G.R. No. 107800. October 26, 1999

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ROLLY PARANZO, @ LORENZO PARANI, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

Decisions / Signed Resolutions October 26, 1999 THIRD DIVISION GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
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GONZAGA-REYES, J.:


This is an appeal from the decision dated September 3, 1992
of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal
in Criminal Case No. 1667 finding accused Rolly Paranzo alias Lorenzo Parani
guilty of the crime of rape committed against complainant Anna Liza Jacobe and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to
indemnify her in the amount of P30,000.00 and to pay the costs.

In a criminal complaint filed by Anna Liza Jacobe, with the assistance of her
mother Gloria Jacobe, Rolly Paranzo alias Lorenzo Parani was accused of the
crime of rape committed as follows:

“That in or about 1:00 a.m., on November 13, 1991, in the Municipality of
Rodriguez, Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of threats, force and intimidation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the
undersigned complainant Anna Liza Jacobe against her will and consent.

Contrary to law.”[1]

Upon arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. At the ensuing trial, the
prosecution presented three witnesses, namely: Anna Liza Jacobe, her grandmother
Rafaela Jacobe and Dr. Jesusa Nieves of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Camp
Crame, Quezon City, who conducted the medical examination of complainant after
the alleged incident of rape. The defense, on the other hand, presented Anna
Liza Jacobe as hostile witness and the accused himself.

The trial court summarized the testimonies of the witnesses, as follows:

“Complainant’s version of the subject incident is as follows: On November 13,
1991, at around 1:00 a.m., accused Paranzo raped her inside the house of one
Teresa Rivera located at Yagit, San Rafael, Montalban. While she was sleeping,
accused lied on top of her. She was awakened and she noticed blood on her
shorts, the blood coming from her private part. She felt pain in her genital.
She tried to stop him but he continued doing what he was doing. She did not
shout because accused was intimidating her, pointing a knife at her neck.

Annaliza further alleged that that was not the first time that accused
sexually abused her. Accused first raped her in 1990 near the calamansi
plantation in San Jose, Montalban. She reported it to her mother but the latter
did not do anything. The second time accused raped her was in the house of
accused’s brother located at the other side of the river. She did not do
anything because accused was intimidating her. She was then living with her
father at Ibayo, Maly but accused brought her to his brother’s house and there
raped her. The third time accused raped her (November 13, 1991), accused and her
(complainant’s) mother, who had been living together, were already separated.

Complainant’s grandmother, Rafaela Jacobe, testified that complainant is the
daughter of her (Rafaela’s) son; that in November 1991, complainant was not
living with her. Complainant started living with her only after the incident
when she (complainant) was raped in the calamansian in San Jose, Montalban; that
at the time complainant was raped, she was still eleven (11) years old; that she
has no personal knowledge of the incident; that after the rape incident,
complainant’s mother gave complainant to her (Rafaela) because allegedly
complainant is hardheaded; that she does not have a grudge against her
daughter-in-law, complainant’s mother, because she is a good woman and it is her
son who was negligent; that complainant’s mother and accused are not living
together anymore because complainant’s mother has another husband again, a
different one.

Dr. Jesusa Nieves of the PNP Crime Laboratory Service, Camp Crame, Quezon
City, conducted the medical examination of complainant after the alleged
incident of rape. She testified that at the time of the examination which she
conducted on November 15, 1991, at around 11:30 a.m., subject (complainant) was
in a non-virgin state physically but there was no external sign of recent
application of any form of violence; that there was no sign of infection,
neither spermatozoa in the vagina and the area surrounding the passage of urine;
that based on the healed laceration she saw during the examination, it is
possible that the victim had sexual intercourse seven (7) days or more; It could
be months or years based on the healed laceration, but based on the findings,
which is abrasion on the labia menora, it is possible that there was recent
trauma at the genitalia of the victim, meaning that the abrasion could have been
caused by a rub or friction of a hard blunt object at the area of the genitalia,
more or less within five (5) days prior to the examination on November 15, 1991;
that the loss of victim’s virginity was caused by sexual intercourse.

