REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. HON. MAXIMIANO C. ASUNCION, AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 104 OF QUEZON CITY, AND ALEXANDER DIONISIO Y MANI…

Section 46 of Republic Act No. 6975^[1]
provides that “criminal cases involving PNP members shall be within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts.” The principal issue in this
case is whether the term “regular courts” includes the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner maintains
that it does not while the respondent Judge and the intervenor-respondent hold
otherwise.

Section 46 reads as follows:

“SEC. 46. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases.
— Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases
involving PNP members shall be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular
courts: Provided, That the
courts-martial appointed pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1850 shall
continue to try PC-INP members
who have already been arraigned, to include appropriate actions thereon by the
reviewing authorities pursuant to Commonwealth Act No. 408, otherwise known as
the Articles of War, as amended, and Executive Order No. 178, otherwise known
as the Manual for Courts-Martial: Provided,
further, That criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet
been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the
proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge.”

The factual and procedural antecedents in this case are as
follows:

On 31 July 1991, private respondent Alexander Dionisio y Manio, a
member of the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned to the Central Police
District Command Station 2 in Novaliches, Quezon City, was dispatched by his
Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in Novaliches to respond to a complaint
that a person was creating trouble there. Dionisio proceeded to that place, where he subsequently shot to death T/Sgt.
Romeo Sadang.

On 7 August 1991, pursuant to Section 7, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, the Office of the City Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City an information^[2]
charging Dionisio with the crime of homicide committed as follows:

“That on or about the 31st day of July, 1991, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, and without any justifiable motive,
did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and
employ personal violence upon the person of one T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y MACABEO,
by then and there shooting the latter with the use of a gun, .45 caliber
pistol, thereby inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on his neck and on
his thorax which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of said T/SGT. ROMEO SADANG Y MACABEO in such
amount as may be awarded to them under the provisions of the Civil Code.

Contrary to law.”

The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q-91-23224 and was raffled off to Branch 104 of the RTC, presided over by
the respondent Judge.

On 4 September 1992, while trial was already in progress, the
respondent Judge issued, motu
proprio, an order^[3]
requiring the prosecution and the defense to comment on whether the Court
should still proceed with the trial of the case:

“[i]n view of
the Decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Deloso vs. Domingo (Vol. 191
SCRA, 545), quoted as follows:

. . . .

‘The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by
public officials when the penalty prescribed by Law for the offense is higher
than prision correctional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge against the petitioner
carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art.
248, Revised Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it.'”

In his Order of 24 September 1992,^[4] the
respondent Judge dismissed Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 “for re-filing
with the Sandiganbayan” on the ground that the Sandiganbayan, and not the
Regional Trial Court, has jurisdiction over the case. The body of the order reads:

“Which Court has jurisdiction over police officers who are
charged with the crime of homicide or murder?

Accused Quezon City Patrolman Alexander Dionisio y Manio is being
tried for homicide for killing T/Sgt. Romeo Sadang y Macabeo on July 31, 1991
in Quezon City. Several witnesses were
already presented by the prosecution. Nobody raised the issue of jurisdiction. On September 4, 1992, the Court issued an order requiring the
prosecution and the defense to comment on whether the Court has jurisdiction
over the matter in view of the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of
Deloso vs. Domingo, 191 SCRA 945 [sic] which rules as follows:

‘The Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over offenses committed by
public officials when the penalty prescribed by law for the offense is higher
than prision correccional (Sec. 4, subpar. (c), P.D. 1606). The murder charge against the petitioner
carries the penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death (Art.
248, Revised Penal Code), hence, it is cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and the
Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction to investigate it.’

As a matter of fact, even if the act or crime is not related to or
connected with or arising from the performance of official duty, it must be
investigated by the Ombudsman or any of its duly deputized representative:

‘The clause “any (illegal) act or omission of any public
official” is broad enough to embrace any crime committed by a public
official. The law does not qualify the
nature of the illegal act or omission of the public official or employee that
the Ombudsman may investigate. It does
not require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or
arise from, the performance of official duty. Since the law does not distinguish, neither should we.’

The Sandiganbayan, although trying only certain special classes of
crimes, still can be classified as a regular court functioning within the
framework of the judicial department of the government. It is a ‘trial court and bound by the rules
governing trial courts. It is one of
the “inferior courts” in Article X of the Constitution whose
jurisdiction may be questioned before the Supreme Court and whose judgments are
subject to its review, revision, affirmance or setting aside. The independence of the judiciary enshrined
in the Constitution calls for a unitary judicial system with the Supreme Court
at the top of the hierarchical set-up’ (Rules of Criminal Procedures by Dr.
Fortunato Gupit, Jr., 1986 Edition, p. 26).

