PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ISIDRO ALBA Y MANAPAT, ACCUSED-APPELLANT.

People versus Alba

The Case

This is People versus Alba, a criminal appeal decided by the Supreme Court in April 1996. The People of the Philippines prosecuted Isidro Alba for the killing of his co-worker Constancio Marata at a construction compound in Cebu City. The trial court convicted him of murder. On appeal, the Supreme Court was asked to review his claim of self-defense and, more importantly, to decide whether the killing was attended by treachery. The case matters because it is a compact lesson on the burden of proving self-defense, on the strict proof required for qualifying circumstances, and on the appreciation of voluntary surrender. It is a favorite of examiners for the rule that treachery cannot be presumed from the mere fact that the victim was attacked while supposedly asleep.

Procedural History

Isidro Alba was charged with murder in an information filed in January 1992 before the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty, and the case proceeded to trial. The prosecution presented the lone eyewitness Gregorio Lelis, two police officers, and the autopsy physician, and offered rebuttal evidence through the assistant engineer of the construction company. The defense presented only the accused himself, who claimed self-defense.

The trial court rendered its decision in September 1992, finding Alba guilty of murder. It sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, ordered him to indemnify the heirs of Constancio Marata in the sum of 50,000 pesos, and to pay the costs. Alba appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which reviewed the records and the trial court's findings and rendered its own decision.

Facts

Isidro Alba, Constancio Marata, and Gregorio Lelis were laborers on a two-storey building under construction at Sunny Hill, Casabella, Lahug, Cebu City. The workers lived in bunkhouses provided by the company, except Marata, a bandsaw operator, who preferred to sleep near the bandsaw on a plank. On the evening of December 18, 1991, Alba, Marata, and two co-workers were drinking. Lelis declined to join them and went to his bunkhouse about thirty meters away. Later, Lelis heard a quarrel and a voice pleading, "Don't stab him, Bay. We're all co-workers. If you want to stab, stab me instead." Around eleven in the evening the group broke up, and Lelis heard Alba and Marata laughing together as they walked back to the bandsaw area.

Unable to sleep, Lelis was startled by a sound like an exploding ball coming from the bandsaw area. He peeped through the door of his bunkhouse and saw Alba standing over Marata, who was down on the ground. The area was lit by a forty-watt fluorescent bulb. Lelis saw Alba wielding a stainless knife about six to seven inches long, plunging it into Marata several times and moving it sidewise, forward, and backward with each blow. Alba then went into the bathroom. Fearing for his safety, Lelis stayed inside until other workers were about, and at 3:30 in the morning he reported the matter to the trustee of the building owner, and they called the police.

At 6:30 in the morning the police arrived and found Marata's lifeless body. Lelis identified Alba as the assailant. Other workers said Alba was seen waiting for a jeep outside the compound, and the police found him there and arrested him. On the way back, Alba admitted stabbing Marata and led the police to where he had thrown the knife, which was recovered. The autopsy showed eight wounds, four of them fatal, and the cause of death was irreversible shock secondary to massive hemorrhage due to multiple stab wounds. Alba testified that he acted in self-defense, claiming Marata struck him and drew a knife, which he wrested away, and that Marata later attacked him with a piece of wood. He also claimed that Lelis bore him a grudge, but the prosecution's rebuttal showed Lelis had not been dismissed and worked until the project's completion.

Issues

• Whether or not the accused proved self-defense by clear and convincing evidence.
• Whether or not the killing was qualified by treachery, making it murder rather than homicide.
• Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may be appreciated in favor of the accused.

Applicable Provisions

The Revised Penal Code defines the justifying circumstance of self-defense, which the accused invoked. Article 11, paragraph 1 provides:

The following do not incur any criminal liability: 1. Anyone who acts in defense of his person or rights, provided that the following circumstances concur: First. Unlawful aggression; Second. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; Third. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.

This provision bears on the case because the accused admitted the killing and staked his defense on these three elements, which he was bound to prove.

The Revised Penal Code defines the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Article 14, paragraph 16 provides:

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the offended party might make.

This provision bears on the case because the trial court relied on treachery to raise the killing from homicide to murder, and the Supreme Court examined whether the evidence supported it.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held that the accused failed to prove self-defense by clear and convincing evidence. Having admitted the killing, the burden was on him to establish unlawful aggression, reasonable necessity of the means employed, and lack of sufficient provocation. Unlawful aggression is the essential and primary element; without it there can be no self-defense. The Court found his account hard to believe. It asked why Marata would pin down the accused's right arm when it was the left hand that held the knife, and why the accused, who was right-handed, did not transfer the knife to his right hand. The Court also noted that the autopsy showed eight serious wounds, four of them fatal, not the two the accused claimed, and that their number, location, depth, and width negated any purpose merely to disable an assailant. The mere exhibition of scars, without a medical certificate, did not prove unlawful aggression, and the piece of wood was never presented. The Court upheld the trial court's reliance on Lelis, who had known the accused for three months and positively identified him, and found no basis for the claim of grudge, since the rebuttal showed Lelis had not been dismissed.

On the second issue, the Court agreed with the accused that treachery was not proved. The trial court had concluded that the attack was treacherous because Marata was asleep, but Lelis himself admitted he did not know whether the two were sleeping, saying he was inside his bunkhouse. Lelis witnessed the attack only after it had begun. The Court held that the circumstances that qualify a killing as murder must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself, and that treachery cannot be deduced from mere presumption or sheer speculation. Accordingly, the accused was given the benefit of the doubt, and the crime was considered homicide only.

On the third issue, although not raised on appeal, the Court appreciated in favor of the accused the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The facts showed he was arrested the morning after the killing while waiting for transportation, on his way to surrender. Had he intended to escape, he could have left in the dark hours after midnight rather than at five in the morning when the place would stir with activity.

Doctrine

A Bar candidate should retain three rules. First, when an accused admits the killing but pleads self-defense, the burden shifts to him to prove its elements by clear and convincing evidence, and unlawful aggression is the essential and primary element. Second, treachery is a qualifying circumstance that must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself; it cannot be deduced from mere presumption or sheer speculation, and where the evidence does not show how the attack began, the accused is entitled to the benefit of the doubt and the crime is homicide only. Third, voluntary surrender may be appreciated even if not raised on appeal where the record supports it, as where the accused was arrested while evidently on his way to surrender.

Disposition

The Supreme Court set aside the trial court's decision and found Isidro Alba guilty of homicide, sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, and ordering him to indemnify the heirs of Constancio Marata in the sum of 50,000 pesos and to pay the costs.

Remember This

The single line worth memorizing is that treachery cannot be presumed or deduced from speculation; it must be proven as indubitably as the killing itself. Examiners like to use this case to test the burden of proof in self-defense and the strict standard for qualifying circumstances that separate homicide from murder.