Subsequently in a surprise turn of events, complainant Annaliza testified for
the Defense and stated that what she wants is “palabasin na po namin siya dahil
wala naman pong nangyari sa amin” (TSN, p. 3, August 26, 1992 hearing). In
connection with the said statement, complainant executed an affidavit of
desistance. (Exh. 1). Complainant further testified that she lied when she
testified before in Court and she lied when she executed her affidavit complaint
in connection with this case; that when she testified, she agreed to tell the
truth but when she testified before the Court, she was not telling the truth;
that she is not aware that by giving false testimony, she can be held liable;
that she executed the affidavit of desistance because of the promise of monetary
settlement but she had not yet been paid; that were it not for the monetary
settlement, she would not execute the affidavit of desistance.

Upon the other hand, accused Rolly Paranzo pleaded “NOT GUILTY” to the charge
when arraigned with the assistance of Atty. Regino Garillo, counsel de
oficio
, on January 23, 1992. He denied the charge against him and claimed
that on the date and time of the alleged rape, he was working in a
slaughterhouse in San Jose, Montalban. He reports for work at 4:00 p.m. and
leaves work at 7:00 a.m. the following day. He works at nighttime.

Accused gave a reason for the filing of this case against him. Thus: the
child’s mother was borrowing P200.00 from him and since he did not lend her that
amount, she threatened him by saying: “If you will not lend me that amount, you
will regret afterwards”. Subsequently, he was arrested by the police but he was
not told the reason why he was arrested.

Accused further alleged that he was arrested on November 12, 1991, brought to
Fiscal Nañola on November 13, 1991 and then to the Fiscal’s Office in Pasig on
November 14, 1991; that he signed the waiver of detention not knowing that it
was a waiver since he was told by the police that it was regarding the food;
that the slaughterhouse where he works is far from his place of residence. From
Sitio Yagit going to San Jose, he would have to take a jeep since it cannot be
reached by walking.”[2]

The trial court found that the accused-appellant raped Anna Liza as charged,
and held that although there was no sign of violence on her body, rape was
committed because she was under twelve years of age.

The dispositive portion of the decision states:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused Rolly Paranzo alias
Lorenzo Parani guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape as defined
and penalized under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, to indemnify complainant
Anna Liza Jacobe in the amount P30,000.00, and to pay the costs.”[3]

The accused-appellant appeals to this Court on the following assignment of
errors:

“THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT
THAT THE TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT WAS NOT CORROBORATED AND TAINTED WITH
DOUBT.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING FULL CREDIT AND CONSIDERATION ON (SIC)
THE AFFIDAVIT OF DESISTANCE AND TESTIMONY OF THE COMPLAINANT WHO OPENLY
TESTIFIED THAT SHE LIED BEFORE THE LOWER COURT.

THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN MAINTAINING THAT COMPLAINANT WAS A MINOR
ALTHOUGH NO PROOF OF BIRTH HAS BEEN PRESENTED.”[4]

The appellant avers that a conviction for the crime of rape must be based on
clear and convincing proof of guilt and not merely on the uncorroborated
testimony of complainant Anna Liza Jacobe which is not clear and free from any
contradiction. He points out that complainant’s allegation that the rape on
November 13, 1991 was committed in the house of a certain Teresa Rivera is not
supported by any showing that she indeed slept at the said house on the night of
November 12, 1991 and stayed there up to November 13, 1991, and that the
complainant, sometime in the course of her testimony, retracted and testified
that what she earlier told the lower court was a pure lie, thereby casting doubt
on her credibility.