Conformably therefore to the foregoing consideration, the regular
court referred to in Section 46 of Republic Act 6975 (An Act establishing the
Philippine National Police) is the Sandiganbayan. Since the penalty for homicide, the charge against the accused,
carries the penalty of reclusion temporal, said case is cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and the Ombudsman has the primary jurisdiction to investigate
it. (Art. 249, RPC).

WHEREFORE, the above-entitled case is hereby dismissed for refiling
with the Sandiganbayan.”

On 6 October 1992, the private prosecutor moved for a
reconsideration^[5]
of the dismissal, citing the opinion of the Secretary of Justice of 31 July
1991^[6]
that “crimes committed by PNP members are not cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan” because “[t]hey fall within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the regular courts” as provided in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and
“[t]he Sandiganbayan is not a regular court but a special court.”

The respondent Judge denied the motion in the Order of 7 October
1992:^[7]

“The opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated July 31, 1992 [sic] … is not binding to this
Court.

This Court still holds that the regular Courts referred to in Sec.
46 of RA 6975 (An Act establishing the Philippine National Police) includes the
Sandiganbayan which has exclusive original jurisdiction to try offenses on
felonies committed by public officers in relation to their office, whether
simple or complex with other crimes where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional (Sec. 4, par. c, PD 1606)

What is contemplated in the law is the regular civil court to the
exclusion of non-regular courts such as military courts which had previous
jurisdiction over police officers. The
police force being civilian in character should be under the jurisdiction of
the civil court. What is meant by
‘regular courts’ mentioned in Sec. 46, RA 6975 are the ‘inferior courts’ in
Article X of the constitution which calls for a unitary judicial system with
the Supreme Court at the top of the hierarchical set-up (Rules in Crim.
Procedure by Dr. Fortunato Gupit, page 26, 1986 edition).”

On 6 January 1993, petitioner filed the instant petition. We required the respondents to comment
thereon.

On 5 February 1993, the Office of the Ombudsman filed a motion
for leave to intervene and to file comment^[8]
alleging that its constitutional duty to investigate criminal cases against
public officers, including PNP members, and to prosecute cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan are affected by the issue raised; and that the Office of the
Ombudsman and the Department of Justice (DOJ) had issued a joint circular on 14
October 1991^[9]
wherein (a) both agencies agreed that, subject to the final determination by
competent authorities, the term “regular courts” in Section 46 of
R.A. No. 6975 refers to “civilian courts” as distinguished from
military courts, and (b) certain guidelines were adopted to govern the
investigation and prosecution of PNP members. Attached to the motion is the Ombudsman’s Comment^[10]
on the petition. We granted this motion
to intervene, admitted the Comment, and required petitioner to reply thereto.^[11]

In their separate Comments,^[12] the
respondent Judge reiterates the reasons stated in the assailed orders, and the
private respondent concurs with the position and amplifies the arguments of the
Ombudsman.

Petitioner filed its Reply^[13] to
the Comments of the respondents and the intervenor.

On 6 July 1993, we resolved to consider the separate comments of
the respondents as answers, to give due course to the petition, and to require
the parties to file simultaneously their respective memoranda within twenty
days from notice, which they did, with the petitioner submitting its memorandum
only on 29 December 1993 after obtaining several extensions of time to do so.

In the main, petitioner insists that the dismissal of the
criminal case below “for refiling with the Sandiganbayan” was
erroneous because Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 vests the exclusive jurisdiction
in criminal cases involving PNP members only in the “regular courts”
which excludes the Sandiganbayan since it is, constitutionally and statutorily,
a “special court” and not a regular court. To bolster this claim, petitioner points to Section 5, Article
XIII of the 1973 Constitution which described the Sandiganbayan as “a
special court” and Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that “[t]he present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan
shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter
may be provided by law.”

It further asserts that (a) if it were the intention of R.A. No.
6975 to grant to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over PNP members, then Section
46 should have explicitly stated or used the term “civil courts”
considering that members of the Integrated National Police (INP) were then
integrated with and under the operational control and administrative set-up of
the Philippine Constabulary (PC) and, under P.D. No. 1850, were subject to
court-martial proceedings for all crimes cognizable by the civil courts; (b) if
it were the intention of R.A. No. 6975 to include the Sandiganbayan in the term
“regular courts” in Section 46, then it should not have provided
therein that “criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not yet
been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the
proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge”;
instead, it should have directed such transfer to “the Ombudsman or the
Special Prosecutor since the Ombudsman or the Special Prosecutor is mandated by
law to entertain cases cognizable only by the Sandiganbayan” under Section
15 of R.A. No. 6770; and (c) there is an irreconcilable conflict between
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 and Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 (revising P.D. No.
1486 which created the Sandiganbayan), as amended, which vests in the
Sandiganbayan exclusive original jurisdiction over “[o]ther offenses or
felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office
… where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional … or a fine of
P6,000.00″; the latter then should be deemed impliedly repealed by the
former, which is a later law.

