GREGORIO N. ARUELO, JR., PETITIONER, VS. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF BULACAN, BRANCH 17, MALOLOS BULACAN, AND DANILO F. GATCHALIAN, RESPONDENTS.

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, to set aside the Decision of the Court
of Appeals dated November 24, 1992 in CA-G.R. SP No. 28621, which ruled that
the answer and counter-protest of respondent Danilo F. Gatchalian was filed
timely and ordered the Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Malolos, Bulacan to
continue with the proceedings in Civil Case No. 343-M-92, the protest case
filed by petitioner Gregorio N. Aruelo, Jr.

Aruelo and Gatchalian were rival candidates in the May 11, 1992
elections for the office of Vice-Mayor of the Municipality of Balagtas,
Province of Bulacan. Gatchalian won
over Aruelo by a margin of four votes, such that on May 13, 1992, the Municipal
Board of Canvassers proclaimed him as the duly elected Vice-Mayor of Balagtas,
Bulacan.

On May 22, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) a petition docketed as SPC
No. 92-130, seeking to annul Gatchalian’s proclamation on the ground of
“fraudulent alteration and tampering” of votes in the tally sheets and the
election returns.

On June 2, 1992, Aruelo filed with the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 17, Malolos, Bulacan, a petition docketed as Civil Case No. 343-M-92
protesting the same election. Aruelo,
however, informed the trial court of the pendency of the pre-proclamation case
before the COMELEC.

On June 10, 1992, Gatchalian was served an Amended Summons from
the trial court, giving him five days within which to answer the petition. Instead of submitting his answer, Gatchalian
filed on June 15, 1992 a Motion to Dismiss claiming that: (a) the petition was
filed out of time; (b) there was a pending protest case before the COMELEC; and
(c) Aruelo failed to pay the prescribed filing fees and cash deposit on the petition.

Meanwhile in SPC Case No. 92-130, the COMELEC on June 6, 1992
denied Aruelo’s petition for non-compliance with Section 20 of R.A. No. 7166,
which requires the submission of the evidence and documents in support of the
petition to annul Gatchalian’s proclamation (Rollo, p. 42).

The trial court, on the other hand, issued an order dated July
10, 1992, denying Gatchalian’s Motion to Dismiss and ordering him to file his
answer to the petition within five days from notice, otherwise, “a general
denial shall be deemed to have been entered” (Rollo, p. 45). The trial court also directed Aruelo to pay
the deficiency in his filing fees, which the latter complied with. Gatchalian filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the order but the trial court denied the same on August 3,
1992.

On August 6, 1992,
Gatchalian filed before the Court of Appeals, a petition for certiorari
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 28621, which alleged grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the trial court in denying his Motion to Dismiss and his Motion for
Reconsideration.

Earlier, that is on July
23, 1992, Gatchalian filed before the trial court a Motion for Bill of
Particulars, which was opposed by Aruelo. The trial court denied Gatchalian’s motion in an order dated August 5,
1992, a copy of which was received by him on August 6, 1992.

On August 11, 1992,
Gatchalian submitted before the trial court his Answer with Counter-Protest and
Counterclaim, alleging inter alia, that Aruelo was the one who
committed the election fraud and that were it not for the said fraud,
Gatchalian’s margin over Aruelo would have been greater. Gatchalian prayed for the dismissal of the
petition, the confirmation of his election and the award of damages. On the day the answer was filed, the trial
court issued an order admitting it, and without Gatchalian’s specific prayer,
directed the revision of ballots in the precincts enumerated in Gatchalian’s
Counter-Protest and Construction. For
this purpose, the trial court ordered the delivery of the contested ballot
boxes to the Branch Clerk of Court.

On August 14, 1992, Aruelo filed with the trial court a Motion to
Reconsider As Well As To Set Aside “Answer with Counter-Protest and
Counterclaim” Filed Out of Time by Protestee. The trial court, on September 2, 1992, denied Aruelo’s motion and
forthwith scheduled the constitution of the revision committee.

On September 28, 1992, Aruelo prayed before the Court of Appeals
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction to restrain the trial court from implementing the Order of August
11, 1992, regarding the revision of ballots. The Court of Appeals belatedly issued a temporary restraining order on
November 9, 1992, after actual revision of the contested ballots ended on
October 28, 1992.

