ALEX JACOBO Y SEMENTELA, PETITIONER, VS. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
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Alex Jacobo versus Court of Appeals and People of the Philippines
The Case
This is the story of Alex Jacobo, who was charged with homicide for the killing of Romeo de Jesus at a wake in Sampaloc, Manila, and who admitted the killing but claimed he acted in self-defense. The case matters because it gathers in one place the working rules every student must carry into the courtroom: that self-defense shifts the burden of proof to the accused, that the factual findings of the trial court when affirmed by the Court of Appeals bind the Supreme Court, and that where two persons agree to fight there is no unlawful aggression, and where there is no unlawful aggression there can be no self-defense.
Procedural History
An Information for homicide was filed against Alex Jacobo before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 14, presided over by Judge Inocencio D. Maliaman. Upon arraignment he pleaded not guilty and invoked self-defense. The trial court found his narration well-nigh inconceivable because of his vacillating statements, convicted him of homicide, and sentenced him to an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen years, eight months and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum, with an indemnity of thirty thousand pesos and costs.
On appeal, the Second Division of the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction but increased the civil indemnity to fifty thousand pesos. On motion for reconsideration, the Special Former Second Division modified its decision by crediting voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance and lowered the maximum of the indeterminate penalty to ten years, two months and twenty-one days of reclusion temporal. Still dissatisfied, the petitioner came to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari.
Facts
At around five o'clock in the morning of April 14, 1987, along Extremadura, Sampaloc, Manila, a wake was being held over the dead son of Edilberto Bermudes. Bermudes was gathering the drinking glasses used by the mourners when he heard the petitioner ask if anybody would kill him. Holding a foot-long knife, the petitioner approached Jessie Peralta, who was asleep on a chair, and took aim at him. Bermudes shouted at him to stop. The petitioner desisted, but then approached Romeo de Jesus, who was lying on a bench.
De Jesus woke up and a quarrel ensued between the two. Both were armed, the petitioner with a knife and de Jesus with a beta, and they stabbed each other and then separated, both still standing and appearing not seriously injured. De Jesus asked the petitioner why he was going away instead of finishing the fight. They resumed stabbing each other until de Jesus suddenly fell down, and the petitioner ran away.
A police investigator proceeded to the area and found the dead body of de Jesus. The autopsy showed a penetrating stab wound below the left armpit that perforated the left lung and the ascending aorta as the cause of death. On April 23, 1987, the petitioner was brought to the police station by an agent of the National Bureau of Investigation, to whom he had surrendered. At trial he claimed instead that de Jesus and Peralta had attacked him and that he merely parried the thrusts until the deceased fell on his own weapon.
Issues
- Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that there was no unlawful aggression against the petitioner.
- Whether or not the testimony of prosecution witness Bermudes was worthy of credence despite his earlier sworn statement, which the defense said corroborated the petitioner.
Applicable Provisions
The decision applies the elements of self-defense as a justifying circumstance under the Revised Penal Code, which the Court states as follows:
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.
These three elements frame the entire case, because the accused who admits the killing must prove all of them by clear and convincing evidence.
Ruling
The Court resolved the second issue first, on credibility. It held that it is the peculiar province of the trial court to determine the credibility of witnesses because of its superior advantage in observing their conduct and demeanor while testifying, and that where the issue touches on credibility or factual findings, the appellate court will generally not disturb those findings unless some fact or circumstance affecting the result has been overlooked. An affidavit, being taken ex parte, is almost always incomplete and often inaccurate, and will not always disclose all the facts. The Court found that Bermudes' sworn statement and his testimony in court were not grossly inconsistent, for in both the deceased and the petitioner agreed to fight. It also noted that the defense allowed the case to be submitted for decision without cross-examining Bermudes.
On the first issue, the Court held that the evidence did not support the claim that the deceased was the unlawful aggressor. The trial court did not believe the petitioner's testimony, and the Court of Appeals observed that his representations were elastic, shifting from not remembering the stabbing to affirming that he stabbed the victim to save his life. Such evasiveness does not help establish self-defense, which in essence is an admission of the killing in order to preserve one's life or limb. The Court then laid down the controlling rule:
Where two persons agree to fight, there is no unlawful aggression; where there is no unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense.
Since the protagonists agreed to fight, the deceased was not an unlawful aggressor, and the justifying circumstance fails at its first element.
Doctrine
First, when the accused invokes self-defense, the burden of proof shifts to him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he acted in defense of himself. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution's, for even if the prosecution evidence is weak, it cannot be disbelieved after the accused himself has admitted the killing.
Second, the three elements of self-defense must all be present: unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, and lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. Absent the essential element of unlawful aggression, there is no self-defense.
Third, where two persons agree to fight, there is no unlawful aggression, and where there is no unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense.
Fourth, factual findings of trial courts, when affirmed by the appellate court, are binding upon the Supreme Court, and the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses is generally respected on appeal.
Disposition
The petition was denied, and the decision of the Court of Appeals, as modified by its resolution crediting voluntary surrender, was affirmed, so the petitioner stands convicted of homicide.
Remember This
Memorize the line: where two persons agree to fight, there is no unlawful aggression, and where there is no unlawful aggression, there can be no self-defense. Examiners use this case to test the burden of proof in self-defense and the rule that an accused who admits the killing cannot rely on the weakness of the prosecution's evidence.