Petitioner finally contends that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, is a
general law for it applies to all public officers, while R.A. No. 6975 is a
special law for it sets out a special rule of jurisdiction for PNP
members. The latter should thus
prevail.

Petitioner then prays that the assailed orders of respondent
Judge of 24 September 1992 and 7 October 1992 be reversed and set aside and
that the respondent Judge be directed to reinstate and continue the trial of
Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224.

On the other hand, the Ombudsman maintains the view that it is
the Sandiganbayan and not the Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over
the subject criminal case in view of Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 and the Joint
Circular of 14 October 1991. It asserts
that the term “regular courts” in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 includes
the Sandiganbayan and that R.A. No. 6975 has not repealed Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606.

Amplifying its view, it opines that: (a) while the Sandiganbayan is a special court, it is a regular court within the context of
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 because it is a “court normally functioning
with continuity within the jurisdiction vested in it,” and that the term
“regular courts” is used in Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 to
distinguish the said courts from the courts-martial for it seeks to divest the
latter of such jurisdiction and mandates its transfer to the former pursuant to
the policy of the law to establish a police force national in scope and civilian
in character; and (b) since the creation of the Sandiganbayan is mandated by
the Constitution^[14]
to take cognizance of crimes committed by public officers in relation to their
office and P.D. No. 1606 created it pursuant to such mandate, then the repeal
of the latter, as suggested by petitioner, would diminish and dilute the
constitutional jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and would operate to amend the
Constitution, which no statute can do. Moreover, there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between the two laws
to warrant an implied repeal.

Finally, the Ombudsman asserts that the proviso in Section 46 of
R.A. No. 6975 that “criminal cases against PC-INP members who may have not
yet been arraigned upon the effectivity of this Act shall be transferred to the
proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial court judge” only
means a referral to the proper city or provincial prosecutor or municipal trial
court judge for appropriate preliminary investigation and not the filing of the
criminal information with the proper court it being a fact that all city and
provincial prosecutors have been deputized by the Ombudsman to conduct
preliminary investigation of cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.

As to which law is the special law, the Ombudsman maintains that
it is P.D. No. 1606 because it deals specifically with the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan while Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 does not specifically mention
any particular court.

The resolution of the principal issue hinges on the
interpretation of the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A.
No. 6975 which, in turn, requires an inquiry into the legislative intent and
purpose of the law.

There can be no doubt that the provisions of R.A. No. 6975 on the
PNP are intended to implement Section 6, Article XVI (General Provisions) of
the 1987 Constitution which reads:

“SEC. 6. The State
shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope
and civilian in character, to be administered and controlled by a national
police commission. The authority of
local executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided
by law.”

The sponsors of House Bill No. 23614,^[15]
which together with Senate Bill No. 463^[16]
eventually became R.A. No. 6975 were unequivocal
on this. Representative Antonio
Cerilles, after referring to the aforementioned mandate, declared:

“Today is a date with history, Mr. Speaker, when this august
chamber will try its best to pursue what is mandated by the Constitution. Today, we shall insist, though legislative fiat,
that the State should establish and maintain one police force. Its civilian character on a national scope
shall be paramount. Today, we should
insist that no office in any element or unit of the police force can be
occupied or run by military personnel and officer. We should also insist that the only way to professionalize our
police force is to separate them from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.”^[17]

In his sponsorship speech, Representative Nereo Joaquin stated:

“First and foremost among all these is, as already mentioned earlier, the fact that the bill is
undoubtedly in harmony and in conformity not only with the letter but more
importantly with the spirit of the new Constitution particularly Section 6 of
Article XVI, the General
Provisions ….”^[18]

Police forces have traditionally been under civilian
authority. However, the dictatorial
regime of then President Ferdinand Marcos, consistent with his own agenda to
strengthen the machinery of martial law rule, exploited to his advantage the
provision of the 1973 Constitution which mandated the establishment and
maintenance of “an integrated national police force whose organization,
administration, and operation shall be provided by law.”^[19]
First, he issued a series of decrees consolidating and integrating various
local police forces and placing them under the operational control, direction,
and supervision of the Philippine Constabulary (PC);^[20]
then on 8 August 1975, he promulgated P.D. No. 765 which “established and
constituted the Integrated National Police which shall be composed of the
Philippine Constabulary as the nucleus, and the integrated police forces as
established by Presidential Decrees Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585 and 641, as
components, under the Department of National Defense.” By this decree, Mr.
Marcos succeeded in militarizing the police forces by making them mere
components of the PC which was then one of the four major commands of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (AFP). He did
not stop there. For, even after the
farcical lifting of Martial Law in 1981 through Proclamation No. 2045, and
pursuant to the infamous Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution,^[21]
he promulgated on 4 October 1982 P.D. No. 1850 which provided for court-martial
jurisdiction over police officers, policemen, firemen, and jail guards. Section 1 thereof reads:

“SECTION 1. Court-Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated
National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. — Any provision of the law to the contrary
notwithstanding — (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who
commit any crime or offense cognizable by the civil courts shall henceforth be
exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with
Commonwealth Act No. 408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War;
(b) all persons subject to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited
Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by
courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case
shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or judicial authorities when
court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of
Commonwealth Act Numbered 408, as amended, or court martial jurisdiction over
the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can
no longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service
without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless otherwise provided
by law.