Meanwhile, Gatchalian filed with the Court of Appeals on
September 21, 1992 another petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No.
28977), again alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court
in issuing the Order dated August 5, 1992, which denied his Motion for Bill of
Particulars. The Court of Appeals, in
its Resolution dated September 28, 1992, dismissed this petition for lack of
merit.

On November 24, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 28621, denying Gatchalian’s petition, but declared, at the same
time, that Gatchalian’s Answer With Counter-Protest and Counterclaim was timely
filed. The appellate court also lifted
the temporary restraining order and ordered the trial court to “proceed
with dispatch in the proceedings below” (Rollo, p. 212).

Hence, this petition.

Aruelo claims that in election contests, the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure gives the respondent therein only five days from receipt of summons
within which to file his answer to the petition (Part VI, Rule 35, Sec. 7) and
that this five-day period had lapsed when Gatchalian filed his answer. According to him, the filing of motions to
dismiss and motions for bill of particulars is prohibited by Section 1, Rule
13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure; hence, the filing of said
pleadings did not suspend the running of the five-day period, or give
Gatchalian a new five-day period to file his answer.

We do not agree.

Petitioner filed the election protest (Civil Case No. 343-M-92)
with the Regional Trial Court, whose proceedings are governed by the Revised
Rules of Court.

Section 1, Rule 13, Part III of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is
not applicable to proceedings before the regular courts. As expressly mandated by Section 2, Rule 1,
Part I of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the filing of motions to dismiss and
bill of particulars, shall apply only to proceedings brought before the
COMELEC. Section 2, Rule 1, Part I
provides:

“SEC. 2. Applicability
– These rules, except Part VI, shall apply to all actions and proceedings
brought before the Commission. Part VI
shall apply to election contests and quo warranto cases
cognizable by courts of general or limited jurisdiction.”

It must be noted that nowhere in Part VI of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure is it provided that motions to dismiss and bill of particulars are
not allowed in election protests or quo
warranto cases pending before the
regular courts.

Constitutionally speaking, the COMELEC can not adopt a rule
prohibiting the filing of certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to promulgate rules concerning
pleadings, practice and procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court
(Constitution, Art VIII, Sec. 5 [5]).

Private respondent received a copy of the order of the Regional
Trial Court denying his motion for a bill of particulars on August 6,
1992. Under Section 1 (b), Rule 12 of
the Revised Rules of Court, a party has at least five days to file his answer
after receipt of the order denying his motion for a bill of particulars. Private respondent, therefore, had until
August 11, 1992 within which to file his
answer. The Answer with Counter-Protest
and Counterclaim filed by him on August 11, 1992 was filed timely.

The instant case is
different from a pre-proclamation controversy which the law expressly mandates
to be resolved in a summary proceeding (B.P. Blg. 881, Art. XX, Sec. 246;
COMELEC Rules of Procedure, Part V, Rule 27, Sec. 2; Dipatuan v. Commission on
Elections, 185 SCRA 86 [1990]). Pre-proclamation
controversies should be summarily decided, consistent with the legislators’
desire that the canvass of the votes and the proclamation of the winning
candidate be done with dispatch and without unnecessary delay. Questions as those involving the appreciation
of the votes and the conduct of the balloting, which require more deliberate
and necessarily longer consideration, are left for examination in the
corresponding election protest (Abella v. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 [1989];
Alonto v. Commission on Elections, 22 SCRA 878 [1968]).

An election protest does
not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an
office. Over and above the desire of
the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the true choice
of the people. For this reason, it is a
well-established principle that laws governing election protests must be
liberally construed to the end that the popular will, expressed in the election
of public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated (Unda v.
Commission on Elections, 190 SCRA 827 [1990]; De Leon v. Guadiz, Jr., 104 SCRA
591 [1981]; Macasundig v. Macalangan, 13 SCRA 577 [1965]; Corocoro v. Bascara,
9 SCRA 519 [1963]).

We find no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, (Chairman), and
Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Davide, Jr., in the result.

Griño-Aquino, J., on leave.