Appellant also contends that except for the testimony of Rafaela Jacobe,
complainant’s grandmother, no proof was ever presented to show the exact date of
birth and age of the complainant. Furthermore, accused-appellant adverts to
certain inconsistencies between the testimony of the complainant and that of Dr.
Jesusa Nieves, i.e. Dr. Nieves testified that based on the healed laceration she
saw during the examination, it is possible that the victim had sexual
intercourse, months or years or not later than seven (7) days or more before;
that the abrasion found on victim’s labia menora is a recent trauma which could
have been caused by a rub or friction of a hard blunt object at the area of the
genitalia, more or less five (5) days prior to November 15, 1991 (TSN, pp. 5-6,
July 16, 1992), whereas complainant testified that on November 13, 1991 at about
1:00 A.M., the accused-appellant raped her and as a matter of fact blood came
out of her private part (TSN, p. 4, March 4, 1992; TSN, pp. 15-16, March 25,
1992). Thus, it was not possible that complainant was raped on November 13,
1991, which is only three (3) days before she was physically examined.

The Solicitor General filed brief for the appellee praying for the affirmance
of the judgment of conviction of the accused-appellant and for the increase in
the civil indemnity from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence. It is contended that the victim’s testimony that she was raped by
the accused in the early morning of November 13, 1991 at the ground floor of the
house of Teresa Rivera, the then live-in partner of the accused-appellant, need
not be corroborated by statements of other persons including that of Teresa
Rivera who according to complainant all slept in the second floor of the said
house that night and did not know that the accused and the complainant were at
the ground floor. The appellee also contends that there is no inconsistency
between the testimony of Dr. Jesusa Nieves and that of the complainant regarding
the sexual assault committed by the accused-appellant.

As regards the alleged failure of the prosecution to establish that the
complainant was below twelve years of age at the time of the rape incident,
appellee argues that such contention is of no consequence because under Article
335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman by, among others, using force or intimidation and the instant case, the
rape of the complainant was accomplished by using force and/or intimidation. The
Solicitor General contends that on the two (2) earlier occasions that
complainant Anna Liza was sexually molested, she was intimidated (TSN, pp. 3-4,
March 25, 1992) and on the third time that she was ravished, a knife was pointed
at her neck (TSN, p. 17, March 25, 1992). Whether or not complainant was below
twelve years of age at the time she was raped is beside the point.

The appellee controverts the argument of the appellant that since Dr. Nieves’
findings show that there was no external injury on the private part of Anna
Liza, sexual intercourse in this case could have been consummated with her
consent and that the abrasion found at the labia menora could have been caused
by the complainant herself by scratching her genitalia prior to her medical
examination. The appellee maintains that as explained by Dr. Nieves, based on
the healed laceration, it is possible that Anna Liza had sexual intercourse
seven (7) days or more prior to November 15, 1991, but the abrasion at the labia
menora could have been caused by sexual intercourse within five (5) days from
November 15, 1991, the day she conducted the physical examination of Anna Liza
(see TSN, p. 6, July 16, 1992), meaning that the sexual assault could have
happened on November 13, 1991.

Finally, as regards the defense of alibi put up by the accused-appellant, as
well as his contention that the victim’s mother had an axe to grind against him,
these claims are unavailing in the light of clear and positive evidence of the
prosecution establishing accused-appellant’s guilt. Besides, it was not
physically impossible for the appellant to have committed the offense of rape
imputed to him in or about 1:00 A.M. of November 13, 1991 for the reason that
Sitio Yagit, Barangay San Rafael, where the rape incident happened and Barangay
San Jose where the slaughter house (workplace of accused-appellant) is located
are separated only by Barangay Balite and that these three barangays are located
in the Municipality of Montalban, (now Rodriguez), Rizal which could be
traversed by jeep.

We find no merit in the appeal.

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code,[5] states:

“Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. Rape is committed by
having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age, even though neither of the
circumstances mentioned in the two next preceding paragraphs shall be present.”

Circumstances 1, 2 and 3 are alternative circumstances. When the rape is
committed by using force or intimidation, the victim does not have to be less
than twelve (12) years of age. It is only required that the proper complaint and
information for rape must clearly describe the specific circumstance which would
make the carnal knowledge of a woman qualify as rape under Article 335.