As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated
National Police shall refer to police officers, policemen, firemen and jail
guards.”

In a manner of speaking, this decree completed the militarization
of the INP and consummated the aberration in the police organization. Two years later, or on 5 September 1984, he
issued P.D. No. 1952 which amended P.D. No. 1850 by inserting a proviso to the first paragraph of
Section 1 granting himself the authority “in the interest of justice, [to]
order or direct, at any time before arraignment, that a particular case be
tried by the appropriate civil court.”

Before P.D. No. 1850, or specifically on 16 January 1981, Mr.
Marcos, through P.D. No. 1822, placed under court-martial jurisdiction,
pursuant to the Articles of War, all officers, soldiers, and personnel in the
active service of the AFP or of the PC, charged with any crime or offense
related to the performance of their duties.

Needless to state, the overwhelming sentiment of the framers of
the 1987 Constitution against the martial law regime^[22] and the militarization of the police
forces prompted them to explicitly direct the establishment and maintenance of
one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character. This civilian
character is unqualified and unconditional and is, therefore,
all-embracing. The Declaration of
Policy (Section 2) of R.A. No. 6975 faithfully carried out this mandate when it
declared therein that:

“The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped
primarily for the performance of police functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall be
paramount. No element of the police
force shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines.”

That civilian character refers to
its orientation and structure. Thus,
during a bicameral conference committee meeting on House Bill No. 23614 and
Senate Bill No. 463, Senator Edgardo Angara remarked:

“SENATOR ANGARA:

That’s what we’re trying to interpret nga
eh. Civilian in character meaning,
we’re separating the police both in orientation and structure from the military
discipline and structure. I think that’s
essentially the mandate we’re trying to implement.”

Civilian character necessarily includes,
according to him:

“SENATOR ANGARA:

Civilian system of justice na.”^[23]

It is thus evident that the mandate of Section 46 of R.A. No.
6975 is to divest courts-martial of any jurisdiction over criminal cases
involving PNP members and to return or transfer that jurisdiction to the civil
courts. This return or transfer of
jurisdiction to the civil courts was explicitly provided for in the original
Section 68 of House Bill No. 23614 which read as follows:

“SEC. 68. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — ­Any
provision of the law to the contrary notwithstanding, criminal cases involving
PNP members shall, immediately upon effectivity of this Act, be exclusively
tried by the Civil Courts: Provided,
however, That in cases where a member of the PNP is unable to post bail, he
may be placed upon order by the court under the custody of his supervisor upon
petition of the latter.”^[24]

Upon motion of Representative Rodolfo
Albano, accepted by the Committee and approved in plenary session, this section
was amended to read as follows:

“ANY PROVISION OF LAW TO THE
CONTRARY NOTWITHSTANDING, CRIMINAL CASES INVOLVING PNP MEMBERS SHALL BE WITHIN
THE EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OF THE CIVIL COURTS.”^[25]

In the course of the interpellation on
his amendment, Mr. Albano had the occasion to emphasize the purpose of the law
and the transfer of jurisdiction to civil courts of criminal cases involving members of the PNP:

“MR. ALBANO:

Considering that we are creating here a
purely civilian police force, he [the PNP member] should, therefore, also fall
under our civil force, and there should be no iota of military syndrome
[referring to the proviso in Sec. 68], so to speak”^[26]

During the deliberation by the Bicameral Conference Committee on
National Defense on House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463, more specifically on Section
68 of the former, its Chairman, Senator Ernesto Maceda, used the term
“regular courts” in lieu of civil courts. Thus:

“THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA):

Okay, Rey at saka iyong
House, you work on the flow chart.

So other than that in
that particular section, ano ba itong ‘Jurisdiction in criminal cases?’ What is
this all about?

REP. ZAMORA:

In case they are charged
with crimes.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA):

Ah, the previous one is
administrative, no. Now, if it is
charged with a crime, regular courts.“^[27]

The
term regular courts was finally carried into the reconciled bill,^[28] entitled “An Act Establishing the
Philippine National Police Under a Reorganized Department of the
Interior and Local Government, and for Other Purposes,” and incorporated
in the Conference Committee Report received by the Office of the Secretary of
the Senate on 19 November 1990. Section
46 of the proposed reconciled bill is Section 68 of House Bill No. 23614, with
further modifications and amendments. The
reconciled bill was approved by both Houses of Congress and became R.A. No.
6975.

