties and businesses involved in this Agreement.

as well of Paragraph 6 of the Compromise
Agreement:

VI. Further Acts/Documents.

Each party to this
Agreement agrees to perform such other and further acts and authorizations,
including the execution and delivery of such other and further documents as may
be reasonably necessary to carry out
the provisions of this Agreement.

which serve as built-in safeguards
against amnesia, so to speak, and possible repudiation. At any rate, and assuming in gratia
argumenti that a breach occurs, the remedy of
the PCGG is clearly set forth in Article 2041 of the Civil Code:

Art. 2041. If one of the
parties fails or refuses to abide by the compromise, the other party may either
enforce the compromise or regard it as rescinded and insist upon his original
demand.

It is advocated by the PCGG that respondent Benedicto retaining a
portion of the assets is anathema to, and incongruous with, the zero-retention
policy of the government in the pursuit for recovery of all ill-gotten wealth pursuant to Section 2(a) of Executive Order
No. 1. While full recovery is ideal,
the PCGG is not precluded from entering into a compromise agreement which
entails reciprocal concessions if only to expedite recovery so that
the remaining “funds, assets and other properties may be used to hasten
national economic recovery” (3rd WHEREAS clause, Executive Order No.
14-A). To be sure, the so-called zero
retention mentioned in Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1 had been modified
to read:

WHEREAS, the Presidential Commission on Good Government was created
on February 28, 1986 by Executive Order No. 1 to assist the President in the recovery of ill-gotten
wealth accumulated by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates;

which undoubtedly suggests a departure
from the former goal of total restitution.

Contrary to the PCGG’s observation that the value of the assets
ceded by Benedicto should have been reflected in the contract, Section 5 of
Executive Order No. 14-A does not seem to impose such an element as a condition
sine qua non to the validity of a projected
settlement. Information as to net worth
of Benedicto’s assets need not be stated in the four corners of the agreement
since his duty to disclose all his property is supposed to be made before
the PCGG or to the Sandiganbayan when called upon to testify as a vital witness
on other ill-gotten wealth cases under Section 5 of EO 14-A. It is needless to stress that the series of
negotiations which culminated in the signing of the agreement on November 3,
1990 afforded every opportunity for Benedicto to reveal his assets for the PCGG’s evaluation in conjunction
with its general function to collate evidence relative to ill-gotten wealth (Bataan shipyard and
Engineering Co., Inc. vs. PCGG (150 SCRA 181 [1987]).

The fact that certain details peculiar in other compromise
agreements, such as those found in the Fonacier, Razon and Floirendo deals, are not reflected in the Benedicto
agreement does not mean that the settlement is susceptible to challenge,
especially so when the PCGG itself
concedes that any future agreement need not follow the pattern fixed in
previous contracts (p. 33, Petition; p. 38, Rollo in G.R. No. 108292).

To support the thesis that the agreement per se is contrary to law, the PCGG shifts discussion to the
salient portions of Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti?Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, particularly those with respect to acts allegedly causing undue
injury to the government, resulting into a manifestly disadvantageous contract
and leading to unwarranted privileges (p. 35, Petition; p. 40, Rollo in G.R. No.
108292). But these assumptions remain
mere verisimilitudes, unsupported by evidence that indeed the contract was
entered into under circumstances which would invite reasonable suspicion of bad
faith on the part of those privy thereto.

To backtrack from the effects of the settlement, the PCGG relies
on the principle that the State is never estopped by acts of its agents, as
applied in cases which require no citation,
and as affirmed by Section 15, Article 11 of the 1987 Constitution:

The right of the State to recover properties unlawfully acquired by public
officials or employees, from them or from their nominees or transferees, shall
not be barred by prescription, laches, or estoppel.

We agree with the statement that the State is immune from
estoppel but this concept is understood to refer to acts and mistakes of its
officials especially those which are irregular (Sharp International
Marketing vs. Court of Appeals, 201 SCRA
299; 306 [1991]; Republic vs. Aquino, 120 SCRA 186 [1983],
which peculiar circumstances are absent in the case at bar. Although the State’s right of action to recover ill-gotten wealth is not
vulnerable to estoppel, it is non sequitur to suggest that a contract, freely and in good
faith executed between the parties thereto is susceptible to disturbance ad infinitum. A different interpretation will lead to the
absurd scenario of permitting a party to unilaterally jettison a compromise
agreement which is supposed to have the authority of res judicata
(Article 2037, New Civil Code),
and like any other contract, has the force of law between privies thereto (Article
1159, New Civil Code; Hernaez
vs. Kao, 17 SCRA
296 [966]; 6 Padilla,
Civil Code annotated, 7th ed., 1987, p. 711; 3 Aquino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., p. 463). Thus, as empha­sized by Justice Escareal in
Civil Case No. 0034:

Viewed against the backdrop of the foregoing factual antecedents
and legal principles, We are of the considered opinion that new PCGG Chairman
Magtanggol C. Gunigundo lacks the legal and moral authority to overturn and set
aside a previous valid and authorized contract/transaction entered into by his predecessor in behalf of the
Republic. To rule otherwise is to
sanction an unlawful betrayal by one party of the trust and confidence reposed
by the other. It must be noted that the
parties to the Agreement are plaintiff Republic of the Philippines, as
represented by the PCGG, and defendant Roberto S. Benedicto, not anybody
else. With this basic premise, it
logically follows that after the due execution of the Agreement by and between
PCGG, as representative of plaintiff Republic of the Philippines, and defendant
Benedicto, the same has acquired a binding and res judicata effect as against the parties thereto. Perforce, any change in the administrative
structure and/or personalities within the PCGG cannot defeat the validity and
binding effect thereof between the parties. A ruling to the contrary is not only illogical and irrational, but
inequitable and pernicious as well, for it may open the door for capricious
adventurism on the part of the policy-makers of the land, and disregard for the
majesty of the law, which could ultimately bring about the citizenry’s loss of
faith and confidence in the sincerity of the government in its dealings with
the governed.

(p. 115-116, G.R. No.
108368)

Within the context of the Civil Code, the principle of estoppel
under Article 1431 is only of suppletory application insofar as they are not in
direct friction with other provisions of the Code, such as the binding effect
of a compromise agreement under Article 2037, the Code of Commerce, the Rules
of Court and special laws (Article 1432, New Civil
Code; 4 Paras, Civil Code Annotated, 12th ed., 1989, p. 172). The real office of the equitable norm of
estoppel is limited to supply deficiency in the law but it should not supplant
positive law.

Furthermore, this Court will reject a settlement only if it
contravenes Article 2035 of the Civil Code (prohibiting compromises on the
civil status of persons, the validity of marriage or a legal separation, or any
ground for such separation, future support, the jurisdiction of courts, and
future legitime) or if the stipulations thereof are repugnant to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy (First Philippine Holdings Corp. vs. Sandiganbayan,
202 SCRA 212 [1991]).

The Sandiganbayan stated in its questioned decision that
“the essence of compromise being mutual concessions by the parties to
avoid or end litigation, it is to be expected that neither will be able to
maintain his initial demands wholly unaltered” (Periquet vs. Reyes, 21
SCRA 1503 [1967]). As succinctly stated
by Justice Cipriano A. del Rosario in his concurring opinion, any compromise
has at its very essence reciprocal concessions; that “One must give if one
must take. If only one takes all, then
one must first win. But in a
compromise, all win by taking some and giving some” (p. 108, Rollo in G.R.
No. 108292).

The arguments that the compromise is too one­-sided in favor of
Benedicto and that undue injury has been caused to the Government while
unwarranted benefits and advantages have been given to Mr. Benedicto, his
family, and employees contrary to Republic Act No. 3019, have no merit.

The compromise agreement was the result of a long drawnout
process of negotiations with each party trying to come out as best as it
could. There can be no question of its
being freely and voluntarily entered into by the then PCGG Chairman with full
authority from the Commission itself.

The Sandiganbayan had ample opportunity to examine validity of
the compromise agreement and to look into any iniquitous or illegal features,
express, implied, or hidden. Two years
elapsed from the time the agreement was executed up to the time it was judicially
approved. The joint motion to approve
the compromise agreement filed by the PCGG and Benedicto dated November 22,
1990 was followed seven days later by an opposition from Solicitor General
Frank Chavez. Comments, replies,
various motions, a temporary restraining order of the Court in Guinggona
vs. PCGG and our decision in that case – 207 SCRA 659 (1992),
memoranda, hearings set for August 11, 1992 September 1, 1992, and September
17, 1992, oppositions, manifestations, and the September 17, 1992 resolution of
the Sandiganbayan preceded its now questioned October 2, 1992 decision. Every question regarding the legality and
propriety of the compromise agreement was fully threshed out before the
Sandiganbayan by the parties. We are
not dealing with the usual compromise agreement perfunctorily submitted to a
court and approved as a matter of
course. The PCGG-Benedicto agreement
was thoroughly and, at times, disputatiously discussed before the respondent
court. There could be no deception or
misrepresentation foisted on either the PCGG or the Sandiganbayan.

In Araneta vs. Perez (7 SCRA 923 [1963]), we ruled that a
compromise once approved by final orders of the court has the force of res
judicata between the parties and should not be disturbed except for vices of
consent or forgery. It is a long
established doctrine that the law does not relieve a party from the effects of
an unwise, foolish, or disastrous contract, entered into with all the required
formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing (Tanda vs.
Aldaya, 89 Phil. 497 [1951]). Courts have no power to relieve parties from obligations voluntarily
assumed, simply because their contracts turned out to be disastrous deals or
unwise investments (Villacorte vs. Mariano, 89 Phil. 341
[1951]).

In the case at bar, the compromise agreement, as stated by
Sandiganbayan, was signed and executed by the parties “with their eyes
wide open” (Decision, p. 23; p. 101, Rollo in G.R. No. 108292). The PCGG knew the strength of the evidence
in its hands, the advantages of immediate recovery, the projected income if
forthwith privatized, and other benefits to the Government. The Sandiganbayan itself in two years of
proceedings and deliberations rejected the allegations of fraud, deception,
illegality, and contrariness to morals, good customs, public policy and public
order now raised again before us.