Otherwise stated, the complaint and information must concretely describe the
crime of rape in any of the specified forms prescribed in the said Article 335
so as to duly inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against
him.[6]

The complaint in the case at bar alleges that the rape was committed by the
accused-appellant against complainant’s will and consent “by means of threats,
force and intimidation.”

A careful review of the evidence for the prosecution convinces us that the
accused had carnal knowledge of the offended party through the use of force and
intimidation in the early morning of November 13, 1991.

Complainant’s testimony is clear and positive on this point:

“Q: Now, in the early morning of November 13, 1991, where were you?

A: In the house where he is residing, mam. (Pointing to the accused)

Q: And where is this house?

A: There in Yagit, mam.

Q: What municipality?

A: Bo. San Rafael, Montalban, mam.

Q: Now, why were you at the house where Rolly Paranzo was staying?

A: Because my mother left me there, mam.

Q: Why?

A: Because he said that we sleep there, mam. (Pointing again to the accused)

Q: When you said we, what do you mean?

A: Myself and my mother, mam.

Q: And did your mother and you sleep in that place?

A: It is only me who slept there, mam. My mother left me.

Q: Why did your mother leave you, do you know?

A: Yes mam.

Q: Why, what is the reason?

A: Because my mother does not want to sleep there, mam.

Q: How about you, why did you sleep there?

A: Because my mother left me there, mam.

Q: Now, while you were thus in the house of the accused, was there anything
unusual that happened?

A: Yes mam.

Q: Will you state before the Honorable Court what was that incident?

A: He (laid) on top of me, mam.

Q: What do you mean when you said he lied on top of me?

A: I did not know that because I was sleeping, mam.

Q: And you said that you were sleeping. How were you able to know that he
laid on top of you?

A: Because I felt it, mam.

Q: And when you felt that he laid on top of you, do I get it right from you
that you were roused from your sleep?

A: Yes mam.

Q: Now, what did you notice when you were roused from sleep and you said that
he laid on top of you?

A: That I have blood, mam.

Q: Where?

A: In my shorts, mam.

Q: And did you notice where the blood came from?

A: Yes mam.

Q: Where?

A: In my private part, mam. (Witness pointing to her private part)

Q: And when you woke up, what did the accused do?

A: He left, mam.

Q: Now, you said that you noticed that blood was on your shorts. At the time
that you were roused from your sleep, did you notice where your shorts was?

A: Yes mam.

Q: Where was your shorts then?

A: My shorts was near my feet, mam.

Q: Do I get it right from you that at the time this incident happened, you
were then wearing shorts when you slept?

A: Yes mam.

Q: Now, upon finding out that the accused laid on top of you and you were
roused, what then did you do?

A: I told my mother about it, mam.[7]

x x x

Q: What time, more or less, was that when you noticed that the accused was
already sleeping beside you?

A: About 11:00 o’clock ,sir.

Q: And after you noticed that the accused was sleeping beside you, according
to you, you asked him to go away?

A: Yes sir.

Q: But nonetheless, the accused did not leave?

A: No sir.

Q: And as a matter of fact , he slept beside you?

A: Yes sir.

Court:

Q: Did anything happen when both of you were sleeping beside each other?

A: There was, sir.

Q: What happened?

A: He stayed on top of me, sir.

Q: What did you feel when he stayed on top of you?

A: I felt pain on my genital, sir.

Q: Did you try to stop him?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Did he stop?

A: No sir, he did not stop.

Q: What did he do?

A: None, sir, he just continued what he was doing.

Q: How long did he stay on top of you?

A: For a short time only, sir.

Q: Were you scared?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Did you do anything?

A: Yes sir.

Q: What did you do?

A: I stood up, sir.

Atty. Garillo:

Q: When did you stood up?

A: That night, sir.

Q: Was that before or after the accused raped you?

A: After the accused was on top of me, sir.

Q: When you go to sleep, you were fully dressed. Am I correct?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Were you wearing a dress like a girl?

A: Yes sir.

Q: How did the accused able to succeed in raping you when according to you,
you were dressed?

A: Because he undressed me, sir.

Q: And when the accused undressed you, what did you do?