The foregoing considered, we have no doubt that the terms civil
courts and regular courts were used interchangeably or
were considered as synonymous by the Bicameral Conference Committee and then by
the Senate and the House of Representatives. Accordingly, the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A.
No. 6975 means civil courts. There could have been no other meaning intended since the primary
purpose of the law is to remove from courts-martial the jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving members of the PNP and to vest it in the courts within
our judicial system, i.e., the civil courts which, as
contradistinguished from courts-martial, are the regular courts. Courts-martial are not courts within the
Philippine judicial system; they pertain to the executive department of the
government and are simply instrumentalities of the executive power.^[29]
Otherwise stated, courts-martial are not regular courts.

Parenthetically, in Quiloña vs. The General Court Martial,^[30]
this Court found correct and impliedly adopted as its own a statement of
the Office of the Solicitor General in its Comment that Section 46 of R.A. No.
6975 mandates the transfer of criminal cases against members of the PNP to the civilian
courts. Thus:

“Moreover, as correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General
in his comment –

. . .

The civilian character with which the PNP is expressly invested is
declared by RA 6975 as paramount, and, in line therewith, the law mandates the
transfer of criminal cases against its members to civilian courts.”^[31]

Having thus ruled that the term “regular courts” in
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 refers to the civil courts, we must now determine
if the Sandiganbayan is included in that term.

Regular courts are those within the judicial
department of the government, namely, the Supreme Court and such lower courts
as may be established by law.^[32] Per
Section 16, Chapter 4, Book II of the Administrative Code of 1987,^[33]
such lower courts “include the Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of
Tax Appeals, Regional Trial Courts, Shari´a District Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, and Shari’a
Circuit Courts.”

The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486^[34]
pursuant to the mandate of Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution.^[35]
This was revised by P.D. No. 1606.^[36] The
latter was amended by P.D. No. 1860^[37] and
lastly by P.D. No. 1861.^[38]
Under the amendments introduced by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the following cases:

“SEC. 4. Jurisdiction. — The
Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic
Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;

(2) Other offenses
or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or felonies mentioned in this paragraph
where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6)
years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court,
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial
Court.

(b) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction:

(1) On appeal, from
the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in
cases originally decided by them in their respective territorial jurisdiction.

(2) By petition for
review, from the final judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial
Courts in the exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over cases originally
decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction. …”

Undoubtedly then, the Sandiganbayan is a regular court and is
thus included in the term regular courts in Section 46 of R.A.
No. 6975.

Petitioner’s insistence that it is not because, by the Constitution
and by the statutes, the Sandiganbayan is a special court and,
therefore, not a regular court is untenable. In the first place, a comparison between the
words regular and special is inappropriate since the opposite of
the latter is not the former and vice versa. Special means “designed for a particular purpose;
confined to a particular purpose, object, person, or class,”^[39]
and is, therefore, the antonym of general.^[40]
On the other hand, regular means “steady or uniform in course,
practice, or occurrence,” as opposed to casual or occasional.^[41]
In other words, special and general are categories in the
distributive order.^[42] With
reference then to the courts, they principally relate to jurisdiction. Thus, there are courts of general jurisdiction
and courts of special jurisdiction. It is, of course, incorrect to say that only courts of general
jurisdiction are regular courts. Courts of special jurisdiction, which are permanent in character, are
also regular courts. The Sandiganbayan
is a court with special jurisdiction because its creation as a permanent
anti-graft court is constitutionally mandated and its jurisdiction is limited
to certain classes of offenses.

That the Sandiganbayan is among the regular courts is further
strongly indicated by Section 1 of P.D. No. 1606 which vests upon it “all
the inherent powers of a court of justice” and places it on “the same
level as the Court of Appeals,” and by Section 4 thereof, as amended by
P.D. No. 1861, which grants it appellate jurisdiction over certain
cases decided by the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

There is, as well, no merit in the theory of petitioner that
Section 46 of R.A. No. 6975 impliedly repealed Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as
amended by P.D. No. 1861, as regards the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over
members of the PNP. First, the argument
is based on the faulty assumption that the Sandiganbayan, being a special
court, is not a regular court within the contemplation
of Section 46. Second, both provisions
are not irreconcilable and the presumption against an implied repeal has not
been overcome. Implied repeal may be
indulged in only if the two laws are inconsistent, or the former law must be
repugnant as to be irreconcilable with the latter law. Necessarily then, an attempt must be made to
harmonize the two laws. In Valera vs. Tuason,^[43] this Court stated:

“One of the well-established rules of statutory construction
enjoins that endeavor should be made to harmonize the provisions of a law or of
two laws so that each shall be effective. In order that one law may operate to repeal another law, the two laws
must actually be inconsistent. The former
must be so repugnant as to be irreconciliable [sic] with the latter act. (U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil., 208). Merely because a later enactment may relate
to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself
sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the latter, since the new law may be
cumulative or a continuation of the old one. (Statutory Construction, Crawford, p. 634).”

