CRUZVALE, INC., PETITIONER, VS. HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER ANGELI M. TUYAY AND UNION OF FILIPINO WORKERS …

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court, with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order, to reverse and set aside the Decision dated
September 25, 1992 of respondent Undersecretary of Labor and Employment and his
Order dated October 13, 1992 in OS-MA-A-11-334-91.

I

On July 23, 1991, private respondent, a labor union, filed with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Regional Office No. IV, a
petition for certification election among the regular rank-and-file workers of
petitioner, docketed as Case No. RO-400-9107-RU-0107.

On August 27, 1991, petitioner filed its comment to the petition
for certification election. It sought
the denial of the petition on the following grounds:

(a) That no charter certificate evidencing the
organization of a local union therein was attached to the petition or submitted
to the DOLE at the time the petition was filed;

(b) That the respondent Union has not presented
any proof that it is a legitimate labor organization; and

(c) That the Regional Office No. IV of the DOLE
has no jurisdiction over the petition since petitioner Company’s place of
business is located at Cubao, Quezon City, which is outside the jurisdiction of
the said Regional Office. Consequently,
it is the National Capital Region or NCR of the DOLE which has jurisdiction
over said petition (Rollo, p. 7).

On September 27, 1991, respondent Med-Arbiter rendered a decision
in favor of private respondent, pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

“Anent the first issue on the status of the petitioner, it is
established that the petitioner is a legitimate organization with Dole
Registration Certificate No. 11106 LC (FED) and has a local chapter in the
respondent’s company located at Cainta, Rizal. The existence of a local union is likewise undisputed as the same is
evidenced by Charter Certificate No. 82 issued to it by the petitioner, United
Filipino Workers, and submitted to this Office which automatically forms part
of the records of this case.

As regards the second and third issues on whether or not the herein
petition is duly filed or not, the allegation of the respondent that the same
is defective in form and substance since no charter certificate and signatories
were attached thereto at the time of filing of this petition is unmeritorious
and without legal basis.

The respondent is an unorganized establishment which is governed by
Article 257 of the Labor Code, as amended by R.A. No. 6715, which read as follows:

Petitions in unorganized establishments. — In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining
agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med­-Arbiter
upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate labor organization” (Rollo,
pp. 74-75).

Petitioner appealed the said order to the DOLE. The latter, thru respondent Undersecretary,
upheld the order of respondent Med-Arbiter.

Not satisfied with the decision of the DOLE, petitioner filed the
instant petition and assigned the following errors:

1

RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY GRAVELY ABUSED
HIS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING A PATENTLY NULL
AND VOID DECISION OF THE MED-ARBITER HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR
CERTIFICATION ELECTION WAS FILED BY A LEGITIMATE LABOR ORGANIZATION.

2

RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY GRAVELY ABUSED
HIS DISCRETION AND COMMITTED A SERIOUS LEGAL ERROR IN LIMITING THE
CERTIFICATION ELECTION TO PETITIONER’S EMPLOYEES AT CAINTA, THEREBY
DISENFRANCHISING THE OTHER REGULAR RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF PETITIONER
COMPANY AND INSPITE OF A FINAL ORDER CALLING FOR A CERTIFICATION ELECTION TO BE
PARTICIPATED IN BY ALL REGULAR RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES.

3

RESPONDENT UNDERSECRETARY ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN HE AMENDED OUT OF
HIS OWN WILL AND DERIVED A PROVISION OF THE IMPLEMENTING RULES WITHOUT ANY
BASIS OR AUTHORITY IN THE LABOR CODE, AS AMENDED.

II

As to the first assigned error, petitioner avers that private
respondent is not a legitimate labor organization, “considering that its
local or chapter, at the time said petition was filed, did not undergo the
rudiments of registration required under Section 3, Rule II, Book V of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code and the pronouncements
made by this Court in Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary,
Department of Labor and Employment (205 SCRA 802) xxx” (Rollo, pp. 13-14).

The Med-Arbiter found that private respondent was issued
Certificate of Registration No. 11106 and Charter Certificate No. 82.

Findings of fact of labor officials are generally conclusive and
binding upon this Court when supported by substantial
evidence (Five J Taxi v. National Labor Relations Commission, 212 SCRA 225
[1992]).

Progressive Development Corporation, (supra.)
is inappropriate to the case at bench. Thereat, the union failed to show that it had complied with the
statutory requirements of Section 3, Rule II, Book V of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing the Labor Code. The copy
of the constitution and by-laws and list of officers submitted to the Bureau of
Labor Relations by the union were not certified under oath by the union
secretary.

