🎧 Case Brief Lecture

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. RAUL CABINTOY Y INTONG AND CELSO FERNANDO Y ANO, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.

G.R. No. 107534. August 21, 1995 August 21, 1995

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Cabintoy versus Fernando

The Case

This is the People of the Philippines against Raul Cabintoy and Celso Fernando, two men charged with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide for the killing of a taxi driver on the evening of 24 May 1991 in San Mateo, Rizal. The case matters because there were no eyewitnesses, and the conviction below rested almost entirely on the two extrajudicial confessions the appellants signed during custodial investigation. The Supreme Court uses the case to enforce, with full rigor, the constitutional rules on custodial investigation: an uncounselled confession, without a valid written waiver made in the presence of counsel, is inadmissible, and without it the remaining evidence did not prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Procedural History

Cabintoy and Fernando, together with one Fernando Garcia who remained at large, were charged before the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal, Branch 77. Both appellants pleaded not guilty at arraignment, and the case went to trial. The trial court rendered a judgment of conviction, finding both accused guilty of robbery with homicide, relying principally on their written confessions. The appellants went directly to the Supreme Court on appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in giving credence to the extrajudicial confessions and in finding them guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Facts

Late in the evening of 24 May 1991, the San Mateo police received word that a robbery with homicide had taken place along General Luna Street, in front of the Catholic Cemetery. The victim, Wilfredo Diaz, was a taxi driver; he was brought to the nearest hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival. At the scene, the police found the taxi lying on its right side, bloodstains inside, a smashed rear windshield, a butcher's knife, and a pair of slippers. A trail of blood led away from the scene, suggesting that one of the suspects had been wounded.

On the morning of 26 May 1991, the investigator brought the knife to the San Mateo slaughterhouse, where three butchers identified it as one frequently used by a co-worker named Amang, or Celso Fernando. Acting on information that the suspects were at a construction site in Dapitan, Sampaloc, Manila, the police coordinated with the Manila police and arrested Cabintoy and Fernando there. The arresting officers testified that Cabintoy had a wound on his left thigh, and that both men verbally admitted participation in the crime before they were informed of their rights.

On the same day, each appellant signed a waiver of the right to counsel and then a sworn confession. The prosecution claimed these were signed in the presence of Attorney Benjamin Pozon of the Public Attorney's Office. The appellants testified otherwise: that they signed the confessions without a lawyer, and that the waivers were signed first and only later brought to Attorney Pozon, who signed them the following day, 27 May 1991. The trial court convicted them, and they appealed.

Issues

  • Whether or not the extrajudicial confessions of Cabintoy and Fernando are admissible in evidence against them.
  • Whether or not the remaining evidence of record, apart from the confessions, is sufficient to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Applicable Provisions

Section 12 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

This is the provision that governs the validity of the waivers and confessions, and its requirements of writing and presence of counsel are what the confessions failed.

The same Section 12 further provides:

No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

This guarantees the voluntariness of any statement taken during custodial investigation, which the Court treats as inseparable from the right to counsel.

On circumstantial evidence, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

This is the test the Court applies to the single remaining circumstance against the appellants.

Ruling

On the first issue, the Court held the confessions inadmissible. Examining the records, it found that Attorney Pozon signed the waivers on 27 May 1991, as shown by the date he himself wrote beside his signature, while the confessions were executed in the evening of 26 May 1991. This confirmed the appellants' account that they were brought to Attorney Pozon only after they had already signed, and belied the prosecution's claim that the waivers came first. The Court stated the governing rule:

The settled rule is that an uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, i.e., in writing and in the presence of counsel, is inadmissible in evidence.

The Court added that even if a confession were the gospel truth, if it was made without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver, it is inadmissible regardless of the absence of coercion. It also refused to let Attorney Pozon's later signature validate the waivers retroactively, warning that any such suggestion must be taken with extreme care lest the constitutional right be eroded into an empty formality.

On the second issue, the Court held the remaining evidence insufficient. The claim that the knife belonged to Fernando rested only on the testimony of a policeman recounting what three butchers had told him; none of the butchers testified, so the evidence was hearsay and deprived Fernando of confrontation and cross-examination. The verbal admissions at the time of arrest were uncounselled extrajudicial confessions, inadmissible and hearsay as well. The only circumstance left was the wound on Cabintoy's leg, and one circumstance does not satisfy the three-part test for circumstantial evidence. The Court likewise rejected the inference of flight, since the appellants' presence in Dapitan was satisfactorily explained.

Doctrine

First, the rights to silence and to counsel during custodial investigation cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel; a waiver signed without counsel, or a confession taken before any valid waiver, renders the confession inadmissible. Second, the admissibility of a confession does not depend on whether it is true or voluntary in fact; even a voluntary and truthful confession is excluded if uncounselled and unwaived. Third, a later signature of counsel does not retroactively validate an earlier uncounselled waiver and confession. Fourth, hearsay testimony, even if admitted without objection, has no probative value. Fifth, circumstantial evidence convicts only when there is more than one circumstance, the underlying facts are proven, and their combination produces moral certainty of guilt.

Disposition

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court, acquitted Cabintoy and Fernando of the crime charged for failure of the evidence to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, and ordered that no costs be assessed.

Remember This

The one line to memorize: an uncounselled extrajudicial confession without a valid waiver in writing and in the presence of counsel is inadmissible, even if true and voluntary. Examiners use this case to test the waiver requirements of Section 12 of Article III, the retroactive-validation question, the hearsay rule, and the requisites of circumstantial evidence.