In Gordon vs. Veridiano,^[44] this Court, speaking through Mr.
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, emphasized the task of courts to reconcile and
harmonize laws:

“Courts of justice, when confronted with apparently
conflicting statutes, should endeavor to reconcile the same instead of
declaring outright the invalidity of one as against the other. Such alacrity should be avoided. The wise policy is for the judge to
harmonize them if this is possible, bearing in mind that they are equally the
handiwork of the same legislature, and so give effect to both while at the same
time also according due respect to a coordinate department of the
government.”

Indeed, it has been appropriately said:

“The presumption against implied repeals is classically
founded upon the doctrine that the legislature is presumed to envision the
whole body of the law when it enacts new legislation, and, therefore, if a
repeal of the prior law is intended, expressly to designate the offending
provisions rather than to leave the repeal to arise by necessary implication
from the later enactment. Still more
basic, however, is the assumption that existing statutory and common law, as well as ancient law, is
representative of popular will. As
traditional and customary rules, the presumption is against their alteration or
repeal. The presumption has been said
to have special application to important public statutes of long
standing.”^[45]

It can thus be reasonably presumed that in the enactment of R.A.
No. 6975, Congress had the whole body of the law in mind and, for consistency,
coherence, and harmony, took into account the provisions of the Constitution
regarding the Sandiganbayan, the law, creating it, and the amendments thereto
relative to its jurisdiction. Since
under the law, the Sandiganbayan is a special anti-graft court with exclusive
original jurisdiction over (a) violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; and (b) other
offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees (including
those in government-owned or controlled corporations) in relation to their
office where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, and
since members of the PNP are public officers or employees,^[46]
Congress can be logically presumed to have read into Section 46 of R.A. No.
6975 the constitutional and statutory provisions regarding the Sandiganbayan. The alleged inconsistency seen by petitioner
is non-existent for, on the contrary, the two provisions can well go together
with full and unhampered effect to both and without doing violence to either,
thereby giving spirit to the maxim, interpretare
et concordare legibus est optimus interpretandi or every
statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a
uniform system of jurisprudence.^[47] As
harmonized, the conclusion is inevitable that members of the PNP, as public
officers and employees, are subject to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
with respect to (a) violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, and (b) other offenses or felonies committed
by them in relation to their office where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of
P6,000.00. All other offenses committed
by them are cognizable by the appropriate courts within the judicial system
such as the Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts.

That the public officers or employees committed the crime in
relation to their office must, however, be alleged in the information for the
Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over a case under Section 4(a)(2).^[48]
This allegation is necessary because of the unbending rule that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations of the information.^[49]

In the instant case, the trial court dismissed Criminal Case No.
Q-91-23224 on the ground that since the penalty prescribed for the crime
charged — which is homicide — is higher than prision correccional,^[50] then pursuant to Deloso vs. Domingo,^[51] it is the Sandiganbayan which has
jurisdiction over the case. In order to
avoid a misapprehension of the ruling in Deloso, which
was based on P.D. No. 1606 alone, it must be stressed that we had unequivocally
ruled in Aguinaldo vs. Domagas^[52]
that for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive original jurisdiction over
offenses or felonies committed by public officers or employees, under Section
4(a)(2) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, it is not enough that
the penalty prescribed therefor is higher than prision correccional
or imprisonment for six years, or a fine of P6,000.00; it is also necessary that such offenses or felonies
were committed in relation to their office. We then concluded:

“Even before
considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged, it is thus
essential to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to have
been committed by the public officers and employees in relation to their
offices.”

In the recent case of Sanchez
vs. Demetriou,^[53] we reiterated our ruling on the
requirement that the offenses or felonies covered by Section 4(a)(2) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, have to be committed by public officers
and employees in relation to their office
and likewise elucidated on the meaning of offenses committed in relation to the
office by reiterating the principle in Montilla vs. Hilario^[54] that an offense may be considered as
committed in relation to the office if “the offense cannot exist without
the office,” or that “the office must be a constituent element of the
crime as … defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the
Revised Penal Code,” and the principle in People vs. Montejo^[55] that the offense must be intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetuated while he was in the
performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions. Further, we intimated that the fact that the
offense was committed in relation to the office must be alleged in the
information.

Just recently, in Natividad
vs. Felix,^[56] we explicitly declared that we had
re-examined the Deloso case in Aguinaldo and in Sanchez
and reiterated the requisites for an offense under Section 4(a)(2)
of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861, to fall under the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan.