A: None, sir, just cried.

Q: Did you not shout for help while the accused was undressing you?

Fiscal:

May we know, your Honor, if this is also on November 13?

Atty. Garillo:

Yes, your Honor, the incident of November 13, in the house of Teresa Rivera.

Fiscal:

Well, your Honor please, the question is now misleading considering the
tender age of the child now being under cross-examination because the statement
of the child was that she was awakened when she felt that the accused was on top
of her, kissing her and she noticed that she no longer has her panty and that
she tried to shout but the accused pointed a sharp instrument at her neck at the
time that the witness felt that the accused was on top of her that she was
awakened and she no longer has a panty, your Honor please.

Atty. Garillo:

Well, your Honor, I am just following up the answer of the witness, your
Honor, and I am on cross-examination.

Court:

Alright, I would allow the witness to answer.

A: I did ask help, sir.

Atty. Garillo:

Q: How did you ask help when the accused was undressing you?

A: I told him not to continue, sir.

Q: To whom are you addressing that?

A: He, sir.

Q: My question is, did you shout?

A: No, sir.

Q: Why did you not shout?

A: Because he was intimidating me, sir.

Q: How did he intimidate you?

A: He told me that if ever I tell the matter, he will kill me and my mother,
sir.

Q: Was that all that he did insofar as threatening you or intimidating you,
as you said?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Was he armed at the time when he threatened you?

A: He has, sir.

Q: What was his weapon?

A: A small knife, sir.

Q: How big is the knife?

A: Small only, sir, just this.

(Approximately about 8 inches)

Q: Accused was holding the knife?

A: Yes sir.

Q: While he was on top of you, accused was also holding the knife?

A: Yes sir.

Q: Where was it pointed to?

A: It was pointed on my neck, sir.

Q: Which part of your neck?

A: Here, sir. (Witness pointing to the right side of her neck).

Q: Which hand of the accused was holding the knife?

A: The right hand, sir.

Q: And after the accused had successfully raped you on that night of November
13, 1991, where did he stay?

A: In the house of his brother, sir.

Q: On that night, where did he continue to sleep?

A: In that same place, sir.

Q: Where? Beside you or upstairs?

A: In the place where we slept, sir.

Q: So, you are telling the Court now that you slept together from almost
11:00 o’clock in the evening when you noticed the accused beside you up to the
morning of November 13?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And the accused, after having succeeded in raping you on November 13 in
the morning, at 1:00 o’clock in the morning, he slept there beside you?

A: Yes sir.

Q: And you stayed with him on that morning?

A: Yes sir.”[8]

Contrary to the claim of the appellant, the trial court based its judgment of
conviction not solely on complainant’s testimony. The testimony of complainant
Anna Liza Jacobe was corroborated by the Medico-Legal Report (No. M-1652-91) on
the examination conducted by prosecution witness, Dr. Jesusa Nieves, (Exh. E) to
the effect that the complainant, when medically examined by her, was found to be
“in non-virgin state physically; there are no external signs of recent
application of any form of violence.” Dr. Nieves however, also testified that
Anna Liza’s hymen was already lacerated since she (Dr. Nieves) was able to
insert the speculum during the examination; that the laceration of Anna Liza’s
hymen may be due to sexual intercourse or as a result of its penetration by a
hard object, like a penis, among others, (Tsn, pp. 5-6, July 16, 1992). Dr.
Nieves explained that based on the healed laceration, it is possible that Anna
Liza had sexual intercourse seven (7) days or more prior to November 13, 1991
but the abrasion at her labia menora could have been caused by sexual
intercourse within five (5) days from November 15, 1991, when she examined her.
Dr. Nieves testified thus:

“Q. At the time you conducted examination upon the person of this Annaliza
Jacobe, will you state before this Court the possible time that she (ha(d) lost
her virginity?

A. Basing on the healed laceration which I saw during the examination it is
possible that the victim had sexual intercourse seven (7) days or more, sir. It
could be months or years based on the healed laceration but based (on) the
findings which is abrasion at the labia menora, it is possible that there was a
recent trauma at the genitalia of the victim, sir.

