🎧 Case Brief Lecture

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. ANTONIO DANQUE Y DANDO, APPELLANT.

G.R. No. 107978. November 19, 1993 November 19, 1993

← Read the full text of the decision

Listen, read along, or open presentation mode.

People versus Danque

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Antonio Danque y Dando, a criminal case for murder. The appellant was charged, together with an unidentified companion referred to as John Doe, with the treacherous killing of Vivencio Lucaban on a highway in Catbalogan, Samar. The case matters to a reviewee for three reasons: it shows how the Supreme Court treats the credibility of eyewitnesses, including a wife who did not come to her husband's rescue and a bystander who did not report the crime; it shows how a qualifying circumstance must be proven as clearly as the crime itself; and it shows that abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery.

Procedural History

An Information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch Twenty-Seven, of Catbalogan, Samar. After trial on the merits, the trial court convicted the appellant of murder for the treacherous and premeditated killing of Vivencio Lucaban. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it sentenced him to imprisonment of from twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to seventeen years, four months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, to indemnify the heirs in the amount of 50,000 pesos, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

Because of the penalty imposed, the appellant appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the factual findings of the trial court but ruled that the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance. For that reason, the appellate court refrained from promulgating its decision and certified the case to the Supreme Court for review. The Supreme Court then decided the case, modifying the judgment below.

Facts

On the twelfth of August, 1989, at around five-thirty in the afternoon, Lydia Lucaban was in the house of Vicente Mabingay at Barangay San Vicente, Catbalogan, Samar, waiting for her husband Vivencio Lucaban, who had gone to the adjacent barangay of New Mahayag to buy fish. After a long wait, she decided to follow him. Walking toward Barangay New Mahayag, she saw from a distance of about one hundred meters an unidentified person holding the hands of her husband. She then saw another person, whom she recognized as the appellant Antonio Danque, deliver a hacking blow on her defenseless husband, who fell to the ground. She hid in the bushes, where she lost consciousness. When she regained consciousness she hurriedly went home, and her brother-in-law and a policeman fetched her and accompanied her to the Samar Provincial Hospital, where her husband's lifeless body was brought.

Lydia had known the appellant for more than a year. She and her husband were living with her aunt, Mrs. Marcing Longara, in whose house the appellant's house was adjacent. She testified that the appellant had a long-standing grudge against her husband, resenting the turning over of Mrs. Longara's land to Vivencio. In one instance the appellant even prevented them from harvesting coconuts on that land, drew a bolo, and faced her husband, who was then carrying a scythe; when Vivencio ran to their house and got a lead pipe, the appellant scampered away.

The second eyewitness, Monico Bola, testified that on the same date and time he was gathering firewood in a coconut plantation along Maharlika Highway, just across the road from the scene. He heard a voice crying for help, shouting that he was about to be killed. He looked across the street and saw an unidentified person holding both hands of Vivencio, and he saw the appellant hack Vivencio three times. Vivencio fell after receiving the hacking blows. Bola did not answer the call for help because he was afraid, and he did not go near the scene; he just picked up the firewood and went home. Bola also confirmed that the appellant had previously boasted that although smaller in build he could easily beat Vivencio and would not give a second thought to killing anyone. For his part, the appellant offered the defense of alibi, claiming that from the fifteenth of June to the twelfth of August, 1989 he was in Biliran, Leyte, gathering shells, corroborated by Paquito Senogat. He denied knowing Lydia Lucaban.

Issues

  • Whether or not the prosecution eyewitnesses, Lydia Lucaban and Monico Bola, are credible despite Lydia's failure to help her husband and Bola's failure to report the incident to the police.
  • Whether or not the defense of alibi of the appellant can prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the two prosecution witnesses.
  • Whether or not the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the killing.
  • Whether or not the qualifying circumstances of evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength were properly appreciated against the appellant.
  • Whether or not the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.

Applicable Provisions

Article 14, paragraph 16 of the Revised Penal Code, on treachery, provides:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

This is the provision under which the killing was qualified to murder, because the victim's hands were held by a co-conspirator, rendering him defenseless.

Article 14, paragraph 13 of the Revised Penal Code, on evident premeditation, provides:

The execution of the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment.

This is the essence of premeditation as the Court states it, and it is the standard the prosecution failed to meet, since only a previous altercation was shown.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court upheld the credibility of both eyewitnesses. On Lydia Lucaban, the Court added that survival was and still remains the first law of man; she had reason to fear for her safety, she belongs to the weaker sex, and any effort on her part to help Vivencio would amount to nothing but raw and reckless courage. On Monico Bola, the Court held that the initial reluctance of a witness to testify and his unwillingness to be involved in an investigation are a common occurrence and do not affect his credibility. The Court also stressed that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect, because trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify.

On the second issue, the Court held that the trial court correctly disbelieved the defense of alibi. The appellant's testimony and that of his corroborating witness were marked by inconsistencies and contradictions, including his pretense that Lydia was a stranger to him although he was a tenant-farmer on her aunt's land, and a variance on whether a certain Kiko Senogat was with them. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the two prosecution witnesses that it was the appellant who perpetrated the crime.

On the third issue, the Court found that treachery qualified the killing to murder. The manner in which the victim was assaulted by the two accused sufficiently established its existence: Vivencio's hands were held by the appellant's co-conspirator, which effectively rendered him defenseless from the hacking blows and afforded the two accused an opportunity to kill him without risk to their lives.

On the fourth issue, the Court held that evident premeditation should not have been appreciated. For evident premeditation to be considered, convincing proof of three elements is necessary: the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; an act manifestly indicating that the offender had clung to his determination; and the lapse of an interval of time between the determination and the execution, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the consequences of his act. The prosecution proved only a previous altercation, which may explain the reason for the murder but, without more, could not prove evident premeditation. Similarly, the trial court erred in considering abuse of superior strength, because this aggravating circumstance was absorbed by treachery.

On the fifth issue, the Court held that the crime committed is murder qualified by treachery, and that there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the medium penalty of reclusion perpetua should be imposed.

Doctrine

A qualifying circumstance must be proven as clearly as the crime itself and cannot be deduced from debatable inferences. Treachery exists when the offender employs means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime which tend directly and specially to insure its execution without risk to himself arising from the defense the offended party might make; holding the victim's hands so that he is defenseless is the classic example. Evident premeditation requires proof of the time of determination, an act showing the offender clung to that determination, and a sufficient interval for reflection; a prior altercation alone does not prove it. Abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery when treachery is the circumstance that qualifies the killing. Alibi cannot prevail over positive and categorical testimony of prosecution witnesses, and the trial court's findings on credibility are respected absent a compelling reason to disturb them.

Disposition

The Court modified the decision appealed from, found the appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery, and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, with an indemnity of 50,000 pesos to the heirs of Vivencio Lucaban, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and with costs.

Remember This

Memorize this line: abuse of superior strength is absorbed by treachery, and a qualifying circumstance must be proven as clearly as the crime itself. Examiners use this case to test the elements of evident premeditation, the absorption of abuse of superior strength, and the rule that alibi cannot prevail over positive eyewitness testimony.