In the light then of the foregoing, the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City would be without jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 if
the information therein would show that the offense of homicide charged was
committed by the accused (private respondent) in relation to his office. The information has failed to do so. The pleadings of the parties are of little
help. We can only speculate therefrom
that the crime charged might have been committed while the private respondent
was in the pursuit of his mission. Under the sub-heading in the petition entitled “Relevant
Antecedents,” the petitioner merely states:

“1. On July 31,
1991, private respondent … then a member of the PNP-NCR assigned to the
Central Police District Command Station 2, based in Novaliches, Quezon City,
was dispatched by his Commanding Officer to Dumalay Street in Novaliches to
check on a complaint regarding a person creating trouble in the place. While in Novaliches, private respondent shot
Romeo Sadang to death.”

There is no indication at all that the
trouble-maker was the victim and that he was shot by the private respondent in
the course of the latter’s mission. On
the other hand, the private respondent asserts in his Comment that he
“shot Romeo Sadang in the performance of a lawful duty and in lawful
defense of his life.”^[57]
Petitioner ignored this claim in its Reply to the Comment. This claim is an anticipatory defense yet to
be proved and its assertion in the Comment does not cure the deficiency,
pointed out earlier, of the information. It would appear to us that with respect to the issue of jurisdiction,
the parties only took into account the prescribed penalty, relying upon Deloso
vs. Domingo, for which reason they did not consider important and relevant
the issue of whether the offense charged was committed by the private
respondent in relation to his office. But as stated earlier, Deloso vs. Domingo was modified by Aguinaldo
vs. Domagas.

The dismissal then of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 solely on the
basis of Deloso vs. Domingo was erroneous. In the light of Aguinaldo and Sanchez,
and considering the absence of any allegation in the information that the
offense was committed by private respondent in relation to his office, it would
even appear that the RTC has exclusive jurisdiction over the case. However, it may yet be true that the crime
of homicide charged therein was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office, which fact, however, was not alleged
in the information probably because Deloso vs. Domingo did not require
such an allegation. In view of this
eventuality and the special circumstances of this case, and to avoid further
delay, if not confusion, we shall direct the court a quo to conduct a
preliminary hearing in this case to determine whether the crime charged in
Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 was committed by the private respondent in relation to his office. If it be determined in the affirmative, then it shall order the
transfer of the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall forthwith docket and
proceed with the case as if the same were originally filed with it. Otherwise, the court a quo shall set aside the challenged orders,
proceed with the trial of the case, and render judgment thereon.

Henceforth, any officer authorized to conduct a preliminary
investigation^[58]
who is investigating an offense or felony committed by a public officer or
employee (including a member of the PNP) where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correcional or imprisonment for six years, or a fine
of P6,000.00, must determine if the crime was committed by the respondent in
relation to his office. If it was, the
investigating officer shall forthwith inform the Office of the Ombudsman which
may either (a) take over the investigation of the case pursuant to Section
15(1) of R.A. No. 6770,^[59] or
(b) deputize a prosecutor to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of the case pursuant to Section 31
thereof.^[60]
If the investigating officer determines that the crime was not committed by the
respondent in relation to his office, he shall then file the information with
the proper court.

In the light of the foregoing, further discussion on the other
collateral issues raised has become unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ORDERING the
respondent Judge to conduct, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of
this Decision, a preliminary hearing in Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224 to
determine whether the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in
relation to his office, and

(1) If he determines
that the crime charged was committed by the private respondent in relation to
his office, DIRECTING the respondent Judge to forthwith transmit the records of
the case to the Sandiganbayan which shall docket and proceed with the case as
if the same were originally filed with it; or

(2) If he determines
otherwise, DIRECTING him to set aside the challenged Orders of 24 September
1992 and 7 October 1992, to proceed with the hearing of Criminal Case No. Q-91-23224,
and to render judgment thereon.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado,
Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

---

^[1]
Entitled “An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under a
Reorganized Department of the Interior and Local Government, and for Other
Purposes,” otherwise known as the Department of the Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990.

^[2]
Annex “A” of Petition; Rollo, 17-18.

^[3]
Annex “B” of Petition; Rollo, 19.

^[4]
Annex “C” of Petition; Rollo,
20-21.

^[5]
Annex “D” of Petition; Rollo, 22-23.

^[6]
Quoted in Memorandum Circular No. 10 of the DOJ, dated 19 August 1991.

^[7]
Annex “E” of Petition; Rollo, 27-28.

^[8]
Rollo, 30-33.

^[9]
Annex “E” of the Motion For Leave to Intervene And To File Comment; Id.,
44-45.

^[10]
Rollo, 46-64.

^[11]
Id., 68.

^[12]
Id., 69-70; 96-112.

^[13]
Id., 126-132.

^[14]
Section 5, Article XIII, 1973 Constitution; Section 4, Article XI, 1987
Constitution.

^[15]
Entitled “An Act Establishing the Philippine National Police Under the
Administration and Control of the National Police Commission.” This bill
was recommended by the Committee on Public Order and Security of the House of
Representatives in Committee Report No. 535, which substituted for several
House Bills including the certified bill entitled “An Act Establishing the
Philippine National Police, Creating the National Police Commission, and for
Other Purposes (Journal and Record of the House of Representatives, vol. 7,
401-412).