Q. And when you tell that there is a recent trauma at the genitalia of the
victim, what do you mean by that?

A. As I have said earlier there was an abrasion at the inner lip so that
abrasion could have been caused by a rub or friction of a hard blunt object at
the area of the genitalia, sir.

Q. This could be how many days, more or less prior to the examination that
you conducted on November 15, 1991?

A. Within five (5) days, sir.”[9]

In other words, as clearly declared by the complainant and confirmed by Dr.
Nieves, it was very possible that sexual intercourse between the
accused-appellant and the complainant took place on November 13, 1991.

We find that the appellant was able to have carnal knowledge of the
complainant in the early dawn of November 13, 1991 by using force and
intimidation, i.e., by the use of a knife pointed at complainant’s neck in the
third rape incident which is the subject of the present indictment.[10]

The Court has repeatedly held that rape is committed when intimidation was
used on the victim and the latter submitted against her will because of fear for
her life or personal safety.[11] It is
not necessary that the force or intimidation employed be so great or of such
character as could not be resisted because all that is required is that it be
sufficient to consummate the purpose that the accused had in mind. And in the
case at bar, there is no need for the prosecution to show or prove that the
complainant-victim was a minor below twelve years of age, as erroneously claimed
by the appellant in the third assigned error.

The appellant argues in his second assigned error that the lower court erred
in not giving full credit and consideration to the affidavit of desistance and
the testimony of the complainant that she lied when she first testified before
the lower court. This particular assigned error was not discussed by the
appellant in his memorandum, which simply stated that when complainant Anna Liza
Jacobe testified that she lied when she executed her affidavit of desistance
(Exh. 1) and also when she first testified before the lower court (TSN, p. 3,
August 26, 1992), doubt is cast on her credibility.

Well settled is the rule that the trial court’s assessment of the credibility
of witnesses is accorded great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal
unless a material or substantial fact has been overlooked or misappreciated
which if properly taken into account may alter the outcome of the case.”[12] The credibility given by the trial court
to a rape victim is an important aspect of evidence.[13] Generally, the courts lend credence to
the testimonies of young girls especially where the facts point to their having
been victims of sexual assault. What is important is that the trial court which
had observed the demeanor of the witnesses during their testimonies, found the
testimony of the complainant credible.[14] In fact, the rape victim’s testimony,
standing alone, can be made the basis of the accused’s prosecution and
conviction, if such testimony meets the test of credibility.[15] A victim who says she has been raped
almost always says all there is to be said[16] and it is an accepted rule that the
credibility of a rape victim is not impaired by some inconsistencies in her
testimony.[17]

Furthermore, the testimony of the complainant as to who abused her is
credible where no motive on her part to incriminate and falsely testify against
the accused has been shown.[18] In rape
cases, the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony of the complaining
witness provided such testimony is credible, natural, convincing and otherwise
consistent with human nature and the course of things.[19] In the case at bar, the trial court
concluded that:

“[T]he earlier declarations in Court by complainant about the sexual abuse
she suffered in the hands of the accused cannot be doubted, straight forward and
detailed as they were and given without any sign of influence having been
exerted on her.”

The trial court stated that only the subsequent declarations made by
complainant regarding the sexual abuse she suffered in the hands of the accused
are “dubious, and obviously improperly motivated”. The trial court correctly
disregarded the said declarations because of the complainant’s admission in open
court that she executed the Sinumpaang Salaysay sa Pag-uurong ng Demanda or
Affidavit of Desistance (Exh. 1) because of the promise of monetary settlement;
that were it not for the monetary settlement, she would not execute the
affidavit of desistance and that the accused-appellant reneged in his promise to
pay or make a monetary settlement of the case with the complainant. Moreover,
complainant was not aware that she could be held liable if she lied and/or gave
false testimony in court (TSN, pp. 5 and 6, August 26, 1992 Hearing). As stated
earlier, the assessment of the credibility of the complainant in a rape case
falls primarily with the trial court.[20]
Discrepancies between statements in an affidavit and those made on the witness
stand would seldom discredit the declarant.[21] Moreover, ample margin of error and
understanding should be accorded to young witnesses, like the complainant who,
much more than adults, would be gripped with tension due to the novelty of the
experience of testifying before a Court.[22]