As to the second assigned error, petitioner claims that
respondent Undersecretary should not have limited the certification election to
petitioner’s employees at the garment factory in Cainta but should have also
covered those employed in the cinema business.

We agree with the following observation made by respondent
Undersecretary in his Decision dated September 25, 1992:

“As regards the question on the composition of the bargaining
unit, we stress once more that the call for the conduct of election covers all
the regular rank-and-file employees of Cruzvale, Inc. at its garment
manufacturing corporation. The use of
the pronoun ‘all’ in our decision dated 16 December 1991 refers to all
aforementioned employees at the garment manufacturing operation based on the
finding that they were the ones sought to be represented by the petitioner as
clearly reflected on the face of the petition and as embodied in the Order of
the Med-Arbiter dated 24 April 1992 which was affirmed by this Office on
appeal.

Moreover, as stated in the questioned Decision the employees
at the Cinema operation and those at
the garment manufacturing operation do not
share commonality of interest as the former
clearly perform work entirely different from
that of the latter. Thus, their separation into two
(2) distinct bargaining units is proper. This is in accordance with the decision of
the Supreme Court in the case of Belyca Corporation v. Dir. Pura
Ferrer-Calleja, et al., G.R. No. 77395, 26 November 1988″ (Rollo, p. 42;
Underscoring supplied).

As to the third assigned error, petitioner contends that the
petition for certification election should have been filed with the regional
office which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the employer in
accordance with Section 1, Rule V, Book
V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code (Rollo, p. 27). Said section provides:

“Where to file. A petition for certification election shall be filed with the
Regional Office which has jurisdiction over the principal office
of the Employer. The petition shall be in writing and under oath” (Underlining
supplied).

The word “jurisdiction” as used in said provision
refers to the venue where the petition for certification must be filed. Unlike jurisdiction, which implies the power
of the court to decide a case, venue merely refers to the place where the
action shall be brought (Sulo ng Bayan, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,
72 SCRA 347 [1976]). Venue touches more
the convenience of the parties rather than the substance of the case
(Consolidated Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 198 SCRA 34 [1991]).

Section 1, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code refers only to cases where the place of work of the employees and
the place of the principal office of the employer are within the same
territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Office where the petition for
certification election is filed. The
said provision does not apply to the filing of petitions for certification
election where the place of work of the employees and the place of principal
office of the employer are located within the territorial jurisdictions of
different regional offices. We assume
that in the drafting of the Omnibus Rules, the Secretary of Labor and
Employment took into consideration the fact that there are many companies with
factories located in places different from places where the corporate offices
are located.

The worker, being the economically-disadvantaged party whether as
complainant, petitioner or respondent, as the case may be, the nearest
governmental machinery to settle a labor dispute must be placed at his
immediate disposal and the employer must in no case be allowed a choice in
favor of another competent agency sitting in another place to the inconvenience
of the worker (Nestle Philippines, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
209 SCRA 834 [1992]).

Petitioner has not shown how it will be prejudiced by the hearing
on the petition for certification election before the Regional Office No. IV,
which has its offices in Quezon City, the same city where the principal place of business of petitioner is
located. Petitioner is, therefore,
being unreasonable in demanding that the petition for certification election be
filed with the National Capital Region Office, which holds offices in Manila.

Unlike in the Rules governing the procedure before Regional
Offices, the New Rules of Procedure of the National Labor Relations Commission
prescribes that all cases in which labor arbiters have jurisdiction should be
filed in the branch office which has territorial jurisdiction over the
“workplace of the complainant/petitioner” (Rule IV, Sec. 1[a]). The NLRC Rules defines the workplace as
follows:

“For purposes of venue, workplace shall be understood as the
place or locality where the employee is regularly assigned when the cause of
action arose. It shall include the
place where the employee is supposed to report back after a temporary detail,
assignment or travel. xxx.”

The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code has no provision as
to when an objection to improper venue may be raised. The Med-Arbiter ruled that where the employer had appeared twice
at the hearing of the petition for certification election without questioning
the venue, said employer was barred from raising the issue in the subsequent
proceedings. He observed:

“xxx This practice of deliberately delaying the legal
proceedings cannot be countenanced any further, otherwise, the ends of justice
will forever be defeated. We don’t see
any reason for the respondent to delay as it did, the proceedings of the case
only to assail later on the jurisdiction of the office. This issue could have been brought up or
objected to during the initial hearing” (Rollo, p. 77).

The stance of the Med-Arbiter, that the question of the venue in
representation cases should be raised at the first hearing, was accepted by
respondent Undersecretary. We are not
prepared to say that said administrative officials have gravely abused their
discretion.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the temporary
restraining order is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.