^[16]
Entitled “An Act Creating a Department of the Interior, Abolishing for the
Purpose the Department of Local Government, the Philippine Constabulary and the
National Police Commission and for Other Purposes.”

^[17]
Journal and Record of the House of Representatives, vol. 7, 413.

^[18]
Id., 414.

^[19]
Section 12, Article XV.

^[20]
P.D. Nos. 421, 482, 531, 585, and 641.

^[21]
It provided: “Whenever in the judgment of the President (Prime Minister),
there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or whenever
the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is
unable to act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment
requires immediate action, he may, in order to meet the exigency, issue the
necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall form part of
the law of the land.”

^[22]
Reflect, for instance, on the provisions of (a) the Bill of Rights directing
that only a Judge may issue a search warrant or warrant of arrest; prohibiting
secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado or other forms of detention;
prohibiting detention solely by reason of one’s political beliefs and
aspirations; (b) the Article on the Executive Department limiting the period of
suspension of a writ of habeas corpus or the proclamation of martial law;
allowing Congress to revoke such suspension or proclamation, or extend the same
upon the initiative of the President; authorizing the Supreme Court, in an
appropriate proceeding filed by any citizen, to review the sufficiency of the
factual basis of such suspension or proclamation; and limiting the effects of a
state of martial law; and (c) the Article on General Provisions prohibiting the
appointment or designation of any member of the armed forces in the active
service to any civilian position in the government including government-owned
or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries, and limiting the tour
of duty of the Chief of Staff of the armed forces.

^[23]
TSN, Bicameral Conference Committee on
National Defense, 18 October 1990, 1.

^[24]
Journal and Record of the House of Representatives, vol. 7, 410.

^[25]
Id., 311-312.

^[26]
Journal and Record of the House of Representatives, vol. 7, 312.

^[27]
Transcript of the Committee Meeting (Alavazo) of 15 May 1990 at 9:16 p.m., 46
(emphasis added).

^[28]
Reconciliation of House Bill No. 23614 and Senate Bill No. 463.

^[29]
Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144 [1987]; Magno vs.
De Villa, 199 SCRA 663 [1991].

^[30]
206 SCRA 821 [1992].

^[31]
Id. at 825-826 (emphasis added).

^[32]
Section 1, Article VIII, 1987 Constitution.

^[33]
Executive Order No. 292.

^[34]
Effective on 11 June 1978.

^[35]
Said Section provides: “The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special
court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over
criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other
offense committed by public officers and employees, including those in
government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their office as may
be determined by law.” Section 4, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides: “The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall
continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be
provided by law.”

^[36]
Effective on 10 December 1978.

^[37]
Effective on 14 January 1983.

^[38]
Effective on 23 March 1983.

^[39]
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1397 (6th ed., 1990).

^[40]
Id. at 682.

^[41]
Id. at 1285.

^[42]
ROGET’S THESAURUS OF ENGLISH WORDS AND
PHRASES 28 (1990 ed.).

^[43]
80 Phil. 823, 827 [1948].

^[44]
167 SCRA 51, 58-59 [1988].

^[45]
1A C. DALLAS SANDS, STATUTES AND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 23.10 (4th ed.,
1972).

^[46]
See definition of public officer or employee, Section 2(14) and (15),
Introductory Provisions, Administrative Code of 1987.

^[47]
RUBEN E. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 192 (2d ed., 1990).

^[48]
See Aguinaldo vs. Domagas, supra, at footnote no. 45.

^[49]
People vs. Ocaya, 83 SCRA
218 [1978]. See also, Abad vs. CFI of Pangasinan,
206 SCRA 567 [1992] for the similar rule in civil cases.

^[50]
The penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal whose duration is from
twelve years and one day to twenty years (Article 249, (in relation to) Article
27, Revised Penal Code).

^[51]
191 SCRA 545 [1990].

^[52]
G.R. No. 98452, en banc Resolution, 26 September 1991.

^[53]
G.R. Nos. 111771-77, 9 November 1993.

^[54]
90 Phil. 49 [1951].

^[55]
108 Phil. 613 [1960].

^[56]
G.R. No. 111616, 4 February 1994.

^[57]
Rollo, 96. This was re-stated in
the petitioner’s Memorandum.

^[58]
Section 2, Rule 112, Rules of Court.

^[59]
The Ombudsman Act of 1989.

^[60]
It must be emphasized that the Office of
the Ombudsman has primary (not exclusive) jurisdiction over cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan (Section 15[1]). See Cojuangco vs. PCGG, 190 SCRA 226 [1990]; Aguinaldo vs.
Domagas, supra.; Sanchez vs. Demetriou, supra.; Natividad vs.
Felix, supra.