There is another aspect of these petitions presented by
petitioners which appears inconsistent and infeasible. The original prayer of the new PCGG Chairman
was to “renegotiate a more just, fair and equitable agreement” (Annex
G of Petition in G.R. No. 108292, p. 191, Rollo). At the risk of being redundant, we once again must emphasize that
the government has already taken over everything ceded to it by Benedicto. In fact, it is already selling if it has not
yet sold various ceded property under the privatization program. In other words, the agreement has not only
been executed, it has been implemented. Even as the PCGG seeks to nullify and declare void the compromise
agreement, it has no intention of returning any of the pieces of property which
it received under the agreement. It
states that the rules on the question of “restitution” are not those
on rescissible contracts but those on void and inexistent contracts in the
Civil Code.

The PCGG seemingly forgets that the ownership of the ceded
property has been vested in the government not because it won its cases in the
courts and the true ownership or illegal acquisition has been definitively
established. It cannot assume that its
allegations have been sustained by the Sandiganbayan. Ownership has been transferred because of the compromise
agreement, not because of any evidence presented in court by either side on the
merits or demerits of the reconveyance and rever­sion cases.

The Compromise Agreement itself declares:

WHEREAS, following the termination of the United States and Swiss
cases, and also without admitting the merits of their respective claims and
counterclaims presently involved in
uncertain, protracted, and expensive litigation, the Republic of the
Philippines, solely motivated by the desire for immediate accomplishment of its
recovery mission and Mr. Benedicto, being interested to lead a peaceful and
normal pursuit of his endeavors, the parties have decided to withdraw and/or
dismiss their mutual claims and counter­claims under the cases pending in the
Philippines earlier referred to;

In other words, the Government wanted to recover as much as it
could and as fast as possible while Benedicto wanted to buy peace without
admitting guilt. If the PCGG wants to
nullify the agreement it entered into freely and voluntarily, it must be
willing to return all the property ceded to it because of the Agreement and
recover them by proving its cases in the course of judicial proceedings. This is an essential first step. It cannot renege on the agreement while
holding on to property which it received as a result of said agreement.

More than any person or institution, the government should honor
its solemn commitments. It would set a
bad precedent and result in public disenchantment with government if every new
head of a government agency is allowed to freely disown the legitimate
agreements of his predecessors, especially those bearing court approval and,
even as everything is already final and implemented, insist on further rounds
of negotiations. Under the PCGG’s
theory, there would be nothing to prevent any of its future Chairmen from
repudiating and revoking acts of his predecessors. The vital element of trust, honor, and stability in dealing with
the government would be lost.

The petitioners in G.R. Nos. 108548-49 and 108550 filed their
petitions to set aside the denial of their motion to intervene. They raise essentially the same grounds as
the PCGG in the two other cases
in their bid to set aside the compromise agreement. According to said petitioners, they are intervening because
Benedicto should compensate them and the sugar industry for the systematic
plunder of the industry. We agree with
the Sandiganbayan that their
rights can be fully protected in a
separate proceeding.

There is no doubt that interested parties who claim ownership of
some assets embraced in the settlement can participate in pending
litigations involving ill-gotten wealth before the Sandiganbayan as held in Republic
vs. Sandiganbayan (184 SCRA 382 [1990]) with reference to
incidents arising from, incidental to, or interwoven with, cases falling within
respondent court’s exclusive and original jurisdiction (PCGG vs. Peña, 159 SCRA 556 [1988]). But inasmuch as the petitioners in G.R. No.
108548-50 filed their motion for leave to intervene and to admit memorandum in
intervention on November 13, 1992 (p. 7 Petition; p. 8, Rollo in G.R. No.
108548-49; p. 7, Petition; p. 7, Rollo in G.R. No. 108550) or after
promulgation of the impugned decision on October 2, 1992, it cannot be gainsaid
that the intended intrusion was not seasonably raised before or during the
trial spoken of by Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 2 – Intervention – A person may, before or during a trial, be permitted by the court,
in its discretion to intervene in an action, if he has legal interest in the
matter in litiga­tion, or in the success of either of the par­ties, or an
interest against both, or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected by
a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court or
of an officer thereof.

At any rate, availability of a separate
proceeding for petitioners as third persons to the compromise agreement before
the Sandiganbayan, in accordance with the ruling of this Court in Republic
vs. Sandiganbayan (184 SCRA 382 [1990]) and in PCGG vs.
Peña (159 SCRA 556 [1988]), proscribes intervention under Section 2(b),
Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court:

Sec. 2(b) – Discretion of court – In
allowing or disallowing a motion for intervention, the court, in the exercise
of discretion, shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay
or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether
or not the intervenor’s rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 108292, 108368,
108548-49, and 108550 are hereby dismissed. The restraining orders issued in the respective cases dated March 10,
1993, March 23, 1993, and March 24, 1993, are hereby lifted and the parties to
the compromise agreement are ordered to comply strictly with the terms thereof.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide,
Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Puno, and
Vitug, JJ., concur.

Feliciano, J., on leave.

Quiason, J., no part.