Finally, we agree with the trial court that the defense of alibi put up by
accused-appellant cannot be sustained. The clear and positive identification of
the accused made by the complainant cannot be overcome by the accused’s naked
defense of alibi, especially so that the accused-appellant herein failed to
present as witnesses the two other persons whom he claimed were with him working
at the slaughter-house in Barrio San Jose, Montalban, in the afternoon of
November 12, 1991 up to six o’clock in the morning of November 13, 1991 (TSN,
pp. 5-7, September 3, 1992). In other words, the physical impossibility of the
presence of the accused-appellant at the scene of the crime at Sitio Yagit,
Barangay San Rafael, Municipality of Montalban in or about 1:00 A.M., of
November 13, 1991, has not been corroborated and credibly established.[23]

Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of conviction rendered by Branch 76,
Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, San Mateo, Rizal in Criminal Case
No. 1667. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the civil indemnity granted by
the trial court to the complainant in the amount of P30,000.00 is modified and
is hereby increased to P50,000.00. Furthermore, in light of recent
jurisprudence, the victim shall be indemnified in the amount of P50,000.00 as
moral damages notwithstanding the absence of proof of its award.[24]

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court finding the
appellant guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua and to pay the costs is AFFIRMED with
modification that the civil indemnity is increased to P50,000.00 and appellant
shall indemnify Anna Liza Jacobe an additional amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages. Costs against appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Vitug, Panganiban, and Purisima,
JJ., concur.


[1] Exhibit “B”, Records, p. 1.

[2] RTC Decision, pp. 1-4; Records,
pp. 121-124.

[3] RTC Decision, p. 5; Records, p.
125.

[4] Rollo, p. 41.

[5] The law in force and effect on
November 13, 1991.

[6] People vs. Race, Jr., 212
SCRA 90; People vs. Manlapaz, 88 SCRA 704.

[7] TSN, pp. 3-5, March 4, 1992.

[8] TSN, pp. 15-19, March 25, 1992.

[9] TSN, p. 6, July 16, 1992.

[10] TSN, p. 17, March 25, 1992.

[11] People vs. Sabellina,
238 SCRA 492 (1994); People vs. Angeles, 222 SCRA 451 (1993); People
vs. Muralon, 189 SCRA 488 (1990).

[12] People vs. Villaza, 127
SCRA 349; People vs. Ramos, 240 SCRA 191; People vs. Nicolas,
241 SCRA 67; People vs. Mariñas, 248 SCRA 165; People vs.
Ramirez, 266 SCRA 135; People vs. Teodoro, 280 SCRA 384; People
vs. Jose G. Perez, G.R. No. 124366-67, May 19, 1999.

[13] People vs. Mabunga, 215
SCRA 694.

[14] People vs. Abuyan, Jr.,
211 SCRA 662; People vs. Devilleres, 269 SCRA 716.

[15] People vs. Corea, 269
SCRA 76.

[16] People vs. Borja, 267
SCRA 370.

[17] People vs. Sagaral, 267
SCRA 671.

[18] People vs. Montealto,
269 SCRA 755; People vs. Dabon, 216 SCRA 656.

[19] People vs. Alvarez, 213
SCRA 722.

[20] People vs. Sagucio, 277
SCRA 183.

[21] People vs. Travero, 276
SCRA 301.

[22] People vs. De la Cruz,
276 SCRA 352.

[23] People vs. Orquila, Jr.
203 SCRA 736; People vs. Dinglasan, 267 SCRA 26; People vs.
Henson, 270 SCRA 634; People vs. Sumbillo, 271 SCRA 428.

[24] People vs. Prades, 293
SCRA 411.